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ABSTRACT

LEARNING AND UNDERSTANDING IN ABSTRACT ALGEBRA
by
Bradford R. Findell
University o f New Hampshire, December, 2001
Students’ learning and understanding in an undergraduate abstract algebra class were
described using Tall and V inner’s notion o f a concept image, which is the entire
cognitive structure associated with a concept, including examples, nonexamples,
definitions, representations, and results. Prominent features and components o f students’
concept images were identified for concepts o f elementary group theory, including group,
subgroup, isomorphism, coset, and quotient group.
Analysis o f interviews and written work from five students provided insight into their
concept images, revealing ways they understood the concepts. Because many issues were
related to students’ uses o f language and notation, the analysis was essentially semiotic,
using the linguistic, notational, and representational distinctions that the students made to
infer their conceptual understandings and the distinctions they were and were not making
among concepts. Attempting to explain and synthesize the results o f the analysis became
a process o f theory generation, from which two themes emerged: making distinctions and
managing abstraction.
The students often made nonstandard linguistic and notational distinctions. For example,
some students used the term coset to describe not only individual cosets but also the set

xiv
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o f all cosets. This kind o f understanding was characterized as being immersed in the
process o f generating all o f the cosets o f a subgroup, a characterization that described and
explained several instances o f the phenomenon o f failing to distinguish between a set and
its elements.
The students managed their relationships with abstract ideas through metaphor, process
and object conceptions, and proficiency with concepts, examples, and representations.
For example, some students understood a particular group by relying upon its operation
table, which they sometimes took to be the group itself rather than a representation. The
operation table supported an object conception even when a student had a fragile
understanding o f the processes used in forming the group.
Making distinctions and managing abstraction are elaborated as fundamental
characteristics o f mathematical activity. Mathematics thereby becomes a dialectic
between precision and abstraction, between logic and intuition, which has important
implications for teaching, teacher education, and research.

xv
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Mathematics is the science o f order, patterns, structure, and logical relationships.”
(Devlin, 2000, p. 74)
In a compelling new book The Math Gene, renowned mathematician, expositor, and
National Public Radio commentator Keith Devlin (2000) claims that everyone has innate
ability to do mathematics because “the features o f the brain that enable us to do
mathematics are the very same features that enable us to use language” (p. 2). A key
point in his argument is that richer representation rather than richer communication was
the driving force behind the emergence o f language.
In order to properly understand how we acquired language, we should view it as
a representational structure rather than as a medium o f communication. In order
to communicate some concept, you first need to have a mental representation o f
it. (p. 291)

His argument draws on a broad body o f empirical and theoretical work in anthropology,
neuroscience, linguistics, psychology, mathematics education, and also upon his
contention that most people do not know what mathematics is. “M odem mathematics,”
he claims, “is about abstract patterns, abstract structures, and abstract relationships”
(p. 136). And with a sufficiently broad understanding o f “pattern,” the shorter version
“the science o f patterns” says it all (pp. 73-74), suggesting that patterns reveal structure
and relationships. In fact, structure, pattern, and relations are mutually dependent aspects
of mathematical thinking, any o f which may be taken as primary. Poincare, for example,
begins with relations and arrives at structure:

1
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Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations among objects; they are
indifferent to the replacement o f objects by others as long as the relations don’t
change. Matter is not important, only form interests them, (cited in Gallian,
1994,p . 102)

And I would argue that structure gives rise to relationships and patterns. Thus, when I
speak o f a structural view o f mathematics, I mean a view that embodies all o f these
aspects.
Devlin’s thesis raises a number o f practical questions: What are the implications for the
mathematics curriculum? Should all students experience mathematics as abstract
patterns, structure, and relationships? If so, how might such ideas be taught? Just when
do mathematics students, particularly future mathematicians and secondary teachers,
have an opportunity to develop such a perspective about mathematics? And what do
students take from such experiences? To what extent is the representational structure o f
natural language sufficient for reasoning about mathematics? Where does natural
language fall short?
With the organization o f today’s mathematics curriculum, few students ever have an
opportunity to develop a structural view o f mathematics. Mathematics majors are first
exposed to such a view o f mathematics in a university course called abstract algebra,
typically taken in their junior or senior year. The course usually focuses on elementary
group theory and often also includes introductions to ring theory and other abstract
structures. It is worth pointing out that examples from group theory form a significant
portion o f Devlin’s description o f what mathematics is.
The structural view o f mathematics has been an organizing theme in the mathematics
research community since the group o f mathematicians known collectively as Bourbaki

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

identified three mother structures: algebraic structure, order structure, topological
structure, although they allow for the possibility o f additional fundamental structures (see
Bourbaki, 1950, for an overview). Beginning in 1939, this influential group published a
collection o f texts under the title Elements de Mathematique, intended to set mathematics
on a firm footing. In a short expository piece, Bourbaki (1950) simultaneously present a
description o f the structural view and an argument for the formal, abstract, axiomatic
method upon which it is based, acknowledging explicitly the difficulty o f higher stages o f
abstraction and “the great problem o f relations between the empirical world and the
mathematical world” (p. 231). And, once again, group theory serves as the canonical
example.
During the 1960s, curriculum developers and some psychologists adopted structure as a
central theme, though not always with the same motivations. Piaget (1970a), for
example, was interested primarily in mental structures, and so structure was a
fundamental characteristic o f his psychogenetic theory. He was subsequently taken by
the structures suggested by Bourbaki, such as the analogy between his concept of
reversibility and the algebraic concept o f inverse. Ernest (1994) goes so far as to say,
“Piaget was seduced by the Bourbakian account o f mathematics as logically constituted
by three mother structures” (p. 2). Bruner (1960/1977), on the other hand, took structure
to be a fundamental characteristic o f the disciplines and suggested that structure must be
taught. “The task ... is one o f representing the structure o f that subject in terms o f the
child’s way o f viewing things” (p. 33). Judging from the movements in the mathematics
curriculum since the “new math,” it seems that the structure has largely faded in school
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mathematics, but structure has remained at least a dominant background influence in the
upper-level undergraduate mathematics curriculum.
Despite this history, little is available in the mathematics education literature about how
students learn content, such as group theory, that typifies the structural view. And less is
known about the extent to which learning group theory helps students develop a
structural view o f mathematics. This study aimed to contribute to the empirical and
theoretical work in this area o f mathematics education by investigating student learning
in abstract algebra, or more specifically, group theory. Like D evlin’s book, this study
was about mathematics, language, and representations, but rather than taking such a
global and evolutionary view, it was more exploratory, beginning at the level o f
individual students in a college mathematics class.

Rationale
The reasons for investigating student learning in group theory are manifold. First, such
investigations can contribute to an understanding o f advanced mathematical thinking,
especially because group theory typifies what modem mathematics is about, as discussed
above. Second, students often find the course difficult, and instructors are often
dissatisfied with the level o f understanding reached by the students. Third, the research
in this area is particularly thin. And fourth, because the course is typically required of
preservice secondary teachers, there are potential implications for teacher education.
These reasons are elaborated below.
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Advanced Mathematical Thinking
Tall (1992) suggests that “advanced mathematical thinking ... is characterized by two
important components: precise mathematical definitions (including the statement of
axioms in axiomatic theories) and logical deductions o f theorems based upon them”
(p. 495). Over the past decade and a half, the mathematics education community has
seen growing interest in the study o f advanced mathematical thinking and,
simultaneously, in research in the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics.
Although there was some scholarly work in this area in the 1970s and early 1980s, a
community o f researchers was formally established with the creation in 1985 o f the
working group on advanced mathematical thinking within the International Group on the
Psychology o f Mathematics Education (PME). Since then, accompanying the broader
curricular and pedagogical reforms in undergraduate mathematics (Dossey, 1998;
Douglas, 1986; National Research Council, 1992; Steen, 1992; Tucker & Leitzel, 1994),
scholarly interest in the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics has grown
and intersected with the broader mathematics community, as evidenced by the increasing
numbers o f sessions at the Joint Mathematics Meetings devoted to educational issues and
particularly by the creation in 1999 o f the Association for Research in Undergraduate
Mathematics Education (ARUME), which has since become a special interest group of
the Mathematical Association o f America.

Literature Is Thin
Despite these developments, the research literature in advanced mathematical thinking
and undergraduate mathematics education has been and remains sparse, particularly
regarding the learning o f post-calculus mathematics. This is perhaps a particular

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

symptom o f a general phenomenon that the amount o f research literature diminishes
sharply as one proceeds from elementary school to secondary school to undergraduate
mathematics. One comprehensive survey o f the literature in undergraduate mathematics
education was conducted in 1995 (Scher & Findell, 1996), at about the time this study
was conceived. Based on literature published in journals and known collections (e.g.,
Kaput & Dubinsky, 1994) between 1985 and 1994, the survey found 312 research articles
on the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics and categorized them
according to mathematical content and research outcome. O f those 312 articles, fewer
than 30 could clearly be described as attending to the teaching and learning o f content
beyond first-year calculus, and only two concerned the learning o f abstract algebra. The
research about the teaching and learning o f undergraduate mathematics has grown since
1994, particularly through the publication o f volumes II through IV o f Research in
Collegiate Mathematics Education (Dubinsky, Schoenfeld, & Kaput, 2000; Kaput,
Schoenfeld, & Dubinsky, 1996; Schoenfeld, Kaput, & Dubinsky, 1998). And although
there is substantial recent work in linear algebra (Dorier, 2000), the literature specific to
the teaching and learning o f abstract algebra remains thin. A literature search using the
same criteria as the previous survey revealed 15 articles on the learning of abstract
algebra. Eleven o f them had bee published since 1994, o f which 9 grew from the work of
Dubinsky, Leron, and their collaborators.

Difficulties with Teaching and Learning
Some research has indicated student understanding o f the concepts in abstract algebra is
less than satisfactory (see, e.g., Dubinsky, Dautermann, Leron, & Zazkis, 1994; Hazzan
& Leron, 1996). Leron and Dubinsky (1995) go so far as to declare that the teaching of
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abstract algebra is a disaster and to claim that there is wide consensus on this view among
both instructors and students. This view may be indicative o f a larger problem: The
transition to advanced mathematics courses, particularly those beyond calculus, is often
problematic.
Harel (1989) proposes several reasons why the learning o f linear algebra is difficult for
students, which I paraphrase as an initial characterization o f the difficulties with abstract
algebra. First, the concepts are abstract structures that serve as categories for a broad and
diverse range o f examples. The objects are defined by their properties, and the properties
rather than the examples are primary, making it hard for students to conceive o f them.
Second, many o f the examples themselves are unfamiliar to the students. And third,
many students are not yet comfortable with proof and the axiomatic method. Regarding
the last point, it is worth mentioning that linear algebra is often studied before abstract
algebra. But in some mathematics programs, the approach to linear algebra is fairly
concrete, unlike the abstract approach Harel describes. Furthermore, some mathematics
programs require that students take a course in “mathematical proof,” before they take
abstract algebra. Even with such experiences, there is reason to believe that students
have not yet transcended the difficulties with proof (see, e.g., Moore, 1994).

Abstract Algebra for Future Teachers
There is widespread agreement on the need for improvements in teacher preparation and
professional development in mathematics, as evidenced in the plethora o f recent reports
that discuss teacher education. The reports recommend ways to improve the system o f
teacher education (Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001; National Commission on
Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century, 2000; National Research
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Council, 2001a), recommend mathematics that should be required o f future teachers
(Conference Board o f the Mathematical Sciences, 2001), and reframe questions about the
content and delivery o f mathematics teacher education (National Research Council,
2 0 0 1

b), yet there has been little empirical or theoretical work exploring the relevance of

particular mathematics courses in the preparation o f future teachers. Most certification
programs for prospective secondary mathematics teachers require a course in abstract
algebra. Thus, by exploring what students do learn in an abstract algebra course, this
study provides some empirical and theoretical backing for ways to implement and
improve upon the recommendations.
For some time, professional organizations and committees have agreed that the study of
abstract algebraic structures is an important part o f a secondary preservice teacher’s
mathematical preparation (see, e.g., Leitzel, 1991; National Council o f Teachers o f
Mathematics [NCTM], 1991; Committee on the Undergraduate Program in Mathematics,
1971). Although these reports provide little in the way o f rationale, the dominant point o f
view is that the equivalent o f a major in mathematics should be required o f prospective
high school teachers (Ferrini-Mundy & Findell, 2001).
The implicit rationale might be that a major in mathematics is necessary in order to
understand secondary school mathematics with sufficient depth. And, as elaborated
below, powerful ideas from advanced mathematics can explain and unite ideas from
school mathematics. A recent report on the mathematical education o f teachers
(Conference Board o f the Mathematical Sciences, 2001) acknowledges, however, that
“unfortunately, too many prospective high school teachers fail to understand connections
between [abstract algebra and number theory] and the topics o f school algebra” (p. 40).
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Although the empirical basis for this claim is not stated, there is clearly a perceived need
to think about ways to improve the content and effectiveness o f the courses that are
offered to future teachers. Furthermore, there is a need to think deeply about the
rationale for requiring o f future teachers a course in abstract algebra, and this study
provides some suggestions there.

What Is Abstract Algebra?
The notion o f a “group,” viewed only 30 years ago as the epitome o f
sophistication, is today one o f the mathematical concepts most widely used in
physics, chemistry, biochemistry, and mathematics itself. (Sosinsky, 1991, cited
in Gallian, 1994, p. 68)

School algebra can be seen as a generalization o f arithmetic in which the variables are
numbers and the expressions and equations are formed with the four arithmetic
operations. Abstract algebra is a generalization o f school algebra in which the variables
can represent various mathematical objects, including numbers, vectors, matrices,
functions, transformations, and permutations, and in which the expressions and equations
are formed through operations that make sense for the particular objects: addition and
multiplication for matrices, composition for functions, and so on. This section provides a
short sketch o f abstract algebra in order to highlight ideas o f structure and to present the
terms, concepts, notations, and perspectives that undergird the research questions and
subsequent analysis.

Abstract algebra consists o f axiomatic theories that provide opportunities to consider
many different mathematical systems as being special cases o f the same abstract
structure. The theories are called axiomatic because the structures are defined by axioms.
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Group theory is “one o f the oldest (and also one o f the simplest) o f axiomatic theories”
(Bourbaki, 1950, p. 224).

Consider, for exam ple, the following four m athem atical systems:
1. The integers {... , -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...} under the operation of addition. This
system is denoted Z.
2. The whole numbers less than a given whole number n, {0, 1, 2, ... , n - 1}, under the
operation of addition, where addition is given by the remainder after dividing the
usual sum by n. This system is denoted Zn.
3. The translations of the plane, where the operation is given by composition, that is,
following one translation by another.
4. The set of 2 x 2 matrices of real numbers with determinant 1, under matrix
multiplication.
Each o f these exam ples consists o f a set o f elements (numbers or translations) together
w ith an operation that specifies how to combine two o f the elements to get an element
that is also in the set. Because the operation com bines two elements, it is often called a
binary operation. In order to talk about these exam ples sim ultaneously, the operation is
denoted by *, w here the interpretations are addition, addition “m odulo

composition,

and m atrix m ultiplication, respectively, in the four examples.

W ith some work, it is possible to see that each o f these systems satisfies the following
axioms:
1. Associativity. For any three elements, x, y, and z, in the set (not necessarily distinct),
(x*y)*z = x*(y*z).
2. Identity. There is an element, e, in the set, such that for any x in the set, e*x = x =
x*e. (For addition of integers, the identity is 0; for addition modulo n, the identity is
0; for translations of the plane, it is the “identity” translation that leaves every point
fixed; for matrices under multiplication, it is the “identity” matrix with 1s on the
diagonal and 0s elsewhere.)
3. Inverse. For each element x in the set, there is an element y in the set such that x*y =
e= y*x.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A fourth (or zeroth) axiom, closure, is built into the requirem ents o f a binary operation:
that the com bination o f two elements gives an elem ent that still lies in the set. It should
be pointed out that com m utativity is not one o f the axioms, and it is not hard to see that
m atrix m ultiplication is not commutative.

A ny set and operation that together satisfy these axioms is said to be a group. W hen the
operation is also com mutative, the group is said to be Abelian. The advantage o f the
axiomatic approach is that any result (i.e., theorem ) that can be proved on the basis o f the
axioms alone necessarily applies to all four exam ples and also to any other m athematical
system that satisfies the axioms.

The im portant results in group theory depend upon a collection o f related concepts. A
subgroup, for exam ple, is a subset o f a group, w hich is itself a group under the group’s
operation. The role o f structure again returns to the fore w ith the concept o f
isomorphism. O n a high level, the group axioms define an algebraic structure that applies
to a broad collection o f m athem atical systems. The axioms create the rudim entary
structure to w hich all groups m ust conform. A t a low er level, every specific group is a
mathem atical system w ith its own internal structure. A n im portant abstraction can occur
w hen two groups appear in different settings and yet are “essentially the same.” The
intuitive idea is that two groups are structurally the same, or isomorphic, if they differ
only in the nam es o f their elements and operation. D em onstrating that two groups are
isomorphic requires finding a renam ing that preserves the group operation. Such a
renaming, w hich is essentially a function that takes elements from one group to the other,
is called an isomorphism .
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It should be pointed out that the above mathematical systems and other standard examples
m ay not be fam iliar to undergraduates in a first course in abstract algebra. Thus, some o f
the student’s energy m ust be spent trying to build som e fam iliarity w ith the examples.
Taken together, these exam ples and the concepts o f group, subgroup, and isom orphism
constitute the fundam ental concepts o f group theory for the purpose o f this study.

I distinguish as “advanced concepts o f group theory” those concepts that require the
construction o f new objects. Given a subgroup H, one can create a left coset o f the
subgroup by m ultiplying an element a o f the group on the left by each o f the elements in
the subgroup. The coset is denoted aH. W hen the set o f left cosets forms a group by
extending the group operation to the cosets, the resulting group is called a quotient group,
and the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets is said to be normal.

O ther im portant m athem atical structures are rings and field s. In ring theory, there are
two operations, typically called m ultiplication and addition. Exam ples are the arithm etic
o f integers, o f matrices, and o f polynom ials in one variable w ith integer coefficients. A
field is essentially a ring in w hich m ultiplication is com m utative and division is also
possible, except, o f course, division by zero. Exam ples are the rational numbers, the
com plex num bers, and the integers m odulo p , w here p is prime.

The Big Ideas of Abstract Algebra
A course in abstract algebra is the place w here students m ight extract common features
from the m any m athem atical systems that they have used in previous mathematics
courses, such as calculus, linear algebra, and school algebra. Students have opportunities
to develop deeper understandings o f concepts such as identity, inverse, equivalence, and
function. W hat is shared, for example, by the identity for m ultiplication o f real numbers,
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the identity m atrix, and the identity function? W hat is the com m on idea behind the
inverse o f a function, the inverse o f a m atrix, and the m ultiplicative inverse o f a number?
In abstract algebra, students can also learn about the im portance o f precise language in
m athem atics and about the role o f definitions in supporting such precision. M athematics
is also about noticing w hen things are the same and being able to describe how they are
different. In abstract algebra, this naive notion o f “sam eness” becom es formalized in the
concept o f isomorphism .

Thus, it is clear that the concepts in abstract algebra provide guiding themes, principles,
and sensibilities that pervade mathematics. It is not so clear, however, what sequence o f
topics from abstract algebra can be constructed to help students recognize and appreciate
such themes. And, in particular, it is not clear w hether an abstract algebra course
intended for m athem atics m ajors, as it is typically taught, can serve such a role.

W hen the population o f students in an abstract algebra course includes future teachers
(w hich m ay be almost always), these big ideas, such as inverse and identity, are
particularly im portant because they can help teachers connect advanced mathematics with
high school m athem atics in ways that can strengthen and deepen their understandings o f
the m athem atics they w ill teach. O f course, it is also crucial that future teachers are able
to employ those new understandings in their teaching, but that concern takes us beyond
the scope o f this study.

Conceptualizing the Study
In the previous sections, I provide a rationale for an investigation o f student learning in
abstract algebra and a short description o f w hat abstract algebra is. The rem ainder o f this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

chapter describes how I arrived at this particular study and presents the research
questions.

M y interest in the teaching and learning o f abstract algebra stems from m y own
experiences as a student and as an instructor. I found the subject quite difficult myself,
both as an undergraduate and as a graduate student in m athem atics. W hen I first taught
abstract algebra to undergraduate mathem atics m ajors at a state college, m y hope was to
provide m ore conceptual and concrete support for the students than I had been given.
U pon beginning m y graduate program in m athem atics education, I im agined several
possible thesis topics, but forem ost among these w as learning in abstract algebra. In
particular, I w as interested in exploring students’ conceptual understandings.

Some o f the literature on the learning o f advanced undergraduate mathem atics focuses on
students’ difficulties w riting proofs (e.g., M oore, 1994; Hart, 1994). W hile this literature
confirm s that structuring, organizing, and w riting proofs presents significant difficulties
for m any undergraduates, there are also significant obstacles in the concepts themselves
(Dubinsky et al., 1994).

As I began to conceptualize this study, I had an opportunity, as part o f a graduate course
in m athem atics education, to interview an undergraduate abstract algebra student on
several abstract algebra tasks. That experience and subsequent pilot activity not only
served to develop m y interview ing skills but also confirm ed that students’ conceptual
understandings in abstract algebra was a researchable area in the sense that the subtleties
in students’ thinking seemed interesting and w orth exploring.
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Research Questions
In investigating students’ understandings o f advanced m athem atics, m y intent was to
begin building a theory: a representation o f student’s understandings, or, alternatively, an
understanding o f students’ representations. The central theoretical construct for this
study w as the notion o f a concept im age (Tall & Vinner, 1981), w hich denotes the entire
cognitive structure associated w ith a concept, including examples, representations,
processes, and the relationships among them. The concept im age is distinguished from a
concept definition, w hich is a form o f words used to specify a concept, and w hich I take
to be part o f the concept image. It is helpful to im agine a concept image as a network in
w hich the links indicate relationships betw een ideas. The m etaphor o f a conceptual
netw ork accommodates the perspective that new know ledge builds on prior
understandings, and so I investigated not only students’ understandings in group theory
but also how prelim inary m athem atical understandings were involved in students’
learning.

M y interest in characterizing students’ understandings led ultim ately to the following
research questions:
•

What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images
as they are learning the fundamental ideas o f group, subgroup, and isomorphism?

•

What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images
as they are learning the more advanced ideas o f homomorphism, coset, and quotient
group?

•

H ow do students’ understandings o f prior mathematics come into play as they are
learning elementary group theory?

The context for the study was a nontraditional class in w hich the instruction w as based
largely on problem sets that the students com pleted in collaborative groups o f three or
four students. In such a setting, and w ithout a com parison group, it was not possible to
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determ ine the causes o f m any o f the events. The goal o f this study was not comparison,
however, but rather to begin building a theory supported by a thick description o f the
issues that students grappled w ith around the m athem atical content o f elementary group
theory w hile they w ere in the process o f learning.

The following chapter reviews the relevant literature on the teaching and learning o f abstract
algebra. Chapter 3 sets forth the conceptual and analytical framework that guided this
study. Chapter 4 describes the context and m ethodology. Chapters 5 through 7 address
the research questions in turn. A nd chapter

8

provides conclusions and implications.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

To synthesize the research on the teaching and learning o f abstract algebra, it is useful to
consider first two categories: those articles connected with D ubinsky’s framework for
research and curriculum development (Asiala et al., 1996) and those that are not. These
sections are followed by a brief discussion o f research on the learning o f proof. To
complement the educational research, I include discussion o f historical literature
describing the genesis and evolution o f algebra and also some o f the literature that
provides suggestions for curriculum or instruction. Much o f this literature takes a
negative tone, describing difficulties, errors, obstacles, and the ways in which student
understanding falls short o f expert understanding. Clearly, the field could benefit from
an approach that begins organically, with students’ ways o f thinking.

Dubinskv’s Framework
The work o f Dubinsky and his colleagues is based on a well-articulated framework for
research and curriculum development in undergraduate mathematics education (Asiala et
al., 1996), which grows largely from Dubinsky’s (1991) elaboration o f Piaget’s notion of
reflective abstraction. The core o f framework is the theoretical perspective that all
mathematical conceptions can be understood as actions, processes, objects, or schemas
(hence the acronym APOS). The categories may be seen as an extension of the
process/object distinction that is well developed in the literature and that is discussed in

17
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detail in chapter 3. It is important to keep in mind that the theoretical perspective
provides ways to categorize students’ thinking about mathematical concepts, not
categories for the concepts themselves. Thus, one student may have an action conception
o f coset and another a process conception. The categories are roughly developmental,
with each new conception requiring new mental constructions.
According to D ubinsky’s theory, an action conception is different from a process
conception in that in the former, the student is particularly focused on going through
specific procedural steps and is unable to talk clearly about one o f the steps until all the
previous steps have been carried out. An action conception can become a process
conception through a mental construction called interiorization. Then, the student can
think about the result o f the process without actually having done it and, in particular, can
imagine reversing the process. A student who has an object conception of a
mathematical idea can imagine it as a totality and, in particular, can act on it with higherlevel actions or processes. Processes can be encapsulated into objects, and it is
sometimes useful that the student be able to de-encapsulate an object to focus on the
underlying process. Schemas are coordinated collections o f actions, processes, objects,
and other schemas, which can themselves be encapsulated into objects.
Dubinsky’s research and development framework consists o f three activities: theoretical
analysis, design and implementation o f instruction, and observation and evaluation o f the
implemented instruction. The theoretical analysis describes the actions, processes,
objects, and schemas that students might construct in order to develop an understanding
o f the target concepts. Instructional activities are designed specifically to help students
make the constructions identified in the theoretical analysis and typically include
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computer activities using the programming language ISETL (Interactive Set Language),
whose syntax closely resembles mathematical notation. Evaluation consists largely of
interviews and written exams to determine to what extent students made the desired
constructions. The framework is cyclical in that observation and evaluation inform
revisions in the theoretical perspective, which informs subsequent instructional design,
and so on. The research papers primarily report the results o f a particular
implementation, focusing primarily on characterizing the action, process, and object
conceptions o f students, reporting the numbers o f students in each category, and,
sometimes, comparing results with classes that had received traditional instruction.
On the learning o f abstract algebra, the evaluation o f the first round o f curriculum
development is reported in a research article (Dubinsky et al., 1994) and the resulting
second version o f the curriculum has been published (Dubinsky & Leron, 1994).
Dubinsky et al. conclude, not surprisingly, that many o f the concepts, especially coset
and quotient group, seem quite difficult for students, and they offer some explanations.
They discuss a number o f cognitive obstacles that are common among beginning abstract
algebra students. Regarding the group concept, the idea o f an abstract binary operation
poses a significant obstacle for students, who often think o f a group as a set and ignore
the operation. Students are often unable to correctly answer questions about cosets in and
quotients o f noncyclic groups, and they often confuse normality with commutativity.
Although some o f the students can perform the calculations required for listing the
elements in a coset, they have difficulty thinking o f cosets as objects that can themselves
be manipulated. It may seem obvious that a set is an object, but sets are often described
by a process that lists all elements or that would eventually list any element. In this way
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a set is a process. A set is not a full-fledged object in the mind o f the student until the
student can imagine a set as an element o f another set. The researchers isolate certain
prerequisites for success in abstract algebra, including understanding o f functions as both
processes and objects.
This research has been criticized by Bum (1996), who characterizes Dubinsky et al.
(1994) as a report o f a novel teaching procedure using the computer and particular
activities. He suggests that the fundamental concepts o f group theory may be not group,
subgroup, coset, and normality, but rather closure, associativity, identity, inverse,
function, and set. Bum further points out that some o f the interview excerpts that were
regarded as misconceptions may actually reveal insight on the part o f the student (e.g.,
closure is enough to determine whether a subset o f a finite group is a subgroup).
Furthermore, quotient groups are quite easy to see in some situations (e.g., even and odd
integers, rotation and reflection in the transformations o f the plane). It should not be
surprising, Bum suggests, that the concepts in abstract algebra can be described in the
language o f sets and functions, but that may be twentieth century analysis imposed on
nineteenth century ideas. (I would point out that in order to implement the concepts in
ISETL, it is necessary to view them as sets and functions.) Finally, he proposes that
automorphisms (specifically permutations and symmetries) may be more profitably
viewed as the fundamental concepts o f group theory.
Dubinsky et al. (1997) respond by reaffirming that their previous article is not a report of
a novel teaching procedure but an attempt to contribute to knowledge o f how students
understand certain concepts in group theory. Regarding Burns’ unsupported claims about
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the ease with which students might understand certain instances o f quotient group or
permutation, they suggest that Bums conduct a study and report on it.
The second iteration o f research and curriculum development using the APOS framework
to study the learning o f abstract algebra is reported in a collection o f articles (Asiala,
Brown, Kleiman, & Mathews, 1998; Asiala, Dubinsky, Mathews, Morics, & Oktac,
1997; Brown, DeVries, Dubinsky, & Thomas, 1997; see Clark et al., 1997, for an
overview). The general conclusion o f these articles is that the authors’ initial
epistemological analyses o f the various topics are supported by the data, in the sense that
the analyses describe the important processes, objects, and schemas that students need to
construct in order to leam the those topics. The authors then typically offer refinements
o f the epistemological analyses and later offer pedagogical suggestions. Some specific
conclusions include the suggestion that the crucial idea in calculating a quotient group
may be constructing the binary operation, the importance o f being able to choose
appropriately between two binary operations defined on a set (e.g., multiplication and
addition), and specific misconceptions such as the fact that some students believe Zn is a
subgroup o f Z.

Student Thinking
Although the literature on the learning o f abstract algebra contains a small number of
research articles, the list o f misconceptions identified is not short. Selden and Selden
(1978) alone list thirteen types o f errors, many o f which might occur in any
undergraduate mathematics course. Some commonly found misconceptions include
confusion about the group operation, particularly when the problem involves more than
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one group (Hart, 1994; Selden & Selden, 1978), believing that the only solution to the
equation x = x ' 1 was the identity element (Hazzan, 1994), using techniques from the real
numbers in the abstract setting (Selden & Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994, 1999), confusing
a theorem and its converse (Selden & Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994; Hazzan & Leron,
1996), and difficulty managing the distinction between set and element (Hazzan, 1999;
Selden & Selden, 1978). This last distinction is further complicated by the fact that the
elements o f the quotient group are themselves sets.
Some o f the above misconceptions are tied to the use o f mathematical notation. Selden
and Selden (1978) found, for example, that students often use the same symbol for two
different things, and, conversely, they often assume things are distinct because they have
different names. Hazzan (1994) suggests, regarding the use o f different letters in the
axiom for inverses, that it is easier to think o f a relation between two different objects
than o f an object with itself.
Other difficulties seem to be tied to other sorts o f representations. As part o f a study on
visual and analytic thinking, Zazkis and Dubinsky (1996) investigated abstract algebra
students’ ability to represent the elements o f D 4 , the group o f symmetries o f the square
and then to find the product o f two elements. This task can be approached either
“visually,” using a geometric representation, or “analytically,” using permutation
representations. They found that most students used a combination o f these approaches,
suggesting that the dichotomy between visual and analytic thinkers may be false. They
propose an alternative model that assumes visual and analytic thinking to be mutually
dependent in mathematical problem solving.
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The study also produced some unexpected mathematical results (Zazkis & Dubinsky,
1996). Eight o f ten students found as they translated between the geometric and
permutation representations that the groups were not isomorphic, causing Zazkis and
Dubinsky to conclude that the dihedral groups such as D 4 are not groups until some
structure is imposed on them in the sense that the relationship between the group
operations in the two representations must be specified appropriately. By careful analysis
o f the ways to translate from the geometric to the permutation representation, they found
that students could focus on the square and where its vertices traveled (an object
interpretation) or on the four positions and which vertices they contained after the
transformation (a position interpretation). In computing the product o f two
transformation symmetries in the geometric representation, students could imagine either
that the axes describing the transformations were fixed (a global interpretation) or that
they traveled with the square (a local interpretation). Choosing either the object/global or
the position/local pair o f interpretations results in the desired isomorphism between the
geometric and permutation representations. Most students, however, were drawn to the
position/global pair or the object/local pair, which caused the groups to be anti
isomorphic, in the sense that the order o f multiplication is reversed. Zazkis and Dubinsky
suggest that the embedding o f dihedral groups in permutation groups deserves some
careful attention in instruction.,
Hannah (2000) pursued Zazkis and Dubinsky’s ideas through a teaching experiment.
Expecting that students would prefer the global interpretation, he encouraged the object
interpretation by using additional labels to separate the object from the position. About
half the students still preferred the position interpretation, although one o f these students
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also chose the local interpretation, thus leading to an isomorphism between the geometric
and permutation representations. In the second trial o f the teaching experiment, after
making some additional adjustments in his notation to make the object and frame o f
reference more salient, all but one student chose consistent interpretations. Hannah also
found that permutation notation can lead to the same local/global interpretational issues.
Leron, Hazzan, and Zazkis (1995) discuss the development o f the concept o f group
isomorphism. Some o f the difficulties, they suggest, may actually be with quantification.
They note that the naive concept o f isomorphism (same group with the names changed) is
a good start, but the object isomorphism is defined directionally, with the two groups
playing different roles, and requires a sophisticated concept o f function. In other words,
although there is symmetry in the statement that two groups are isomorphic, actually
finding an isomorphism requires choosing one group as the source (the domain o f a
function) and the other as the target. When trying to construct an isomorphism between
two groups, they note that students hope for a canonical (or at least obvious)
isomorphism and get stuck when there is a choice.
Hazzan and Leron (1996) argue that the standard formulation o f Lagrange’s theorem
hides its nature and its deep meaning. The standard formulation is:
Let G be a finite group. If H is a subgroup o f G, then o(H) divides o(G).

The notation o(G) signifies the order o f the group , 1 that is, the number o f elements in it.
The authors suggest that the contrapositive o f the theorem includes explicit quantifiers
that make its nature as a nonexistence theorem clearer and reveal its deep meaning:

1This is Hazzan and Leron’s notation. In the class that provided the context for the present study, we used
the alternative notation |G| to denote the order of a group G.
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Contrapositive: If k does not divide o(G), then there does not exist a subgroup o f
order k.

Deep meaning: If there exists a subgroup o f order k, then k divides o(G).
This analysis o f Lagrange’s theorem arose in response to data collected on the question,
“Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6 ?” Out o f 113 students, 73 gave incorrect answers. O f these, 20
gave some version of, “Yes, by Lagrange’s theorem, because 3 divides 6 .” Hazzan and
Leron suggest that students’ response may be due to a coping mechanism and may not
really reflect thinking about the theorem and the two groups. The authors explore issues
o f coping more fully elsewhere (Leron & Hazzan, 1997).
In a broader study o f learning in abstract algebra, Hazzan (1999) found that students
tended to reduce the abstraction level in order to cope with the task at hand. She
organized her results according to three ways o f looking at the level o f abstraction.
Regarding abstraction level as the quality o f the relationships between the object o f
thought and the thinking person, she found that students tend to make the unfamiliar
familiar by basing their argument, for example, on numbers and number operations.
Regarding abstraction level as a reflection o f the process/object duality, she found that
students tend to personalize formal expressions and logical arguments by using firstperson language and that they tend to engage a well-rehearsed procedure rather than rely
on theoretical knowledge. Regarding abstraction level as the degree o f complexity o f the
concept o f thought, she found that students sometimes reduce abstraction level by
replacing a set with one o f its elements.
Hirsh (1981) describes an abstract algebra course for preservice secondary school
teachers that included a “didactical shadow” seminar in which the mathematical concepts
were followed closely by readings and discussions on teaching K-12 mathematics. These
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readings were intended to encourage preservice teachers to see abstract algebra as
relevant in their future as secondary school teachers. The study found significant
improvement in the experimental group in the students’ understanding o f the real number
system and nonsignificant improvement in the control group. On several affective
measures, no significant differences between groups were found. The most important
result, Hirsch suggests, was that the study demonstrated the feasibility o f such a course.

Proof
As stated in chapter 1, mathematical proof is one o f the defining characteristics o f
advanced mathematical thinking, and proof plays a central role in the learning o f abstract
algebra. Because the role o f proof did not play a central role in this study, this section
briefly reviews literature that was helpful in framing the study.
One o f the leading expositors o f the role o f proof in mathematics education is Gila Hanna
(1991, 1995). She suggests that constructivist theories have led to a mistaken view o f the
teacher as playing a passive role and o f proof as being unimportant. She argues for
recognizing and promoting proof in the mathematics curriculum as a key tool for
promoting understanding. The research on the role o f proof in mathematics education is
thin and confused by the typical four-year separation between proof in high school
geometry and proof in undergraduate mathematics.
Hart (1986, 1994) describes a research study in which twenty-nine college mathematics
majors, taking different abstract algebra courses from beginning undergraduate to
beginning graduate, were asked to write six standard abstract algebra proofs, each
“doable in 15 minutes or less.” On the basis o f their performance on three criterion
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proofs, students were classified into four levels o f conceptual understanding. Analysis o f
errors made, processes used, correctness o f proofs, and student assessment o f tasks
suggested that the journey from novice to expert in a content domain may be an irregular
and unstable developmental process, rather than the dichotomy often assumed in the
literature.
In a mathematics course called Introduction to Higher Mathematics, Moore (1990, 1994)
found seven major sources o f student difficulties in learning to do proofs, including
inability to state the definitions, inadequate concept images, inability to use the definition
to structure a proof, inability or unwillingness to generate examples, and difficulty with
mathematical language and notation. He suggests that the concept image/concept
definition dichotomy was not sufficient to explain his results and suggested the term
concept usage to discuss how students used definitions to generate and use examples,
applied definitions within proofs, and used definitions to structure proofs. Although in
M oore’s work this construct more accurately describes students’ use o f concept
definitions rather than o f concepts, thinking about concept usage proved helpful in this
study in identifying components and characteristics o f students’ concept images, as
described below.
Taken together, these articles support the idea o f investigating not only students’
understandings o f concepts but also their personal definitions o f those concepts. Proof,
after all, involves reasoning about concepts, which must be meaningful to the students in
order to support such reasoning.
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History
Sfard (1995) gives a detailed a description o f the historical development o f algebra with
strong connections to the teaching and learning o f both school and abstract algebra,
providing compelling support for the claim that historical-critical and psychogenetic
studies should converge (Piaget & Garcia, 1989, p. 108). According to Sfard, group
theory arose out o f the work o f Lagrange and Ruffini, who noticed that methods o f
solving polynomial equations depended on permutations o f the roots. Soon permutations
and then, with Cauchy, operations on those permutations became objects o f attention.
Galois defined the notion o f a group by declaring interest in the structure imposed on the
permutations by the so-called substitutions. Cayley freed the concept from any
commitment as to the nature o f the elements, focusing instead on the manipulations.
W ith the invention o f the concept o f group, the seeds had been planted for algebra to
become a science o f abstract structures.
Kleiner (1986) describes four lines o f inquiry that coalesced toward the end o f the
nineteenth century to form the area we now call abstract algebra. First, the techniques
from classical algebra for solving polynomial equations led to the permutation groups.
Second, questions in number theory led to the finite Abelian groups. Third, attempts to
unify and organize geometry led to transformation groups. Finally, roots in analysis led
to investigation o f continuous transformation groups. One response to this account is to
use historically important problems to provide pedagogical and intellectual motivation in
the teaching o f abstract algebra (see Kleiner, 1995).
Nicholson’s (1993) account o f the slow historical development o f the concept o f quotient
group can provide additional sources for cognitive roots to be exploited. She suggests
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several obstacles that were overcome by the mathematics community during the
development o f this concept. First, the community needed an abstract concept o f group
that was not dependent on any particular representation. Second, the community needed
the concept o f equivalence (modulo a subgroup). Finally (and most importantly), the
community needed to realize that the elements o f the quotient group are not like the
elements o f original group, but are equivalence classes— sets. All o f these historical
developments provide clues about what might be the issues for students learning the
subject. In this study, I paid attention in particular to the ways in which students develop
an abstract concept o f group and the sense in which they consider sets to be elements of
quotient group.

Teaching Suggestions
I close the review o f the literature with a discussion o f articles that informed the
development o f the course, that provide additional rationale for investigating learning in
abstract algebra, and that collectively support the decision to investigate learning in a
nontraditional course.
In “An Abstract Algebra Story,” Leron and Dubinsky (1995) condense the principles and
research behind their textbook (Dubinsky & Leron, 1994) into a dialogue with an
“idealized reader.” They begin by asserting that "'The teaching o f abstract algebra is a
disaster, and this remains true almost independently o f the quality o f the lectures'’
(p. 227). They suggest that the ISETL computer activities provide an experiential basis
for the abstractions that follow, asserting that “if the students are asked to construct the
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group concept on the computer (by programming it), there is a good chance that a parallel
construction will occur in their mind” (p. 230).
In Dubinsky and Leron’s approach, before seeing the concept o f quotient group, the
students have already explored a construct they call GmodH, which is the set o f cosets in
G o f a subgroup H, independent o f whether H is normal, an approach consistent with that
recommended by Benson and Richey (1994). Leron and Dubinsky acknowledge that the
notation G mo A ll is unorthodox, particularly when H is not normal, but defend their
approach by noting that students realize they need to look into the properties o f H that
make GmodH a group and come to appreciate that the main issue is closure.
Furthermore,
by building on the material that the students bring up, the instructor is able to
state most naturally and smoothly the definition o f a normal subgroup, the
theorem that when H is normal then GmodH forms a group, and the (now very
easy) proof o f this theorem. Normality is naturally introduced here as the
condition which insures that GmodH be a group, and the definition most often
discovered by students is aH = Ha for all a e G . Except for the new name, the
students can really feel that the instructor merely summarizes what they have
found in their investigations. In the session that follows, the instructor makes the
final ties with the “standard” approach by explaining that when H is normal,
GmodH is commonly denoted G/H, and is called the quotient group o f G modulo
H and coset product is commonly defined by the formula (Ha)(Hb) = H(ab).
(p. 238)

Freedman (1983) also rejects the lecture method, quoting Halmos, “A good lecture is
usually systematic, complete, precise— and dull; it is a bad teaching instrument” (p. 631)
and Moise, “It is simplistic to suppose that people remember what they are told and
understand the things that are explained to them clearly” (p. 631). He discusses an
approach he used in London in which students in a small seminar were each required to
read and lecture on some original papers in abstract algebra. Although this approach may
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seem quite radical to instructors in the United States, he claims that the students worked
together and were quite successful.
In response to the difficulties students usually have with Lagrange’s theorem, Johnson
(1983) notes that the traditional proof involves cosets and equivalence relations, both o f
which are new concepts to most students. As Lagrange’s theorem is usually used to
prove the more intuitive theorem that the order o f an element divides the order o f the
group, Johnson suggests proving the latter result first, for it follows quite naturally from
the decomposition o f a permutation into disjoint cycles. O f course, this approach
assumes the students are familiar with permutation groups, and such an assumption might
be unwarranted.
Holton and Wenzel (1993) describe an abstract algebra course in which Lagrange’s
theorem is preceded by cooperative learning via examples. Rejecting the traditional
approach o f “exposition, exhortation and regurgitation” (p. 883), they found that students
were able to conjecture the theorem and many o f the necessary lemmas. Although it was
not a formal research study, the description o f the classroom environment was
compelling.

Conclusion
This review has shown that although there have been few published research studies on
the learning o f abstract algebra, there is a theoretical and empirical base on which to
build. To complement the work embedded in the APOS framework, this study is more
exploratory in nature, taking a broader view o f the ways o f thinking that students exhibit
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while trying to make sense o f the concepts in the course. The next chapter describes the
conceptual and analytical framework designed to support such an approach.
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CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter sets forth the conceptual perspective that guided this study and that
contributed to the design o f the analytical framework. Fundamentally, learning is seen as
a process o f making sense o f experience and o f building understanding, a viewpoint that
is consistent with various forms o f constructivism. The central theoretical construct is the
notion o f a concept image (Tall & Vinner, 1981). The concept image is contrasted with
the concept’s definition, which leads to a discussion o f the role o f definitions in
mathematics, in thinking, and in learning. The chapter continues with a discussion of
other important constructs that are useful in describing the growth and character of
concept images, particularly in advanced mathematical thinking, including abstraction
and generalization and the distinction between process and object conceptions of
mathematical ideas. The chapter also includes a discussion o f the role o f metaphor in
mathematical thinking, with particular attention to thinking in abstract algebra. Next, I
discuss issues o f naming and notation, setting the stage for a discussion o f semiotics,
which provides much of the analytical and theoretical backing for the study. These
various theoretical constructs are then brought together at the end o f the chapter in an
analytical framework that undergirded the analysis of the data.

33
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Learning with Understanding
This study was based upon the following fundamental theoretical assumptions that are
consistent with a large body o f work in cognitive science, psychology, and mathematics
education (see, in particular, Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999; Hiebert & Carpenter,
1992). First, human beings are conceptualizers in that they try to make sense o f their
percepts by developing concepts. People try to understand their experiences by
organizing them, abstracting from them, creating categories, making connections,
particularly with prior knowledge, and making distinctions. In high school and college
mathematics, for example, students create a category called “function” by abstracting the
common features o f the many mathematical creatures called “function” in their
experience. These abstracted features are not necessarily the properties that are isolated
in the formal mathematical definition, as is elaborated below.
Second, knowledge is represented internally in the mind. People create internal
representations for objects, processes, properties, and relationships; for images, sounds,
smells, sensations, and impressions; and also for categories and networks o f these. These
mental representations do not match an external world but rather fit one’s experience
with some degree o f viability (von Glasersfeld, 1990). Because mental representations
are not observable, discussions o f how ideas are represented in someone’s head must be
based largely on inference. Such inferences can be facilitated by building and testing
models o f individual understanding, as is elaborated below. A fundamental goal of
research in the psychology o f learning is to understand mental representations o f ideas,
by building models, describing their features, and so on, based on observation o f learning
situations. It is not necessary that the models match the underlying neural processes
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(Kosslyn & Hatfield, 1984). Rather, the goal is that models fit the observations with
some degree o f viability, particularly with regard to explanation and prediction. In order
to build such models, it is reasonable to assume that the external entity being represented
influences and constrains the internal representation. In mathematics, these external
entities are often themselves representations, such as symbols or diagrams, because
mathematical ideas are accessible only through their representations (Duvall, 1999; see
also Pimm, 1995, p. 119).
Third, internal representations can be connected to one another in useful and hence
meaningful ways. Successful learning may be described as learning with understanding,
where understanding is characterized by connectivity. While in the process o f learning,
connections are made internally in the mind o f the learner and over time the concepts,
processes, properties, examples, and the connections among them grow to form cognitive
structures that might be described as networks. In general, the more connections, the
more intricate and encompassing are the networks, and the deeper are the understandings.
In this study, individual conceptual understandings are described via the term concept
image, which denotes the entire cognitive structure that a particular individual associates
with a particular concept, as elaborated below. In considering the notion of a concept
image, it is important to contemplate not only a concept’s structure and connections to
other concepts but also the boundaries that distinguish the concept from related ideas.
Concept images and other cognitive structures are actively built up over time through
experience and through active reflection on that experience. The structures, o f course,
depend heavily upon prior experience and also upon the nature and extent o f the
reflection. Thus, in response to an experience, the actual constructions are personal and
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idiosyncratic, which implies that learning and knowing, too, are personal. It is for these
reasons that phrases such as “construct personal meaning” or “construct knowledge” are
helpful in describing the learning process. This is not to say that all conceptual structures
are equal. Some conceptual structures are particularly weak or fragile or lack long-term
viability in light o f future learning goals. Other structures are strong and persistent.
Some conceptual structures are unproductive and fade as a result. Other structures are
productive and will support and promote future learning. And, o f course, when measured
against established knowledge, sometimes conceptual structures contain ideas that are
incorrect.
The real quandary lies with strong, productive, but faulty structures with incorrect
ideas— often called misconceptions. Independent o f whether these are called knowledge,
such structures are personal conceptions that are held with conviction and are based upon
some reasoning, however incomplete or fallacious.
Piaget describes two mechanisms by which a subject makes sense o f experience:
assimilation and accommodation (see, e.g., Steffe & Wiegel, 1996). When an experience
fits within the existing cognitive structures, the experience has been assimilated. If, on
the other hand, the experience evokes cognitive structures that do not fit with the
experience, we say the learner has been disequilibrated. To re-equilibrate, the learner
must reorganize his or her cognitive structures in light o f the new experience. It is this
reorganization that Piaget calls accommodation.
The point is that new information is not simply received but is actively interpreted and
filtered through prior experience. The experience must either make sense within the
existing structure, in which case it is assimilated, or it must be “moderately novel” so that
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the experience creates a disequilibration, which can lead to an accommodation. The
experience must be only moderately novel, for it must be sufficiently interpretable to
create some cognitive conflict.
This balance between assimilation and accommodation makes the point that learning is
sometimes difficult, and thus faultless communication is fiction. Papert suggests that,
“Anything is easy if you can assimilate it to your collection o f models. If you can’t,
anything can be painfully difficult.... What an individual can learn and how he learns it
depends on what models he has available” (cited in Steffe, 1990, p. 173).
Given the above positions about the nature o f learning, what then are the implications for
the teaching o f mathematics? First, mathematics itself is a highly structured and
organized domain. For mathematical knowledge to be useable (or perhaps even
accessible), it must be organized in some way in the mind. It is clearly not possible to
transmit whole structures from the mind o f the instructor to the mind o f the student.
Rather, the student must do some constructing in his or her own mind. Second, it is
impossible to know in advance what a person will learn from a given activity. Moreover,
it is impossible to know with certainty what a person has learned, although an instructor
or researcher can develop approximate models by asking questions. Explicit reflection,
with the corrective mechanisms o f the observations and responses o f the teacher and
other students, is likely to lead to strong, viable, and productive connections.

Relationship with Constructivism
Many of the above positions are consistent with the assumptions o f any o f several forms
of constructivism.
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What the various forms o f constructivism all share is the metaphor o f carpentry,
architecture, o f construction work. This is about the building up o f structures
from preexisting pieces, possibly specially shaped for the task. The metaphor
describes understanding as the building o f mental structures, and the term
restructuring, often used as a synonym for accommodation or conceptual change,
contains this metaphor. (Ernest, 1996, p. 335)

A key expositor o f constructivism in mathematics education is Ernst von Glasersfeld,
who proposes two principles for radical constructivism:
(a) Knowledge is not passively received but actively built up by the cognizing
subject;
(b) the function o f cognition is adaptive and serves the organization o f the
experiential world, not the discovery o f ontological reality, (von Glasersfeld,
1989,p . 162)

Adopting only the first o f these principles is to take a position that is sometimes called
“weak constructivism” (Ernest, 1996) or “trivial constructivism” (von Glasersfeld, 1996).
As Kilpatrick (1987) and others have noted, the first o f these principles is broadly
accepted and “almost no mathematics educator alive and writing today claims to believe
otherwise” (p. 7). The second principle, on the other hand, is much more controversial.
My position is that whether one believes in an objective reality or Platonic ideals or
denies both is, in a sense, immaterial because the student’s cognitive structures will
match neither reality, nor an ideal, nor the teacher’s or researcher’s cognitive structures
but instead will fit each o f these with varying degrees o f viability. This is a particularly
important point regarding the learning o f mathematics, since mathematical concepts exist
not in the physical world but rather in abstractions from activity in the physical world and
in the mind.
In order to understand what constructivism provides, it is important to recognize that the
theories arose in part as a response to what was missing from behaviorism, which refused
to posit any meaning behind student’s actions. Stimulus-response mechanisms were
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supposed to explain all behavior. Thus, constructivism was one o f many efforts during
the twentieth century to insert meaning and understanding into theories o f knowledge and
learning. But not all behavior is meaningful.
Vinner (1997) describes some behaviors as pseudo-conceptual and pseudo-analytical
because they may be taken as an indication that true (i.e., meaningful) conceptual and
analytical processes have occurred when in fact the behavior is little more than simple
association and imitation based on superficial similarity. For example, a calculus student
who immediately responds “ 2 x” when hearing “x2” is not responding meaningfully if the
response is merely a verbalized association. In a calculus class, sometimes this simple
association will yield the correct answer, and it is impossible to know, without asking
further questions, to what extent the student can construct (or resurrect) some meaning
for the response. Students are bound to have such associations. Vinner’s point is that in
mathematics class, students should evaluate their associations consciously and critically,
rather than merely verbalizing them in hopes o f getting “credit.” He argues that such
verbalized associations should not be interpreted as indicating misconceptions or
anything about a student’s cognitive structures, because cognitive structures are not
involved.
Part o f the reason many students exhibit pseudo-conceptual behavior in mathematics is
that they have found such behaviors to be viable in mathematics classes. Many students
are successful in mathematics by relying almost exclusively on simple association and
imitation, practicing problems that are just like the ones demonstrated in the textbook or
by the teacher. Yet the severe filtering effect o f high school and college mathematics
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suggests that for most students, mere imitation fails at some point, in arithmetic, algebra,
geometry, or calculus.
Thus, learning with understanding requires the development o f cognitive structures in
which the connections are not simple associations but relationships that are rich in
meaning.2 Mathematical learning is rarely effective without such meaning, in the sense
that it is unlikely to be durable, flexible, and supportive o f future learning. Mathematical
learning that is based only on simple associations is not mathematics at all, not to
mention that such skills are fragile and essentially useless today.
There are certain meta-cognitive behaviors that may support learning even if they are
simple associations. For example, my students learn that in response to their statements I
am likely to say, “Okay. Why?” Some o f them internalize this behavior and begin to ask
the question themselves. Deborah B all’s class learned that she was likely to ask, “Are
these all the solutions?” (Ball & Bass, in press; Suzuka, 2001). And many o f Polya’s
(1957) suggestions (Can I think o f a similar problem? Can I simplify the problem?) can
be seen in a similar light. The list o f desirable behaviors also includes many so-called
habits o f m ind that describe successful mathematics knowing and learning. Cuoco,
Goldenberg, and Mark (1996) provide a compelling list o f such habits, suggesting, for
example, that students should leam to look for patterns, to watch for things that change,
and also to watch for things that do not change.

2 When I asked my 19-month-old daughter, “When will you be two?” she responded, “November.” But
how much meaning might have been behind her response? It is rather overwhelming how much conceptual
knowledge she will need to construct before she will be able to give a detailed account of the meaning
adults might take from her response.
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Thus, investigations o f mathematical understanding must look at behavior, because that is
all that is observable, but should also address meaning, which requires probing beneath
the simple associations to explore and make inferences about the meaning that students
bring to the situation. My goal as a researcher is to understand how meaningful
mathematical understanding is built and how meta-cognitive behavior can help.

Concept Image
The assumption that learners build up cognitive structures as they learn mathematics
requires some terms to discuss these structures. I borrow a term from Tall and Vinner
(1981):
We shall use the term concept image to describe the total cognitive stmcture that
is associated with the concept, which includes all the mental pictures and
associated properties and processes. It is built up over the years through
experiences o f all kinds, changing as the individual meets new stimuli and
matures, (p. 152)

In this seminal paper, Tall and Vinner contrast the concept image with the term concept
definition, which is a verbal description o f the concept and about which I say more
below. Because only part o f a cognitive structure is brought into consciousness during a
particular task, the term evoked concept image refers to that portion o f the concept image
that is evoked in response to a given task (Tall & Vinner, 1981).
The ideas o f concept image and evoked concept image are consistent with the work o f
Hart (1994), who found that when students approach mathematical tasks, “strategies are
evoked [rather than chosen], based on the interaction between the task at hand and the
current conceptual schema” (p. 61). Furthermore, he explained his results by suggesting
that “processes, metacognition, and misconceptions are actually part o f one’s conceptual
schema” (p. 62).
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Characterizing Concept Images
Concept images consist o f examples and nonexamples, representations (symbolic,
graphical, pictorial, verbal, enactive, iconic, etc.), definitions and alternative
characterizations, properties, results, processes and objects, contexts, and impressions
from previous experiences. Solving a mathematical problem (or any mathematical
activity) involves recalling or reconstructing examples, representations, objects, or
processes and establishing connections to other examples, representations, objects, or
processes.
Concept images are not monolithic, for the various examples, properties, and
representations play different roles. M ichener (1978), for example, distinguishes among
start-up examples, reference examples, model examples, and counterexamples. Some
properties hold for all examples o f the concept (e.g., all groups have an identity element).
Other properties, on the other hand, are useful for categorizing examples (e.g., some
groups are Abelian). For many concepts, there are also lists o f key properties for
describing examples (e.g., when making computations or deriving results about a group,
it is useful to know the group’s cardinality, a set o f generators, or an alternative
representation).
Because individuals are sometimes more able than at other times to make particular
connections or to reconstruct particular examples, representations, or processes, concept
images not static entities but rather are always in a state o f flux as one thinks about a
concept, focusing and refocusing one’s thought on various aspects o f the concept image.
Thus, it is useful to consider not only the components o f a student’s concept image but
also the students’ concept usage (Moore, 1994), which in turn can provide
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characterizations o f a concept image. Concept images, for example, can be dominated by
particular examples, representations, or ways o f thinking. Dubinsky et al. (1994)
observed, for example, that some students focused on the process o f computing a coset,
whereas more successful students were also able to conceive o f cosets as objects that
themselves could be acted upon by other processes. Thus, concept images can be
limiting when they inhibit an individual from making certain constructions or
generalizations.
A concept image is built through all previous experiences with the concept. Experiences
that are assimilated make sense within the evoked concept images. Experiences that
require accommodation, on the other hand, cause structural changes in an individual’s
concept images such as the construction o f a new concept, the creation o f new
connections to other concepts, or the reorganization o f the connections within or among
concepts
A key theme that emerged in this study is the complicated relationship between a concept
and its name. I make only two points here and provide additional theoretical discussion
below. First, a student’s concept image might not reasonably be described as a subset o f
a mathematician’s concept image. A student’s concept image may instead include
misconceptions or may even be o f a different character entirely. Second, the notion o f
concept image presents something like a chicken-and-egg problem: Which comes first,
the concept or the name? One might begin with the name o f a concept and then gradually
build experiences underneath. On the other hand, as individuals gain experience, they
build mental structures that are not necessarily part o f a named concept but at some point
subsume those structures (and experiences) under a single name. In either scenario, at
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what point is there a concept image? The resolution o f the problem lies in the realization
that the notion o f concept image is merely an analytical tool. People do not have concept
images in the same sense that they have internal organs. Thus, in the analysis I try to
maintain a notion o f concept image that is flexible enough to accommodate all o f these
possibilities.

Relationship to Schema
The term concept image shares some similarity with the term schema, used by Piaget and
many researchers in both the constructivist and cognitive science traditions (see, e.g.,
Bransford et al., 1999; Piaget, 1970a). In the problem-solving literature, particularly in
cognitive psychology, schemas are associated with problem types, and each schema has
“slots” that are filled by the specific information provided in the problem. (For an
overview o f this literature see Mayer, 1992.) This view is problematic because it seems
to suggest that learning consists o f constructing a new schema for each new problem
type.
For Dubinsky (1991), “A schema is a more or less coherent collection o f objects and
processes” (p. 102), which typically might be named as a concept. For example, “The
concept o f group can be understood as a schema that consists o f three schemas: set,
binary operation, and axiom (Brown et al., 1997, p. 192). For Skemp (1987), on the other
hand, a schema is a suitably connected collection o f concepts.
For the purposes o f this study, I was primarily concerned with the ways that students
think about particular concepts. Thus, a concept image was associated with a particular
concept, typically given by name. And with the term, I considered both the way it is
structured and the ways it connects to other mathematical ideas.
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Concept Definition
As described above, Tall and Vinner (1981) introduced the term concept image to
contrast with a concept definition, which is a form o f words used to specify a concept.
This distinction serves as a reminder o f two simple ideas about students’ learning o f
mathematics. First, around any (mathematical) concept, students’ thinking is strongly
influenced by the examples, nonexamples, representations, and contexts in which they
have previously experienced the concept. Second, students do not typically employ (or
naturally adopt) the mathematical habit o f consulting a formal definition in response to
mathematical tasks but rather rely entirely on their concept image. Furthermore, Vinner
(1992) found that even when students can recall a concept definition, the concept
definition and the concept image might conflict or contradict one another. He calls this
phenomenon compartmentalization, suggesting that the concept definition and the
concept image are not evoked at the same time.
Perhaps because o f the phenomenon o f compartmentalization, Vinner and Tall often
separate the concept definition from the concept image, in describing cognitive structure
(see, e.g., Vinner, 1992), and even go so far as to discuss a “concept definition image” to
describe a concept image built up around the definition (Tall & Vinner, 1981). For
successful mathematicians, however, a formal concept definition constitutes an integral
part o f the cognitive structure built around that concept. The definition is routinely
consulted and is well integrated into the rest o f the concept image. Thus, for this study, a
concept definition (personal, formal, or otherwise; see below) was considered a subset of
a concept image. In the analysis, I explored the definitions that the students provided as a
means o f making inferences about the nature and connectivity o f their concept images.
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Theoretically, including the definition as part o f the concept image is reasonable even
when the definition is compartmentalized, because the term concept image implies
nothing about the connectivity o f that structure. In fact, an individual’s concept image
may include several essentially separate components, each evoked for different kinds of
problems.
Definitions are not easily remembered verbatim. And in everyday life, a definition’s
precise wording is often forgotten shortly after it is used, introduced, or consulted. When
terms are introduced via a definition, the definition sometimes provides only scaffolding:
When the construction is sufficiently complete, the scaffolding is taken away. To
overcome this tendency, some instructors, in mathematics as well as other subjects,
recommend that students memorize definitions. But it is not at all clear to what extent
mathematicians or other experts recall rather than reconstruct definitions that they use in
their professional work.
Because definitions are not easily remembered, it seems likely that they are constructed,
and this is the point o f view that informed this study. According to Tall and Vinner
(1981), a student, when asked to define a concept, may respond with a p e rso n a l concept
definition, which may not agree with a mathematically acccptable /orm a/ concept
definition but which instead might be described as an ad hoc description o f his or her

concept image. Thus, some parts o f the concept image function as definitions. For
example, in Deborah Ball’s third grade classroom, Cassandra shows that six is even by
pointing to the number line: “Six can’t be an odd number because this is {sh ep o in ts to
the num ber line, sta rtin g with zero ) even, odd, even, odd, even, odd, even” (Ball & Bass,

2000, p. 213). For her, the alternating pattern provides the definitions o f even and odd.
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For other students in the class, grouping by twos serves to provide the definitions. Still
other students prefer to separate numbers into two groups. As another example, the
literature on the learning o f functions is replete with examples o f students defining
function as synonymous with form ula or equation (see, e.g., Vinner, 1992; Ferrini-Mundy
& Graham, 1994). Students implicitly use personal concept definitions when asked to
determine whether a particular thing is an example or a nonexample o f a concept. This is
reasonable behavior in contexts— including many mathematical contexts—where precise
definitions are not necessary for the task at hand, particularly when one’s concept image
is sufficiently rich and robust.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, pp. 117-125) point out that from a cognitive point o f view,
definition is not a matter o f giving a list o f necessary and sufficient properties for a
concept, although this is sometimes possible. Instead, concepts are defined by prototypes
and by types o f relations to the prototypes, and there need be no fixed core o f properties
o f the prototypes that are shared by all instances o f the concept. Furthermore, some
properties o f a concept are not part o f the thing itself but are functional, purposive, or
otherwise involve interaction with an instance o f the concept. And finally, concepts are
not fixed but can be systematically modified by metaphors and by hedges such as
“technically” or “loosely speaking.”
In advanced mathematics, on the other hand, the definition o f a concept becomes
primary; the definition becomes the touchstone whose role is to ensure rigor (i.e.,
precision and consistency) within, between, and among concept images. Because this
perspective on definitions is unusual outside of mathematics and the hard sciences, it
represents a significant adjustment for students. The nature and role o f definitions in
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mathematics did not play an explicit role in the course that is the subject of this study, but
because these ideas inform my analysis, the topic deserves more attention here.

Types of Definitions
Linguists distinguish among several types o f definitions (see Kemerling, 2001). A lexical
definition is an attempt to describe the meaning o f a word as it is commonly used. These

are the kinds o f definitions found in dictionaries, which, contrary to some beliefs, portray
current usage not timeless truths, in full acknowledgement that languages evolve. A
stipu lative definition, on the other hand, specifies what a term is to denote. Such

definitions are commonly found in technical, legal, and scholarly writing. From the
viewpoint o f some writers, a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a new term
and thus is intended to be the touchstone for all subsequent uses o f the term.
Nonetheless, the expositor is somewhat constrained by what the reader might be willing
to accept. Thus, one common approach is to use a p re c isin g definition, which begins
with a lexical definition o f a term, and then proposes to sharpen it by stipulating more
narrow limits on its use.
T heoretical definitions are stipulative definitions made within the context of a broader

intellectual framework. It is worth noting that the validity o f a theory depends upon the
definitions on which the theory is built. Thus, an appropriate interpretation o f N ewton’s
laws o f motion, for example, depends upon imposing particular definitions o f terms such
as mass, inertia, and force onto experience. For example, I presume that separating the
concept o f weight into mass and acceleration due to gravity was a major conceptual
advance. When they were introduced, Newton’s particular set o f definitions provided an
extremely elegant description o f objects in motion. But one should recognize that the
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precise definitions were required for the creation o f the theory. It seems backward to
teach students the theory only to conclude later that they have misconceptions about
some o f the terms. Why not instead try to provide them with experiences that will help
them see the importance o f precise definitions and the usefulness o f particular definitions
and o f the distinctions among them?
Formal definitions in mathematics are, in a way, peculiar precising definitions— peculiar
because o f the inflexible totality o f the implied precision (i.e., no more, no less) and
because the formal definition sometimes bears little relationship to the term’s informal
usage (e.g., “cycle”). This use o f definitions may be peculiar to mathematics and the
hard sciences. In the social sciences, precise definitions are hard to find. Rather, an idea
is given a name (often a common word), and then the researcher spends paragraphs
describing what does and does not fit under the name.
In the analysis o f the data in this study, I followed Vinner (1976) and restricted my
attention to formal and lexical definitions to discuss the two primary roles that definitions
play in mathematics and mathematics learning, but it is worth pointing out that in the
above discussion I have presented stipulative definitions o f several terms including
concept image and stipulative definition itself. None o f these, however, carries the
precision o f formal mathematical definitions. I believe that such precision is not possible
because ideas about language and cognition are messy, fuzzy, and dependent upon the
phenomena that the definitions are intended to describe. Mathematical ideas, on the other
hand, are ideal— abstracted from phenomena and no longer dependent on the “real
world,” at least in formal mathematical practice.
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Definitions in Mathematical Practice
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it means
just what I choose it to mean— neither more nor less.” (Lewis Carroll, Through
the Looking Glass)

In the words o f Polya (1957), the “definition o f a term is a statement o f its meaning in
other terms which are supposed to be well known” (p. 85). But this seemingly innocuous
statement hides four crucial aspects o f the role o f definitions in mathematics: the creation
o f meaning, the need for undefined terms, the substitution criterion, and the use o f mental
or physical models. These are discussed, in turn, below.
“The mathematician is not concerned with the current meaning o f his technical term s....
The mathematical definition creates the mathematical meaning” (Polya, 1957, p. 86).
This view o f definitions, embodied in the character o f Humpty Dumpty above, reached
its height in the formalism o f Russell, Whitehead, Peacock, Hilbert, and others, but in
fact, has its early roots in Kant.3 Formalists maintain that mathematics involves
manipulating meaningless symbols according to the formal rules o f the system, and the
primary criterion is that the system is consistent. O f course, this point o f view requires
certain ontological and epistemological commitments or at least changes in perspective.
Hamilton, for example, insisted that the symbols must stand for something ‘real’— if not
material objects, then mental constructs (Kleiner, 1987). Nonetheless, some
mathematicians were reluctant to adopt a formalist view. Graves, for example, on
Hamilton’s invention o f the quaternions, responded, “I have not yet any clear view as to
the extent to which we are at liberty to create imaginaries, and to endow them with
supernatural properties” (quoted in Kleiner, 1987, p. 233). By 1844, however, less than a
3 This was the fundamental idea behind Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori statements. “Whereas, therefore,
mathematical definitions make their concepts, in philosophical definitions concepts are only explained”
(cited in Beth & Piaget, 1966, p. 13).
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year after Hamilton had published his work on quaternions, Graves and other
mathematicians begin creating new mathematical structures almost without restraint.4
It is well known that in any mathematical system some terms must be taken as primitive,
that is, left undefined, for the only alternatives are circular definitions or infinite regress,
neither o f which is logically tolerable. If one accepts that definitions create the meaning
o f terms, where, then, do undefined terms acquire their meaning? Just as the axioms o f
natural numbers form implicit definitions o f natural numbers (Beth & Piaget, 1966, p.
68), the axioms o f any mathematical system give implicit definitions o f the undefined
terms o f that system. Couturat made this point by distinguishing between direct
definition and definition by postulates, the latter applying not to a single notion but a
system o f notions (cited in Poincare, 1946, p. 453).
To adhere to the principle that all assumptions must be made explicit in the axioms and
definitions, Pascal was apparently the first to put forward the criterion o f substitution:
that the definition permits us “to substitute the definition in place o f the defined” (cited in
Beth & Piaget, 1966, p. 38). Thus, the substitution principle is a way o f ensuring that
every theorem and every proof could, in principle, be written using only the undefined
terms, the axioms, and the laws o f logic. Mariotti and Fischbein (1997) clarify the
implications o f this view:
In the new theory, it is not possible to prove anything which was not already
possible to prove in the old one. From the formal point o f view, a definition does
not enlarge the power o f the theory. A definition is rather a correct definition just
because it can be eliminated, (p. 222)

4 This approach is not without its failures. There is one apocryphal story, for example, of a mathematician
who proved all sorts of theorems based on a set of axioms that, it turned out, were satisfied only by the
empty set. See Wilensky (1991, note 4) for a similar example.
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And although this extreme formalism is rarely carried out, the first substitution is a
standard mathematical practice. In other words, when proving theorems about a newly
defined mathematical concept, the standard approach is to replace the term by its
definition. Polya (1957) calls this process “the elimination o f technical terms” by “going
back to definitions” (p. 89).
I f the axioms and the definitions are to be the source o f meaning within a mathematical
system, then the implication is that all proofs and formal reasoning should proceed from
the axioms, definitions, and previously proven theorems. This is what is meant by
mathematical rigor. Because physical and mental models o f the system might carry
meaning that does not follow from the axioms and definitions, such models cannot be
trusted and thus are inadmissible in proofs. The validity o f a proof is independent o f the
meaning o f the descriptive terms. To emphasize this point, Hilbert once said, “One must
be able to say at all times— instead o f points, straight lines, and planes— tables, chairs,
and beer mugs” (Reid, 1986, p. 57). The implication is that no matter how the terms are
interpreted, a counterexample will never be produced (Lakatos, 1976, p. 100). Taken to
an extreme, the formalist approach identifies mathematics with metamathematics and
with logic, resulting in a rather bleak picture:
The subject matter o f metamathematics is an abstraction o f mathematics in which
mathematical theories are replaced by formal systems, proofs by certain
sequences o f well-formed formulae, definitions by “abbreviatory devices” which
are “theoretically dispensable” but “typographically convenient.” (Lakatos,
1976, p. .1, drawing on Church, Peano, Russell, Whitehead, and Pascal)

But even Russell (1938) admits:
It is a curious paradox, puzzling to the symbolic mind, that definitions,
theoretically, are nothing but statements o f symbolic abbreviations, irrelevant to
the reasoning and inserted only for practical convenience, while yet, in the
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development o f a subject, they always require a very large amount o f thought,
and often embody some o f the greatest achievements o f analysis, (p. 63)

Thus, despite the formalism and the claim to disregard meaning, thinking and meaning
remain crucial characteristics o f mathematical activity. It is true that the words are
symbolic abbreviations, but the concepts for which they stand (and hence the meaning
that they are intended to carry) took time to formulate and constitute significant human
achievements.
When one acknowledges the importance o f both rigor and meaning, perhaps it is not
surprising that most mathematicians are Platonists on weekdays and formalists on the
weekends (P. J. Davis & Hersh, 1981), seeking to discover timeless mathematical truths
and simultaneously adhering to meaningless formalism.

Definitions in the History of Mathematics
The history o f mathematics is full o f examples where the definitions changed in order to
correct for unintended consequences, including such “simple” concepts as function,
continuity, and polyhedron (see Lakatos, 1976). Much o f the history o f mathematics has
been spent trying to figure out what the concepts are, trying to “get the definitions right,”
so that they correspond to the intuitions that the mathematicians had in mind.
We begin with a vague concept in our minds, then we create various sets o f
postulates, and gradually we settle down to one particular set. In the rigorous
postulational approach the original concept is now replaced by what the
postulates define. This makes further evolution o f the concept rather difficult
and as a result tends to slow down the evolution o f mathematics. It is not that the
postulation approach is wrong, only that its arbitrariness should be clearly
recognized, and we should be prepared to change postulates when the need
becomes apparent. (Hamming, 1980, p. 86)

The process o f “gradually settling down” on a definition deserves elaboration. Drawing
on Lakatos (1976), the process goes something like this:
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•

Get a mathematical idea that can form the beginning o f a concept.

•

Create an informal definition that seems to describe the concept.

•

Formalize that definition.

•

Reason from that definition to determine what it implies: Create some examples;
prove some theorems; look for equivalent or closely related characterizations o f the
concept.

•

Modify the formal definition to exclude undesired consequences.

•

Alternatively, enlarge or otherwise alter one’s understandings and intuitions o f the
concept to accommodate these newfound possibilities.

There are several points to make about this process. First, sometimes the modifications
to the definition amount to little more than eliminating undesirable examples through ad
hoc redefinitions, a seemingly nonmathematical practice Lakatos (1976) called monster
barring.
Second, the process incorporates apparent contradictions on the role o f definitions: On
the one hand, the definition is taken to create a mathematical object and to give a term its
meaning. And on the other hand, the definition is carefully chosen to capture a specific
meaning and with an instrumental or expository purpose. Because both o f these roles are
mathematically indispensable, their relationship is better viewed as dialectical.
Third, once agreement is reached, a definition can be taken as primary— as though it had
been handed down on stone tablets. In the deductivist, definition-theorem-proof format
o f much mathematical presentation and exposition, the dialectical evolution o f the
concept and its definition are subsequently ignored.
In deductivist style, all propositions are true and all inferences valid.
Mathematics is presented as an ever-increasing set o f eternal, immutable
truths.... Deductivist style hides the struggle, hides the adventure. The whole
story vanishes, the successive tentative formulations o f the theorem in the course
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o f the proof-procedure are doomed to oblivion while the end result is exalted into
sacred infallibility.5 (Lakatos, 1976, p. 142)

Such strict adherence to formalism is to ignore the history o f mathematics, rendering the
teacher and students blind to important epistemological obstacles and ignorant o f
required changes in perspective. And not only are students deprived o f opportunities to
see and benefit from the growth o f particular definitions, they are thus also deprived of
opportunities to appreciate the evolution o f the role o f definition in mathematics.
It should not be at all surprising that students have difficulty accepting the role o f
definitions in modem mathematics when it was not fundamental in until the nineteenth
century.

Definitions and Mathematical Intuition
By relaxing the demands o f pure formalism, one can adopt a position in which intuition
and meaning are central to mathematical activity but where logic and rigor are available
as tools for verification. As Hadamard said, “The object o f mathematical rigor is to
sanction and legitimize the conquests o f intuition, and there never was any other object
for it” (cited in Ahlfors et al., 1962, p. 192). Despite the rhetoric o f formalism and rigor,
it seems that metaphorical thinking (Sfard, 1994) and intuition remain central:
It is significant that when a mathematician reads a theorem which conflicts with
his intuitive expectations his first move is to doubt not his intuition but the proof.
He trusts his intuition more. If after having checked the proof carefully he
becomes convinced that it is correct, he then inquires into what may be wrong
with his intuition. (Kline, 1973, p. 160)

Thurston (1994) acknowledges putting “a lot o f effort into ‘listening’ to my intuitions and
associations, and building them into metaphors and connections” (p. 165). He discusses

5 Lakatos condemned mathematics and science education as a hotbed of authoritarianism and as the worst
enemy of critical thought (Lakatos, 1976, pp. 142-143, note 2).
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the relationships am ong definition, understanding, and intuition by presenting several
characterizations o f the concept o f derivative:
(1) Infinitesimal: the ratio o f the infinitesimal change in the value o f a function to
the infinitesimal change in a function.
(2) Symbolic: the derivative ofx" is nx"_1, the derivative o f sin(x) is cos(x), the
derivative o f f ° g is f ' ° g * g ' , etc.
(3) Logical: / ' ( x ) = d if and only if for every s there is a 8 such that when

0 < |Ax| < 5 ,
/ ( x + Ax) - / ( x )

< 8 [sic\.

Ax
(4) Geometric: the derivative is the slope o f a line tangent to the graph o f the
function, if the graph has a tangent.
(5) Rate: the instantaneous speed of/f?), when t is time.
(6) Approximation: The derivative o f a function is the best linear approximation
to the function near a point.
(7) Microscopic: The derivative o f a function is the limit o f what you get by
looking at it under a microscope o f higher and higher power.
This is a list o f different ways o f thinking about or conceiving o/the derivative
rather than a list o f logical definitions. Unless great efforts are made to maintain
the tone and flavor o f the original human insights, the differences start to
evaporate as soon as the mental objects are translated into precise, formal and
explicit definitions.
I can remember absorbing each o f these concepts as something new and
interesting, and spending a good deal o f mental time and effort digesting and
practicing with each, reconciling it with the others. I also remember coming
back to revisit these different concepts later with added meaning and
understanding....
The list continues; there is no reason for it ever to stop. A sample entry further
down the list may help illustrate this. We may think we know all there is to say
about a certain subject, but new insights are around the comer. Furthermore, one
person’s clear mental image is another person’s intimidation:
37. The derivative o f a real-valued function/in a domain D is the Lagrangian
section o f the cotangent bundle T*(D) that gives the connection form for the
unique flat connection on the trivial R-bundle D x R for which the graph o f / i s
parallel, (pp. 163-164)
D espite the fact that Thurston’s 37 characterizations are not definitions, for him they may
function as definitions in reasoning within certain problem settings, though perhaps
without the precision o f a formal definition. From his use o f words such as fla v o r , tone,
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and insight, it is clear that these characterizations are full o f m eaning for Thurston. And
it is w orth em phasizing that attempting to form alize these ways o f thinking runs the risk
o f changing their character and perhaps their usefulness in reasoning.

Definitions and Learning Mathematical Concepts
D raw ing on the history and expository literature discussed above, I take the position that
m eaning is central to m athem atical learning and m athem atical thought and that careful
reasoning from precise definitions is an im portant capability to be cultivated in
m athem atics majors. W hat, then, is the relationship betw een definitions and learning?

Skemp (1987) proposes two principles for teaching m athem atical concepts:
1.

Concepts o f a higher order than those which people already have cannot be
communicated to them by a definition, but only by arranging for them to
encounter a suitable collection o f examples.

2.

Since in mathematics these examples are almost invariably other concepts, it
must first be ensured that these are already formed in the mind o f the learner.
(p. 18)

Skemp does not indicate how or when he cam e to these sensible conclusions or w hat sort
o f empirical data support them. But from the preceding discussion, it should be clear that
mathem aticians are distinguished by their ability to violate the first o f these principles,
and it appears that Halm os, at least, transcends the second principle by constructing his
ow n examples: “A good stock o f examples, as large as possible, is indispensable for a
thorough understanding o f any concept, and w hen I w ant to learn something new, I make
it m y first jo b to build one” (cited in Gallian, 1994, p. 34).

Thus, learning to violate or transcend these principles is a requirem ent for entering into
the m athem atical community. Specifically, a student pursuing a degree in mathematics
m ust leam to build understanding (and perhaps create the examples) by reasoning from a
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definition. But here we have a conflict: On the one hand, students must learn to reason
from the definitions rather than exclusively from their concept images because pictures,
metaphors, and informal understandings are sometimes unreliable. On the other hand,
the source o f their reasoning may continue to be the models and metaphors that they keep
in mind.
Conflicts between the empirical (lexical) approach and the theoretical approach
can represent a real obstacle for the students’ understanding. That is the reason
why the problem o f introducing pupils to the mathematical process o f defining
constitutes a crucial point in mathematics education, which needs to be faced
directly. (Mariotti & Fischbein, 1997, p. 226)

Adopting a formalistic approach to definitions may require epistemological and
ontological changes in perspective. Suffice it to say that these changes in approach and
perspective are rarely made explicit to the student. It is possible that successful
mathematicians learned to reason from the definitions without ever being aware o f these
changes in perspective. And by the time they are teaching courses to undergraduates, this
approach has become so natural that they do not realize that nothing has changed for the
student.
From the naive student’s point o f view, definitions are lexical: They are used to describe
or explain ideas that already exist (Vinner, 1976). But as concepts expand, become more
general, and allow inclusion o f never-before-imagined examples, the natural meaning
gets lost. What does it take to understand the importance o f formal reasoning, which
includes reasoning from definitions?
Students do not understand the role o f mathematical definitions in general and, in
particular, do not know how to reason from definitions. Mariotti and Fischbein (1997)
found, like Vinner, that students may know the definition and yet fail to correctly identify
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whether objects satisfy the definition because the “concepts are often, implicitly or
explicitly, distorted by gestalts” (p. 244). These distortions can take the form of
additional conditions that remain implicit. They suggest that “in empirical domains, one
tends to adapt the definitions to the empirical data— and exceptions are admissible”
(p. 245).

Borasi’s Work
Some o f the most fully elaborated work on learning the nature and role o f mathematical
definitions comes from Borasi. In Learning Mathematics Through Inquiry (Borasi,
1992), she presents a detailed analysis o f a “mini-course” with two high school students.
Although she had broad mathematical goals, she chose to focus on the notion o f
definition because it “presents a beautiful example o f the more humanistic and
contextualized aspects o f mathematics” (p. 7).
Before presenting any o f the data or analysis, she sets forth five criteria for definitions:
•

Precision in terminology. All the terms employed in the definition should
have been previously defined, unless they are one o f the few undefined terms
assumed as a starting point in the axiomatic system one is working with.

•

Isolation o f the concept. All instances o f a concept must meet all the
requirements stated in its definition, while a noninstance will not satisfy at
least one o f them.

•

Essentiality. Only terms and properties that are strictly necessary to
distinguish the concept in question from others should be explicitly
mentioned in the definition.

•

Noncontradiction. All the properties stated in a definition should be able to
coexist.

•

Noncircularity. The definition should not use the term it is trying to define.
(Borasi, 1992, pp. 17-18)

She then points out that these criteria stem, in part, from the fact that we want a definition to:
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1. Allow us to discriminate between instances and noninstances of the concept
with certainty, consistency, and efficiency (by simply checking whether a
potential candidate satisfies all the properties stated in the definition).
2. “Capture” and synthesize the mathematical essence of the concept (all the
properties belonging to the concept should be logically derivable from those
included in its definition), (p. 18)
During the mini-course the students wrote, created, and modified definitions, extended
definitions to new domains, and constructed definitions in new contexts, such as taxicab
geometry. In one o f the activities, inspired by Lakatos’s (1976) example of the evolution
o f the definition o f polyhedron, Borasi asked the students to construct a definition o f
polygon, believing that such an experience “could help students appreciate that
definitions are really created by us, even in mathematics, where everything may seem
rigid and predetermined (at least to most students)” (Borasi, 1992, p. 44).
Based upon her analysis, Borasi concludes that the students changed their conceptions
not only o f mathematical definitions but also o f mathematics. Through the experience,
she also changed her view o f mathematical definition, realizing a deeper understanding o f
the role o f context and purpose in the creation and evaluation o f mathematical definitions.
Furthermore, she reconsidered the role o f her five criteria set forth above, for those
criteria are satisfactory only in specific mathematical contexts when it is reasonable to
imagine the definition is fixed. When the context changes, however, the criteria must be
relaxed, at least for a moment, and the definition may change.

Which Definition?
Which of the various equivalent formulations o f a concept is chosen as its definition?
The choice is not arbitrary, despite the formalist claim to the contrary. In a formal
presentation o f a concept, the definition that is chosen is usually the one that is most
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elegant or most useful in proofs concerning the concept, which implies that it is formal
and often that it is minimal and otherwise concise. In a pedagogical presentation, a
definition is chosen with a particular pedagogical purpose. Poincare (1946) makes it
clear that the choices should not be the same:
What is a good definition? For the philosopher or the scientist it is a definition
which applies to the objects defined, and only those; it is the one satisfying the
mles o f logic. But in teaching it is not that; a good definition is one understood
by the scholars [students], (p. 430)

This view toward formalism was echoed by 75 mathematicians who, responding to the
excesses o f the new math, warned that “premature formalization may lead to sterility”
(Ahlfors et al., 1962, p. 190).
From the mathematics education community, Mariotti and Fischbein warn that “the
formal approach does not grasp the very process o f defining” (p. 222) and suggest,
instead that definitions have a constructive and creative role and actually bring new
concepts into existence. They propose that “a definition is to be considered a ‘good’
definition as far as the new object starts to live by itself and may become the subject o f a
new theory” (p. 223).

There seems to be very little discussion in the literature about the problem o f conflicting
definitions, other than occasionally mentioning that parallelograms are sometimes but not
always included as trapezoids. What is rarely acknowledged is that there are also
conflicting definitions o f natural number (including vs. omitting 0), ring (including vs.
omitting 1), and integral domain (including vs. omitting commutativity). Thus, although
a particular definition may be chosen with a particular expository or pedagogical purpose,
there is a certain arbitrariness in which objects are thus defined.
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Definitions in Textbooks
How are definitions treated in mathematical texts? Explicit definitions can send implicit
messages about the role o f definitions in mathematics. Raman (1998) found that texts
send conflicting messages about the purpose and use o f mathematical definitions. Vinner
(1991) suggests that mathematics textbooks and classroom practice are partly based on
the following assumptions:
1.

Concepts are mainly acquired by means o f their definitions.

2.

Students will use definitions to solve problems and prove theorems.

3.

Definitions should be minimal.

4.

It is desirable that definitions will be elegant.

5.

Definitions are arbitrary, (pp. 65-66)

What conclusions do students draw from such implicit messages? Rin (1982) found that
students do not understand that the definition is to be the official source of information
about the concept and that textbooks sometimes compound the problem by burying
definitions in the text or the exercises, or by leaving implicit the quantifiers or the
appropriate range o f the variables.
W ould it be better if texts were explicit about the nature and role o f definitions in
mathematics? Textbooks are rarely explicit about the role o f definition, although some
texts emphasize that all definitions are “if and only i f ’ statements (e.g., Fraleigh, 1989, p.
3; Bittinger, 1982, p. 40), and a few point out that a definition is an abbreviation (e.g.,
Bittinger, 1982, p. 40). But these are statements about what a definition is, which is
singularly unhelpful to students, who believe they already know what definitions are and
implicitly operate on this basis (Vinner, 1976). Instead, students need to leam what to do
with definitions.
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Summary
Definitions play opposing roles in mathematical thinking and learning, serving
simultaneously to describe and support informal mathematical intuition and meaning and
to create meaning through the imposition o f formalism. These opposing roles are evident
in the history o f mathematics, in the evolution o f definitions o f key concepts, in
mathematics textbooks, and in research into students’ use o f definitions in mathematical
learning. In order to accommodate both o f these roles into descriptions o f students’
understandings o f concepts in abstract algebra, I took a broad view o f definitions, with
the aim o f capturing both meaning and level o f precision. Thus, the analysis included not
only students’ attempts at formal definitions but also the ad hoc personal definitions they
provided when I asked for the meaning o f a term or statement.

Abstraction Versus Generalization
Mathematically, a definition creates meaning for a new concept, but psychologically, new
concepts are created through processes o f abstraction and generalization. Abstraction and
generalization are fundamental human activities that become critically important in
advanced mathematics. Dreyfus (1991) suggests, for example, that the ability to
consciously make abstractions from mathematical situations “may well be the single most
important goal o f advanced mathematical education” (p. 34). I begin with abstraction,
which played a central role during the new math era. Here is one view from that era:
The process o f abstraction is defined as the process o f drawing from a number o f
different situations something which is common to them all. Logically speaking
it is an inductive process; it consists o f a search for an attribute which would
describe certain elements felt somehow to belong together....
For example the forming o f the concept o f the natural number two is an
abstraction process, as it consists mainly o f experiences o f pairs o f objects o f the
greatest possible diversity, all properties o f such objects being ignored except
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that o f being distinct from each other and from other objects. The essential
common property o f all such pairs o f objects is the natural number two. (Dienes,
1961, p p .281-282)

Piaget distinguishes between empirical abstraction, which starts from perceived objects,
and reflective abstraction, which starts from actions and operations (Beth & Piaget, 1966,
pp. 188-189).
As an adjective, abstract is usually contrasted with concrete. Wilensky (1991) points
out, however, that concreteness is not a property o f an object but a property o f a person’s
relationship to an object. Concreteness, he suggests, measures the degree o f our
relatedness to the object (the richness o f our representations, interactions, connections
with the object), how close we are to it, or the quality o f our relationship with the object.
Thus, any object can become concrete for someone. He notes that this point o f view
turns the old definition o f concrete on its head, so that thinking concretely is not narrow
but rather opens up a whole world o f ideas and relationships. Frorer, Hazzan, and Manes
(1997) agree with Wilensky and suggest two additional themes in abstraction: ignoring
details and thinking o f things in terms o f properties rather than actual components.
As for generalization, it should be mentioned that generalization and abstraction are often
confounded in the literature (e.g., Dreyfus, 1991) and are sometimes treated as essentially
synonymous (e.g., Beth & Piaget, 1966; Vygotsky, 1934/1986).6 Tall (1991) suggests,
however, that generalization simply involves an extension o f familiar processes whereas
abstraction requires mental reorganization. Thus, generalization is the application o f an
existing process or structure to a broader class o f objects (see also Dienes, 1961).
Generalization may be contrasted with specialization, where the scope o f a process or
6 Piaget speaks mostly about abstraction and Vygotsky mostly about generalization, but it is possible that
these choices were made by the translators.
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structure is restricted in some way. Abstraction, on the other hand, creates a new
structure on a higher level, which is not a deduction but a construction process.
Abstraction may be contrasted with exemplification, which creates a specific instance of
the abstract structure or idea. A mathematical metaphor may help make the distinction
more clear: Generalization and specialization are about creating supersets and subsets;
abstraction is about constructing a new kind o f set and exemplification involves choosing
an element o f that set. In mathematical thinking, o f course, abstraction and
generalization may be operating simultaneously or consecutively. It is not always
possible, however, to separate the two processes, such as in the introduction o f the
notation o f an asterisk

to serve generally for an abstract binary operation.

Processes Versus Objects
One o f the central theoretical themes in advanced mathematical thinking is the distinction
between process and object conceptions o f mathematical ideas. Although the
terminology is diverse, the primary distinction is that a process is an activity carried out
through some sort o f procedure, whereas an object can be conceived o f as a single entity.
Many mathematical ideas can be conceived both as processes and as objects, so the
distinction is psychological. Sfard (1991) distinguishes between operational and
structural conceptions. Harel and Kaput (1991) distinguish between a process and a
conceptual entity. Dubinsky and his colleagues (Dubinsky, 1991; Breidenbach,
Dubinsky, Hawks, & Nichols, 1992) also distinguish between processes and objects and
offer additional categories described above. In reviewing this literature, Tall, Thomas, G.
Davis, Gray, and Simpson (2000) suggest that it is possible to ascertain whether students
have constructed a mental object based on the way they talk and write about the concept.
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Object conceptions allow for descriptive discourse and attention to structural features o f
the mathematical ideas. Process conceptions, on the other hand, are confined to narrative
discourse.
There are some differences among the perspectives o f these researchers, but they are in
agreement that a learner cannot meaningfully act on a process with another process until
the former has become an object in his or her mind. This kind o f mental construction is
called encapsulation (or reification, or entification). For some concepts, encapsulation
seems to be extremely difficult for most students, and coset may be one such concept, as
suggested in the literature review above.
On the other hand, there are “natural,” implicit instances o f encapsulation. For example,
from a process o f counting, a young child creates an understanding o f “4” as an object
that describes what is the same about the wheels on a car, the legs on a dog, and the sides
o f a rectangle. To emphasize the ambiguity in the symbolism for mathematical ideas,
Gray and Tall (1994) coined the term procept. Thus, “4 + 5” is a symbol that
simultaneously denotes both the process o f addition and object that results. In abstract
algebra, given a subgroup H and a group element a, the notation aH simultaneously
specifies the process for calculating the cosets o f //a n d the result o f one o f those
calculations for the particular value a.
Gray and Tall (1994) further distinguish between a procedure, where the focus is on stepby-step details, and a process, where the concern is with the result (as dependent on the
initial state). A procedure, in other words, refers to a specific algorithm for carrying out a
process. The process o f addition, for example, can be carried out by many different
procedures, including counting all, counting on, or pressing buttons on a calculator.
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Similarly, there are many procedures that can be constructed to determine whether a
subgroup is normal, but any (or all) o f them may be conceptualized as the process for
determining normality.

Metaphor
Drawing on the work o f Lakoff and Nunez (1997, 2000), I take the position that
mathematical concepts are predominantly metaphorical in nature. Despite the central role
o f precise formal definitions, mathematical thinking is usually guided by metaphors.
This recent work in the cognitive science o f mathematics is based upon a large body o f
empirical work in cognitive science that has produced three major findings: “The mind is
inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely
metaphorical” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 1). In identifying the metaphors that support
particular concepts, most o f the evidence comes “from language— from the meanings of
words and phrases and from the way humans make sense o f their experiences” (p. 115).
Lakoff and Nunez (2000) elaborate the metaphorical nature o f mathematics,
concentrating first on arithmetic and later on concepts such as the real numbers, limits,
and continuity, building up to a case study o f the equation e™ +1 = 0. In their analysis,
some mathematical concepts are based upon grounding metaphors, such as Sets Are
Containers,7 that grow out o f bodily experience in the world. Other concepts link to,
build upon, or coordinate previously established metaphors, so that “much o f the
‘abstraction’ o f higher mathematics is a consequence o f the systematic layering of
metaphor upon metaphor, often over the course o f centuries” (p. 47). A metaphor “A is

7 Throughout this section, I have adopted Lakoff and Nunez’s convention of capitalizing the names of the
metaphors.
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B” is a mapping from a source domain B to a target domain A, where the source domain
is typically more familiar. The inferential structure o f the source domain gives structure
to the target domain, often introducing new elements or relationships in the target
domain. The Arithmetic-Is-Object-Collection metaphor, for example, provides
grounding for the commutativity o f addition; the Arithmetic-Is-Motion-Along-a-Path
metaphor provides grounding for the concepts o f zero and fractions.
Between their detailed treatments o f arithmetic and real analysis, Lakoff and Nunez
provide a short discussion o f metaphorical nature o f abstract algebra. A key construct in
their analysis is the Fundamental Metonymy o f Algebra, which allows us to reason about
numbers or other entities without knowing which particular entities we are talking about.
This mathematical notion depends upon its everyday version, the Role-for-Individual
metonymy, by which we are able to imagine carrying out actions with whoever (or
whatever) fills the required role.
Because algebra in general and abstract algebra in particular are about essence, Lakoff
and Nunez (2000) discuss the Folk Theory o f Essences, which includes such notions as
“everything is a specific kind o f thing” (p. 107), “kinds are categories” (p. 108), and “the
essence o f a thing is an inherent part o f that thing” (p. 108). Essence is characterized by
three metaphors: Essences Are Substances, Essences Are Forms, and Essences Are
Patterns o f Change. The Folk Theory o f Essences was behind Aristotle’s definition o f
definition as a “list o f properties that are both necessary and sufficient for something to
be the kind o f thing that it is, and from which all its natural behavior flows” (p. 109) and
also behind Euclid’s axiomatic (or postulational) approach.
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Building on the metaphor Essences Are Forms, Lakoff and Nunez (2000) put forward a
foundational metaphor for abstract algebra: The essence o f a mathematical system is an
abstract algebraic structure, which is taken to include the elements in the structure, the
operations used on those elements, and the essential properties o f the operations (p. 111).
I accept their guiding principles and much o f their analysis, but regarding abstract
algebra, their analysis falls short on two counts. First, their notion o f a mathematical
structure is too restrictive because mathematical structures do not always have operations.
Second, some o f their metaphors are backwards in the sense that the source domain is
less familiar and more abstract than the target domain it is intended to describe.
For example, they claim, in effect, that Z3 is the abstract group with three elements.
While this is a true statement, it is not a helpful metaphor. Furthermore, their description
o f the abstract group with three elements uses the set {/, A, B} with the expected
operation table. This group, it is important to note, is not the abstract group itself but a
particular representation of it— a representation, moreover, that does not easily support
calculation. If abstract concepts are metaphorical, as they claim, then the appropriate
metaphor is that the abstract group with three elements is Z3, thereby providing a familiar
instantiation o f the abstraction. This metaphor does not provide a complete
characterization o f the abstract group, however, because it leaves out the necessary
abstraction. Where do abstractions come from, and by what process do they come about?
Unfortunately, the process o f abstraction (abstracting) is conspicuously missing from
their analysis, although the results o f abstractions are covered in their Folk Theory of
Essences.
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To remedy the analysis provided by Lakoff and Nunez, it is necessary first to broaden the
notion o f structure. Rickart (1995) suggests that there is “not much hope for stating in a
few lines a precise and complete definition o f structure” (p. 11). In its place, he suggests,
puts forward “an admittedly imprecise approximate definition, which is then elaborated
and made increasingly more complete through examples and explanations” (p. 11).
Rickart’s definition is the following: “A structure is any set o f objects (also called
elements) along with certain relations among those objects” (p. 17, emphasis in original).
The advantage o f this definition over that o f Lakoff and Nunez is that it can
accommodate topological and order structures. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
notion o f structure in fields outside mathematics, such as linguistics, psychology,
biology, and anthropology (Rickart, 1995; see also Piaget, 1970b).
Algebraic structures fit this definition by way o f an appropriate interpretation o f the
relations among the objects. A group is a structure, for example, in that the objects are
the elements and the relation is a ternary relation defined in terms o f the group operation:
The group elements in an ordered triple (g, h, k) are related if gh = k. (Rickart, 1995,
p. 53) The group axioms can be also be specified as relations.
Analysis o f the concepts in group theory, focusing primarily on language, leads to the
conclusion that group theory is guided primarily by two metaphors:
•

Groups Are Sets

•

Groups Are Structures

At first sight, these do not appear to be metaphors at all but would be more accurately
characterized as obvious statements o f fact. A group, after all, is a set. But sets and
structures are themselves metaphors, which may be traced back to metaphors that are
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grounded in bodily experience. With the above definitions o f structure as a set o f
elements with relations among them, it is possible to reduce this to one metaphor: Groups
Are Structures. A guiding principle behind the concept o f structure, however, is that a
structure is independent o f the elements themselves, depending only on the relations. For
this reason and because the Groups-Are-Sets metaphor is so predominant, it makes sense
to consider it separately.
The metaphor Groups Are Sets is quickly grounded through the Sets-Are-Containers
metaphor, hence groups are containers. This metaphorical thinking becomes apparent in
expressions such as “an element g in a group G.” When a set is closed under an
operation, as all groups are, the container is metaphorically closed, preventing the
elements from escaping. The Groups-Are-Containers metaphor takes a slightly different
character in the question “Where does this element live?” suggesting a Containers-AreTerritories metaphor that becomes particularly apparent when the group is the domain or
codomain o f a homomorphism.
The metaphor Groups Are Structures becomes apparent in the etymological derivation of
the term isomorphism as meaning “same form.'" The metaphor o f structure also suggests
that the form is in some sense incomplete, providing only the framework that is the
relations among the elements. The elements themselves are unimportant details. When a
particular set under a particular operation is said to be a group, it is the operation that
provides the structure, by sitting metaphorically above the elements and imposing form
on the relations among them.
In constructing the above definition o f structure and structuralism that applies across
diverse fields, Rickart (1995) observes, “The objective o f a structuralist approach to a
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subject is to extract the essential information from the background o f irrelevant or
unimportant information” (p. 19). Thus, structures are also essences. And since
“essence” and “essentially” share the root essens (Latin present participle o f esse, “to
be”), the merged concepts o f structure and essence is revealed in the semantic
equivalence between the statements “the groups are essentially the same” and “the groups
have the same structure.”
By building metaphors on top o f metaphors, abstraction on top o f abstraction, it is
possible to create hierarchical chains o f metaphors that ultimately depend upon
grounding metaphors. What, then, is the metaphorical relationship between essence and
structure in mathematics? On the one hand, structures are essences, but on the other
hand, the essence o f a mathematical system is its structure. This is not circular reasoning,
however, but an example o f a conceptual blend, where two concepts combine to form a
deeper unified concept while also contributing to a more flexible understanding o f each
o f the concepts individually. The conceptual blend Numbers Are Points on a Line, for
example, beginning with Descartes, paved the way for profound connections between
geometry and algebra. Thus, structures are essences and vice versa. Saying structures
are essences highlights the push toward abstraction that is a guiding principle behind the
structuralist approach. Saying mathematical essences are structures, on the other hand,
gives body and form to an otherwise ethereal concept.
Consider the definition o f a structure as a set with relations, along with the metaphor
Structures Are Essences and the three metaphors that characterize essence: Essences Are
Substances, Essences Are Forms, and Essences Are Patterns o f Change. Taken together
these metaphors reaffirm the point made in chapter 1 that mathematics can fit under any
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o f the three themes in Devlin’s (2000) characterization that “modem mathematics is
about abstract patterns, abstract structures, and abstract relationships” (p. 136).
This discussion provides but a preliminary analysis o f the metaphorical nature o f the
concept o f group. Group theory involves many more concepts, some o f which are
discussed metaphorically in the analysis that follows. I note here only a few key
metaphors that informed this study: Subgroups are subsets, homomorphisms are
functions, cosets are sets, and sets are objects.

Naming and Notation
Thus far, I have discussed concepts and their definitions, and certainly mathematical
thinking and discourse require concepts and definitions. But students often use language
and notation incorrectly. Rin (1982) suggests that students’ linguistic misbehaviors are
interpretable as reflective o f deficient understanding or o f deficient expressive powers
(p. 10). Mathematical learning requires not only constructing concepts but also learning
the standard names and notations for those concepts and the appropriate verbal and
mathematical syntax for referring to those concepts in mathematical discourse. In this
study, issues o f naming and notation were central, as they are key components o f the
larger issues o f language and representation.
One commonly advocated approach for teaching that promotes understanding is to
provide opportunities for students to explore concepts before giving the concept a name
(e.g., Leron & Dubinsky, 1995). After the students have had sufficient experience and
have noticed certain regularities, the relevant concepts can be given names. The naming
itself is seen as unproblematic. As the mathematician John H. Conway (1995, April 13)
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once said when discussing whether spherical geometry is a non-Euclidean geometry,
“This is the sort o f question that bugs me! Being about names, it’s not a mathematical
[s/e], so ‘the answer’ really doesn’t matter.”
But this study and at least one other (Lajoie & Mura, 2000) suggest that attaching the
name is sometimes not as simple as supposed. As part o f a larger study into the learning
o f abstract algebra, Lajoie and Mura found that when asked about cyclic groups, students
seemed to focus on metaphors o f coming back to the start, cycles, and images o f circles.
Most students did not consider infinite cyclic groups to be cyclic because “you don’t
come back.” Lajoie and Mura propose several sources o f confusion: inappropriate use o f
mathematical definition, semantic contamination from everyday language (a la Pimm,
1987), confusion with cyclic permutations, and nonstandard definitions o f powers and
generators. They point out, first, that incorrect conceptions can lead to correct answers
for many questions about Z„ and, second, that in the history o f group theory, Ruffini,
Cauchy, and Jordan used similar imprecise “circular” language and excluded infinite
cyclic groups. As possible solutions, they suggest drawing students’ attention to
differences between mathematical and ordinary uses o f words and explicit teaching o f the
role o f definition in mathematics.
The question here is, What is the relationship between a concept and its name? What is
gained by giving a collection o f physical or mental entities a name? How is thinking
constrained by the particular name chosen? Given the name o f a new concept, what
understanding do students associate with that name and how? These uncertainties imply
that the notion o f concept image must be applied flexibly in the analysis to allow for the
possibility o f nonstandard connections between concepts and names.
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Similar questions may be asked regarding mathematical notation. As mentioned above,
students often use mathematical notation improperly in abstract algebra (Selden &
Selden, 1978; Hazzan, 1994). M ason and Pimm (1984) suggest that students’ difficulty
may be caused partly by ambiguity in the notation itself. What, for example, does 2N
stand for? Is it any even number or all even numbers? Is it specific, particular, generic,
or general? Perhaps it is not an even number at all, for it would never appear in a list o f
even numbers. Is it shorthand for {2N: N a whole number}? In this case, 2N is not an
even number but an instruction to carry out a calculation. Mason and Pimm suggest that,
for students, 2N sometimes represents any even number and that as a result they may
show that the sum o f two even numbers is even by writing 2N + 2N = 4N. What is
missing is awareness o f 2N as a particular even number. Any has two interpretations:
generic and general, and the latter implies “every.” Recognizing that in fact “2N ” is
merely marks on the paper, they point out that the meaning has to do with perception.
Durkin and Shire (1991) suggest that some difficulties with language arise from
ambiguities in the language itself, pointing in particular to polysemy, the property o f
some words to have distinct but related meanings. There are many examples, such as
function or group, in which an everyday word takes on a specialized meaning in
mathematics. Durkin and Shire suggest that the words some and any may be similarly
confounded, providing additional insight into the observations o f Mason and Pimm
(1984) above. What is more problematic is when words take on multiple but related
meanings within mathematical discourse itself. Zazkis (1998) suggests, for example, that
the term quotient takes on different meanings depending upon whether one is dealing
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with whole numbers or rational numbers. In abstract algebra, it appears that the term
cycle is mathematically polysemous (Lajoie & Mura, 2000).
Taken together, these studies suggest that attaching names and notations to ideas involves
subtle distinctions and ambiguities in language to fit with subtle conceptual distinctions
among mathematical objects. Thus, empirical and theoretical work must allow for and
explain the possibility that students might take words and notations to carry nonstandard
meanings. For this study, the analytical tools were furnished by semiotics.

Semiotics
Figure 1. Ceci n’est pas un groupe
* e
e e
a a
b b

a
a
b
e

b
b
e
a

& eci a 'e&it fzaa. cut ynottfre

To paraphrase Rene Magritte regarding his painting Ceci n ’est pas une pipe [This is not a
pipe] (see Foucault, 1983), the table in Figure 1 is not a group. To be precise, it is a
representation— a sign. The sign is certainly not itself the abstract group with three
elements. A central theme in this study is the relationship between mathematical notation
and language, concept definitions, and conceptual understanding. This is essentially the
relationship among signs, objects, and meaning, which is the province o f the field of
semiotics, or the study o f signs. Whereas semantics is the study o f meaning in language,
semiotics is the study o f meaning in signs, which includes language as a subset.
Semiotics is generally recognized to have been founded in the work o f Swiss linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and independently in the work o f American
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mathematician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). This section
presents the influential distinctions made by Saussure and Peirce on the nature o f signs
and o f sign systems and their relationship to meaning. These basics o f semiotics are then
connected to the work o f Vygotsky, with particular attention to learning and the
relationship between personal and social meaning. Additional theoretical background is
then provided on various types o f signs and on the semiotics o f mathematics. The section
closes with a discussion o f the analytical framework that was used to guide and organize
the analysis for this study.

The Sign
Saussure’s (1959) fundamental contribution was the distinction between the two
inseparable components o f the sign: the signifier (e.g., a sound or symbol) and the
signified (the concept represented). The signifier itself is meaningless, for the same
signifier can represent a different signified in a different context. Saussure also
distinguished between speech (sound patterns) and writing, seeing writing as a separate,
dependent sign system. Such a distinction was not necessary for this study, and Saussure
him self arrived at many o f his principles by analyzing words and not sound patterns. I do
distinguish between mathematical language and notation, however, as there are clear
psychological differences for mathematics students. The term multiplicative identity and
the symbol 1, for example, do not necessarily have the same meaning.
The fundamental unit o f semiotic analysis is the sign, which includes the signifier, the
signified, and the crucial connection between them. The sign, it should be recognized, is
arbitrary, in the sense that the bond between signifier and signified is essentially
circumstantial, cultural, conventional, and historical. It is tempting to conclude that
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meaning is contained in the sign. But signs have no meaning except as they relate to and
are distinguished from other signs:
In Saussurean linguistics, words do not refer to things themselves. Rather, they
have meaning as points within the entire system that is a language— a system,
further, conceived as a network o f graded differences. (Harkness, 1983, p. 5)

Thus, Saussure’s “conception o f meaning was purely structural and relational rather than
referential1(Chandler, in press, emphasis in original). The structure o f a language
system or any system o f signs depends upon its network o f graded differences. The
network is built from semantic distinctions that create concepts, for a concept is not a
concept until its boundaries are specified. These semantic distinctions, as well as the
supporting phonological, syntactic, and symbolic distinctions, are ontologically arbitrary,
as evidenced by the fact that translation between languages is sometimes problematic.
Anthropological linguists Sapir and W horf found, for example, that “Eskimo has many
words for snow, whereas Aztec employs a single term for the concepts o f snow, cold, and
ice” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1999). In other words, different languages provide for
different concepts. This observation puts a twist on Shakespeare’s aphorism “a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet.” The validity o f the statement depends, after all,
upon a language that distinguishes roses from objects that smell less sweet, and also
distinguishes “smell” and “sweet” from related concepts.
Semiotics is concerned not only with what signs mean but with how signs mean what
they mean (Sturrock, cited in Chandler, in press), which requires studying the structural
relations among signs, as mentioned above, and also the relationship between signs and
interpreters. But what is meaning? And where is it? There is a long history of
philosophical debate about the meaning o f meaning (see, e.g., Zemach, 1992). For the
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purposes o f this study, I point out one particularly influential approach, proposed by
Wittgenstein (1973):
For a large class o f cases— though not for all— in which we employ the word
“meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning o f a word is its use in the
language.
And the meaning o f a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
(pt. 1, set. 43)

Wittgenstein’s solution contrasts sharply with that of Saussure (1959), for whom “the
linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image”(p. 66).
For Saussure, meaning was a psychological phenomenon in that the signifier was a
mental representation o f sensory impressions and the signified was also a mental
construct. W ittgenstein’s statement, on the other hand, has a decidedly social or cultural
sense, a point o f view that fits with Matthews (2000), who argues that “meanings are in
the public domain; they have to be enculturated” (p. 171). In the analysis for this study, I
considered both psychological meaning and social meaning in mathematical discourse,
focusing, in particular, on the relationships between them.
Charles Sanders Peirce developed a semiotic theory that takes into account both the
psychological and social planes. Asserting that nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as
a sign, Peirce (1955) proposed, “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to
somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (p. 99). This is essentially a
material version o f Saussure’s signifier. This sign addresses somebody, creating in the
mind o f that person an equivalent or more developed sign, which Peirce calls an
interpretant. These are complemented by the object to which the sign refers, creating a
triadic relationship. It is important to point out that there is not necessarily any direct
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relationship between the representamen and its object, and in fact the only relationship
may be through an interpretant, which requires an interpreter.
The semiotic models o f Saussure, Peirce, and Wittgenstein are compared in Figure 2.
The vertical alignment is intended to indicate correspondences, though the
correspondences, particularly between the psychological and social planes, are not direct.
Moreover, the fit among the models is not perfect, precisely because Saussure, Peirce,
and Wittgenstein were using different categories as well as different names. In particular,
an interpretant for Peirce could be either a mental recreation o f the representamen or a
more developed sign, perhaps approaching a concept.

Figure 2. Comparison of meanings of meaning

Saussere:

signifier
_____ signified
(sound pattern)
(concept)
interpretant
P sy ch o lo g ic a l

Peirce:
S o cia l

representamen m
Wittgenstein:

name

►object

•+-------- ► thing

Figure 3 illustrates a semiotic model that blends each o f the models described above and
expands on them as well. A signifier is a symbol or a word or anything external that is
taken to signify something else. A concept is a mental entity, which may be considered
the core o f a concept image, as described above. A referent is a mathematical object,
process, or property, taken to be external in some sense. I make no ontological claims
about whether or where the referent exists but say merely that it is useful in the analysis
to suppose that it is distinct from the concept and from the signifier. This model o f a
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sign, then, is what I mean by the meaning o f a mathematical word or symbol, with the
added stipulation that the meaning must be considered within a system o f language and
symbols.

Figure 3. A general sign
concept

SIGN
signifier

referent

Conceptual Grids
In this study, signs provided access to the students’ concept images. The students’ use o f
signifiers provided insight about the meanings and understandings that the signs held in
their thinking. The principles o f semiotics make clear, however, that signs (and hence
meanings) must be interpreted within a system o f signs. Thus, the notion o f concept
image must be sufficiently flexible to pay attention to the ways that the students’ concept
images related to each other.
Within a system o f signs, the meaning o f an individual sign is determined, in large part,
by its relations to other signs and, in particular, by the distinctions between it and closely
related signs. The structure and categories o f a system o f signs lead those who use the
signs to impose a conceptual grid on experience, specifying the way that the experience is
cut up and hence shaping the way the experience is perceived. The crucial content in a
system is the set o f boundaries that are placed around and between the categories, and
thus the essence o f the system is independent o f the particular symbols and names that
are attached to the concepts it delineates. The categories, however, are not inherent in the
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experience but arise in the way the world is represented in the structure o f the system.
Different systems provide different categories that give rise to different concepts. Those
differences manifest themselves in the particular grid that is used to organize an
experience. A semiotician can gain insights about concepts and their meanings by paying
attention to distinctions in the use o f the signs— by trying to infer the conceptual grid.
Thus, language and other sign systems play a crucial role in shaping the concepts that are
available. This position is supported by empirical work in linguistics:
The “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language
habits o f the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be
considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different
societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels
attached. (Sapir, 1929/1949, p. 162)
We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do,
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way— an
agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the
patterns o f our language. The agreement is, o f course, an implicit and unstated
one, B U T ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY-, we cannot talk at all except by
subscribing to the organization and classification o f data which the agreement
decrees. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

The above theoretical perspectives led to what is known in linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, which in its extreme form is called linguistic determinism, indicating that
language determines the framework o f perception and thought. Although few linguists
accept the hypothesis in this form, its weaker formulation— that language influences
thought—is generally accepted (Chandler, in press).

Semiotics and Learning
As stated above, I consider in the analysis both psychological and social meaning,
focusing particularly on the relationship between them. What is missing from all o f the
above treatments is acknowledgment that personal and social meanings may not fit.
Unless an individual makes the same conceptual distinctions as made by the community,
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the conceptual grids imposed on an experience will be different. In educational research,
the critical question concerns the relationship between personal and social meanings
during learning.
M uch of Vygotsky’s work can be viewed as describing the process o f personal
acquisition o f social meanings, which is essentially the acquisition o f speech and
language. In developing his research methodology, Vygotsky (1934/1986) was critical o f
methods o f analysis that analyzed psychological processes into components, such as
thought and word, to be studied separately, when what is most crucial is to understand
how they operate together. In considering a method for analyzing the acquisition o f
language, he asked:
What is the unit o f verbal thought that is further unanalyzable and yet retains the
properties o f the whole? We believe that such a unit can be found in the internal
aspect o f the word, in word meaning, (p. 5)

Although it seems that Vygotsky (1978) did not explicitly draw on semiotics in his work,
his perspective fits with semiotics. “The sign acts as an instrument o f psychological
activity” (p. 52), and by sign he generally meant a word, which is but one kind of
signifier. By comparing the use o f signs in thought to the use o f tools in physical
activity, he maintained that the sign and the tool both mediate activity indirectly, the tool
being externally oriented and the sign being internally oriented.
Borrowing from French psychologist Paulhan, Vygotsky (1934/1986) also proposed a
distinction between the meaning and the sense o f a word, which are roughly its
denotation and connotation, respectively:
The sense o f a word, according to [Paulhan], is the sum o f all the psychological
events aroused in our consciousness by the word. It is a dynamic, fluid, complex
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whole, which has several zones o f unequal stability. Meaning is only one o f the
zones o f sense, the most stable precise zone. (pp. 244-245)

Note the striking similarity between this definition o f sense and Tall and Vinner’s (1981)
definition o f concept image as the total cognitive structure associated with a concept.
And so, the distinction between meaning and sense may be considered to be roughly the
distinction between a concept and a concept image.
Constructing personal meaning requires establishing a conceptual bond between the
signifier and the referent. This necessity is well recognized in mathematics education and
is seen in the metaphor o f attaching or gluing names to ideas (see, e.g., Hewitt, 2001).
The fact that the signifier is arbitrary and thus needs to be taught (Hewitt, 1999) fits well
with many explicit and implicit theories o f mathematics teaching and learning.
What is seldom recognized in mathematics education, however, is that the signified also
is arbitrary, in the sense that the conceptual grid is not predetermined. In emphasizing
the role o f language in creating conceptual grids, Sapir and W horf seem to have ignored
the learning that is required to build the intended distinctions into one’s own cognitive
structure. I accept the weak version o f the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in the sense that the
conceptual grids that are used by the community certainly influence, and to a great extent
limit and constrain, those o f the learners. But one must also recognize that students’
conceptual grids do not always fit with the ones used in the mathematical community.
Social and personal meanings will not match but will fit with some degree o f viability.
Students do not learn social meanings whole and unproblematically but instead make
successive approximations, adjusted via accommodation.
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Typology of Signs
In addition to his seminal contribution on the nature o f the sign, Peirce (1955) also
provided a detailed typology o f signs. For the purposes o f this study, it is sufficient to
mention only his distinction between icon, index, and symbol. An icon bears a
resemblance to its referent, “such as a lead pencil streak as representing a geometrical
line” (p. 104). An index bears a direct connection to its referent, such as smoke to fire or,
in mathematics, as a letter used in text following a figure to refer to a labeled portion o f a
figure. The label itself, however, is not an index. Finally, the connection between a
symbol and its referent requires establishment by convention.
Bruner (1966, pp. 10-11) distinguished three ways in which human beings model their
experience: enactive, iconic, and symbolic representations, the latter two o f which are
similar to Peirce’s categories. Enactive representations embody experience in action and
are, in a sense, prior to the other types o f representations. Enactive representations, I
would suggest, are helpful in describing the gestures that accompany certain metaphorical
conceptions o f mathematical ideas such as function.
Regarding the signs (or representations) in abstract algebra, it is important to point out
that Peirce categorized algebraic equations as icons, in the sense that they are compound
signs, composed o f symbols and indices, in which the relationship o f the signs to one
another iconically represents the mathematical expressions and relations they are to
represent. But as Peirce pointed out, a sign is not a sign unless someone interprets it as
such. Thus, whether a sign is an icon, index, or symbol depends upon the individual
using or interpreting the sign. Therefore, when (but not until) an individual has
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established a conception o f set, element, and set arithmetic in a group, the symbol aH can
function as an icon for a coset.

A Semiotics of Mathematics
In a initial semiotic analysis o f mathematics, Rotman (1988) identifies three aspects of
mathematical discourse: the referential aspect, the formal aspect, and the psychological
aspect, which have rough parallels in the mathematical philosophies o f Platonism,
formalism, and intuitionism, respectively. Each philosophy captures, in part,
an important facet o f what is felt to be intrinsic to mathematical activity.
Certainly, in some undeniable but obscure way, mathematics seems at the same
time to be a meaningless game, a subjective construction, and a source of
objective truth, (p. 6)

Thus, through semiotics, we are back to the metamathematical issues that arose in the
discussion o f definitions above.
Drawing on Peirce, Rotman distinguishes between the Mathematician (the “s e lf’), who
imagines and conducts reflective observations, the Agent (a skeleton diagram and
surrogate o f the self), who metaphorically constructs objects and carries out processes as
demanded by the Mathematician, and the Person (the subject), who operates with the
signs of natural language and participates in nonmathematical discourse. The distinctions
become clear in Rotman’s (1988) observation:
A mathematical assertion is a prediction, a foretelling o f the result o f performing
certain actions upon signs. In making an assertion the Mathematician is claiming
to know what would happen if the sign activities detailed in the assertion were to
be carried out. (p. 13)

The Mathematician cannot directly verify claims that would require infinitely many
operations, so she or he sets up a thought experiment in which it is the Agent who
performs the necessary actions. The proof o f the assertion is presented via the
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mathematical Code, which consists o f “the discursive sum o f all legitimately defined
signs and rigorously formulated sign practices that are permitted to figure in
mathematical texts” (p. 15). The proof is guided by an underlying idea, which Peirce
called a leading principle. Discussion o f neither the leading principle nor knowledge of
the Agent are permitted in the Code. Rather, they are part o f the metaCode, which
consists o f “informal, unrigorous locutions within natural language involved in talking
about, referring to, and discussing the Code that mathematicians sanction” (p. 15). Thus,
it is not the Mathematician alone but the Mathematician in the presence of the Person, the
natural language subject o f the metaCode, who can be persuaded by a proof, for
conviction depends upon knowledge o f both the leading principle and the actions o f the
Agent.
Rotman (1988) then uses this model to provide compelling critiques o f the three
mathematical philosophies, largely based upon the aspects o f mathematical experience
that they ignore. I will not discuss the substance o f these critiques except to mention the
Platonic nature o f naming. In present-day mathematical Platonism, the principal function
o f language is naming aspects o f a pre-existing world— o f assigning names to
prelinguistic referents. Rotman argues instead that mathematical language creates reality.
Furthermore,
what present-day mathematicians think they are doing— using mathematical
language as a transparent medium for describing a world o f pre-semiotic
reality— is semiotically alienated from what they are, according to the present
account, doing— namely, creating that reality through the very language which
claims to “describe” it. (p. 30)

Rotman’s point here suggests that the preceding discussion o f semiotics, particularly the
Peircian version, suffers from what might be a serious philosophical problem: the
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ontological status o f the mathematical object that serves as the referent in the model of
the sign. In mathematical discourse, the various signifiers exist as marks on paper or
perhaps merely as ephemeral vibrations in the air; the concepts exist in the minds o f the
students or in the collective mind o f the mathematical community, as reflected in
discourse. But in what sense does the object exist and, more particularly, where does it
exist?
This is an age-old philosophical problem that was present in the work o f Plato, Russell,
Frege, Godel, Hilbert, and many others. Rather than choosing among the various
solutions to this problem, I suggest that for this study (and, I believe, for the semiotic
study o f mathematical cognition more generally) it was necessary only to suppose that
mathematical objects exist in some sense. In particular, this assumption is all that is
necessary for semiotics to be a useful analytical tool. From my understanding of
philosophies o f mathematics, this assumption and the general sign (Figure 3) fit with all
the major philosophies o f mathematics, with the exception o f H ilbert’s strict formalism,
which maintains that the symbols are themselves the mathematical objects. In particular,
this approach can satisfy both Platonistic and anti-Platonistic philosophies (see Balaguer,
1998).
The point is mathematical cognition is primarily a psychological problem, not a
philosophical problem, and, as such, theoretical explanations must be psychologically
plausible. In other words, psychological considerations must trump philosophical ones.
Whether one supposes that mathematical objects exist in an abstract Platonic realm or
exist only as fictions, whether abstract objects are created by the community or by an
individual’s thought, mathematical discourse— including all extemalization o f
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mathematical thought—proceeds as though abstract objects exist, and thus the analysis
proceeded on this basis.
Unfortunately, this assumption is not sufficient to establish the psychological and
philosophical grounding o f my version o f Peirce’s semiotics. There is also the problem
o f whether the concept is distinct from the object. From a psychological perspective, it is
clear that the concept and the object are not identical. A concept o f a rock is certainly not
identical to a rock that exists as an object in the world. Similarly, it is useful to consider
that a concept o f the group o f integers is distinct from the object that is the set o f integers
under addition. If the object exists physically, then there is no question that a concept of
the object is distinct from the object itself. Thus, once again, independent o f where, how,
or even whether mathematical objects exist, it was useful in the analysis to suppose that
the concept and the object are distinct.
To complete this discussion, I must address the question o f whether the signifier is
distinct from the referent. In the case o f a rock, there is no signifier; the rock is the object
and Peirce’s triadic structure fails. This is not surprising, however, for Peirce’s semiotics
is a theory o f signs, not o f physical objects. One approach, due to Hilbert, is to suppose
that the symbols are the objects, simultaneously solving the ontological problem above
and rendering the current question moot. Hilbert’s solution to this problem strikes me as
a desperate attempt to construct a coherent, anti-Platonic philosophy o f mathematics.
The approach is both counterintuitive and anti-psychological, for it ignores the nature o f
mathematical activity and discourse. Mathematicians feel as though they are working
with real objects that exist independent o f the symbols and independent of their own
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thought, and mathematical discourse suggests such a perspective (see, e.g., P. J. Davis &
Hersh, 1981).
Nonetheless, there is sometimes a sense in which students treat symbols as though they
are the objects. Nemirovsky and Monk (2000) suggest the construct o ffusion to describe
how some children behave when symbols are used to model something in the world, such
as marks on a page to represent people getting on and off a bus, or when a stick becomes
a horse during a child’s play. This construct is not immediately helpful for noncontextual
mathematics, when there is neither a physical object nor a physical activity that the
student is attempting to model with the symbols. In the case o f a physical object or
activity, the student is always able to step back and agree that the stick is not really the
horse and the marks on the page are not really people on a bus. In the case o f abstract
mathematics, the phenomenon is more complex. Sfard (2000) points out that a crucial
event in learning about a mathematical concept is when an individual separates a signifier
from its referent. At first, the symbol (perhaps an operation table o f a group) is the object
o f thought, much as a particular rock may be an object o f thought. The students begins to
develop a concept o f the symbol by developing some familiarity with it, perhaps relating
it to other symbols, transforming the symbol in various ways, and particularly translating
it to what is to be another symbolic representation o f the same object. Eventually, as the
student begins to see the symbol not as a thing-in-itself but as a representation, then the
student has a concept o f an abstract object and the Peircian triadic sign applies.

Semiotics in Mathematics Education
Because this version o f semiotics and the semiotic framework below is not identical to
anything currently available in the literature, it is important to point out some similarities
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and differences. I have already discussed ways in which this semiotics is similar to the
work o f Sfard (2000) and others. Several other mathematics education researchers use
Lacan’s (1977) modifications o f Saussure’s version o f semiotics to describe chains of
signifiers that arise in mathematical discourse. For example, Sfard (2000) suggests that
“in Lacan’s writings, one finds the idea o f a sign turning into a signified of another sign”
(p. 45). Proceeding in this way, one can create a hierarchy o f signs o f increasing
abstraction. The literature describes how students use chains such as candies —» unifix
cubes —» pictured collections —» verbal enumerations (Cobb, Gravemeijer, Yackel,
McClain, & Whitenack, 1997) and double-decker bus passengers -» beads -»
nonstandard notations —> conventional notations (Gravemeijer, Cobb, Bowers, &
Whitenack, 2000). Such chains o f signifiers typically proceed from some real-world
situation to be modeled, to abbreviated (iconic or essentially indexical) signifiers, to
conventional symbols. The trouble with this description is that any chain o f signifiers
creates a hierarchy that implicitly privileges some signifiers over others. In studying
advanced mathematics, where what is important is moving flexibly among the various
important signifiers, including names, definitions, and several symbolic representations,
one needs a framework that allows more flexibility. The Peircian approach is preferable
because it allows consideration o f the concept and the object separately, as discussed
above, and because it allows a nonhierarchical perspective on the various signs that might
come into play during mathematical discourse.

Analytical Framework
The goal o f the study was to characterize students’ images for concepts in elementary
group theory. The preceding sections have described a number o f theoretical constructs
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that inform the characterizations. In particular, I have discussed the role o f definitions in
mathematics, the role o f metaphor in mathematical intuition, the distinction between
processes and objects in mathematical thinking, the distinction between abstraction and
generalization in the creation o f mathematical concepts, and the role o f naming and
notation in mathematical thinking and communication. The primary analytical tool,
borrowed from semiotics, is the sign, embodied as the distinction between a signifier, a
concept, and a referent.
In this section I describe how these theoretical constructs and analytical tools are brought
together in an analytical framework. For the purposes o f this study, I was interested in
the relationship between a concept and three types o f signs: symbols, names, and
definitions, including informal ones. That symbols and names are signs is obvious; that
definitions are signs follows from the substitution criterion described above. A primary
activity o f thought is replacing one representation with another, and substitution o f a
definition for the defined accomplishes exactly that.
The theoretical constructs discussed above are partially synthesized in the semiotic
conceptual framework shown in Figure 4 for a conceptual object. It is important to note
the framework is but a mere skeleton intended to highlight the main relationships for this
analysis. The two front-most faces o f this pyramid and the vertical cross-section through
the vertices labeled concept, name, and referent each constitute a sign in the Peircian
sense, in that they are triadic relationships between a concept, a signifier (a name,
symbol, or definition), and a referent. Furthermore, the framework suggests
consideration o f mediating role (in Vygotsky’s sense) o f the name, symbol, or definition
in mathematical activity.
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Figure 4. Semiotic conceptual framework
concept

name

definition

symbol

referent

The framework in Figure 4 is not a concept image but rather an organized collection of
slices of the concept image that serves as a tool for semiotic analysis. Separating these
various signifiers from the referent and from each other provides lenses for looking at
students’ use o f language and notation for the purpose o f making inferences about the
conceptual structures that the language and notation represents. By paying attention to
structural relations among signifiers, one can gain insights on structural relations among
concepts.
As for the concepts themselves, they are likely to be metaphorical in nature, and semiotic
analysis can serve to reveal some o f the operative metaphors. As for the referents, they
may be objects, processes, properties, or some combination o f these, though in view of
the process/object duality o f many mathematical concepts, perhaps the nature o f the
referent is in the relationship between the concept and the referent. Taken as a whole,
this framework for analysis can be seen as an elaboration o f Gray and Tail’s (1994)
notion o f procept, where the semiotic nature o f the analysis is made explicit.
Furthermore, the analysis takes advantage o f the observation that it is possible to
ascertain whether students have constructed a mental object based on the way they talk
and write about the concept (Tall et al., 2000).
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The above framework serves to guide the analysis o f individual concepts. But what
about collections o f concepts and the relationships among them? Here I use the metaphor
o f a conceptual grid that organizes experience into concepts. The grid is not in an
individual’s cognitive structure but rather is created because o f one’s cognitive structure
and is then imposed on experience. In other words, a conceptual grid is not something
one has but rather something one uses. There is a potential conflict, it should be pointed
out, between the notion o f concept image, which assumes the concepts to be primary, and
the metaphor o f a conceptual grid that manifests itself in the way experience is cut up and
organized into concepts. Thus, one needs a sufficiently flexible notion o f concept image
to accommodate not only the possibility that students might have the right concepts but
attach the wrong names but also the possibility o f having entirely different concepts. In
general, this accommodation requires an analysis that gets at the concept without the
name (via an activity) and also analysis that tries to determine what is organized under
that name. Furthermore, the analysis must provide for the possibility o f multiple
meanings in the language itself (polysemy or lexical ambiguity) and the analogous
phenomenon o f compartmentalization in thought, wherein an individual holds two
aspects o f the same concept under the same name in such a way that they are not evoked
at the same time and therefore do not interact.

Summary
On the fundamental assumption that mathematical learning is meaningful learning, the
ideas expressed in this chapter combine to create a conceptual and analytical framework
intended to support the investigation of the meaning behind students’ utterances. The
notion o f a concept image, as distinct from a concept definition, served to organize the
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analysis o f learning and using the various concepts in elementary group theory. To
characterize the students’ concept images, I paid attention to issues o f abstraction and
generalization, to the sense in which they treated the concepts as processes or objects, and
to the metaphors they used explicitly or implicitly. To study the students’ use o f
language and notation, I borrowed constructs from semiotics, focusing in particular on
the sign as a relationship among a signifier, a concept, and a referent, such as a
mathematical object.
The conceptual perspective evolved over the course o f the study. Early versions helped
to frame the initial research questions, to inform the design and implementation o f the
course, and to ground the research methodology and data collection. Later versions
served to guide the analysis o f the data. These contextual aspects o f the study and the
evolution o f the research questions and methodology are elaborated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV

CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

The participants in this study were enrolled in a junior-level abstract algebra course at the
University o f New Hampshire (UNH) during the spring term o f 1996. The class was
taught by Dr. Steve Benson, a visiting faculty member, and I served as his teaching
assistant. The curriculum was designed collaboratively by Dr. Benson and me. The
instruction was unusual in that there were no formal lectures, although there were wholeclass discussions at least weekly that were led by Dr. Benson or me.
This setting was chosen for the study based, in part, on my theoretical stance and my
research questions. They might be paraphrased as, What does students’ understanding
look like in abstract algebra, and how does it build on their prior experience? Because
this was essentially an exploratory study, I wanted to be able to observe some o f this
knowledge building in a rich, example-driven environment in which the students were
encouraged to make their thinking overt and explicit.
The analysis and results are based largely on interviews with five key participants. The
methods o f analysis were designed to provide characterizations o f the students’ concept
images. This chapter describes the context, curriculum, and instruction in more detail,
followed by descriptions o f the participants, the data sources, and the methods o f
analysis.

96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

The Context
UNH is a land-grant institution with about 10,500 undergraduate and 2,000 graduate
students. The mathematics department consists o f 23 full-time faculty, 3 faculty emeriti,
4 adjunct faculty, and 34 full-time graduate students.8 The department offers 10
undergraduate major programs: a Bachelor o f Arts (BA) in Mathematics; a Bachelor of
Science (BS) in Mathematics; a BS in Mathematics Education, with Elementary, Middle,
and Secondary School options; and a BS in Interdisciplinary Mathematics with options in
Computer Science, Economics, Electrical Science, Physics, and Statistics.

The Course
The class that provided the setting for the study was an abstract algebra course intended
to be taken by most mathematics majors at UNH and required by the BA in Mathematics,
the BS in Mathematics, and the Middle and Secondary School options o f the BS in
Mathematics Education. The course was offered in only one section in the spring term o f
1996.
The class met for 50 minutes, four times per week, for 15 weeks. (See Appendix A for a
syllabus.) There were two midterm exams, the first consisting o f an in-class and a takehome portion and the second entirely take-home, and a two-hour final exam (see
Appendix B). A standard text (Gallian, 1994) was used as a resource for examples,
problems, and explanations. The bulk o f the class was devoted to collaborative problem
sets (classwork) and individual assignments (homework), written by Dr. Benson and me,
with Dr. Benson taking the lead role. Problem sets with homework assignments were

8 These data are from 2000 and are reasonably representative of the situation in 1996.
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distributed (sometimes separately) approximately every week, though more frequently at
the beginning o f the course (see Appendix C). Some o f the classwork was completed
using the computer software Exploring Small Groups (Geissinger, 1989), which was
available in the department’s computer laboratory. The classwork and homework were
periodically collected for comment or grading. Although I provided comments on the
students’ work, I had no responsibility for grading.

Mathematical Content
This course focused on group theory, including the concepts o f group, subgroup,
isomorphism, homomorphism, coset, and quotient group. This focus is in contrast to
some beginning abstract algebra courses that include introduction to rings and fields. To
provide an experiential basis for the group axioms, these concepts were preceded by
some exploratory work in number theory, particularly modular arithmetic. The course
was highly example driven, focusing especially on the following:
Z: The group o f integers. The elements are the integers, {... , -2, -1, 0, 1,2, ...},
and the operation is addition. Sometimes the operation o f multiplication was also
considered to illustrate the failure o f the inverse axiom.
nZ\ The group o f multiples o f n. The elements are the integers, {... , -In. -n, 0, n,
2n, ...}, and the operation is addition.
Z„: the group o f integers modulo n. The elements are the integers {0, 1, ... , n 1} and the operation is addition modulo n. Sometimes multiplication modulo n
was also considered to illustrate the failure o f the inverse axiom.
U„: the group o f units modulo n. The elements are the integers in {0, 1
1} that have inverses under the operation multiplication modulo n. An equivalent
characterization is the integers i n { l , . . . , « - l } that are relatively prime (i.e.,
share no factors) with n. Thus, for example, Ul0 = {1, 3, 7, 9}.

D„: the dihedral group o f order 2 n. The elements are the symmetries o f a regular
n-gon and the operation is given by thinking o f the symmetries as
transformations and composing them; that is, carrying out one transformation
followed by the other. The elements o f D„ were represented both geometrically
(as transformations) and as permutations o f the vertices.
S„: The symmetric group o f degree n. The elements are the permutations o f a set
with n elements, and the operation is composition o f permutations, thought o f as
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functions. The elements were usually represented as arrays notation or in cycle
notation. For example, a permutation a , where a ( l ) = 3, a(2) = 2, a(3) = 4, a(4)
= 1, is represented by the array
1 2 3 4'
3 2

4

1

where the elements in the second row indicate the images o f the elements in the
first row. In cycle notation, this same permutation would be written (134),
indicating that 1 goes to 3, which goes to 4, which goes (back) to 1. The fact that
2 is missing implies that 2 remains unchanged. The identity permutation is
denoted (1) in cycle notation, specifying explicitly that 1 goes to 1 and implying
that everything else remains unchanged as well.

We also considered the real, rational, and complex numbers; sets o f matrices; and various
groups and nongroups given by operation tables. During class and on problem sets, these
examples were notated as sets, leaving the operation implicit (see chapter 5).
These examples were used to motivate the concepts treated in the course, which included
group, subgroup, isomorphism, center, centralizer, order o f an element, cyclic subgroups,
subgroups generated by elements, homomorphism, coset, Lagrange’s theorem, and
quotient groups. These concepts are described in more detail in the description o f the
problem sets below.

Instruction
As was stated above, this class included no lectures. Most o f the time for this class, both
in class and out, was devoted to working on activities and problem sets designed by Dr.
Benson and me. The students worked through most o f the activities and problem sets
collaboratively, usually in groups o f three or four, although some assignments,
particularly the take-home exams, were to be completed individually. During class time,
Dr. Benson and I worked with the groups and periodically brought the whole class
together to discuss common issues, to encourage synthesis o f the various results, and to
point toward important themes and ideas. Both individually and when working
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collaboratively, the students were expected to justify their claims. In this way, student
thinking was expected to be overt and explicit. Both Dr. Benson and I held office hours,
both regularly and as needed, and students attended both individually and in groups,
usually to get help with specific problems on the problem sets.
Aspects o f the theoretical perspective described in chapter 3 implicitly and explicitly
informed the instruction and the design and implementation o f the problem sets. In
particular, Dr. Benson and I tried to pay particular attention to what the students were
thinking because what they learned might not be what we intended. The class was
somewhat like a teaching experiment in that our planning tried to take into account the
experiences, including both difficulties and insights, that students were having with
previous problem sets. Moreover, because reflection is key to building strong and
productive understandings, we encouraged overt reflective activity whenever possible,
meaning that the students were expected to explain their thinking, orally or in writing, to
us or to other students.

Problem Sets and Homework
The problem sets were designed to provide experience with examples that could be used
to motivate the key ideas. Often, concepts were introduced not by a definition, statement,
or theorem, but by a problem. Then, as students developed solutions, key features or
properties o f the problem were drawn out, defined, and given standard names and
notations. Often the key terms, definitions, and notations were provided again in
subsequent problem sets. In this way, the students might see some o f the concepts as
growing naturally from the problems they were trying to solve. A sampling of the
problem sets is included in Appendix C.
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The course initially focused on modular arithmetic, which was used the primary example
o f a system in which to solve equations. For example, the students were asked to find
solutions o f 3 + x = 5 mod 7, 3x = 5 mod 7, and 3x = 5 mod 6 , and to investigate when
such equations had a unique solution, no solutions, or multiple solutions. The students
also spent time solving equations o f the form ax = b, a + x = b, or a*x = b in other
mathematical systems such as subsets o f the real numbers, sets o f matrices, and also in
finite systems for which the operation was given by an operation table. The group
axioms were then presented as a generalized consolidation o f what the students suggested
needed to be true about a system in order for such equations always to be solvable.
The students were asked to find all possible Cayley tables with 2, 3, and 4 elements in
order to motivate the ideas o f isomorphic groups, which they initially called congruent
groups. The isomorphism itself was not explicitly a function, at first, but instead resulted
from a renaming process based on looking at the group table.
In order to provide experience for making sense o f addition and multiplication o f cosets,
set addition (and multiplication) were introduced early through examples such as
{1, 3, 4} + {2, 6 } = {3, 7, 5, 9, 6 , 10} and by comparing the sets 3Z, 3 Z + 1, ... , 3Z + 7.
Later, the students were asked to make operation tables for {0, 4, 8 }, {1, 5, 9}, {2, 6 , 10},
and {3, 7, 11} in Z 1 2 . And to motivate the usefulness o f the normality o f a subgroup after
introducing the concept o f coset, the students performed coset arithmetic at first without
concern for whether the subgroup was normal. Additional detail is provided in chapter 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

Participants
All 29 students enrolled in the class were participants in the study for the purposes of
field observation. All were mathematics majors: 24 o f them were juniors, and 22 were
pursing a Bachelor o f Science in one or more o f the Mathematics Education options.
This high concentration o f mathematics education majors is typical in the spring semester
offering o f this course. They had previously taken an average o f seven mathematics
classes, typically including a four-course calculus sequence, courses in mathematical
proof and statistics, and another course such as geometry or linear algebra. Because the
mathematical proof course is a prerequisite for abstract algebra, it is reasonable to assume
that all students had taken it previously, although two did not list it on the questionnaire
distributed on the first day o f class. O f the 29 participants, 25 allowed collection of their
written work, 21 were willing to be interviewed, and 19 consented to both. Blank
consent forms and Institutional Review Board Approval are provided in Appendix D.
Almost all o f the students who completed course evaluations said they found the problem
sets and the collaboration helpful in their learning. Some students even said they found
the take-home exams particularly helpful.

Key Participants
For key participants, I wanted students who might be considered typical students in the
course. I did not want students who were struggling so much that the interviews would
not be able to reveal their understanding o f the key ideas in the course. On the other
hand, I did not want students for whom many o f the abstractions and generalizations were
quick and obvious. Thus, based on discussions with and observations o f the students
over the first two weeks o f the course, I chose six students who had given permission for
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full participation and whom I expected to perform at an average level in the class. As it
turned out, their grades were above average, with 3 A, 2 A-, and 1 B in the following
distribution: 13 A, 4 A-, 9 B, 2 B-, and 1 D. The study was based primarily on an
analysis o f the interviews with the five students for whom I was able to collect a full set
o f interviews: Carla, Diane, Lori, Robert, and W endy . 9 These students are described
briefly below.
The data for these sketches come from three sources: questionnaires distributed to all the
students at the beginning o f the course, moments in the interviews when the students
chose to describe themselves, and conversations with the students after the completion of
the class.
Carla. Carla was a junior and was majoring in mathematics education in both the middle
and secondary school options. She planned to teach eighth grade. She had taken seven
college mathematics courses previously, including calculus, and was taking linear algebra
concurrently. Two o f these courses were among those taken primarily by preservice
elementary teachers.
Carla described herself as follows: “I am a visual learner. So I remember, like, a
sequence o f letters if I see them” (Interview 1, line 34). She said she was a very
successful mathematics student, though she admitted mathematics had not always been
easy for her. When a mathematics course was very challenging, she often looked back
later and appreciated the struggle. Looking back on this abstract algebra class, she
indicated that the class had been stressful and she did not like the fact that that Dr.

9 The key participants have been given pseudonyms that preserve their gender.
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Benson and I often answered questions with questions. Nonetheless, she felt that she had
learned a lot.
Diane. Diane was a junior majoring in mathematics education under the secondary
school option. She had taken six mathematics courses previously, including calculus.
She hoped to teach high school mathematics, particularly algebra and calculus.
On her questionnaire, Diane expressed some apprehension: “Because o f the approach o f
this class I ’m a little concerned with how I ’ll do. It’s different working through a
problem, exploring possibilities and then reaching some conclusions, not just begin told
that something is right and here’s how to do it.” During her second interview, she
indicated some frustration with the exploratory approach, which she described as “just
playing around with it like this. There has got to be a better way” (line 101). After all,
“this is math. There are always rules to follow, and it’s always very n eat.... But this has
already been established somewhere, so I know there’s rules” (lines 235-240).
Lori. Lori was a junior pursuing a BA in mathematics and not intending to teach. She
was repeating the course. She had been advised to take abstract algebra in the fall
because o f a perception that the sections offered in the fall were typically geared more
toward the mathematics majors and those in the spring were geared more toward the
mathematics education majors. Because she had received a poor grade in the fall, she
was taking the course again in order to improve the grade on her transcript. She had
taken five other mathematics courses previously.
Lori was the weakest student among the key participants. She was the only one who
received a B in the class; all o f the others received an A or an A-. She indicated that she
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appreciated some aspects o f the approach o f this class: “I don’t think that I necessarily
understood the concept o f closed until we made charts and tables and stuff, and we never
made tables last semester” (Interview 1, line 5).
Robert. Robert was a junior and a mathematics education major under the secondary
school option. He had taken five mathematics classes previously, including calculus. He
intended to teach high school mathematics and was considering a graduate degree in
science education.
Robert claimed on his questionnaire that he had had uneven success in his mathematics
classes: “I find that I do all right w/ computational math, but I find the theory classes very
difficult. Perhaps due to my lack o f intuition.” When struggling with an unfamiliar
problem or concept, he said that he often look at various texts, examples, definitions, to
“see if I could make heads or tails out o f it, which, typically, I probably couldn’t. It’s
written in mathematics, not English” (Interview 1, line 162).
Wendy. Wendy was a senior and was majoring in mathematics education in the
elementary and middle school option. During her program she had decided that she
would prefer to teach secondary school, so she was planning to attend graduate school for
secondary certification after graduation. She had taken thirteen mathematics courses
previously, including calculus. Three o f the courses were among those typically taken by
preservice elementary teachers.
After the class was over, Wendy indicated that her favorite part about the class was all
the writing. She explained that she got a lot out o f doing the problems and said she got
even more out o f explaining the problem and trying to write her solution carefully.
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Instructor
Dr. Steve Benson is a mathematician who was a visiting faculty member at UNH and
who, at the time, had recently decided to devote his attention to mathematics education.
He received his doctorate from the University o f Illinois in 1988 and then held a two-year
postdoctoral teaching position at St. O laf College. He taught at Santa Clara University
and another year at St. O laf before coming to UNH in the fall o f 1995. His research area
was algebraic number theory. While working in mathematics, he published two research
papers, two expository papers in journals o f the M athematical Association o f America,
and one paper on teaching suggestions in abstract algebra (Benson & Richey, 1994).
Dr. Benson had a temporary faculty appointment in the mathematics department at UNH,
which he saw as an opportunity to learn about and begin working in mathematics
education by interacting with the faculty and graduate students in the Ph.D. program. His
teaching was always a priority in his work, as evidenced by a graduate student teaching
award at the University o f Illinois and by consistently excellent teaching evaluations. In
fact, teaching was a primary reason that he pursued and accepted the postdoctoral
position at St. O laf College, which is known for valuing and encouraging quality
teaching. He had taught the content o f this abstract algebra course three times before,
although previously his approach had been more traditional.
T eacher/Researcher
In my interactions with students, I played two roles— teacher and researcher— which
brought both opportunities and pitfalls. Ball (2000) suggests that such an approach
“offers the researcher a role in creating the phenomenon to be investigated coupled with
the capacity to examine it from the inside, to leam that which is less visible” (p. 388).
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Simultaneously, the dual roles create challenges with respect to the validity and
generalizability o f the results, and particularly with respect to causation. Here I pause to
discuss how I managed and coordinated these roles.
By assuming the roles o f both teacher and researcher in this study, I gained considerable
inside knowledge. In constructing the problem sets, I provided some o f the ideas and
served as a sounding board for some o f Dr. Benson’s ideas. Like Dr. Benson, I helped
and guided groups o f students as they worked in class on their problem sets. I led some
o f the whole-class discussions, and I provided office hours in which students sought extra
help. In this way, I provided another pair o f ears and eyes to help Dr. Benson learn about
the students and their thinking. These duties not only provided detailed knowledge o f the
context for the interviews but also helped me get to know all the students much better
than if I had merely observed from the back o f the class and selected a few for interviews.
In class as well as in office hours, the students’ thinking was expected to be explicit and
was valued, no matter how nascent. Dr. Benson and I rarely told students that they were
right or wrong, an approach that served to encourage their own thinking and discussion,
although, in retrospect, our implementation o f this approach may have been too extreme,
as it occasionally led to unproductive discussions (see Chazan & Ball, 1999). It is
plausible that the atmosphere we had created in the classroom was partially responsible
for the fact that key participants often required little prompting in the interviews.
Many o f the pitfalls o f being a teacher/researcher arise when the purpose of the research
is to study teaching. The problem is gaining sufficient objectivity to ensure the reliability
o f observations and the validity o f conclusions about one’s own thoughts and actions.
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Such pitfalls were not present in this study, however, because the purpose was to study
learning.
Some o f the challenges arise in any research that relies on cases. In such research,
generalizations must be made carefully and are often only tentative. Any generalization
depends upon the extent to which the case resembles other situations. Yet
generalizability depends also upon the nature o f the claim. When the goal is to establish
an existence proof or theory building, as was the case for this study, generalizability is
determined outside and after the study and thus is not really an issue.
The most potentially problematic issue for a study such as this is the evaluative role of
the teacher. Ball hints at the issue when asking, “W hat might [the students] not want to
say to her? W hat might it be risky to disclose?” (p. 389). Although it is plausible that
this issue is not serious when the students are third graders, as in B all’s research, I am
quite convinced that it merits careful consideration when the students are undergraduates.
This is why I chose to make it clear to the students, with Dr. Benson’s support and
assistance, that I was to play no direct evaluative role in the class. I was particularly
fortunate that Dr. Benson was comfortable with this arrangement.
The goal o f this study was to describe student thinking and, to the extent possible, to
build theoretical explanations for the descriptions without necessarily attributing cause as
part o f the explanations. With such goals, validity and reliability are ensured during
analysis through the constant comparative method, as described under methods of
analysis. In summary, the conduct o f the study and the methods o f analysis were
designed to take advantage o f the opportunities and mitigate the pitfalls o f my dual role
as teacher/researcher.
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Data Sources
The primary source o f data was the interviews with five key participants. Some exams
and other written work were also collected, including final exam and second midterm
papers from all the students, to provide a broader view o f the ways students understood
the material. Contextual data were provided through a questionnaire distributed on the
first day o f class (see Appendix A), from field notes I took on 20 occasions, from the
problem sets and explanatory handouts, and from audiotaped planning discussions with
Dr. Benson.

The Interviews
The interviews took place outside o f class, and the students were compensated for their
time. All interviews were simultaneously videotaped and audiotaped to aid subsequent
transcription and analysis. Each o f the five key participants took part in four interviews
organized roughly around mathematical content, as described below. To provide some
perspective on how the students were working together in the collaborative setting, Lori
and Diane were usually interviewed together. (Their third interviews occurred separately
because o f scheduling difficulties.) Thus, a total o f 17 interviews provided the core of
the data. The interview schedule is given in Table 1. Two o f the interviews took place
after the final exam, which was administered on M ay 10, 1996.

The interviews were intended to address the initial versions o f my research questions,
which all fit under the guiding question, “In what ways do these students understand the
mathematical content o f the course?” The interviews were not highly structured but
rather were exploratory and contingent. To provide sufficient data on each o f the key
concepts in the course, the four interviews were organized around mathematical content:
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(1) groups and subgroups, (2) isomorphisms, (3) homomorphisms and cosets, and
(4) quotient groups. Each interview typically began with a common question and
proceeded from there, guided by the student’s responses.

Table 1. Interview Schedule
Diane and Lori
Robert
Wendy
Carla
Robert
Diane and Lori
Wendy
Carla
Diane
Carla
Diane and Lori
Carla
Robert
Wendy
Robert
Lori
Wendy

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
3
3
4
3
4

04/05/96
04/05/96
04/06/96
04/12/96
04/15/96
04/17/96
04/18/96
04/24/96
05/01/96
05/02/96
05/03/96
05/07/96
05/07/96
05/08/96
05/09/96
05/13/96
05/13/96

The interviews were opportunities for me to observe the issues that the students were
struggling with during their early learning o f these new concepts. Thus, most o f the
interviews were conducted during the several days after which key concepts had been
introduced, sometimes immediately following the class. My aim was to try to understand
students’ utterances as sensible and meaningful from their individual perspectives.
During all my discussions with students (during interviews, office hours, and class), my
predominant method was to pose problems, ask questions, and encourage students to
explain their thinking, so the students were accustomed to nondirective interaction.
During the interviews, however, because I was trying to understand students’
understanding, I was typically more probing and less directive than in class or in office
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Ill
hours, at least until I thought I understood what a student was saying. Then, when I did
move on, I typically posed a leading question intended to provide opportunities for the
student to correct errors or make new connections among new and old ideas.
The interview tasks and questions were essentially o f three varieties: tasks from the
literature, open-ended questions such as “What is a homomorphism?” intended to get at
the meaning the student had developed, and questions intended to probe the key concepts
through standard examples. The key questions and topics in the interviews are given
below.
Interview 1: Groups and subgroups. The first interview began with the question, “Is Z 3 a
subgroup o f Z6?” During the students’ responses, I paid particular attention to the role of
the operation. When the students had resolved the opening question, I asked them to find
subgroups o f Zg and then to compare those subgroups with Z3 and Z 2 to look for the
beginnings o f the concept o f isomorphism.
Interview 2: Isomorphisms. The second interview approached the concept o f
isomorphism by comparing different groups o f order 4, beginning with the four operation
tables the students had identified on their take-home exam. Carla’s second interview was
largely about the concepts o f function, domain, and range, prompted by discussions
during the class that had preceded the interview. With Robert, we began with a followup to the first interview and spent the remainder o f the interview representing the
elements o f D 4 .
Interview 3: Homomorphisms and cosets. The third interview began with the question,
“What is a homomorphism?” and I asked for examples. Then, I gave the students a
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homomorphism from Us to Z4 and asked how they would check whether it was a
homomorphism. After checking a few specific examples, I asked them to find the kernel
o f the homomorphism and the cosets o f the kernel. I asked Robert also to find the cosets
o f the subgroup generated by 3 in Z\i. I asked W endy to try to make a group out o f the
cosets.
Interview 4: Cosets and quotient groups. The fourth interview was based on comparing
the cosets o f the subgroup generated by (12) in D 3 with the subgroup generated by (123).
The students computed right and left cosets and then tried to construct a group using the
cosets. Wendy also computed cosets and the quotient o f 4Z in Z, and Carla also
constructed the cosets and quotient o f {0, 3, 6 , 9} in Zn- Much o f each interview was
spent sorting out the students’ uses o f the terms coset, normal, and quotient group to
describe the results o f their calculations.

Conventions in Transcripts and Figures
All the interviews were transcribed. In the transcripts, I tried to capture all abandoned
phrases and restatements, although “ahs” and “urns” were mostly ignored. Because I
wanted the analysis to be guided as much as possible by complete thoughts, I chose the
paragraph as the smallest unit o f coding, although I refer to these paragraphs as “lines” in
the transcripts and provide line numbers for all direct quotes. In order to improve the
coherence and completeness of paragraphs in the transcripts, I did not interrupt a
statement from one speaker to insert inconsequential statements such as “Okay” from
another speaker when the statement seemed to have no effect on the train of thought.
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Instead, I inserted such statements inside the paragraph o f the primary speaker, enclosing
the statements in square brackets to signal the change o f speaker.
Numbers were written as numerals in the transcripts except when the use o f the numbers
did not seem relevant to the mathematics. In long lists o f numbers, semicolons were used
to indicate slight pauses. The notations x, +, - , and = were used only for the words times,
plus, negative, and equals, respectively; similar expressions such as “added to” or “is
equal to” were written out as words. Notations for standard groups were used throughout
the transcripts, so that “Zee six” was transcribed as “Z6,” for example. Functional
notation was used when the argument o f the function seemed clear, so that, for example,
“f o f x” was transcribed as/(x). Set notation was used when the context or the written
work suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, that the students were thinking about sets.
Similar conventions were used for permutation notation, transcribing “one two three” as
“(123),” for example. These transcriptional conventions helped me read and analyze the
data more fluently than if I had written out each word in full. Importantly, each o f these
conventions is reversible by reading the transcript aloud. The students’ written work was
typeset as figures rather than scanned, on the judgment that the essential characteristics o f
that work could be more clearly conveyed this way. Thus, it is my conviction that these
conventions improved the clarity o f the transcripts and the written work without
influencing the data or analysis by imposing notation inappropriately.

Methods of Analysis
Essentially three types o f analysis were employed: detailed analysis o f each interview
transcript; global analysis to confirm, refine, and refute the initial hypotheses generated
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by the detailed analysis; and conceptual analysis o f the mathematical content. Because
both the research questions and the methods o f analysis evolved as the study progressed,
I begin this section with discussion o f the fits and false starts that led to the methods.
Then I provide a detailed description o f the methods and the ways that each type of
analysis informed the others. I close with a discussion o f the relationship between the
methodology o f this study and the methodology o f constant comparison and grounded
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Evolution of the Method
In my proposal for this study, the research questions included the following: “In what
ways do these students understand the mathematical content o f the course? How do these
understandings emerge from their experiences?” These broad questions were sufficient
to guide the interviews, but, as will become clear, they were initially unhelpful in guiding
the analysis because they neither suggested a scheme for coding nor helped me decide
what to look for in the transcripts.
Before coding any o f the data, I developed a preliminary coding scheme that included
categories o f mathematical content, such as coset and commutativity; categories from the
research literature, such as the proof schemes o f Harel and Sowder (1998); categories of
student action, such as choosing an example or giving a justification; categories about
affect, metacognition, and the nature o f mathematics; and categories that described the
types o f errors that students made, along with categories that described how errors were
resolved. The scheme was, from my perspective, exhaustive (and exhausting), including
all possible dimensions and aspects o f mathematical experience that I could imagine
might be present in the interviews. My attempts to use this scheme to code the transcripts
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statement by statement proved unsuccessful not only because the scheme was unwieldy
but also because the salient portions o f a transcript were typically extended exchanges
that fell entirely under one or two codes. Simultaneously, other exchanges were
straightforward calculations that were not particularly interesting. The fact that both
kinds o f exchanges received equal emphasis in the coding was clearly not satisfactory.
Furthermore, large portions o f the scheme did not seem pertinent to the available data.
I temporarily abandoned coding and instead carried out a detailed analysis o f each
transcript. By comparing the audiotape with the student’s written work and, when
necessary, with the videotape, each transcript was annotated to clarify the referents o f
pronouns and what the student was writing. At the same time, the transcripts were
segmented into episodes, providing both a chronology and a table o f contents for each
interview. Additional annotations were inserted to highlight episodes, events, and
statements that struck me as interesting or significant, typically because o f the use of
nonstandard language, an error that seemed nontrivial, a hint o f an unusual way o f
thinking, or a change that suggested learning. Guided by very general questions such as
“W hat was the student doing? W hat was the student using?” I developed short
descriptions o f these interesting events. The table o f contents and the significant events,
together with my description, provided an initial “bottom-up” analysis that also served as
a summary o f the interview.

During the above processes, the research questions evolved, eventually arriving at
questions such as, “What concept images do students demonstrate as they are learning the
fundamental ideas o f group, subgroup, and isomorphism?” Using the summaries o f the
interviews, I began the next phase o f analysis with an eye toward answering the research
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questions. Intending to delineate various components o f concept images, I developed a
coding scheme that was short, focused on describing concept images, and more relevant
to the data. The scheme had categories such as representations, properties, and examples
o f concepts, as well as definitions, results, and associations about concepts. Once again,
however, when I tried to code the transcripts, I had trouble making the scheme fit. It
became clear that the most salient features o f the interviews were issues of language,
notation, and meaning, and the relationship between signs and the concepts that they
were intended to represent. These issues still were not sufficiently prominent in the
coding scheme.
I again abandoned explicit coding. Reviewing the interview summaries, I instead asked
directed questions such as “W hat can I say about this student and her concept o f group?”
that led to answers such as the following: “She reasoned from the table; she confused
related words; she used idiosyncratic language and syntax; she was confused about the
operation in Z„.” The resulting long list o f observations about student thinking was then
examined for emergent themes. In continuing the episode-by-episode analysis and
synthesis, I elaborated the observations with examples of dialogue from the interviews,
regularly asking myself, “What is this an example of?” thereby keeping the goal of
describing student understanding at the forefront o f my thought. As is described in detail
below, I also looked for regularities and overarching themes that could be developed into
theoretical explanations.
In summary, the method o f analysis evolved from line-by-line coding to detailed
description o f significant episodes and events. Another way to describe the transition is
as follows: The unit o f analysis was originally the concept, as indexed (not in the Peircian
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sense) by the concept name. The students’ language use was so unusual and
idiosyncratic, however, that it became clear that the unit o f analysis needed to be the
episode. This change is analogous to W ertsch’s (1985) observation that although
Vygotsky began with the word as his unit o f analysis, many o f his colleagues and
students (e.g., Davidov, Leont’ev) moved to using the activity as the unit of analysis (see
also Wertsch, 1981).

Detailed Description of the Method
The goal o f the analysis was, o f course, to provide answer to the research questions,
which meant describing students’ concept images for the key concepts in the course and
also describing the ways that preliminary mathematical ideas came into play. In the
analysis, I considered both personal and conventional meanings o f the concepts and
focused on the differences between them, for that is where clues to learning problems lie.
Thus, the main fodder for the descriptions o f students’ concept images was episodes,
events, and statements that struck me as significant because o f potential differences
between personal and conventional meanings. Events were pursued through detailed
analysis when my observations about the event seemed sufficiently robust, such as when
similar events occurred elsewhere with the same student or with a different student. In
this section, I describe some technical and theoretical aspects o f the method and also
provide additional detail.
Most of the data were managed via N5, the fifth major revision o f NUD*IST qualitative
research software (QSR International, 2000). The annotated transcripts and their
summaries were imported into N5 along with excerpts from the midterm and final exams
of the five key participants. To provide some context for the interviews and exams, the
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discussions with Dr. Benson were summarized, including some verbatim transcription,
and imported into N5. The field notes were also imported. All electronically available
data were coded for mathematical content. In particular, I coded for the following
concepts: modular arithmetic; function; binary operation; properties o f operations,
including the four group axioms and commutativity; group; subgroup; isomorphism;
homomorphism; kernel; coset; normality; and quotient group. These mathematical
categories formed the primary headings under which I sought to describe students’
concept images.
In trying to create descriptions o f students’ concept images, I found that one o f the most
puzzling aspects was explaining or even describing students’ idiosyncratic and seemingly
inconsistent use o f language and notation. I was initially at a loss and for a long time
found little in the mathematics education literature that helped me understand the
students’ statements and actions. Eventually, I was led to literature in linguistics,
philosophy, and particularly semiotics, from which I borrowed and adapted theoretical
constructs that helped explain what I saw and that led to a theory that ultimately
connected back to the mathematics education literature.
With these additional theoretical constructs, the analysis o f the episodes became
essentially semiotic in character. Although semiotics holds no widely shared theoretical
assumptions or methodologies, a consistent feature is looking beyond specific signs to
discern the relationships between signs and the systems o f distinctions operating within
them (Chandler, in press). For analyzing student thinking, the approach might be
described as looking at the students’ language rather than through it (Sfard, 2000).
Lacking direct access to the personal meanings o f the students, I relied on semiotic
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analysis to help me make inferences about those meanings and to build a theory that fit
the data. In the detailed analysis o f the significant episodes, I tried to discern meaning in
students’ utterances and tried to understand their use o f mathematical signs, particularly
words, notations, and definitions, using the analytical framework described in chapter 3.
N ot all significant episodes were so analyzed; instead, I focused on those episodes that
either spoke to the use o f language, notation, and representations; suggested
consideration o f relevant objects, processes, or metaphors; or raised issues o f abstraction
and generalization.
To complement the detailed analyses o f episodes, I also took a global view, searching for
additional uses o f words or notation that might confirm, refine, or refute the working
hypotheses. For example, I coded and collected the various formal and informal
definitions that the students gave o f the key concepts in the course. Some o f these were
in response to very direct prompts such as “What is a homomorphism?” as in the
interviews, or “Provide complete definitions for the following terms and phrases” as on
the final exam (Appendix B). Other definitions arose without a direct prompt, typically
as part o f an explanation o f something else.
In the global analysis, I used N5 to search the transcripts and other electronically
available data for other instances o f the signs (i.e., words and notations) that the students
and I were using to discuss the particular concept. On the basis o f my familiarity with the
data and with the aid o f the interview outlines, I also carefully examined portions o f the
transcripts that were likely to speak to the particular ideas under analysis. The excerpts
identified by these searches were considered first for relevance and then for fit with the
emerging hypotheses, which were modified to accommodate data that did not fit.
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Because the study aimed to characterize students’ concept images, the hypotheses were
often about a nonstandard conception that a student had during a particular episode.
Sometimes the search identified excerpts that suggested that later in the course the
student had developed a conception that fit better with standard mathematical usage. I
saw such excerpts not as discontinuing evidence o f a hypothesis but rather as partial
evidence o f learning.
The detailed and global analyses produced preliminary descriptions and representations
o f students’ concept images for the key concepts in the course. These were compared
with what I took to be standard language usage and descriptions o f the concepts in the
mathematical community. This comparison was implicit, at first, in the sense that during
the analysis, I was particularly interested in language or understanding that did not fit
with my own, which I took to be a fair representation o f standard mathematical usage.
Because both my interview technique and the method o f analysis took as a guiding
principle the pursuit o f that which was interesting, unusual, or unexpected, many
discrepancies with standard usage were explored in detail during the interviews
themselves, thereby providing substantial supporting data to confirm or disconfirm both
the implicit hypotheses that I was generating during the interview and the related
hypotheses I was developing during the analysis.
To make explicit the concept images that implicitly guided my analyses o f student
thinking, I also completed conceptual analyses o f the key concepts in the course, as
described below. The various analyses were conducted iteratively. By reflecting on the
students’ statements, I was often better able to conceptualize and articulate what the
conventional concepts are and the distinctions between them. Conversely, with a detailed
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conceptual analysis I was better able to characterize students’ concept images. In this
way, comparisons between students’ personal meanings and accepted mathematical
meaning became increasingly explicit. Because these versions o f the accepted
mathematical meanings were largely my own creation, some explanation is in order.
In mature discourse, particularly within a professional community, meaning is often
“taken as shared” in the sense that individuals converse as though their personal meaning
is shared by the community (see, e.g., Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992; Ernest, 1991).
Because no one has direct access to the shared meaning o f the mathematical community,
it was not possible to import conventional concepts directly into my analysis.
Furthermore, traditional mathematical exposition would not have been appropriate for
this study, because, as Pimm (1995) observes, mathematicians use words as though they
are the concepts, as is apparent in mathematical discourse, and symbols as though they
are the objects, as is revealed in the metaphor o f manipulation. Instead, I created
descriptions o f the mathematics based on a conceptual analysis that aimed at careful
semiotic description o f the meanings o f the words and representations o f the mathematics
under study. Guided by my own thinking, frequently consulting resources such as
mathematical texts (e.g., Gallian, 1994; Herstein, 1975; Hungerford, 1974), and with
careful consideration o f accepted formal definitions, I arrived at a particular elaboration
o f the meaning o f a concept, highlighting its semiotic nature and including process,
object, and metaphorical characterizations. I take these meanings to be shared by the
community, in the sense that the descriptions fit with, though they are not identical to,
descriptions I found in texts I consulted.
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As the detailed, global, and conceptual analyses proceeded, my preliminary observations
about student understanding were combined, reworded, and sometimes dropped, leading
to working hypotheses that were categorized eventually under two broad themes: the use
o f language and notation and the mathematical meanings that students gave to their
activity. Although my intent was originally to describe students’ concept images for a
list o f concepts, these themes became increasingly prominent as the analysis continued,
eventually overtaking the mathematical content categories in importance. Furthermore, it
became clear that these emergent themes provided not components but rather
characteristics o f concept images. Thus, the research questions were adjusted to reflect
this observation, resulting in the versions given in chapter 1 .

Characterizing the Method
The working hypotheses evolved over the course o f the analysis into a theory that was
organized under the two themes. Analysis, synthesis, and theory generation were
conducted iteratively and sometimes simultaneously. In other words, by frequently
returning to the initial analyses and to the data themselves to judge the faithfulness o f the
emerging theory and the accompanying explanations, I established the theory in an
empirically grounded way.
Very late in the process, I realized that the detailed summaries functioned as codes, the
preliminary observations served as initial categories and hypotheses, and the synthesis o f
the working hypotheses formed the core o f an emergent theory. It is now apparent that,
disregarding the false starts, the method is consistent with the constant comparative
method o f Glaser and Strauss (1967; see Cobb & Whitenack, 1996, for a similar
discussion). Theoretical constructs were developed as part o f the data analysis, and the
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constructs are grounded in the sense that they are rooted in the data. The inferences made
while analyzing the episodes formed working hypotheses that were constantly compared
to the data and modified in light o f new data and analysis, and the theory emerged via this
process. The methodology also emerged as I abandoned unproductive approaches and
instead focused on what the data afforded. Explicit description o f the method was made
only retrospectively.
W hat was hardest about the process that eventually led to this method was coming to the
realization that there was no need to be apologetic about the fact that my initial research
questions were vague and that I could not stick to a coding scheme. From the start, the
goal o f this study had been to develop new understandings o f the ways that students learn
abstract algebra. When the study began, the only extant theory had been grown out o f
Dubinsky’s (1991) APOS framework, and I suspected right away that the APOS
framework missed and even obscured important issues for the learning and teaching o f
advanced mathematics. Now it is apparent that my aim all along was theory generation,
which is precisely what the constant comparative method is intended to support.
As for the coding, by thinking up the coding scheme in advance, the subsequent attempts
at statement-by-statement coding required that I impose (or force) preconceived
categories onto the data. The coding did not work precisely because the codes did not fit
the data. W hat I should have done instead was let the codes and categories emerge from
the data, and that was the end result, despite the several dead ends that were explored.
To be precise, however, not all o f the codes emerged from the data. In particular, coding
and categorizing by mathematical content was intended in the early conceptualization o f
the study and remained important throughout. The fact that these categories were
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imposed on the data seems reasonable because they are natural in a sense, because I was
interested in the learning o f specific mathematical content, and because these categories
organize important learning goals. Thus, because o f these preconceived categories, the
resulting theory is not entirely grounded in the sense o f Glaser (1992).

Relationship with Grounded Theory
I have mentioned that the method o f this study is consistent with the constant
comparative method o f Glaser and Strauss (1967), but that seminal book is more often
cited (with little detail) for the methodology o f grounded theory. In this section, I fill in
some o f the oft-missing detail and explain the relationship between the constant
comparative method and grounded theory. This discussion is particularly important
because Glaser and Strauss themselves later disagreed about the methodological
requirements o f constant comparison and grounded theory (compare Strauss & Corbin,
1990; Glaser, 1992). I follow Glaser’s account because it seems to me to be more faithful
to the notions o f groundedness and emergence.
The constant comparative method forms the methodological backbone in the
development o f grounded theory. Regarding the formulation o f a research problem,
Glaser (1992) suggests, “Remember and trust that the research problem is as much
discovered as the process that continues to resolve it” (p. 21). As for reviewing the
literature, Glaser dictates that the researcher not review any o f the relevant literature in
the field o f study (p. 31), because the theoretical constructs in the literature may
contaminate the analysis, steering the researcher toward imposing preconceived
categories on the data. Any theory that grows through the constant comparative method I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

will call an emergent theory, usage that fits with the work o f Glaser and much o f the
work o f Cobb and his colleagues (see, e.g., Cobb & Whitenack, 1996).
How do the constant comparative method and an emergent theory satisfy the traditional
research ideals o f validity and reliability? Glaser (1992) suggests that the criteria by
which to judge the theory are not verification and reproducibility but rather fit, work,
relevance, and modifiability. When the goal o f a study is theory generation, verification
is not necessary if the theory fits, although future studies might undertake verification.
Furthermore, it matters not whether another researcher would have produced the same
theory but rather whether the theory fits the data, works to explain the variation in the
data, is relevant to the context from which the data came, and is modifiable to
accommodate the integration o f additional concepts.
In the following chapters, I have tried to include enough detail in the analysis to
demonstrate that these four key criteria are satisfied. The final analysis and the emergent
theory for this study also essentially satisfied Glaser’s prohibitions about the formulation
o f the research problem and the influence o f the relevant literature, if the false starts and
missteps are disregarded. Certainly, the original statement o f the research problem was
sufficiently vague, and the statement o f the research problems underwent revisions
throughout the process in response to what was available in the data. Regarding the
review o f the literature, although I read much o f the literature ahead o f time and did try to
force some categories on the data, in the final analysis only the process/object distinction
was helpful, and that formed but a small part o f the resulting theory. O f course, I also
used the notion o f concept image, but that construct served mostly as a reminder that I
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aimed to describe students’ understandings broadly, and the construct carried little
theoretical baggage that could have been imposed on the data.
Thus, the methodology o f this study was consistent with the constant comparative
method, and I call the result an emergent theory. A grounded theory, on the other hand,
requires additional methodological commitments. For example, in Glaser’s version o f
grounded theory, data analysis and data collection are iterative so that emerging theories
can inform and guide subsequent data collection. I do not see this discrepancy as very
serious in this study, although I readily admit that the theory could have been developed
further and in more detail if I had been able to alternate analysis and data collection.
There are two senses, however, in which the design o f this study could not lead to a
grounded theory. The first sense concerns the imposition o f codes for mathematical
content, as described above. That was unavoidable. Because the goal was to understand
learning in abstract algebra, it was necessary to keep the mathematical content available
in the analysis.
The second discrepancy with the tenets o f grounded theory is more fundamental, though
it also arises from the attention to mathematical learning. In formulating a research
problem, Glaser suggests that the researcher enter the substantive area wondering what
the main issue is for the subjects and the processes by which it is handled. Furthermore,
it is essential that issue be relevant for the subjects from their perspectives. At least in his
field o f sociology, it seems that Glaser hopes that the researcher’s findings might actually
be directly useful to the subjects who participate in the study. Thus, in grounded theory,
the subjects’ meanings are primary, whereas I was concerned not only with the subjects’
meanings but also with the community meanings and the fit between them. As both a
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researcher and a teacher, I want not only to understand students’ conceptions but also to
understand how to guide and direct students toward important mathematical ideas and
conventional concepts. This perspective was always in the background in the interviews.
In the analysis, this perspective took a different form: How might we improve the
teaching o f abstract algebra in particular and advanced mathematics in general?
It is hard to imagine a grounded theory that is committed to describing students’
conceptual understanding and its relationship with conventional concepts as they exist in
the mathematical community. In studying students’ conceptual understanding, I would
suggest that the criteria o f fit and relevance are with respect to teachers and researchers
primarily and only secondarily with respect to the students. The fact that a theoretical
construct is useful for teachers and researchers does not necessarily imply that it will be
directly relevant for students, although it is possible to imagine recasting some constructs
in ways that might assist students in reflecting on their own thinking and learning. The
point is that in judging the theory, fit and relevance for students is at most a secondary
consideration. After all, who would suggest that first graders should begin the year with
some lessons on assimilation and accommodation?

Summary
This chapter provides a detailed description o f the context for this study, including the
curriculum, the instruction, and the participants, and the methodology employed. Briefly,
this study consists o f a semiotic analysis o f interviews with students to support the
development o f theoretical descriptions o f their understanding and learning in elementary
group theory. The next three chapters provide the results o f that analysis, organized
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according to mathematical content and addressing the three main research questions
individually.
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CHAPTER V

GROUPS AND ISOMORPHISMS

This chapter presents analysis o f students’ concept images o f binary operation, group,
subgroup, and isomorphism, which were the mathematical foci o f the first and second
interviews. The chapter is organized around the mathematics and thus essentially follows
the chronology o f the interviews. The bottom-up analysis o f these interviews revealed
two themes that are threaded throughout this chapter: use o f language and use o f the
operation table. Because these themes are well illustrated by W endy’s interviews, a
detailed case study o f W endy’s concept images forms the bulk o f the chapter, with
supporting data from other students and other interviews providing corroborating and
contrasting evidence. Each section begins with a description o f the interview task, which
is followed by an analysis o f the mathematics. Then portions o f the Wendy’s interviews
are presented and analyzed, followed by related evidence from other students and other
interviews. But first, I provide a short description o f W endy’s language and reasoning as
an introduction to the chapter’s main themes.

Wendy’s Language and Reasoning
Wendy often misused words. The analysis o f the transcripts o f W endy’s interviews was
complicated by the fact that many o f her misstatements were mere slips o f the tongue.
She would say one thing but meant to say something else. Such an inference is clearly
reasonable in two kinds o f situations: when Wendy immediately corrected herself and
when she restated the idea differently moments later. Because these occurrences were
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rather frequent, W endy’s language inaccuracies were also interpreted as slips o f the
tongue when both the context and W endy’s typical usage strongly suggested she intended
to say something else. In cases where I do not otherwise call attention to her
misstatement, I enclose in brackets what I believe she intended. Not all o f W endy’s
misstatements were so categorized, however. In particular, her use o f the words inverse,
identity, commutativity, associativity, and isomorphism indicated conceptual issues that
are explored in this analysis.
W endy’s images o f the fundamental concepts in group theory were dominated by the use
o f operation tables. She often relied on the operation table to provided support for her
reasoning and seemed to require that the table be visible in order to begin. The operation
table played a metaphorical role in her explanations, appearing to substitute for the group
in her reasoning and thinking. Wendy drew conclusions and generalizations from her
consideration o f the operation tables but also was constrained by her reliance on the
tables and found it hard to separate her thinking from them. A related and perhaps
consequential phenomenon was that Wendy often considered the group axioms
individually, seldom engaging more than one o f them at a time in her explanations.
W endy’s use o f the operation table is explored in detail below.

Groups and Binary Operations
As stated in chapter 4, the first interviews began with a question from the literature: “Is
Z 3 a subgroup o f Z6?” The short answer to this question is no because the operations in
the two groups are different. More specifically, because Z3 is the set {0, 1, 2} under
addition modulo 3, and Zg is the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} under addition modulo 6 , the
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operations are not the same. For example, 2 + 2 is 4 in Z& but 1 in Z3 . Nonetheless, the
subset {0, 2, 4} o f Z(, is simultaneously a subgroup o f Z(, and isomorphic to Z 3 , so there is
a sense in which the answer is yes. Both o f these ideas were explored in the interviews.
The literature suggests two reasons for students’ difficulties with this question. First,
although students think o f a group as a set, they are not always sufficiently aware o f the
operation (Dubinsky et al., 1994). The second finding in the literature is that some
students use a powerful result inappropriately, saying that Z 3 is a subgroup o f Z 6 by
Lagrange’s theorem because 3 divides

6

(Hazzan & Leron, 1996). Because the students

had not yet been introduced to Lagrange’s theorem at the time o f the first interview, my
intent was not to explore the students’ understanding o f Lagrange’s theorem but to
explore the role o f the operation in their conceptions o f group and subgroup.
Nonetheless, by exploring subgroups o f Ze in the interviews, I intended to get at some of
the divisibility ideas that are behind Lagrange’s theorem. Before providing a detailed
description and analysis o f the interviews, I offer an analysis o f the mathematical
concepts o f binary operation, group, and subgroup. The analysis is semiotic in the sense
that I pay particular attention to names, notations, and other representations, particularly
those that were used in this class.

Conceptual Analysis
As described in chapter 1, a group is a set and a binary operation that together satisfy four
axioms (closure, associativity, identity, and inverse). The operation gives the group its
structure. In other words, a group without its operation is merely a formless collection of
elements. In some textbooks, this point is sometimes made notationally, but it is more
common to use the set to denote the group, thereby leaving the operation implicit.
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Fraleigh (1989), for example, at first uses the notation <G, *> to denote the group
composed o f the set G and the binary operation *. Almost immediately he adopts the
shorthand notation:
At some point, all authors give up and become sloppy, denoting the group by the
single letter G. We choose to recognize this and be sloppy from the start. We
emphasize, however, that when you are speaking o f a specific group, G, you
must make it clear what the group operation on G is to be, since a set could
conceivably have a variety o f binary operations, all giving different groups.
(p. 40)

Using Fraleigh’s first notation, <Z„, +„> denotes the group consisting o f the set {0, 1, ... ,
n — 1} under the operation addition modulo n. In this class, the instructors and students
adopted the shorthand, denoting the group merely by Z„. Because the most obvious
operations to consider are addition modulo n and multiplication modulo n and because
the set Z„ is not a group under multiplication modulo n, it is reasonable to say that, for
many mathematicians, the phrase “the group Z„” or “the group o f integers modulo n”
carries the implication that the intended operation is addition modulo n (see also Gallian,
1994; Hungerford, 1974). Nonetheless, this implication was not always obvious to the
students.
The operation on a set may be given in a number o f ways, such as by a formula, by a
table, or by inheriting an operation from a larger structure in which the set sits. In subsets
o f the integers, for example, the operations o f addition and multiplication may be
inherited from the familiar operations on integers. For the sets Z„, however, the
operations addition modulo n and multiplication modulo n are not inherited from Z
because, for example, 3 + 5 =

8

in Z, but 3 + 5 = 2 in Zv

For sets with only a few elements, the table was the predominant representation o f binary
operations for this class. Even with sets such as Z 3 and Z 5, for both addition modulo n
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and multiplication modulo n, the students typically created tables that served to support
their reasoning.
Just as a group is a set with structure provided by an operation, a subgroup is not merely
a subset o f a group but rather a substructure, and the structure is provided by the
operation o f the group. General insight into the structure can be provided by Lagrange’s
theorem, which says that in a finite group the order o f a subgroup (the number o f
elements in the subgroup) must be a factor o f the order o f the group. The converse o f the
theorem is false in general, as discussed in chapter 3, although it is elegantly true for Z„:
For each divisor d o f n, there is a unique subgroup o f order d, which consists o f the
multiples o f n/d. In the task at hand, although Z 3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, the multiples of
2 in Z(, are the subset {0, 2, 4}, which is a subgroup o f Z(, and which is isomorphic to Z3 ,
as mentioned above.

Wendy. Groups, and Binary Operations
The beginning o f W endy’s interview was marked by uncertainty. She first tried to
understand the question:
5

Wendy: Okay. Well on the first question I look at, is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6? From.... Z6 is
just mod 6 , right? Mod 6 ? So first o f all I’d want to.... I am assuming Z6 is a group if
you are going to ask that Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6.

11

Wendy: I am taking Z6 to be integers mod 6 . And I don’t know what’s leading me to
think that. But, so, but if it is.... Can I just say, “if it is ... ”?

12

Brad: Sure.

13

Wendy: A total table. It would consist o f 6 items or elements, and for.... It has to be
mod 6 . Z6. It has to be integers mod 6 , because.... Well, we have to also figure out an
operation, also, too. So now you have the elements, you know Z6. We have to know the
operation because that will be [inaudible] whether or not it’s going to be a subgroup.

Wendy was unsure o f what Z6 was, what the operation should be, and whether it was a
group. Nonetheless, she made some assumptions. Using the wording o f my question,
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she assumed Z6 to be a group. She also assumed Z6 to be integers mod 6 , but her
statement “Z6 is ju st mod 6 ” (line 5), with its odd syntax, suggests she may have been
thinking as much about the process o f calculating the remainders as about the set of
remainders. Later in the interview, she confirmed this impression, saying, “I ’m assuming
Z6 means it’s integers mod 6 , which means you look at the remainders after dividing by
6

” (line 32). The students’ under standing o f modular arithmetic is considered in detail in

chapter 7.
W endy’s phrase “a total table” (line 13) suggests she wanted to create a table, but she
quickly realized she would need to figure out what the operation should be. To resolve
this issue, she referred back to the question at hand:
17

Wendy: So, therefore you have to find.... That would help you to determine what
operation, because maybe if you tried multiplication and if Z6 wasn’t a group under
multiplication then you would know that Z3, you are not talking about whether Z3 is a
subgroup under Z6 because Z6 isn’t a subgroup [group]. But maybe under addition Z6 is a
group and therefore you can look at the case under addition.

Thus, although W endy’s concept images o f group, subgroup, and binary operation were
insufficient to provide a quick answer to the interview question, her concept images were
sufficient to provide general framing o f the question at hand. In particular, she saw that it
would be helpful to determine first whether the operation in

was addition or

multiplication. The fact that she didn’t say “addition modulo n” suggests that she may
not have been distinguishing between addition and addition modulo n, and similarly for
multiplication. I did not pursue this distinction in the interview but merely suggested that
she try both possibilities. She started with multiplication.
20

Wendy: Okay. Well, Z6 is not going to be, when I start with my chart, and I do the first
row, 0 times any element is going to equal 0, so if you look at that.... Actually, okay.
Let me just.... It’s not going to have.... You have to.... I’ll just finish it. Okay, now it
has to hold four properties to be a group. Let’s write these down. It has to have an
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identity, an inverse, it has to be closed, and it has to be associative, which we’re going to
leave for last. [Laughs]
During this statement, Wendy set up an operation table and filled out the “0” row and
column (see Figure 5). She also wrote down the names o f the four group axioms to assist
her, it appears, in the process o f checking whether Zg is a group under multiplication.

Figure 5. Wendy’s table for multiplication in Z&
X 0

1 2

3 4

5

0

0 0
1 2
2 4

0

0

(i
(2

3
4
5

0
0
0
0
0
0

0

3 4 5)
0 2 4)

3
4
5

Wendy continued filling out the table, checking the identity and inverse properties as she
went along:
22

Wendy: So it has an identity, which is 1, which is the identity ... which is the identity for
every element, identity equals 1. But inverse ...

23

Brad: Every element identity? What do you mean?

24

Wendy: An identity means when you multiply the identity by itself, like say if you have
the letter m and you multiply it by the identity i, it’s going to equal m. [Writes m{i) = m.]
It is going to give you back the same thing. The identity is ...

2

5

Brad: Okay. So how does that fit in here?

26

Wendy: Ifyou look at this row, you multiply.... If I
I am calling 1 the identity. If
you multiply 1 by every element, you get the element back, get the original element back.
So, like 1 multiplied by this row gives you the same row back.

2 8

Wendy: So Z6 does have an identity. Now, inverse. Inverse means when you multiply....
If you have a number in Z6, there has to be a number in which when you, a number so that
when you multiply it, you will get the identity.

30

Wendy: So m times the inverse. I don’t know how I should represent the inverse.
Identity is usually.... I am going to change it so that my identity being represented as e,
and then I am going to change the inverse as i. So when you multiply some number m
by, it has to have an inverse i, so that when multiplied, it will equal the identity. [Writes
inverse = m(i) = e].

This excerpt provides the first clear hint that Wendy was thinking about the identity and
inverse properties in similar ways. She struggled to articulate each o f the concepts and
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arrived at definitions (lines 24 and 28) and notations (lines 24 and 30) that were similar.
Furthermore, her syntax suggested that to some extent the names o f the concepts had
been swapped in her thinking. For example, when talking about the identity, she used the
phrase “for every element” (line

2 2

), which is more typical when talking about inverses.

Similarly, her phrase “m times the inverse” (line 30) employs syntax more typical of
statements about the identity element. A more correct phrasing would be “m times its
inverse,” which makes the dependence on m explicit. A search o f the transcript reveals
that Wendy had used similar syntax for the two concepts when listing the group axioms
earlier in the interview: “It has to have an identity, an inverse” (line 20).
Wendy explicitly used the table to verify the identity property (line 26). Similarly, after
explaining her calculations for the row labeled “ 2 ,” she used the table to explain how the
inverse property failed:
34

Wendy: So if you look at the second row [the “2” row], there is no number when you
multiply.... If you take m equalling 2, if you take a number equalling 2, when you
multiply, there is nothing to multiply by 2 to get— in mod 6 , cause it has to be an element,
to be closed, you can only work with the elements within mod 6 . And I have tried every
element, 0, 1 ... 0 through 5, multiplied by 2 to see if I can get the identity, 1, and I can’t
get it. So therefore, Z6 is not a group under multiplication. So, I don’t think we should
look at it, check to see if Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6 when Z6 isn’t even a group under
multiplication.

Wendy was about to begin considering addition but stopped herself to make a comment
about multiplication:
38

Wendy: Actually, up here, in multiplication, I didn’t even have to look at the second row
[the “2 ” row] because if you look at 0 there is nothing you can multiply by 0 to get the
identity element back, 1 , because 0 times every element is going to equal 0 .

It seems that at this point, Wendy had reduced the process o f checking the inverse
property to a process o f looking for the identity, 1 , in a particular row in the table, for not
only was she able to see from the table that the element

1

did not appear in the “ 2 ” row,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

but she also noticed that

1

did not appear in the “ 0 ” row, which provided a more

immediate reason for the failure o f the inverse property under multiplication. This
process either provides a partial explanation for or is partly explained by the close
relationship between the identity and inverse properties in W endy’s thinking. The word
inverse was not present in her justification, however. I asked her to explain:
39

Brad: So what does that say about 0 there?

40

Wendy: 0 cannot be an element in Z6.

41

Brad: 0. But you are saying it is an element though, because

42

Wendy: Oh yeah; 0 is an element in Z6, but it doesn’t havean inverse.

43

Brad: Oh, okay.

44

...

Wendy: Because you can’t .... There’s not.... When you multiply 0 by anything, you
can’t get the identity element. And this doesn’t help. So that just doesn’t seem .... Like,
if you are going to have a group, you couldn’t, 0 couldn’t be in it. A group under
multiplication, it couldn’t include 0 .

Thus, W endy’s statement that “0 cannot be an element in Z6” (line 40), was a specific
instance o f a general principle: A group, under multiplication, cannot include 0. It is not
surprising that Wendy wanted to exclude elements that did not satisfy desired properties,
because this is essentially the idea behind the construction o f the groups o f units modulo
n. In the introduction to the groups U„, the class used a more general version o f this
principle: Include only elements from Z„ that have multiplicative inverses.
Wendy next began considering whether Z6 is a group under addition. She constructed a
new operation table (Figure 6 ), checking the axioms as she went along.
47

Wendy: Now if you look at addition, I am going to fill out the table the same way, except
with addition. I’m going to just look at the remainders when divided by 6 . We can see, I
can see by filling out the first table [row] that the identity.... Also, I think it is a global
property, that since integers, the identity is going to equal zero. That, if you take a
subgroup o f.... But then we are going to go into another issue, whether Z6 is a subgroup
of, in the integers. But I think if integers has an identity o f 0 under addition, that Z6 will
also have the identity 0. It works.
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Figure 6. Wendy’s table for addition in Zf,
+

3 4 5
0 0
1 2
3 4 5
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
2 2 3 4 5 0
1
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
0

1

2

In class, the word global was often used to describe the associative property when
checking whether a subset o f a group was a subgroup. The term is based on the idea that
if an operation is associative on an entire set, then the property must hold for any subset.
The term is nonstandard, although the idea closely resembles the meaning o f the more
conventional phrase “associativity is inherited from the group.” This excerpt shows that
Wendy had expanded her use o f the term to describe a similar idea for the identity
property. She was correct, in a sense, in that when verifying the identity property for a
subset o f a group, it is sufficient to show that the identity element is in the subset, rather
than showing that it serves as the identity for all elements in the subset. It is not clear,
however, whether she had in mind this precise use o f the word. In any case, the “global”
idea was not appropriate here because addition in the integers and addition in Z(, are
different operations. Thus, this excerpt suggests imprecision in W endy’s concepts of
global and o f addition. These issues are explored in more detail below.
Wendy continued verifying the group axioms:
50

Wendy: So next I am going to check the inverse property. And 0 has an inverse so 0 + 1,
or.... Excuse me. Since 0 is the identity we have to check that when you add 0 to 0 you
get the identity 0. So 0 is the inverse element for itself. And then 1. When you multiply,
when you add 1 and 5 it equals 6 , but that equals 0 (mod 6 ) cause 6 is divisible by 6 .
That’s pretty obvious, but.... So 1 has a inverse. 2 has an inverse because 2 + 4 = 6 ,
which equals 0. 3 + 3 has an in -.... equals 0 (mod 6 ). 4 + 2 = 0 (mod 6 ). And 5 + 1 = 0
(mod 6 ). So each element has an inverse. So you know that Z6 is a group under addition.
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Here, Wendy correctly verified the inverse property by using the table to find the inverse
o f each element. She supported this process by making a check mark alongside each row
o f the table as she identified the corresponding inverse. She momentarily considered 1 as
the identity but corrected this on her own. Apart from her self-corrections, she used
appropriate language throughout this verification, which culminated in the statement
“each element has an inverse.” W endy’s language and calculations, taken together,
suggest that she could distinguish identity and inverse properties according to the
conventional meanings, although the distinction became less clear again later in the
interview.
Although W endy’s verification o f the inverse property was essentially correct, she was
premature in declaring that Z(> is a group under addition because she had not yet checked
all the properties. Because she immediately went on to check closure, however, it seems
likely that she had in mind a preliminary rather than final conclusion. In verifying the
closure and associative properties, Wendy explicitly referred to the table to support her
reasoning:
51

Wendy: And then it’s closed. You can see that there are no elements other than 0 through
5, looking at the chart, because we have all possible combinations on elements in Zg. So
it is closed also.

52

Wendy: And associative. You can see, because the chart has symmetry, that the group
will be, is associative. This is how I look at it, anyway, because if you look at 2 x 5 you
are going to get 1 and if you look at 2 + 5 you get 1. But also you know it is Z6, is also
because it’s a global property, because addition is associative, for integers, and you know
that this carries over to subgroups and so Z6 will be associative under addition. Do you
want me to explain that further?

Wendy made several errors in her attempt to verify associativity. First she stated that she
was comparing 2 + 5 and 2 x 5 when, based on her statement about the symmetry in the
table, she probably was comparing 2 + 5 and 5 + 2. A more significant error was that she
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was describing commutativity but calling it associativity. Furthermore, the penultimate
sentence implies that she thought that Zf, is a subgroup o f Z. During the interview, I
pursued the first two errors.
53

Brad: I want you to explain how you said.... What was it you said, 2 + 5 is the same ...?

54

Wendy: 2 + 5 is the same as 5 + 2.

55

Brad: Oh, okay. So that means it is associative?

56

Wendy: Well that is an example o f associative.... No, that’s not. That’s the
commutative property. So we have to check 1 + 2 + 3 is going to equal1 + 2 + 3. That’s
the associative property. So in a sense we have to .... But w e’d have to go through all of
the different combinations including 0 through 5 and all o f the different elements, which
takes a while. But because we know that the associative property holds under integers,
for addition, we know it holds. And that’s one o f the good things that, good facts about
that global property because associativity is so hard, difficult to check. Would you like
me to try just to see if this checks?

Thus, Wendy was able to correct both errors on her own. Because it took her a moment
to realize that her description was about commutativity, it appears that the commutative
and associative properties were closely related, perhaps even overlapping, in W endy’s
thinking.

Wendy used the idea that associativity is a global property to complete her verification,
but again the idea was not appropriate because addition in the integers and addition in Zs
are different operations. I did not pursue this issue explicitly in the interview but instead
asked Wendy only to verify the property for the example she gave.
At this point, I put aside the case o f Wendy to extend the analysis to other students,
discussing, in particular, the concept of binary operation, the relationship between
associativity and commutativity, and the notion o f global properties. In this section, I
further develop some o f the themes that have emerged thus far, including language use
and the use o f the operation table.
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Binary Operation
Operation confusion. One o f the most persistent occurrences throughout the interviews
was a phenomenon I initially called operation confusion, where students were unsure o f
the appropriate operation on a set. As might have been expected, operation confusion
was more likely to occur when more than one operation was available, such as in Zn,
where there are two natural operations. All the key participants experienced operation
confusion during the first interview, and most had at least momentary confusion in the
third interview when dealing with a function from U% to Z4 . All these groups, it should be
pointed out, have elements that look like integers but that do not behave quite like the
integers with which the students were familiar.
In the first interviews, none o f the key participants was immediately sure about the
operations that would be appropriate for answering the question “Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6?”
Carla, for example, stated at first that the operation must be multiplication “because the
addition w asn’t a group mod n . ... Something about multiples o f «” (line 12). She then
verified that the group axioms are satisfied under addition modulo n, showed that the
group axioms are not satisfied for multiplication modulo n, and realized that she had
remembered incorrectly.
Robert, on the other hand, was at first convinced that Z(, is not a group under
multiplication, “because the inverses aren’t in Z6” (line 9), a statement that was
essentially correct and might have led him quickly to consider addition modulo 6 .
Moments later, however, he stated that the inverse o f 1 would be “ 1 over 1, just 1” (line
15), demonstrating that he was thinking o f inverses as fractions. Then he used analogous
reasoning for addition in Zg.
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2 0

Robert: So, but that’s not a group either because in Z6 if each inverse is itself, the
negative o f itself, which isn’t in Z6.

21

Brad: What do you mean?

22

Robert: Like 1 + -1 will equal 0, so -1 is l ’s inverse, b ut-1 isn’t in Z6.

At this point in the interview, Robert was unsure whether Z 6 is a group at all. By making
operation tables for both operations, he was able to resolve these issues, although he first
stated that 3 is the inverse o f 2 under multiplication because the product is 0,
demonstrating some difficulty keeping his additive and multiplicative thinking separate.
It is likely that the students’ operation confusion was caused in part by the fact that the
class had spent time at the beginning o f the course solving both multiplicative and
additive equations in Zn. It may also be, however, that the notational convention of
writing the group operation multiplicatively when is not specified promotes
multiplicative thinking in additive situations such as this.
During the first interviews, resolving operation confusion consumed considerable time
for all of the key participants, but as the semester progressed, the students developed
more efficient and accurate methods o f determining and keeping track o f the operation.
For example, they used either the identity or closure properties to deduce that the
operation in U% is multiplication and not addition:
34

Carla: Let’s see U%is a group under... [pause]... I am trying to think if it is a group under
addition or multiplication. But it must be multiplication, because if it was addition then 0
would be in there. (Interview 3)

17

Lori: Okay. So, [inaudible]. Is it multiplication? Oh, I was thinking it was addition.
‘Cause I’m like 1 + 1 is 2.

18

Brad: And, why wouldn’t that work?

19

Lori: Because 2 ’s not in t/8. I don’t know why I was thinking that. (Interview 3)
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One might hope that determining a group’s operation w ould become a matter o f recall.
But the evidence suggests some subtlety in the learning process: The students developed
increasingly efficient strategies for determining a group’s operation. This hypothesis is
analogous to the development o f proficiency in other areas o f mathematics, most notably
in the learning o f the basic number combinations: Rather than moving from slow objectbased procedures to recall, young children proceed along a trajectory o f increasingly
efficient procedures until the combinations are based either on recall or on procedures
that are indistinguishable from recall (see, e.g., Kilpatrick et al., 2001, chapter 6 ). Thus,
the phenomenon o f operation confusion may be viewed as a natural stage in the
development o f proficiency with group theory and its standard examples.
Diamond and star. Another explanation for operation confusion may be an inevitable
consequence o f one o f the goals for the course: an abstract concept o f binary operation.
So that all binary operations, including familiar additions and multiplications, might be
seen as instances o f a single idea, Dr. Benson and I chose sometimes to use a neutral
notation for the operation. Clearly the notations +, x, or ■would not provide such
neutrality. Thus, we often used 0 (diamond) or * (star) to denote an unspecified
operation. One could argue that * does not provide the intended neutrality because the
symbol is often used in computer programming languages to denote multiplication. This
is certainly a concern, although it is no more problematic than the common practice in
abstract algebra texts o f leaving the operation implied, as in ab, a convention that clearly
carries overtones o f multiplication. Even the more neutral 0 (diamond), however, was
problematic, as is illustrated by Diane and Lori as they tried to determine the operation in
Z3.
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20

Diane: Z3 you would have addition, multiplication, or a diamond. And 0, 1, 2, 3 ...
[inaudible]. No, it only goes up to 2.

21

Lori: All right, yeah let’s make a table o f Z3 and let’s make a table o f Z6.

22

Diane: You need to make 3 tables because we don’t know what operation we are talking
about.

So for Diane, at least, diamond was not a generic operation that could stand for either
multiplication modulo 3 or addition modulo 3; it was another operation entirely. Upon
questioning, Diane reiterated her list o f three operations, so I asked her to write out
operation tables for all three. Lori interrupted:
28

Lori: Like it’s integers. What’s diamond? Can’t you only really have these two? That’s
what I am thinking.

Diane had begun to construct operation tables but quickly reconsidered:
31

Diane: But I don’t know how to do a diamond because I don’t know what the operation
is.

32

Lori: I don’t think that you can do diamond, because we are in Z3 and it’s integers, and
what is diamond?

33

Diane: Yeah, that’s what I am saying. I don’t know what diamond is.

34

Lori: So you can only do like addition and multiplication.

35

Brad: Where does the diamond ... ?

36

Diane: Diamond comes in when you don’t know what the operation is.

37

Brad: Oh, so you mean when you don’t know what you call the operation you just use
diamond instead? Do you agree with that?

38

Lori: Yes, definitely. But we kind o f know that it’s integers. So we know how to add
integers. It’s not like it’s a and b, you know. Then I would probably use diamond
because I don’t know how to add a and b elements.

Thus, despite their momentary disagreement, Lori and Diane both saw diamond not so
much as a label for an abstraction under which a number o f familiar operations could sit
but rather as a device to use when the operation was unfamiliar or unknown.
Furthermore, it seems that Lori had similar thinking about the notational uses o f a and b,
in the sense that the letters were not generic labels for group elements but rather
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unfamiliar objects that she did not know how to add. Thus, even the most neutral
notation did not necessarily lead students to the desired abstraction.
The abstract concept o f binary operation continued to be problematic for Lori. During
her third interview, while determining whether a particular function/ from U%to Z4 was a
homomorphism, Lori described an appropriate verification formula, j[a*b) =f(a)*f(b),
and seemed to know that the operation * on the left was to take place in U%, whereas the
operation * on the right was to take place in Z4 . Nonetheless, she spent a good deal of
time determining what the operations were in each o f the groups. She first called both
operations addition (line 15), yet after deciding that the operation in U%was
multiplication, she thought that both operations were multiplication (line 30). Finally,
because she could not find multiplicative inverses in Z4 , she decided, “This [L/g] is
multiplication, and this [Z4 ] is addition” (line 34). I asked her whether it was okay that
the operations were different.
38

Lori: If we prove it’s a homomorphism, yes. [Okay, but....] Right now I am not sure.
[Okay.] So I don’t, I guess star right now is just going to have to remain generic until I, if
I prove it is a homomorphism, then.... It’s neat that they call it star because it could be
representing two totally different things. [Oh, Okay.] Do you know what I’m saying?
[Okay] Like in U% it’s multiplication, in Z4 it’s addition. [Okay.] So maybe I should just
keep it star.

Thus, Lori continued to prefer to use * when there was some uncertainty about the
operation, yet she was becoming comfortable with the idea that * could stand for various
known operations. It is not clear why or to what extent these impressions were dependent
on whether/ was indeed a homomorphism. Would Lori have made better sense o f the
task if the two operations had been notated differently? In class, the verification formula
was typically written as f[a*b) =j{d) *'fib), thereby making it more apparent that the
operations might be different. Lori and Diane were unusual in denoting both operations
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as *. Because Lori had taken abstract algebra previously, a reasonable hypothesis about
her use o f notation is that she stuck to notation she had first learned rather than adopting
the class’s notation, and, furthermore, her usage had rubbed off on Diane.
Regarding Lori’s concept o f binary operation, it seems unwise to speculate about the
source o f her confusion and delayed abstraction. Nonetheless, because most textbooks
leave both operations implicit, as in jia b ) =J(a)/(b), it is worth considering the
relationship between the notation used in introducing the concept o f homomorphism and
students’ concepts o f binary operation. If this was a significant moment in Lori’s
construction o f an abstract concept o f binary operation, for example, to what extent did
ambiguity o f the notation * support or constrain this construction?
Late in the course, some students had developed a reasonably robust concept o f binary
operation, as evidenced by the fact that they were able to switch effortlessly between
additive and multiplicative notation and language. Wendy, for example, compared the
expression a*a between U% and Z4 by noting, “Here w e’re squaring it, but here w e’re
saying 2a” (Interview 3, line 156). This ability led sometimes to problematic or awkward
syntax. Robert, for example, called

6

a power o f 3 because “If you operate 3 with itself

you get 6 ” (Interview 3, line 272).
Sometimes, however, the switch between multiplicative and additive notation and
language was not so effortless, and multiplicative language seemed to dominate. In one
interview, for example, I asked Carla to find the subgroup generated by 3 in Z\ 2 .
15

Carla: There would be 3, and 9 would be in it because 3 squared is 9. And 0 would be in
it because.... Well, actually, Zn is a group under addition. So it’s not.... I can’t really
think of it as 3 squared.... So 9 is in it, but not because it’s 3 squared. 9 is in it because
it’s 3 cubed when you are adding. So, in other words three 3s. (Interview 4)
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It took Carla a moment to establish additive thinking, and still she maintained some
multiplicative language, leading to awkward phrases such as “3 cubed when you are
adding.” Later in the same interview, when explaining the sense in which {0, 3, 6 , 9} can
be an identity element, she indicated some discomfort with the broad use of
multiplicative language:
65

Carla: Okay if you add ... We have often called it multiplying, but I don’t like that term
because to me it doesn’t ... I just don’t like the idea o f multiplying; it doesn’t make
sense. So I prefer to think o f combining them.

In summary, the notion o f an abstract binary operation presented notational, conceptual,
and even linguistic issues. Coming to view various operations as instances o f the same
idea was a slow process. Standard notations such as + or ■have associated language and
thus associated meaning. New notations, such as diamond, were sometimes seen not to
represent new abstract categories but rather new operations.
Regarding the concept o f binary operation, the students demonstrated on the one hand
that they didn’t sufficiently distinguish between various operations called addition. On
the other hand, they demonstrated that they imposed nonstandard distinctions between
notations for generic operations such as * and notations for familiar operations such as •
or +. The students also had trouble maintaining the standard distinctions between
associativity and commutativity.

Associativity and Commutativity
It should not be surprising that Wendy sometimes confused the concepts of
commutativity and associativity, for the concepts are indeed closely related. And in fact,
other students also demonstrated similar confusion. Conceptual analysis, supported by a
closer look at the data, provides several possible explanations for the close relationship
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and the confusion between the concepts. This section builds an explanation out of
description o f the definitions, distinguishing examples, and verification processes for the
concepts o f associativity and commutativity.
Definitions. First, the definitions are quite similar in form. On their final exams, all the
key participants except Diane gave largely correct definitions o f associative operation
and commutative operation, such as the following, provided by Carla:
assoc, operation - the operation where, for any a, b, c, a*{b*c) = (a*b)*c.
comm, operation - the operation where, for any a and b, a*b = b*a.

Not all students were careful about the quantifiers. Wendy, for example, stated on her
final exam that “an operation is commutative if for

2

elements a and b, a*b = b*a.”

Students’ definitions and statements often noted that commutativity is about two
elements and that associativity is about three elements, suggesting that this was a salient
distinction between the two concepts. In fact, this is the most obvious difference in the
definitions.
Few distinguishing examples. Second, although associativity and commutativity are
often discussed in high school mathematics, most elementary examples of
noncommutative operations, such as subtraction and division o f real numbers, are also
nonassociative. Experiences in high school mathematics might lead to concepts o f
associativity and commutativity that are merged into an “order doesn’t matter” property.
Wendy said almost exactly this in her fourth interview: “Because it’s associative, you can
move it all around” (line 213). Furthermore, Diane’s final exam included similar claims
about commutativity: “This property allows us to switch around the elements in an
expression so that it doesn’t matter which elements will operate first.” Unless students’
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linear algebra courses emphasized the fact that matrix multiplication is associative but not
commutative, this abstract algebra class may have provided students their first
opportunity to separate their conceptions o f the two properties. Separating the concepts
might require at least a few distinguishing examples, but the group axioms suggest an
asymmetry: Associativity is more important. In fact, it seems to be difficult to create an
operation that is commutative but not associative, particularly via an operation table
(Zaslavsky & Peled, 1996; Benson, in press).
Verification. There are other important differences between the concepts of associativity
and commutativity, particularly regarding their verification processes. Commutativity is
often easy to infer from a description o f an operation, and when the operation is given via
a table, commutativity reveals itself as symmetry about the main diagonal. Students
often used commutativity to help them reason about groups and subgroups, particularly
when filling in an operation table. Thus, commutativity is tied closely to the
phenomenon o f reasoning from the table.
Associativity, on the other hand, is hard to see in an operation table. When an operation
is given via a table, the number o f calculations required to verify the property is
prohibitively high even for groups with as few as 4 elements. When an operation is given
via a description or a formula, there are a number o f possible approaches, each with its
own subtleties. In class, we took essentially three approaches to the problem of
associativity. For operations given via operation tables, we often used Exploring Small
Groups (Geissinger, 1989) to let the computer perform the tedious calculations. At other
times, we verified associativity via symbolic proof. Perhaps the most common approach,
however, was to argue that associativity was inherited from a larger structure in which
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the desired structure lived. In class, this approach was used uncritically and incorrectly
by many students and took on a life o f its own under the label “Associativity is global.”
This phenomenon is discussed in more detail below.
These differences between commutativity and associativity provide a third reason for the
confusion and also explain the fact that the confusion was essentially one directional:
Students sometimes said associative and meant commutative, but I found no evidence o f
the opposite. I do not contend that the opposite confusion never occurs but suggest
instead that commutativity is more likely to be present in a student’s mind. First, it is
easier to think about two elements at a time than it is to think about three. Second,
commutativity is such a useful property and such a prominent visual feature o f an
operation table, students are likely to focus on it rather than associativity, despite the fact
that commutativity is not one o f the group axioms.

Global Properties
Verifying that a set and an operation satisfy the associativity axiom requires particular
attention to the operation. As mentioned above, sometimes the associativity o f an
operation on a set is inherited from a larger structure in which the set and operation are
situated. All key participants applied this “global property” idea inappropriately at some
point during the interviews, typically by paying insufficient attention to the operation.
Furthermore, many o f the key participants uncritically generalized the idea to other group
axioms.
Both Lori and Robert, for example, claimed that associativity in Z& was inherited from Z:
8

3

Lori: And it’s associative because addition is associative and that’s inherited from the
larger group Z under addition. So that’s why it’s a subgroup.
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6

9

Robert: We are talking about Z6. These are integers, and integers fall in the associative
law, so it’s associative.

Carla demonstrated similar thinking but with more generality and with idiosyncratic
language, calling the set Z„ “mod «.” (See chapter 7 for detailed discussion o f Carla’s use
o f the phrase “mod n.”)
79

Carla: So the next thing to check would be associativity. But mod n is a subset o f Z
because all o f your elements in mod n are integers and Z under addition is associative, so
therefore mod n under addition is associative. So therefore mod n under addition is a
group.

Earlier in the same interview, Carla had similarly claimed that Z 3 inherits associativity
from Z&:
1

Carla:... All right, so then Z6 would be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Okay. So we can see that Z3
is a subset o f Z6 because 0, 1, 2 are elements within 0, 1,2, 3, 4, and 5. So because of
that we know that the associative property holds because the associative property is
global. And if the associative property works on this larger set then we know it is going
to work on the smaller set because it is, just has fewer elements to work on.

Carla’s description o f the idea is essentially correct. In this statement, however, she
made no mention o f the operation and, in fact, had not yet mentioned operations at all in
the interview. This suggests that the notion o f global or inherited properties may have
been mostly about subsets, with little connection to the operation.
Lori provides additional support for this hypothesis. On her midterm exam she stated,
while showing that a subset o f a group was a subgroup, “We need not show associativity
since it is inherited from the larger group.” Similarly, on her final exam, she asserted,
“Associativity is a global property, so it is inherited from the group.” Thus, Lori was
able to use the terms global and inherited with proper syntax. Elsewhere on her final
exam, however, Lori incorrectly claimed that Z4 is a subgroup o f Z and also a subgroup o f
Zg. Such statements do not make sense, o f course, if one is paying attention to the
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operation. This suggests that Lori’s other statements about associativity were not
properly supported by consideration o f the operation, despite their correctness.
Like Wendy, other students broadened the idea o f global or inherited properties beyond
associativity. The notion that the identity is global was perhaps implicit in many
students’ claims that

0

is the identity for addition, in the sense that the statement holds for

a wide variety o f representations o f groups, with many distinct operations called addition.
O f course, the same can be said o f 1 as the identity for multiplication.
Diane and Lori argued explicitly that the identity in Z3 is inherited from Z 6 (lines 78-80).
As in the case with Wendy, it is possible that Diane and Lori intended merely that they
did not need to show that 0 behaved as an identity in the subset. This simple explanation
seems particularly unlikely, however, in light o f Diane’s subsequent claim that an
element’s inverse need not be the same in a subgroup as it is in the group:
94

Diane: The only thing that it says about inherited inverses is that you get the inverse o f 1
is 2 here and 2 is an element o f this Z6. It doesn’t say that the inverse o f 1 has to be 2 in
here; it just says that 2 is in this, it doesn’t say that it has to be the same.

Diane’s concept o f inverse seems especially problematic here in the sense that the inverse
o f an element is unique and thus will not change when restricting to a subgroup. On the
other hand, on the assumption that Diane had a broad notion o f inherited properties— a
notion that did not pay much attention to the operation— then it follows that she would
say something about inverses in Z„ being inherited from Z. Then, because the inverse o f
5 is -5 in Z but 1 in Z 6 , her statement would make sense. This hypothesis is made more
plausible on the basis o f additional evidence o f Diane’s broad use o f the idea o f inherited
properties. Particular compelling evidence is provided by an earlier claim o f some kind
o f inheritance by Z3 from Z„:
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44

Diane: Well Z3 isn’t a subgroup o f Z6, it’s at least a subgroup o f Z„ and we know that Z„ is
a group under addition, so it would have inherited property.

Unfortunately, there was insufficient data to make much sense out o f what Diane meant
by Z„ here. Nonetheless, it is clear that her notion o f inherited properties was broader
than associativity and was insufficiently tied to the operation.
One potential explanation for students’ improper generalization o f the idea o f global
properties is that that term itself is nonstandard and lacks a formal definition. The data
suggest, however, that the more standard term inherited was also problematic.
Furthermore, formalizing either o f these terms would have been essentially the same
exercise.

Subgroups and Binary Operations
At this point, the discussion returns to the case o f Wendy to present detailed analysis o f
W endy’s concept image o f subgroup. Again, the main themes are W endy’s use o f the
operation table and her use o f language. Following the detailed presentation, I broaden
the analysis to include other students, discussing first the concepts o f identity and inverse
and the relationships between them, as these concepts became prominent in students’
reasoning about subgroups. Then, following a brief discussion o f the students’
understanding o f the concept o f closure, the section closes with a presentation o f the
findings about their concept o f subgroup, focusing particularly on the ways that students
answered the main interview question, Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z(p. The central issues are the
ways that the students distinguished among various operations called addition and the
ways that they used the operation table to support their reasoning.
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Wendv and Subgroups
When Wendy returned to the question o f whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Zti, she used the
addition table to support her reasoning.
76

Wendy: Now is Z3 a subgroup o f Z6? Now, we have to check that Z3 is going to be a
group because it has to have all o f the elements [axioms] o f a group, which means it has
to have identity and inverse; it has to be closed. So I am going to start checking Z3. Z3
would consist o f 0, 1, and 2 under addition. But Z3, the table is going to be different. See
I am going to have to explore right now whether or not.... When you say Z3 is a
subgroup o f Z6, whether it means you are taking Z3 out o f Z6, or if you are just looking at
Z6 [Z3] and seeing whether it’s a group. See when you say something is a subgroup of
something else [pause] I am not quite sure what way to look at it. Like how it exactly,
like how Z3 ties into Z6, like to be a subgroup o f Z6. What, that.... Like I know how to
check whether or not Z3 itself is a group and whether Z6 is a group, but to check whether
Z6, Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6,1 don’t know exactly what to look at.

Wendy had a sense that the operation table for Z3 would be different, depending upon
whether it was constructed on its own or taken out o f the Ze table. Consistent with the
emerging hypothesis that W endy’s reasoning was highly dependent on looking at an
operation table, it seems that her statement “I don’t know exactly what to look at” meant
she didn’t know what table to look at.
This excerpt suggests a much stronger observation than has been drawn thus far. Rather
than saying the operation in Z3 is different, Wendy said, “But Z3, the table is going to be
different” (line 76), suggesting that the table was not merely supporting her reasoning but
rather was substituting for the group in her thinking. The phrase “taking Z3 out o f Zf,”
(line 76) suggests again that, for Wendy, Ze was not merely a list o f elements that
appeared on the edges o f the table but was in fact the table. This conjecture is further
supported in the following explanation in which Wendy referred not to the group Z(, but
again to the table:
78

Wendy: Because if you use the elements o f Z3, which is 0, 1, and 2— are the elements o f
Z3. But if you look at them in terms o f Z6, like if you just look at this section o f the table
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Z6 (see Figure 7), this isn’t going to be a group.
79
8

0

Brad: Why?
Wendy: Because it is not closed.

81

Brad: Why?

82

Wendy: Because 4 isn’t an element o f Z3.

8

3

Brad: And where did the 4 come from?

8

4

Wendy: 2 + 2 from Z6 because it’s mod

6

in Z6,but when you look at Z3 it is mod 3.

Figure 7. Wendy’s table for additionin Zb, second version
i+ 0
10 0
i1 1
!2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5

1
1
2
3
4
5
0

2
2
3
4
5
0
1

3
3
4
5
0
1
2

4
4
5
0
1
2
3

5
5
0
1
2
3
4

Thus, through her reliance on the table, Wendy had correctly identified the central issue
behind the interview question: whether the addition was to take place based on the
operation in Z3 or in Zb. Nonetheless, she was not ready to come to a conclusion:
8 6

8

7

8 8

Wendy: See, it doesn’t make sense. Like, I started over here to do, to look at whether or
not Z3 was a group itself, but that didn’t make sense to me.
Brad: What didn’t make sense?
Wendy: To look independently to see whether Z3 was a group under addition. Actually, I
think for the same reasons it is going to be a group under addition, just like Z6. I think
any Z group under addition is going to be a group because 0 is going to b e.... Well, I
guess it depends what elements are in there, but.... Like Z3 is going to be a group, it’s
easy to see after looking at Z6. But if you just look at it separately, it doesn’t really make
sense whether, like, to tell whether or not Z3 is a subgroup o f Z6 to just look at whether Z3
is group because it has no connection with Z6.

It is surprising that Wendy was not able to make general statements about “any Z group”
but instead stated “it depends what elements are in there.” Perhaps this is merely
evidence that she needed to see the operation table in front o f her. Nonetheless, she was
concerned that there should be a clear connection between a subgroup and the group that
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it was supposed to come from. Earlier statements indicate that she thought the
connection should come via the operation table.
To provide some clarity, I first asked W endy to compare the two different versions o f
2 + 2 that she had discussed. She explained:

92

Wendy: This is going to equal 1 in Z3 mod 3 because that equals, 2 + 2 = 4. In mod 3 that
is going to equal, the remainder’s 1. But here it’s only, it’s still going to be 4 because it’s
mod 6 .

Next, I checked briefly why Wendy had not pursued multiplication as the operation in Z3.
(Misused words are set in bold to help call attention to them in the following discussion.)
95

Wendy: Well Z3 isn’t going to be a subgroup, isn’t going to be a group under
multiplication because if you look at the first row it’s going to equal the same thing as it
was up here. Like, they have very similar relationships, the Z tables. Like, Z3under
multiplication has a similar relationship to Z6multiplication table, as does Z3under
addition and Z6 under addition. Like they are going to have the same identity under
multiplication and division [addition]. So if you look at Z3 under multiplication I’d know
that the first row is going to be— I’m going to fix this— is going to be 0 ’s and from here
you know that 0 does not have a, doesn’t have an identity element, or an inverse, excuse
me. So you know already.

99

Wendy: There are no elements in Z3 when multiplied by 0 will give you the identity 1.
That’s why you know that, again, for the same reason, Z3 is not going to be a group under
multiplication.

Wendy had trouble saying what she meant here, correcting her language twice (group for
subgroup and inverse for identity) and also meaning addition but saying division.
Nonetheless, it seems that she was reasonably confident about the fact that Z3 is not a
group under multiplication (mod 3). But to get some clarity on the extent to which
Wendy associated an operation with Z„, I asked her about Z\ o.
104

Wendy: Like, I automatically know when you say Zi0 that, underaddition now it’s not
going to have an inverse element.

105

Brad: Under addition?

10 6

Wendy: I mean under multiplication it’s not going to have an inverse element. Under
addition it probably will be a group; it will be a group.
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Thus, Wendy still had trouble using the words she meant, saying addition when she
meant multiplication. Furthermore, her syntax “not going to have an inverse element” is
more appropriate for talking about the identity.
Then we returned to whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Z&.
I ll

Wendy: Like a subset o f.... I think we have to look at it as like part o f the set o f Z6,
which, like subgroup, like as a group in Z6. So if you look a t ... which is why I kind of
choose the elements Z3 out o f the Z6 table.

Wendy was clearly thinking o f Z 6 as more than a set and as Z 3 as more than a subset. She
was choosing not “elements Z3 out o f the Z6 table,” but rather entries out o f the Z(, table
that corresponded to the restriction o f the binary operation to the subset Z3 . On the
conviction that this was the appropriate method, Wendy decided that Z 3 is not a subgroup
o f Z6 because the subset was not closed under the operation.
The fact that she had answered my question was apparently o f little concern, however, for
she immediately began focusing on the manner in which closure had failed. In particular,
she looked at the 3 and 4 that appeared in top left quarter o f the Z& table (see Figure 7).
123

Wendy: If you just looked at, are, is the subgroup 3 .... Well, I don’t know really what
you’d call that.... But if you kind o f just look at the, like, elements 3 and 4 .... Actually
4 doesn’t have, forget it. 4 doesn’t have an inverse.

1 25

Wendy: I was trying to look. This is closed. Like I was going to say, if you only look at
the elements 3 and 4 in Z6,1 was going to say under Z3 it was going to be closed, but I
was just kind o f thinking. But I’m not, that doesn’t make sense at all.

Wendy may have been considering {3, 4} to determine whether it was a subgroup but
saw that 4 doesn’t have an inverse in {3, 4}. She may also have seen that 3 is its own
inverse. She continued looking for a subgroup.
127

Wendy: Well, I was just kind o f looking. Cause 4 isn’t an element o f Z6, element o f Z3.
So therefore it wouldn’t be closed. But the problem are these elements right here: 3, 3
and 4, and 4. So like if you looked at Z2, it is going to consist o f these first two elements.
The problem here again is going to be this last multiplication, or addition o f 1 and 1,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

158

cause that’s going to equal 0 .
It seems W endy abandoned looking at {3, 4} and instead was trying to exclude the
problematic entries in the table by considering Z2, both as a subset o f Z& and as a group
on its own. I asked her to explain what she was doing:
12 9

Wendy: I am just relating to what subgroups would be. What subgroups, what Z mod n
subgroups would be a subgroup of Z6.

132

Brad: And you were trying specifically ...

133

Wendy: Z2. But the problem is, if you look at Z2, this 2.... Like lx l [ 1 + 1] in Z2 equals
0 and that causes ... or that gives you the identity [inverse] element in 1, for 1. But here
if you just look at it under Z6, it doesn’t, 1 doesn’t have an identity [inverse] element.
Just like here [the {0, 1, 2} subset of Z6], 1 and 2 don’t have an identity [inverse] element
also, besides it not being closed, there are a lot of reasons why it’s not going to be a
subgroup.

Once again, W endy was saying identity and meaning inverse, and she confirmed this
moments later. But this excerpt provides something o f an explanation for her confused
language: She was using the operation table for Z(, to support this reasoning. In
particular, she was checking the inverse property for various subsets by looking for the
identity inside the appropriate subset o f the operation table. Because her process
involved looking for the identity, it is not surprising that Wendy said identity rather than
inverse.
This process was in service o f a larger question that Wendy was pursuing. She had
generalized the question “Is Z3 a subgroup o f Z^T' to consider whether Z„ might be a
subgroup for other n. This provided a natural transition to ask Wendy whether she could
find any subgroups o fZ 6 .
144

Wendy: See Z6, it’s hard to take a subset because you have to make sure you include the
identity element in the set that you pick. So let’s, just for instance, I’m going to take this.
Because if I am looking in the fact that you have to have an identity element. Here, if
you look at 1, 2, and 3 they each have and 3,4.... You can’t do that. ‘Cause now it’s not
closed, really. You can’t take 3, 4, 5 and 1, 2, 3. It wouldn’t work.
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Wendy saw that she needed to include the identity, but she was simultaneously
considering “blocks” in the operation table, and she saw that this would not work. I
suggested that she think more broadly and consider subsets with nonadjacent elements,
such as {1,4}.
14

6

Wendy: 1 and 4. Like, what I was saying before, 3 and 4? Like looking just at 3and 4?

14 7

Brad: Yeah, or maybe not two that necessarily that are right next to each other. Like
what about 3 and 5? Could that work? Or.... Do you know what I am saying?

14 8

Wendy: It’s just easier for me to see [inaudible].

14 9

Brad: So, what are you doing there? Oh, you’re covering up 4.

15 0

Wendy: 4. It distracts me.

At first, Wendy persisted looking for blocks in the table (line 146), and so I suggested
once again that she consider subsets more broadly. This excerpt suggests that she was
looking at blocks in the table partly for visual reasons. Because it was hard for her to see
the operation table for subsets that were not blocks, it was therefore hard to think about
subsets that weren’t blocks. A related possibility is that she looked for blocks in the table
because o f an overly limiting interpretation o f the Groups-Are-Containers metaphor. If
groups are containers, then subgroups must also be containers, but it is difficult to
imagine a container that holds every other element from the group table, for example.
Wendy tried to overcome this limiting view as the interview continued.

Figure 8 . Wendy’s table for Z&, annotated version
+

0

1

2

y

4
5

1
1

3 4 5
3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 0
2 .....
3 4 5 0 1
y y (o '; 1 (?)
4 5 0 1 2 3
5 0 1 (?) 3 @
0

0

2

2

N o te : c ir c le s a d d e d to c la r ify tra n s c r ip t

150

Wendy: ... Technically you are only looking at the 0, 2 ... 2, 4 [circled in Figure 8 ].
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Right? Because, in other words, you can make that table.... You can’t look at the other
elements. You can’t look at the whole row, 3 and 5. You know what I mean? Because
you can only look at the addition o f those two. You can’t start including 0, 1, 2 added to
three, because you have to restrict it to three if you are to restrict it to 3 and 5, in order for
it to be closed. So if I am going to look at the addition o f just 3 and 5 [pause] 0 [5]
doesn’t have an id-, a inverse element.
15 1

Brad: What do you mean?

15 2

Wendy: Nothing [incomplete thought].... When you add 3 or 5 to 5, you can’t get 0.
Like, 3, when you add 3 to itself you get 0. So that wouldn’t be.

153

Brad: So 3 has a ...

15 4

Wendy: It is kind o f hard. Like, what if you took 1 and 3. Oh, no. Not la n d 3. You
have to make sure you pick 1 and 5. What if I tried three, picking three numbers?

Wendy described how she was restricting her view o f the table, describing precisely those
entries inside the table (0, 2; 2, 4) that were relevant to whether {3, 5} is a subgroup.
Furthermore, she justified this view by noting that “you can make that a table” (line 150).
From this view, she noticed that 5 does not have an inverse in {3, 5}, although she said at
first that

0

does not have an inverse, perhaps because she had been looking for a

0

in that

row. Then, perhaps prompted by the fact that 5 lacks an inverse in {3, 5}, Wendy
decided to begin with the set {1, 5} to see whether it was a subgroup o f Z6.
As the interview continued, she focused on the inverse property.
15

6

157
158
15 9
160
16 1
162

Wendy: Let me pick 1 and 5. 1 and 5, and that would give you .... I’ll tell you how I am
going to do this. 1 and 1 is going to give you 2. 5 and 5 is going to give you 4. And 1
and 5, and 5 and 1, is going to give you 0.
Brad: Okay.
Wendy: You see that 1 and 5 both have an inverse. So, ooh.
Brad: Ooh what?
Wendy: 1 and 5 work, so far. It hasn’t.... They both have a inverse element. You see
what I mean?
Brad: Uh huh.
Wendy: 1 and 5 are their own inverse, are each other inverse elements. So if you took
those two separately, it upholds the inverse property. Identity ...
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Although the previous excerpt suggested that Wendy had chosen {1,5} so that it would
satisfy the inverse property, it seems in this excerpt that she was unsure whether this
choice would work until she had considered the operation table. Her syntax about the
relationship between 1 and 5 was somewhat confused and inconsistent, however,
evolving from “have an inverse” to “are each other inverse elements.”
At the same time, it is apparent that Wendy was thinking only about the inverse property.
If she had been thinking about closure, she would have noticed during her calculations
that closure was not satisfied. Furthermore, she was ready to consider the identity
property only after she had completed her verification o f the inverse property.
1 64

Wendy: It has.... However, it doesn’t have an identity element. Like, you have to get 1
and you have to get 5. Like you have to.... If you take something, you kind o f have to
build from it. Kind o f like what we did in abstract class. They gave us, like, one— this
confuses me, but— one element o f a subset, o f a subgroup and they said, “Is this a
subgroup?” It wasn’t. Well then you kind o f have to see what it’s missing, and you have
to kind o f build the subgroup.

165

Brad: Oh, okay, well try that here then. It’s a good idea.

166

Wendy: Okay. So, I need.... Well I picked two numbers so that it upheld the inverse
property. But now it doesn’t have the identity property, which means when added to
itself, or when added to another number it gets itself. And that’s 0. It has to have 0 in it.
So I am just going to move this over. Move this down.

Drawing on a procedure developed in class, Wendy considered adding elements to the set
in order to build the subgroup one element at a time. Here she realized that she needed to
include the identity element in order to be sure that the identity property was satisfied.
This seems to be a significant moment regarding the identity, for from this point on,
Wendy always included the identity early when constructing a subgroup. But at this
point, she was ignoring closure and was having trouble reasoning about the set {0, 1, 5}
because the table for Z& was cluttered with other elements. Thus, she decided to “move
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over” the relevant portions o f the table into a smaller table containing only the three
elements she was interested in (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Wendy’s table for {0,1, 5}
+

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

2

0

5 5

0

4

5
5

17 0

Wendy: Okay. So, here everything has an ... 1 has, everything has.... There is an
identity element in here, because 0 is in the table, and therefore 0 added to anything is
going to equal the number itself. So zero is everything’s identity.

17 1

Wendy: So now everything has an inverse, even though you added 0, 0 is its own inverse.
So, therefore, you didn’t have to worry about changing the inverse, like disturbing the
inverse property when you added 0 .

172

Brad: Oh, okay.

17 3

Wendy: It’s not closed. [Laughs.] Oh, no. It’s got 2 and 4 in it. This is just getting
really difficult. Like, you’re going to have to keep on .... You’re going to have to add 2
and 4 now. So the only thing you are missing is 3, and if you ... I am sure if you add 2 or
4 you’re going to get.... So if you just do away with 3 .... 2 times 1 is going to equal 3.
2 + 1 is going to equal 3. And therefore you’re going to need to add 3 in there. So it
doesn’t work.

There are two points to make here. First, Wendy had been considering the group axioms
one at a time and did not move flexibly among them. From her laughter and frustration
in noticing that the set was not closed, it is clear that she had not considered the closure
axiom earlier in this example. Second, this excerpt reinforces the hypothesis that Wendy
began constructing the set with 1 and 5 because together they satisfied the inverse
property and then added 0 to the set so that there would be an identity element. When
she returned to check the inverse property (line 171), she still was thinking o f the process
by which she had constructed the set, but her reasons for choosing 1 and 5 as a pair were
not explicit. This omission may be significant because she seems to have forgotten her
reasons only a few minutes later when, taking advantage o f her idea to “build up”
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subgroups, I asked what would happen if she had started with different elements or with
only one element:
18

6

Brad: If you just started with 1, would you need 5?

187

Wendy: I don’t know. You have to see after you add 2. If you add 2, 2 and 1 is going to
equal 3. Then you’re going to need 3. 3 and 1 is going to equal 4, and you’re going to
need 4. And then 4 and 1 is going to equal 5 and you’re going to need 5. [inaudible]

18 8

Brad: Okay. So in other words, if you start with 1, what else do you need?

18 9

Wendy: 0 for the identity element.

191

Wendy: You need 2 for closure, 3 for closure, [laughs] 4 for closure, and 5 for closure.

Wendy was no longer thinking o f the inverse property, or she would have responded (in
line 187) more quickly that 5 was necessary. Instead, she was thinking about closure,
which is why 2 needs to be in the subgroup. Continuing the processes o f adding 1, she
decides that 3, then 4, and eventually 5 must also be in the subgroup.
At this point in the interview, the identity axiom was fairly immediate and salient, but the
inverse axiom had faded into the background, obscured by the closure axiom. Closure
remained dominant as the interview continued. Despite W endy’s frustration, she had
built up some ways o f thinking that allowed her to proceed more quickly. I asked her to
try starting with a different element.
196

Wendy: If you start with 2 you are going to need 0. You are always going to need 0,
‘cause, like you said. Okay. So, things are getting kind o f messy. I need a new piece o f
paper. If you start with 2, you’re going to need 4.

198

Wendy: And when you’re doing 4, you need 0. W ell.... Ooh.

19 9
2 00

Brad: Ooh what?
Wendy: You need 0, anyway. You need 4 though, [inaudible] So, 2 ... ‘cause 2 and 4 is
going to equal 0. Uh oh.

2 01

Brad: Uh oh what?

202

Wendy: It works! You don’t.... It’s closed. It’s got an id-, everything has an identity
elem ent... 0 is the identity element for all, each element. Well, they have to have the
same identity element, but.... And it’s got an inverse.
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Figure 10. Wendy’s table for {0, 2, 4}
+

0

2

0

0

2

4
4

2

2

4

0

4 4

0

2

W endy had found a subgroup, and, for the first time in the interview, she considered
several axioms in quick succession. Her explanations were somewhat muddled, however.
In particular, her syntax for the identity and inverse was mostly reversed, suggesting once
again that these two properties were closely related in her thinking. She did clarify that
all elements have the same identity. I asked for clarification about inverse:
2 03

Brad: What’s got an inverse?

204

Wendy: Every element has an inverse. So that’s a subgroup.

Because Wendy corrected her syntax regarding the inverse property, it seems that she
could distinguish the inverse property from the identity property, even if the distinction
was not automatic.
Again, it is remarkable that Wendy considered three o f the group axioms almost
simultaneously, suggesting growing fluency with the axioms. She had said nothing,
however, about the associative property.
2

05

206
2

07

Brad: Did you check all o f the properties?
Wendy: No, I did not check associative. [Laughs.] No![Her tone suggests she’d rather
not check the associative property.]
Brad: And why? Do you think you need to check it?

2 08

Wendy: No, because it’s a global property. And if it’s .... Addition is associative. So no
[matter]... If addition is associative, doesn’t, under integers.... Taking any integers, it’s
still going to be associative. So there’s no need to check it.

20 9

Brad: Okay. So what do you have here?

210

Wendy: A subgroup o f Z6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

W endy’s response to my question indicated some frustration that all her work had not yet
produced something that she could be sure was a subgroup. Nonetheless, she overcame
this frustration quickly upon remembering that associativity is a global property. Wendy
did not correctly use the idea that associativity is global, however, basing her conclusion
on the associativity o f addition in Z rather than in Z(,. Nonetheless, she was correct that
{0, 2, 4} is a subgroup.
Next, I asked Wendy whether there are any other subgroups o f Zg.
212

Wendy: I don’t know I’d have to play and try. I just found one; I didn’t think that we
could find one, but I just found one.

213

Brad: Okay. What do you think? Another one?

215

Wendy: Let me try 3, starting with 3. You need 0. You always need ... [Whistles.]
Found a group!

216

Brad: You found a group?

217

Wendy: Yeah. Because it’s got a identity element. Whoops, I made a little mistake in
my calculation, but.... It’s got an identity element, 0.It’s got an inverse because 0 + 0 =
3 [0] and 3 + 3 = 0, so it’s got an inverse. It is closed between 0 and 3 and it’s
associative. So here’s another subgroup.

Again her syntax regarding the inverse property is more appropriate for talking about the
identity, yet her calculations indicate that she did know that each element must have an
inverse. And again she considered the inverse, identity, and closure properties in quick
succession.
I asked whether there were any other subgroups.
22

0

Wendy: No, because 4 you would need 2.

221

Brad: Why?

222

Wendy: Because if you have 4, 4 and 4 is 2. And therefore you need 2.

22 5

Brad: Well, what if you had 5? What if you started with 5?

22

Wendy: 5 is the same thing as 1.

6

227
22 8

Brad: Why?
Wendy: Because 5 and 5 you are going to need 4, and then 4 and 5 are going to need 3.
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Okay? And then 3 and 4 you going to need 1, you are going to need 0, and 4 and 4 is
going to equal 2. So you need everything.

For both o f the examples in this excerpt (starting with 4 and starting with 5), W endy’s
arguments were based on the closure property, not the inverse property. The inverse
relationship between 5 and 1, which had earlier been quite present in her thinking (see
lines 154 and 158), had faded into the background. Instead she focused on the need to
satisfy the closure property.
Next, I asked Wendy whether she saw any relationship between Z 3 and the subgroup {0,
2, 4} in Z(j. She paused for a moment and then responded:
235

Wendy: You multiply Z3 by 2, all o f the elements by 2, and you get this subgroup. I
don’t know what you call it. I don’t know.

Taking advantage o f this relationship, Wendy decided to call the subgroup 2 Z 3 . She
asserted that Z 3 and 2 Z3 are not the same but are related by multiplication. Wendy was
not satisfied with this description, however, and wanted to find a deeper explanation.
24 9

Wendy: Yeah, but if you take every element in Z3 and you multiply it by 2 .... I can’t
really make that connection yet, like, why that exactly works. I know it definitely has
the.... Like, I think it definitely affects the fact that 2 and 4 are factors of 6. Not
factors.... Oh, no. They’re.... Like 3, when added to itself is going to equal 0. W hen2
and 4 are added to each other, you’re going to ... it’s going to keep it closed. Like when
you start adding 1 you’re switching.... Like, these are two even numbers. The fact that
they are two evens, two evens are going to equal an even number. I don’t know if it has
to do with the evens, but.... I see a definite pattern why these two are going to be
subgroups. Because 2 and 4 .... 2 and 2 is going to equal 4. 4 and 2 is going to equal 6 ,
and 6 is going to be, 6 is equal to 0. So all these.... Like 2 and 4 when.... I’ve explained
this to you [inaudible] four times. I can’t explain.... I don’t know, [inaudible]

2 50

Wendy: Like it makes total sense to me that these two are groups. And I can see why this
isn’t. So can I re-ask a question or can you re-ask me a question?

Wendy considered factors and evenness to explain why 2 Z 3 would be a subgroup, but
neither o f these provided a clear explanation. To assist her in searching for the
explanation, she sought a new question, suggesting that she saw questioning as a useful
means for developing insight and explanation. She continued looking.
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254

Wendy: Well, I want to sort o f look at 4 Z3, for no reason at all [inaudible]. If I’m looking
at 2Z3, why not look at 4Z3. And you’re going to get.... Actually, w e’re adding here.
This is going to equal 4.

Wendy calculated 4 Z3 to be the set {0, 4, 2} and began constructing the operation table,
using that order. Because she was not explicit about how she was doing the arithmetic, I
asked her whether she was still doing arithmetic modulo 6 :
2 58

Wendy: Yeah, just as I did here [in the 2Z3 table].

2 60

Wendy: Ooh, wait a minute. But here I said this was a subgroup. This is a subgroup of
Z6, but that’s because in Z3, w e’re restricting our elements to 0, 1, and 2. Here we are
allowing for higher numbers.

2

62

Wendy: So, technically, this isn’t 2Z3. Cause it’s not in mod 3.

2 63

Brad: Oh, I see.

2 64

Wendy: This is definitely not 2Z3, 2 x Z3.

2 65

Brad: But it is the set {0, 2, 4}, w hich.... I can see why you want to call it 2Z3. I’m not
sure.... I mean, maybe that’s a good notation [inaudible],

2 66

Wendy: Well, I guess if you say Z3, Z3 has to hold.... Like, if you take all the members
o f Z3 and multiply them by 2, who said they still have to hold the stipulations o f Z3? It
has to be divisible, like you look at their remainder after dividing by 3. So I guess you
could still say 2Z3. But I still don’t know the connection between 2Z3 and Z3 and why 2Z3
is a member, is a group of, a subgroup o f Z6 [inaudible], I know why Z3 isn’t. But I just
don’t know why 2 x Z3 would work. This isn’t a. ... 2 x 1 equals 2. 2 x
4
is8

Wendy was uncomfortable with her notation. She was sometimes adding and at other
times multiplying, sometimes modulo 3 and at other times modulo 6 . This inconsistency
caused confusion that she was not able to resolve. Nonetheless, without prompting from
me, Wendy saw a relationship between the tables that she had called 2Z 3 and 4Z3.
2

72

Wendy: I think this is just a different arrangement o f this. Do you see what I mean? This
is just a different arrangement o f this.

273

Brad: So the thing you’re calling 4Z3 and the thing you’re calling 2Z3 ...

27 4

Wendy: Are the same, just a different arrangement.

The fact that Wendy called two different tables the same suggests that, by the end o f the
interview, she had begun to separate the table from the group. The question is whether
she saw the table (and various rearrangements) as the object o f investigation or,
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alternatively, saw the two tables as representations o f another object. Sfard (2000) points
out that “the transition from signifier-as-object-in-itself to signifier-as-a-representationof-another-object is a quantum leap in a subject’s consciousness” (p. 79). Such a
distinction between signifier and signified might mark the creation o f an abstract object—
in this case the group Z3 . This sort o f separation between the table and the group paves
the way for the concept o f isomorphism, which gives rise to the idea o f an abstract group
that is independent not only o f the arrangement o f its elements in the table but also o f the
names o f the elements as well. It is not clear, however, to what extent Wendy had made
this conceptual leap by the end o f the interview. Because isomorphism was the theme o f
the second interview, this issue is explored in more detail below.
W endy’s reasoning about groups and subgroups was largely external, often requiring that
relevant portions o f the table be present before her eyes without extraneous information
interfering with her perception. When considering whether {3,5} was a subgroup, she
covered up the 4, and when building a subgroup with {1,5}, she created a new table
separate from the Z& table. In large measure, the operation table was the group for
Wendy, although she had begun to separate the group from the table, as evidenced by her
suggestion that the table she called 4 Z3 was a rearrangement o f the table she had called
2 Z3 .

The operation table both supported and limited W endy’s ability to reason about

groups and subgroups. On the one hand, the table helped her see quickly the problem
with considering Z3 to be a subgroup o f Z(,. On the other hand, her reliance on the table
made it difficult for her to find subgroups.
A symptom o f the external, table-based nature o f W endy’s reasoning was that she often
considered only one group axiom at a time when reasoning about groups and subgroups.
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Toward the end o f the interview, however, she had developed more fluency and was able
to move quickly among the axioms. Moving toward considering the axioms multiply and
flexibly might be described as a matter o f increasing proficiency and fluency with the
group axioms and with the particular examples, which may be a result o f internalization
o f some o f the external processes that were based in the table.
The above case demonstrates some o f W endy’s difficulties with language and also the
ways that her language use shed light on the ways she was thinking about some o f the
concepts. The case also demonstrates some o f the ways that Wendy used the table to
support her reasoning. In the sections below, I further illustrate these themes by
broadening the analysis to include characterizations o f the concept images o f other key
participants. The theme o f language use is particularly prominent in the discussion o f the
concepts o f identity and inverse. The theme o f the use o f the operation table is Central in
the discussion o f the concepts o f closure and subgroup.

Identity and Inverse
Like Wendy, the other key participants demonstrated that their concept images o f identity
and inverse were closely related. In this section, I first present a synthesis o f the
definitions and informal meanings that students associated with the concepts, followed by
a description o f the notational, linguistic, and conceptual expectations that the students
seemed to have for each o f the concepts. Then I provide some additional examples o f
confusion between the two concepts and some explanations based in procedures and
operation tables.
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Definitions and meaning. On the final exam, several students provided definitions o f the
identity and inverse as part o f their definitions o f group. Lori, for example, wrote the
following:
There must be the existance [sfc] o f an inverse: a 0 a'1 = e (where e is the identity
element).
There must be an existance [s/c] o f an identity: a 0 e = a (e is the identity
element).

The syntactical similarity between the definitions suggests that the two concepts were
closely related in Lori’s thinking. Furthermore, the quantifiers and other specifications
are missing, yet the formulas are correct in the sense that correct definitions could be
crafted around these formulas. This characterization fits many o f the definitions that
students provided.
There were also important differences between students’ definitions o f identity and
inverse. In particular, the definition o f identity seems to have been more difficult to
formulate than the definition o f inverse. Compare, for example, Robert’s definitions:
identity - an element e such that a 0 e = a = e 0 a .
inverses - for each a e G there is a 1 e G such that aa'[ = e = aAa.

Though Robert’s definition o f inverse was essentially correct, including the quantifiers,
his definition o f identity lacked quantifiers entirely. W endy’s definition o f identity was
also problematic:
There is an identity element for the group so that every element in G, when
multiplied by this identity element, e, will give you back the original element:
{x e G \xe = xj.

W endy’s informal characterization was essentially correct and included the quantifier
“every element in G.” The formalization at the end, however, is incorrect. A standard
mathematical reading o f W endy’s symbolism would be, “The set o f x in G such that xe =
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x” or, more informally, “All x in G such that xe = x.” This is not far from the correct
condition, “For all x in G, xe = x.” Thus, Wendy had specified a set rather than a
condition on G, and her unusual symbolism may be interpreted as difficulty with correct
symbolic use o f quantifiers.
Informal characterizations such as “giving back the original element” were common for
the identity element. On her final exam, Lori noted, “The identity o f Z4 is 0 because 0
plus any element in Z4 gives back that element.” Wendy called the identity the “donothing element” (Interview 2, line 306). Carla elevated this characterization to a
definition: “So you could call 0 the do-nothing element, which is the way we’ve defined
identity” (Interview 1, line

8 8

). Robert combined these characterizations: “Ro, which

doesn’t do anything to them. Ro composed with any o f them leaves them the same. So
there is an identity” (Interview 2, line 178).
Informal characterizations o f inverse were more difficult to formulate. Lori, for example,
was quite vague: “Because the inverse o f something is when you operate two things to
equal the identity” (Interview 1, line 87). Recall that Wendy struggled and eventually
came to an approximate characterization: “So when you multiply some number m by, it
has to have an inverse i, so that when multiplied, it will equal the identity” (line 30).
Carla, on the other hand, was more precise in her language, even in her first interview.
She stated, “To get the inverse you have to find something that adds with your element
that results in the identity, which is 0 in this case” (line 39). In the same interview, she
used similar syntax when she described that for something to be an inverse o f 2: “It
means that 2 times that thing equals the identity” (line

1 2 0

).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Expectations about the identity. The students’ images o f the identity property seemed
partly tied to what the identity was called. In other words, the symbol that was used for
the identity (e.g., 0, 1, or e) seemed to support and facilitate the students’ thinking. In
fact, the students’ use o f 0 and

1

(and eventually e) was so flexible that it was not

possible for me to distinguish between the symbol and the name. Not surprisingly, there
were also strong connections between the name o f the operation and the expected name
of the identity. When the operation was called addition, for example, students expected
the identity to be called 0. Then, when determining whether a set was a group or a
subgroup, they needed only determine whether 0 was in the set. Similar statements can
be made about multiplication and 1. Carla, for example, was explicit about this process:
168

Carla: So then you want to check the identity. We already said that the identity for
integers under addition is 0. So we know that the identity for Z3 is 0. The question is, Is
0 in Z3? And yes, it is. So therefore we have an identity.

This statement suggests that Carla was not necessarily distinguishing between addition in
Z and addition in Z 3 and that 0 being the identity was a global property. Both o f these
issues are discussed further below. Here I wish to suggest that students also had a sense
that the 0 in Z 3 is the same as the 0 in Z. This point brings into question the practice o f
calling the elements o f Z3 the integers 0, 1, and 2. The alternative is to construct Z3 as
equivalence classes in Z so that the elements o f Z3 are subsets o f Z and 0, 1, and 2 are but
convenient representative elements. When using representative elements to name
equivalence classes, some texts use a bar over the representative element, as in

2

, so as to

distinguish the equivalence classes from elements themselves (see, e.g., Bhattacharya,
Jain, & Nagpaul, 1986). This approach might solve the problem o f failing to distinguish
between 0 in Z and 0 in Z 3 but might also create a different collection o f conceptual and
notational issues.
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In addition to natural facility with identities called 0 and 1, the students also developed
facility with calling the identity e. When groups were given by tables with elements
named by letters, Diane and Lori seemed to prefer that the identity be called e and
hesitated when the identity was called something else. Yet they also seemed to know that
the names o f the elements do not matter. I asked them whether it mattered that the
identity was called e.
422

Diane: That’s just convention. I mean we could make it i if we want it to be and just say i
is the identity. That’s just conventional.

423

Lori: When we renamed and reordered, we looked at the table after we renamed and
reordered. We said, “Okay, what acts like the identity?” And that’s what we have to set
equal to the identity so that we make sure we get back one o f our tables. (Interview 2)

Whatever names were given to elements in a group, most students were able to notice
when elements acted like the identity even when the elements were themselves sets, such
as in a group consisting o f two elements, {1,3} and {5, 7}. In this group, Wendy called
{1, 3} the “identity set.” Often this sort o f reasoning seemed to arise out of the operation
table, but the students also were aware o f distinguishing characteristics o f the identity.
Wendy, for example, noted on her midterm exam, “The only element that when
multiplied by itself, gets itself is the identity element.”
Expectations about inverses. In some representations, particularly when the
representations looked like integers, the students sometimes drew on their experience
with integers and rational numbers and expected inverses to be negative numbers or
fractions, depending upon the operation. Carla, for example, suggested that “the inverse
o f 2 mod 3 would be 1/2 mod 3, and 1/2 is not an integer, and it is not in mod 3. And the
only elements o f mod 3 are 0, 1, 2” (Interview 1, line 118). Similarly, Wendy stated that
“multiplication is not a group, because there’s no inverse ... because they’re, under
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multiplication they’re going to be, like a fraction” (Interview 3, lines 36-38). In his first
interview, Robert expected multiplicative inverses to be fractions and also expected
additive inverses to be negative: “Like 1 + -1 will equal 0, so -1 is 1 ’s inverse, but -1
isn’t in Zd' (line

2 2

).

This phenomenon o f expecting negatives and fractions for inverses is analogous to
expecting that

0

is the identity for any operation called addition and

1

is the identity for

any operation called multiplication. In the case o f the identity, this phenomenon rarely
caused difficulty because 0 and 1 often continue to behave as they do in the integers. In
the case o f inverses, however, the tendency is potentially more problematic because, for
example, -3 and 1/3 do not have obvious meaning in Z„. The concept o f inverse provides
the meaning by which these symbols may be interpreted in Z„. The students, on the other
hand, used their understandings o f the rational numbers -3 and 1/3 as the source o f
meaning, and those meanings did not fit with their images o f Z„.
Confusing identity and inverse. W endy’s linguistic confusion between inverse and
identity continued at least into the second interview. When she was investigating the
powers of a specific permutation a , for example, I asked her what a 0 would be. She first
called it E and later explained:
30 8

Wendy: The identity. It’s the do-nothing. It doesn’t do anything. When you put
anything to the power o f 0 it doesn’t ... Like, any number to the power 0 is going to
equal 1. Okay? Because... And 1 is the multiplicative inverse? You know, like, it
doesn’t do anything. Multiplicative inverse is the identity. Or not multiplicative inverse.
I’m not talking ... I’m n o t... I don’t know why I just said that, [laughs] But any power,
any number to the power o f 1 [0 ] is going to equal 1 , which is the multiplicative identity,
not inverse. Right? [inaudible] multiplicative identity. So, alpha to the 0 is going, in
cycle notation, has to be the cycle identity, which is the do-nothing cycle, which is 1 .

Wendy was able to correct her language, though not without a struggle. Other students
also sometimes mixed up identity and inverse and corrected themselves. Lori, for
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example, said, “Under multiplication there’s no identity. I am sorry; there’s no inverse
for 0” (Interview 1, line 71). Similarly, when discussing {0, 3} in Z 6 , Robert noted, “3
was its own identity. Was its own inverse, I should say” (Interview 1, line 232). He also
sometimes used confused syntax, such as, “3 plus itself is an inverse. 3 is an inverse o f
itse lf’ (line 189). And sometimes the syntax for the inverse was more appropriate for the
identity, such as, when discussing Z3, he concluded, “So now I find it has an inverse”
(Interview 1, line 114). Moments later, however, he was clearer: “Let me say that again,
the whole group has an identity 0 , and each element in the group, 0 ,

1

and 2 , have an

inverse” (line 116).
The confusion between identity and inverse is probably best explained by the close
procedural relationships between the concepts. In particular, finding the inverse o f an
element necessarily involves the identity. As mentioned above, when operations are
presented through tables, finding the inverse o f an element involves looking for the
identity in the appropriate row or column. More generally, checking whether a binary
operation satisfies the inverse property is a matter o f checking every row and column.
Robert was explicit about this procedure: “0 doesn’t appear in every row and column, so
not every element has an inverse” (Interview 1, line 93). The idea o f looking for or
creating an identity in order to find an inverse leads to procedures in other mathematical
contexts as well. For example, a standard method o f finding the inverse of a matrix
involves performing row operations on an augmented matrix until part o f that matrix
looks like the identity.
Another reason for the strong connection between identity and inverse is that it seems to
be natural for students to think in terms o f inverse pairs, such as {1,5} in Z6, or in terms
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o f triples that include the identity, as is described for W endy above and for Robert below .
In this kind o f reasoning, elem ents that are their ow n inverses are som ething o f a special
case that becom es particularly salient w hen working w ith operation tables.

Several students noticed that an identity occurs in the diagonal w hen an elem ent is its
ow n inverse. For exam ple, Carla demonstrated this connection w hen she described h ow
she knew that a particular table was a group:
3 94

Carla: So if we rename {1, 3} to e, the set {1, 3} as e and the set {5, 7} as a, we will
create a table that looks like e along the diagonal that goes like this and a along the
opposite diagonal, which is a group because that’s . ... Well, for one thing it is one o f the
tables we came up with when we talked about possible groups for a two element set. And
for another thing, we see that each o f the elements appears only once in each row or
column, which tells us it’s group. And we see that it contains the identity, that a is its
own inverse, e is its own inverse. So, w e’re all set. (Interview 3)

A s is discussed in the section on W endy and isom orphism b elow , W endy discriminated
am ong groups o f order 4 according to the appearance o f the identity elem ent along the
diagonal. D iane and Lori took longer than W endy to notice this discriminating feature,
but their description makes clear this fundamental connection betw een identity and
inverse.
3 94

Diane: All the elements squared is e. Each element is its own inverse.

3 97

Lori: They are all their own inverses.

3 98

Diane: Well that’s just definition. If you take a x a = e, b x b = e, c x c = e, the only way
you can get an identity element, if these aren’t the identity elements themselves, these
have to be inverses o f each other, cause that’s just the definition [of inverse].

A ssum ing that e is the identity under m ultiplication, D iane was saying, “I f a x a = e then
a is its ow n inverse.” B y calling this a definition, D iane w as either trivializing her ow n
reasoning or demonstrating that she did not distinguish this statement from the definition,
w hich m ight instead be given by “I f a x b = e then b is the inverse o f a .”
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The connection between the identity and inverse became even more apparent when the
students looked for the inverse o f the identity. As Carla remarked, “The identity’s
inverse is itse lf’ (Interview 4, line 133). This observation helped her verify that a group
containing only the identity was indeed a group.
In summary, although the students often confused the terms identity and inverse in their
language, they often corrected that language on their own. The frequent confusion
between the terms is explained by procedural connections between the concepts. In
particular, using an operation table to find an inverse is really a matter o f looking for the
identity element in the table. The confusion is further explained by the fact that the
students thought in terms o f inverse pairs, for which the product is the identity. Elements
that are their own inverses form a special case when thinking about inverse pairs, and the
identity element is always its own inverse.

Closure
The students’ concept images o f closure were similar to those o f other group axioms in
that the students’ reasoning was often tied to operation tables. On the other hand, the
students’ concept images o f closure were different in that there seemed to be fewer
linguistic and conceptual confusions. Closure became prominent in service o f the
concept o f subgroup, both in determining whether a subset was a subgroup and in
constructing subgroups o f a given group. A firm understanding o f the concept o f closure
also relied on distinctions between operations, such as between addition and addition
modulo 6 . Because all o f these issues are treated in detail in the section on the concept o f
subgroup, here I make only two observations.
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First, the students’ formal definitions were usually correct. For example, on her final
exam Wendy stated that a group must satisfy the property o f closure: “For all a and b in
G, a * b is also in G.” Informal characterizations were quite close to the formal
definition. Lori, for example, wrote on her final exam, “So pick any two elements in S,
namely a and b and operate them together to see if the answer is in S'.”
Second, operation tables helped the students see whether or not closure was satisfied.
Lori, who had taken the course previously, explained in her first interview that tables
helped her understand the concept: “I don’t think that I necessarily understood the
concept o f closed until we made charts and tables and stuff, and we never made tables
last semester” (Interview 1, line 5).

More on Subgroups
The students’ concept images o f subgroup were dominated by the idea that a subgroup is
a subset that is a group in its own right. The students often did not explicitly mention the
operation and often made no distinctions between various related operations. These
themes characterized the students’ formal and informal definitions o f subgroup, as well
as the ways they solved problems involving the concept. In reasoning about subgroups,
the students relied on operation tables, on thinking about the processes underlying the
operation, and on considering each o f the group axioms individually.
After providing the students’ formal and informal definitions o f subgroup, the bulk o f this
section presents an analysis and synthesis o f students’ responses to the question, “Is Z3 a
subgroup o f Zg?” Results o f similar questions on the final exam are also presented. The
section continues with discussion o f two central phenomena that arose during these
interviews: the sense that a subgroup should be a block within an operation table and the
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belief that addition in Z3, addition in Z6 , and addition in Z are all essentially the same
operation. The section closes with analysis o f the ways that the students looked for
subgroups o f Zg and, more generally, how they constructed subgroups generated by
elements o f groups.
Definitions. On the final exam, the students’ definitions mostly characterized a subgroup
as a subset that is a group, and the operation was not always mentioned. Robert’s
definition was typical: “A subgroup is a subset o f elements from a larger group G, which
form a group under G’s operation.” Some students did not state explicitly that the
subgroup would be a group but rather listed the four group axioms as conditions that the
subset must satisfy. Some students mentioned that it was not necessary to check
associativity. These formal definitions were consistent with the students’ informal
definitions found throughout the data. What varied was the kind o f attention they gave to
the operation.
Is Z-\ a Subgroup o f Z<P. When considering whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Z&, most o f the
key participants were seduced by the fact that Z3 is a subset that is a group in its own
right. Carla, for example, after verifying that Z3 is a group, concluded that Z3 is a
subgroup o f Z6 “because Z3 is a subset o f Z6. That is what makes it a subgroup o f Z6”
(line 173). Robert, Lori, and Diane came to similar conclusions. Wendy was alone in her
early conviction that it did not make sense to consider Z3 separately from Z(,. For most
students, overcoming this initial conclusion required a coordination o f resources and
depended upon concluding that addition mod 3 and addition mod

6

are different

operations.
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As the students continued to ponder the question at hand, the operation tables and the
processes behind the operations created suspicions that Z 3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, but the
suspicions were usually not sufficient to convince them o f that fact. Instead, the notion
that a subgroup is a “subset that is a group” was strong enough to create the simultaneous
belief that Z3 ought to be a subgroup. This belief may explain the fact that the students
had a strong sense that “addition is addition” despite differences between addition mod

6

and addition mod 3.
Diane and Lori, for example, knew that a subgroup must use the same operation as the
group and also saw the operations in Z3 and Z6 as different, but that was not sufficient to
lead them to a conclusion.
103

Diane: They are both modular arithmetic, they are both modular addition, they are just
different mods. So it’s kind o f weird what you would think o f mods, if you are talking....
If you take into consideration the different mods here and still consider it the same
operation, then these could be subgroups. This could be a subgroup o f this. But you are
saying that this and this are different, then you have say they are different operations.

104

Lori: Do we define mod 3 under addition a different operation than mod 6 ?

Diane and Lori also considered the operation table for the subset {0, 1,2} in Z&, which
Diane said “would definitely be a subgroup” (line 105). I asked them what the table
would look like.
110

Lori: Oh, it’s the same as Z3.

111

Diane: No it’s not exactly the same, because you are going to have 0, 1, 2; 1, 2, 3; 2, 3, 4
[in the table].

112

Lori: You can’t have 3 and 4. They are not in the set, and then it’s not closed.

113

Diane: You’re right.

Thus, Diane and Lori had at least two kinds o f evidence that the operations are different.
Despite this evidence, Lori still wanted Z3 to be a subgroup o f Z&. She enumerated the
group axioms to support her point o f view:
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118

Lori: I think it is a subgroup o f Z6 under addition because, kind o f like.... We were on a
roll here with these things, these being, they’re both closed, they both have an identity,
they both have inverses, they both are associative, so that makes them both groups, and
this is in here.

Diane was a bit more skeptical. She was still willing to consider Z3 to be a subgroup of
Z(, but only if “dividing by 3 and dividing by

6

[is] just a characteristic o f mod and you

are going to say that it’s all right to kind o f ignore that” (line 122). In other words, she
was unwilling to conclude that Z3 a subgroup o f Z(, without confirmation that “all mod is
fine” (line 124).
Soon thereafter, Lori and Diane went back to considering the tables:
131

Lori: Yeah, that’s what I was saying because when I think o f something being a subgroup
o f something else, its table can almost fit right into it since it’s the same operation, and I
don’t see this anywhere down here.

132

Lori: I don’t think they are subgroups o f each other anymore. I was getting confused
with ...

133

Diane: I say no.

Thus, no simple piece o f evidence was sufficient, but rather an accumulation o f evidence
and consideration was necessary for Diane and Lori to conclude that Z3 is not a subgroup
o f Z6.
Robert was similarly hesitant to come to the same conclusion even in the face o f
evidence. He first used the table for Ze, to show convincingly that the subset Z3 was not a
subgroup because the inverse and closure properties failed. Nonetheless, he went on to
create a separate table for Z3 , and on the basis that Z3 was a group concluded that it was a
subgroup o f Z(,. He was unsure whether to call the operations different: “Are we talking
addition mod

6

and addition mod 3, or are we just talking addition?” (line 148).

Interestingly, Robert was also the only student who was unable to resolve the issue by the
end o f the first interview. This fact may be partly explained by Robert’s sources of
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authority for making mathematical claims. A t the beginning o f the second interview, he
announced that he had determined that Z3 is not a subgroup o f Zg, because the operation
is not the same. “For one thing, I read it in the textbook last night. And, for a second
thing, Steve told me that today. He mentioned that in class” (Robert 2, line 12). Thus,
Robert required evidence, consideration, and external authority to come to the correct
conclusion.
For some o f the key participants, the conclusions they reached during their first interview
were not as enduring as their expressions seemed to indicate. On the final exam, students
were asked whether Z4 is a subgroup o f Z 8 and whether Z4 is a subgroup o f Z. Carla,
Robert, and Diane all pointed out that the operations were different and therefore Z4 is a
subgroup o f neither Z% nor Z. Wendy and Lori, on the other hand, both wrote that Z4 is a
subgroup o f both Z% and Z, arguing, essentially, that Z4 is a group and also a subset o f
both Z% and Z. Lori’s misjudgment was not surprising, for her reasoning had seemed
uncertain and ambiguous throughout the discussion o f whether Z3 is a subgroup o f Zf, and
throughout her interviews more generally. W endy’s response, on the other hand, is a
stark contrast to her thinking in the interview. The most plausible hypothesis for the
discrepancy is that, without a table in front o f her, it was not readily apparent to Wendy
that the operations were different.
Subgroups o f Z and Z„. The prominence o f the idea o f subset in the students’ definitions
of subgroup explained not only the sense in which the students considered Z3 to be a
subgroup o f Z(, but also the sense in which they considered them both subgroups o f Z.
Lori, for example, asserted, “Z3 is a subgroup o f Z. We all agree on that, right? So if
they are both subgroups of Z, then maybe they are subgroups o f each other” (line 142).
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W hat was harder to explain, however, was Diane’s belief that although “Z3 isn’t a
subgroup o f Z6, it’s at least a subgroup o f Z„, and we know that Z„ is a group under
addition” (line 44). From the first half o f D iane’s claim, it is clear that she did not mean
that Z3 is a subgroup o f Z„ for any n. What is puzzling, then, is what kind o f object Z„
was for Diane and in what sense Z3 could be a subgroup. Clearly, Z„ was not an
unspecified group that could be Z3, Z(,, or any o f a number o f other groups. Instead, Z„
was a different group, distinct from Z3 and Z(,, but somehow situated so that Z3 could be a
subgroup. Unfortunately, I did not pursue this unusual idea further in the interview.
D iane’s final exam indicates, however, that, at least at the end o f the course, her
conception o f Z„ was more typical.
Z„: Is a group under modular addition, n is a positive integer and tells which mod
we are in and which elements are contained in the group (0,
1). For
example Z4 is a group under addition mod 4 that contains the elements 0, 1, 2, 3.
Portions o f the table. Like Wendy, most o f the key participants tended to think of
subgroups as blocks within the operation table o f the larger group. Robert, for example,
focused on the top left quarter o f the Z& table and concluded (momentarily, at least) that
Z3 is not a subgroup o f Z 6, because “0 doesn’t appear in every row and column, so not

every element has an inverse” (Robert 1, line 93). Robert, like Wendy, also initially
ignored my suggestion that he pick individual elements from the table and instead
continued to focus on blocks such as {0, 1, 2} and {3, 4, 5} (line 176). Later, after he
had identified {0, 3} as a subgroup, I asked him whether that constituted a portion o f the
table. He replied, “Not in the sense that you are just drawing a box around part o f the
table. This is taking different elements out o f the table and putting them into a new table”
(line 199). Thus Robert, like Wendy, preferred “blocks” in the table or wholly new
tables. Lori’s language also suggested that she was thinking o f blocks: “When I think o f
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something as being a subgroup, if you look at its table, you can fit in into a larger table”
(Diane/Lori 1, line 129).
By the third interview, Carla’s thinking seemed more flexible, although it was still tied,
to an extent, to the order o f elements in the table. When I asked Carla about the
relationship between a table for {0, 2} in Z4 and the table for Z4, she first called it a
portion o f the table. She described how she would reorder the table as 0, 2, 1, 3, so that
“in the top left com er w e’d have an imitation o f the table that we just created” (line 125).
Then I asked again what she would say about the relationship between {0, 2} and Z4.
127

Carla: I would think it would say it’s a subgroup o f it, for two reasons. One would be, if
you just looked at ... “sub” means a smaller part.... If you do the Z4 group table, then
you have a group table and a comer o f it is what you are talking about then that... it
would be a good guess to say that that would be a subgroup. But also you know that 0, 2
that table is a group table, and it is a subset o f Z4, so that means it is a subgroup o f Z4.

When the students used operation tables, they sometimes paid too much attention to the
order in which elements were listed in the table and too little attention to the binary
operation underlying the tables. This phenomenon may be related to the strong sense that
a subgroup is a subset that is a group, coupled with an overly limited Groups-AreContainers metaphor that made it difficult for the students to think about nonconsecutive
subsets. Nonetheless, the tables served a useful purpose in organizing calculations when
the students were constructing subgroups or verifying that a set was a group or subgroup.
Addition is addition. This study supports the finding in the literature that students
sometimes do not pay sufficient attention to the group operation (Dubinsky et al., 1994).
The above analysis shows, however, that even when they do pay attention to the
operation, there is still a tendency to say that two operations are the same if they are both
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called addition, and there is reason to believe that analogous results would hold for
operations called multiplication.
Dubinsky et al. (1994) suggest that students’ progress from thinking o f groups and
subgroups as sets, to considering them as sets with operations, to considering a subgroup
as having the same operation as the group in which it sits. This developmental
progression makes good sense and partially describes the data in this study. A key
question that emerged in this study is, W hat is involved in making the second transition?
Dubinsky et al. suggest that students need to consider the binary operation to be a
function on ordered pairs from the group and then restrict the function to the subset.
Then students recognize that the operations need to be the same on the group and the
subgroup by coordinating their function concept with their emerging group concept.
This description, quite simply, does not fit the data in this study. First, there was no
indication that the students thought o f binary operations as functions. Moreover, there is
no reason to believe that such a conception was necessary for success, as many students
seemed to be successful without it. Regarding the sameness o f the operations, all the key
participants recognized that the operations needed to be the same, though not always
immediately. The issue was that many o f the students were willing to call operations the
same despite evidence that they were different. All the key participants saw— by looking
at operation tables, by considering the processes underlying the operations, or both— that
the operations are in Z3 and Z& are different. Nonetheless, they all concluded at various
times that the operations are the same because they are both addition.
The issue concerns making distinctions, not only between addition in Z3 and in Z6 but
also with addition in Z. The above analysis suggests that making such distinctions
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requires coordination o f evidence and careful reasoning. Furthermore, even after such
distinctions have been made, they can become blurred in students’ minds moments, days,
or weeks later. These findings should not be surprising in view o f the fact that addition in
Z3 , Z6 , and Z are very much the same. This sense o f sameness is not a misconception that
must be overcome. On the contrary, this naive idea, although incorrect, has a grain of
truth that can be firmly established only through the concept o f quotient group, which is
introduced much later.
Constructing subgroups. In constructing subgroups, the students reasoned both from the
table and from thinking about the operation. They typically began with a small number
o f elements and then constructed an operation table to determine whether the elements
constituted a subgroup. Most participants stated, either immediately or while reasoning
during the process, that any subgroup must contain 0. Robert, for example, chose {0, 2,
4} and {0, 1, 5} as possible subgroups because “0 has to be in there. And we need things
that are inverse o f each other” (line 230). Diane, on the other hand, initially chose {0, 2,
4} because she “went for the even numbers” (line 224). Diane and Lori were not able to
find the subgroup {0, 3}, however, until having considered, as Wendy had, what else
would need to be in a subgroup that began with all elements other than 3. Like Wendy,
Diane reasoned largely from closure: “If you have 1 you have to have 2, and if you have
1 and 2 you have to have 3” (line 251). Lori also reasoned from the inverse property,
noting that if you have 5, “you have to have 1” (line 272). Although we did not use the
phrase “subgroup generated by” until much later in the course, Diane, Lori, and Wendy
all seemed to pick up this sort o f reasoning quite naturally.
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In their fourth interview, Diane and Lori used a tabular method o f finding the subgroup
generated by one or more elements. They developed the method in response to such
questions on the second take-home exam. I asked them to explain the method for the
subgroup generated by (123) in £>3 .
49

Diane: Well I know I need an identity, and I know I have the element (123), so I would
go ahead and fill this in as far as it lets me. [Makes an operation table with (1), (123).]

51

Lori: That’s going to give her a different element, and she does (132) (132). And then
she is going to add it next to it, to keep i t ... It’s going to get bigger.

61

Diane: And now our table is done because we didn’t generate new elements in our
[table].

In other words, beginning with the identity and the generators, they constmcted a table
and filled in its interior. Then they expanded the table, when necessary, adding a row and
column corresponding to each new element that appeared in the interior o f the table.
They continued this process until there were no new elements to append to the table.
This process is entirely legitimate for any finite group and with any number of
generators. Furthermore, whenever the process stops, the resulting set is necessarily a
subgroup.
In summary, the students used operation tables, reasoning about the operations, and the
identity, closure, and inverse properties when constructing subgroups. Not surprisingly,
associativity was not a consideration. It is legitimate, o f course, to assume associativity
when the operation considered on the subset is the same as the operation on the set as a
whole, but often that was not the case.
Summary. The students’ concept images o f subgroup may be characterized as subsets
that are groups. Their reasoning about subgroups was dominated by the identity and
inverse, closure properties, as embodied in operation tables, and without sufficient
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attention to distinguishing among various operations called addition. For most students,
overcoming this tendency “addition is addition” required multiple sources o f evidence,
including, for example, operation tables as well as careful reasoning about the operation.
Regarding the main interview question, these data provide additional insight into the
finding in the literature that students believe Z 3 is a subgroup o f Z&. There seems to be a
strong belief that Z 3 should be a subgroup o f Ze and, similarly, that they are both
subgroups o f Z, because they are subsets that are groups o f their own right. Furthermore,
this belief is strong enough to overpower any suspicion that the operations should be
acknowledged as different. As for the inappropriate use o f Lagrange’s theorem to
establish that Z3 is a subgroup o f Z& (Hazzan & Leron, 1996), the data and analysis
suggest that this phenomenon may not be a matter o f confusing a theorem with a
converse but rather a matter o f grasping a seemingly relevant theorem to support a
previously held conviction.

Isomorphisms
Isomorphism was the theme o f the second interviews, but Robert’s and Carla’s second
interviews focused on other topics. Nonetheless, the concept o f isomorphism arose in
interviews with all the key participants, thereby providing sufficiently broad data. Again
this section begins with a conceptual analysis followed by detailed analysis o f W endy’s
second interview, which was particularly rich, and where, once again, the themes are use
o f language and use o f the operation table. The discussion then is broadened to include
other students.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It is through the concept o f isomorphism that students begin to gain a sense o f abstract
groups. Thus, this discussion provides a way then to discuss students’ concepts o f groups
and the nature and role o f abstraction in such conceptions.

Conceptual Analysis
As discussed above, Wendy noticed during her first interview that sometimes a group’s
operation table can be made to look like another group’s table by renaming the elements.
This can happen, o f course, only when the groups have the same structure, because, once
again, it is the operation that gives a group its structure, and the names o f the elements
are structurally unimportant. When two groups have the same structure, they may be
considered “essentially the same,” and the groups are said to be isomorphic.
Furthermore, both groups may be seen as instantiations o f the same abstract group.
It is a hard problem, in general, to determine whether two groups are isomorphic,
although it is often possible to see quickly that they are not, such as when they do not
have the same number o f elements. When two groups are represented by operation tables
and if one believes that the two groups might be isomorphic, the naive approach is to
attempt to rename the elements o f one group and perhaps reorder the elements in the
operation table until the table is identical to the table for the other group. The
formalization o f this naive idea is somewhat involved. The renaming and reordering are
accomplished via a one-to-one function from one group onto the other. Then the task of
comparing the two structures involves comparing two kinds o f calculations:
( 1 ) performing the operation on the elements in the first group and sending the result
through the function, and (2 ) sending the elements through the function individually and
combining their images under the operation in the second group. If the results o f the two
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calculations are the same for all pairs o f elements in the first group, the function is called
an isomorphism. Formally, an isomorphism is a one-to-one function/from a group G
onto a group G1, with operations * and

respectively, such that for all a and b in G,

J[a*b) = f(a)*[f(b). Two groups are said to be isomorphic if such a function exists.
Depending on the manner in which the groups are presented, it may be a very difficult
task to find a function that works.
The formal definition o f isomorphism, although necessary, obscures the intuitive notion
that the two groups G and G' are essentially the same and thus are examples o f the same
abstract group. The formalization has other negative consequences as well. The idea that
two groups are isomorphic is symmetric, in that if G is essentially the same as G', then
clearly G' is essentially the same as G. In contrast, the formal definition is asymmetric,
in that one o f the groups must be chosen as the domain o f the function.
The core idea, once again, is that groups that arise in different contexts might actually be
different representations o f the same group. This point o f view provides an opportunity
for profound insight into the nature of groups. For example, although there are countless
representations o f groups with three elements, all o f them are isomorphic and thus all
represent the same abstract group. It is in this sense that it is legitimate to talk about Z 3 as
representing the abstract group with three elements, or, more simply, to talk about the
group o f order three.
Dr. Benson and I had as a goal for this course that students would begin to develop an
understanding o f such abstract groups, so that they might begin to “see” an abstract group
“through” a representation. Once again, the only access to abstract objects is through
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representations or, more to the point, through multiple representations. An abstract
object emerges in a student’s thinking when he or she begins to see a symbol as a
representation rather than a thing-in-itself, but that is unlikely to happen “unless there are
other symbols that can be regarded as signifying the same entity” (Sfard, 2000, p. 79).
For small finite groups, an obvious mode o f representation is an operation table. Thus, to
pave the way for these ideas in class, the students had been asked on the take-home
portion o f the first midterm exam (Appendix B) to “fill out all possible operation tables
which make the set {e, a, b, c} a group,” where e was assumed to be the identity. The
students had found four such tables . 10 W endy’s tables are provided in Figure 11. It turns
out that first three tables in Figure 11 are isomorphic and thus represent the same abstract
group. The fourth table, on the other hand, is not isomorphic to any o f the first three and
thus represents a different abstract group. In this way, there are exactly two abstract
groups o f order four, just as there is only one group o f order three.

Figure 11. Wendy’s tables for {e, a, b, c}
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To provide additional grounding for the concept o f isomorphism and the ideas behind it,
the class spent several days renaming and reordering tables to show that they were the
same as other tables. For groups with four elements, they were asked to determine
whether they got one o f the four operation tables they had identified on the midterm
exam (see Figure 11) and, if so, which one. Our hope was that, when asked to show that
10 To be precise, there are exactly four such tables only if one assumes that the elements are to be presented
in a particular order. Because all students used the order e, a, b, c, this imprecision did not present a
problem.
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Z\, for example, was isomorphic to one o f these four tables, the students would choose
different ones, and indeed they did. Then when one student showed that Z4 was
isomorphic to Table 1 in Figure 11 and another student showed that Z 4 was isomorphic to
Table 2, they might conclude that Table 1 must be isomorphic to Table 2. Dr. Benson
and I thought that conclusions such as this would be obvious to students, based on their
intuitions about renaming and reordering, and indeed students did make such
conclusions . 11
During this work in class, a student had suggested the word congruent to describe the
relationship between two groups that could be made the same via renaming and
reordering elements in the operation table. This term suggests the intuitive idea that
establishing a correspondence between elements o f two groups and comparing the
operations is, in a way, analogous to establishing a correspondence between vertices of
two geometric figures and then comparing the figures. Dr. Benson introduced the word
isomorphic to give a standard name to the naive concept o f congruence that was
emerging in the class, and he indicated that the term congruent would be acceptable as
well. At the same time, he gave formal definitions o f isomorphism and homomorphism
(see chapter 6 ).

Wendy and Isomorphisms
W endy’s second interview took place just after the session in which Dr. Benson had
introduced the term isomorphic. I had planned to discuss the concept o f isomorphism in
the context o f the several groups o f order 4 that the class had been investigating. I was
getting ready to ask a question when Wendy put forward her own question:
11 It is possible to formalize this kind of reasoning by proving that isomorphic is an equivalence relation,
but this would have required a formal version of isomorphism, which had not been introduced yet.
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10

Wendy: What exactly does the word isomorphic mean? Iso- meaning like, one? Does it
mean one?

11

Brad: Well, the etymology o f the word, iso- means “same.”

12

Wendy: Same.

13

Brad: And -morphic means “having to do with form.”

14

Wendy: Okay. Same form.

15

Brad: Same form?

16

Wendy: Okay, [inaudible] I don’t like using a word if I don’t know what it means.

17

Brad: Right. But on the other hand, understanding what the word means, “same form”
and understanding how it relates to this stuff here, that’s ...

18

Wendy: It really relates.

22

Wendy: Because you can reorder.... The way I explained it to the class today.... I am
kind o f getting a hold on this. [Laughs] (Wendy 2)

Dr. Benson’s introduction o f the term isomorphic apparently had not been enough for
Wendy. Her initial confusion followed by her response “It really relates” seems to
indicate that my description o f the etymology o f the word was both necessary and
sufficient for her to attach the word isomorphic to the idea that she had been developing.
As is shown below, however, understanding isomorphic as “same form” was not really
sufficient.
Wendy then described how she was thinking about the reordering (rearranging) process.
24

Wendy: Well, the way that I do it.... Because people have.... One person in class kept
on putting up, asking a question that didn’t make much sense to me, but I explained my
way o f saying, well, say we have Table 1 and Table 2 [see Figure 11], which we kept on
saying were the same.

26

Wendy: Okay? And we wanted to show that 2, Table 2 is like Table 1. But what she
kept on saying, was, “Well, can you rearrange it anyway you want?” And in a sense you
can, there are different ways to rearrange it to get it to look like Table 1. But you can’t
rearrange it anyway you want to make it look like Table 1, because the way I know how
to rearrange it is that you have to look at the diagonal.

28

Wendy: There might be another way, but this is the way that always works for me. By
looking at the diagonal you see that there.... And the reason why you can tell that it’s
different from this group altogether is because if you look at the squared ...

29

Brad: From your Table 4.

30

Wendy: From my Table 4, is that if you look at the squared elements, all the squared
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elements, e, a, b, and c squared equal the same thing. But in these three tables [Tables 1
through 3], two elements equal the identity e, and two elements don’t. That’s why these
three can be arranged to look like each other. (Wendy 2)

So, for Wendy, the differences in the diagonals indicated a fundamental difference
between the groups that the tables represented. Furthermore, she saw that the appearance
o f the diagonal constrained the ways that one table could be rearranged to look like
another.
It is worth noting that W endy’s approach is correct and insightful: The squares— in
particular the number o f them and how often they each appear—provide essential
information (in the sense o f “essence”) about the structure o f a group. In the case o f
groups of order 4, merely counting the number o f squares is an accurate and efficient
discriminant between the two groups o f order 4. The approach is somewhat general in
that if the number and multiplicity o f the squares is different between two groups, then
the groups are not isomorphic, although the inverse is not always true.
At this point, Wendy had a sense that the groups presented by Tables 1 through 3 were
isomorphic. But actually showing they are isomorphic requires finding an isomorphism,
which for Wendy was a reordering and renaming that would make the tables identical, or
as Wendy said, “in the same form.”
34

Wendy: But to rearrange them, if you want to see whether they are the same or not, you
want to get it in the same form, hence being isomorphic. Same form. So if you want get
[Table] 2 to look like 1, if you look at.... e1 is always equal to e, so you really, you can
leave e where it is. But in the first table you have a2 = c , b 2 = c, and c2 = e. That means
you want to make a2 and b2, or these two elements in the middle o f the table, their squares
to be the same element where the last, the last element in the table you want to equal e2.

35

Wendy: And if you look at the second table. These two elements, their squares equal e2,
but you don’t.... You want, you want this square to equal the nonidentity square. A
nonidentity square. You know what I mean?

36

Brad: So you want a2 to be other than the identity?

37

Wendy: Other than the identity. And you want a2 to be in this position because that’s
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where it is in the first table.
39

Wendy: So by this case you know that a and c have to switch. But as Steve [Benson]
pointed, as we figured it out in class today, that you don’t necessarily.... What I did, is I
switched a and c, so the table would have, the new table to rearrange and rename to make
it look like Table 1 would be e, c, b, a.

W endy’s language in the statement “you want to get it in the same form” (line 34)
suggests that, for her, the form depended on the arrangement o f the elements in the table.
Rearranging a table would put it into a different form, and the goal was to get two tables
into the same form, “hence being isomorphic.” W endy’s concept o f isomorphism was
dominated, at this point at least, by her notion o f same form. Thus, her concept o f
isomorphism depended on the particular arrangement o f elements in the table.
Wendy used the table not only to determine which groups could be rearranged to be the
same but also to determine how to accomplish a reordering that would work. By
focusing on the fact that the two middle elements in Table 1 (a and b) had nonidentity
squares and the fact that a 2 = e'm Table 2, she knew that something other than a in Table
2 must map to a in Table 1. One way to accomplish that was by switching a and c, but
Wendy saw there were other possibilities.
41

Wendy: But if you look at this table, e, b, c, a works, and that is because you can take out
a, the a row on this table and slide it up. And that way the diagonal would be e, a, a and
if you place a down at the bottom, if you kind o f take it out, slide these up and put it back
on the bottom you’d get e, b, c, a and that works too. You can do it that way. So there
are two ways to do it.

43

Wendy: e, b, c, a works, and so does e, c, b, a.

W endy’s explanations were partly based on manipulations o f the table, such as switching
rows and removing a row and sliding others up. Her written work from class
demonstrates the e, b, c, a reordering and renaming process (see Figure 12). She
reordered Table 2 and then used a “renaming function” in order to end up with names that
were easier to compare with Table 1.
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Figure 12. Showing Table 2 is like Table 1
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The work in class had led Wendy to several insights about renaming and reordering
tables. She also had begun to ask more general questions and to sense possibilities for
broader conclusions.
47

Wendy: We can do it more than one way. And that was interesting for me. But what he
[Dr. Benson] was saying today that I really haven’t thought much about was that all you
have to show, to show that they are isomorphic, is one way, and that makes sense. You
don’t have to show all o f the different ways that it’s isomorphic.

48

Wendy: But, I wonder how many different [inaudible] ways. Like, say you have Table 3,
which has a, b, or e, b, e, b in the diagonal, and you want it to look like the first one. I
wonder how many different ways to reorder it before you rename there are. You know,
like, there were two ways to reorder 2 to look like 1 before you rename it. I wonder how
many there are for 3. I don’t know.

Thus, Wendy was concerned not only about whether a table could be rearranged and
renamed to be the same as another table but also about the number o f ways that it could
be done, despite the fact that Dr. Benson had indicated that this was not necessary in
showing that two groups are isomorphic. W endy’s question demonstrates noteworthy
mathematical instinct, for finding and counting the different ways to reorder and rename
a group is the key idea behind the set o f automorphisms o f a group— a topic that we did
not explore in class.
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As the interview continued, I asked Wendy to write out operation tables for two familiar
groups to see whether they were the same. In particular, I wanted her to compare the
rotations in £ > 4 and a group the class came to call the military group, which consisted o f
the commands “stand as you are,” “left,” “right,” and “about face,” abbreviated S, £, R,
A, where the operation was following the first command by the second. I was interested
in how she would approach this task because, from a certain perspective, these groups are
obviously isomorphic, in that the former consists o f rotational symmetries o f a square and
the latter consists o f the same rotations o f a person as viewed from above.
Before I told her the two groups I had in mind, she was concerned that she was going to
have to think o f the examples. And even when I named two groups, she preferred to
copy the table from her notes rather than reconstruct it, suggesting that her reasoning was
largely external and based in the table. As she copied the military group from her notes,
she considered reordering it as part o f the copying:
59

Wendy: Do you want them in any particular order? I presume not because w e’re going to
rearrange it anyway. But it also makes it interesting, while I am just copying this
[inaudible], is that like, you .... It depends on how you set this up. You know what I
mean? Like what if I give like.... I don’t know, [inaudible] You can write the table
down this way or in this way. Rearrange ...

60

Brad: You mean as S, A, L, R or as S ,L ,A , R.

61

Wendy: Yeah, and that is going to make a difference to how you are going to have to
rearrange it to make it look like something else.

62

Brad: Okay. But is i t ...? Whether you write it down as S, A, L, R or S, L, A, R are they,
are these different operations here? Are these different systems?

63

Wendy: No, it’s the same operation. But say for some reason m y.... We are doing the
rotations in Z)4. Maybe if I wrote it this way, I wouldn’t have to rearrange it. It might
turn out to be the same. Or if I wrote this one, it might turn out to be the same. Do you
know what I mean?

Wendy anticipated that in her copying she had an opportunity to choose an order that
could make it unnecessary to reorder the table again. And even though she preferred to
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look at the tables, she saw them as representing something that was independent o f the
order that elements were listed.
Wendy began filling out the table for the rotations in £ > 4 and quickly noticed a
connection:
64

Wendy: Okay, the rotations o f D Aare rotate 0, rotate 90, rotate 180, and rotate 270.
Rotate 90 and a 90 is rotate 180. Rotate 270, rotate 0. [Begins writing out Figure 13,
Table 1.] This is like an addition table.

65

Brad: Oh, really?

66

Wendy: I think so [inaudible] because you ju st.... Do you know what I mean when I say
it is like an addition table? Like if this was 0, l,2 ,a n d 3 ; 0 , 1, 2, and 3, this is.... R0 is
the identity. And then it kind o f rotates 1, it like moves up one.

67

Brad: Why don’t you write it down? What the table would be if you call them 0, 1, 2, 3
just like that?

68

Wendy: Under addition?

69

Brad: Well, however you are thinking about it.

70

Wendy: I am thinking about it like an addition table. 0, 1, 2, 3. [Begins writing out
Figure 13, Table 2.] Uh oh. I am thinking about it mod 4, a Z4 addition table.

71

Wendy: You know how you always kind o f ...? When you are filling out a table if you
pick up a pattern, if it clicks with something else? Like this is how it clicked with me.
And that’s how I know how to fill out my table.

Figure 13. Wendy’s connection: Rotations in D 4 as Z4
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Wendy noticed the connection while working in the table, not by reasoning about the
rotations or addition modulo n or abstractly about the groups. This point becomes clearer
as the excerpt progresses. She noticed how the elements rotated and moved up one
position in the interior o f the table (line

6 6

). Furthermore, her surprise in line 70

indicates that it was not until she was carrying out this rotation process to construct the
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addition table for {0, 1, 2, 3} that she realized that the operation was not addition, but
addition mod 4.
To get some clarity on her thinking, I asked her why she switched to addition mod 4.
75

Wendy: It wouldn’t be closed if I turn it, if I didn’t switch it to mod 4.

76

Brad: Okay, but .. .why is the connection here?

77

Wendy: Because with addition, modulo addition, when you have, the first row is always
going to be the identity. Row or column is always going to be the identity. And then
when you fill out the next row, it always increases by one, the following row, it almost
like cycles. It’s almost like a turn [inaudible]. Almost like when we did the
permutations. Let’s see if I can remember the forms. I mean the notation kind o f screws
me up. It’s like that notation. Permutation notation. Right?

78

Brad: Okay. How, what?

79

Wendy: So, 1 goes to 2, 2 goes to 3 .... Well, I have.... It should be 0, 1, 2, 3, but if we
are going to look at this case. But, same difference. 0 goes to 1, 1 goes to 2, 2 goes to 3,
3 goes to 4, 4 goes to 1. Same thing as if you wrote Ro, R9Q, R m , and R27o- Same thing.
R always goes to .... R goes to .... If you look at the rows and columns, Row 0 goes to
Row 90, Row 90 goes to 180, Rotate 170 [270] would go back to zero, and it does this in
all o f the columns. Like, rotate 90 goes to rotate 180. It kind o f moves up.

W endy’s explanation supports the point that she was reasoning from the table, for her
description was about how the elements move around the rows and columns o f the table
and included no discussion o f the meanings o f the operation in D 4 or the structural
aspects o f the group. W endy’s statement “the first row is always going to be the identity”
(line 77) suggests, however, that Wendy may have thought o f the whole row as actually
being the identity, rather than indicating how the identity acts on the elements o f the
group. W endy’s comparison with permutation notation is problematic, based perhaps
only on notational similarities between the rows in the operation table and one o f the two
methods the class used for representing permutations. On the other hand, the idea o f
elements o f the group acting on the group as a whole is yet another seed of an important
mathematical idea. Furthermore, developing the connection more fully requires strong
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connections with permutations, once again demonstrating W endy’s good mathematical
instinct.
Moments later, when Wendy compared these tables to the table for S, A, L, R, she first
wondered whether she had made a mistake in copying the table but soon suggested that
switching things around might make it work.
89

Wendy: Because if you noticed in these two tables [Figure 13, Tables 1 and 2], you can
write the same permutation notation because if you look at the diagonal again, it has the
same form. These are in the same isomorphic form. They’re iso-.... I don’t know how
to use the word right yet, but.... These have the same form right now. The way that
these two are set up, D4 and, I don’t know, military— I don’t know what you want to call
it— this military form. It’s not cut up in the same form, yet, that’s the table.

Thus, for Wendy the form was the table, a perspective that may have made it difficult for
her to separate the notion o f isomorphism from the particular table (and its arrangement)
used to represent a group. She had a sense that there was something that stayed the same
under rearrangement, but she did not yet have the language for it.
As the interview continued, Wendy reaffirmed that her key to whether two tables were in
the same form was first to look at the diagonals, and her goal was to try to get the
diagonals to look the same. I asked her to do that with the military group, to try to make
its diagonal look like the diagonal o f the rotations in D4.
101

Wendy: Well, I see that rotation 0 is the identity in this table, and it goes.... In this
diagonal, I am going to try to set this diagonal up to look like this diagonal and see if
everything else will fall into place. In here it’s identity, rotation 180, identity, and
rotation 180. So am going to see, since S is the identity in this table, I am going to see if I
can get the same thing: the first and third squared elements to equal the identity. Like
here it’s the second. So I am going to try to see if I switch A and L, if I can make the
tables look the same.

As Wendy tried to carry out this plan, she stumbled for a moment because she tried to
switch the row and the columns at the same time but then completed the rearrangement
(Figure 11, Table 3).
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Figure 14. Wendy’s tables for other groups of order 4
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She next renamed Table 3 to E, A, B, C, yielding Table 4. Throughout this process, she
paid careful attention to the diagonals, frequently checking the correspondence along the
diagonals and often filling out the diagonal o f the table first.
Her process began by making each calculation and then each translation, but as she
continued, the process became increasingly abbreviated. She also introduced a function/
to describe the renaming from Table 3 to Table 4:
116

Wendy: I am saying that there is a function almost that puts this table to this table. And I
am going to call that function.... And the function brings S.... Let’s call it the renaming
function, and it puts S to E, L to A, A to B and R to C. And what I realized as I was filling
up this table, that when, if you have S times L for instance it is going to equal L, and
instead o f figuring out.... All you have to do is look at the function o f L, which is A, to
figure out, to rename it, to this ...

I asked her to explain how this function helped her abbreviate the procedure:
124

Wendy: So the function that w e’re calling the renaming function is up here. So R brings,
R is renamed to C. So almost J[R) is going to equal C. So that’s why I was just saying R
is going to be equal to C.

It took Wendy a long time to say this, and she had trouble articulating the way that the
function supported the sense o f equality between the groups. In particular, saying
“almost J(R) = C” is redundant, whereas saying “R = C” omits the role o f the function
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entirely. A more accurate description would be “almost R = C.” The function establishes
the “almost” precisely: flR ) = C.
She completed her calculations and described the result:
12 6
127

Wendy: So that’s the new form [Table 4] after I reordered it and renamed it. So reorder
and then rename.
Wendy: Here [Table 1] I am just going to rename. And this I am going to use as my
function. So rotate 180 is equal to B. Good, it’s working. [Both laugh] Rotate 270 is
equal to C, rotate 0 is equal to E. Rotate 270 is C, rotate 0 is E, rotate 90 is A, rotate 180
is B, rotate 0 is E, and rotate 90 is A. And these two [inaudible] the same. By renaming,
by just renaming Z)4 and by reordering and renaming the military one you can get them to
hold the same form.

12 8

Brad: That’s nice.

12 9

Wendy: Isn’t that nice?

Thus, Wendy described Table 4 as the “new form” o f Table 2 and immediately went on
to rename Table 1 to create Table 5. Upon completing this process, she summarized the
relationship between D 4 and the military group and also expressed some satisfaction in
what she had shown.
At this point, Wendy still thought o f the form as the particular arrangement o f elements in
the table. The group did not have a form that was independent o f the table, but rather the
groups could sometimes be made to “hold the same form” by the processes o f renaming
and reordering. In other words, the form was not a property o f the group but something
you could do with the group.
Wendy explained further:
134

Wendy: Because if you are looking at the table, the table is like a very specific form....
Like.... You know how we said that these are kind o f alike, before we really started
asking this isomorphism stuff. There are different arrangements you can have o f the
same table. Like these two [Tables 2 and 3] we are calling the same table, but they are
just different arrangements o f the same table. So, technically these would be the....
These are different arrangements o f the same.... Like these have different forms, but
they are really the same operation. So this takes form into account, this permutation.
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So the operation and the table are independent o f the arrangement and they take fo rm in
particular arrangements o f the table. The permutation “takes form into account” by
specifying the necessary rearrangement to get tables into the same form.
I asked Wendy whether the groups represented by the tables in Figure 13 and Figure 14
were all the same.
138

Wendy: Yeah, they are the same because you can rearrange them to be the same. They
are definitely the same. But when you have it, if you have the original military one, the
original, and this is Z)4, they are different.... These [Tables 1 and 2] are in different
forms o f the same, what would you call it, the same group. Like it has the sam e.... Or
actually, I don’t know how you’d say it. They have the same form. They are iso-.... I
don’t really know .... I have to make this.... I think this is going to be the.... Once I
make this statement right here I’ll totally understand what I am doing.

Wendy saw that many o f the groups o f order 4 were essentially the same. As she tried to
describe this, however, her use o f language evolved from “different forms o f the same,”
to “same group,” to “same form.” She almost said “isomorphic” but held back and
instead revealed personal insights about the relationship between her language and her
understanding. Perhaps she had a sense that the word isomorphic should be about the
group and not about the particular order in which the elements are listed. In any case,
this seems to have been a significant moment, for her attention turned from the processes
o f renaming and reordering to resolving her language difficulties.
13 9

Wendy: What I am trying to understand right now is whether or not these have the same
form, or if these have the same form [Tables 1 and 2 versus Tables 1 and 3]. Can you say
that these two have the same form, or can you say that these two have the same form?
‘Cause I understand that these two [Tables 1 and 2] are the same tables once you
rearrange it and rename it, but without rearranging it and renaming it, do they have the
same form? They don’t. Well, they do because you can rearrange it to have the same
form. But I just don’t know if you can say that when they’re not the same yet.

14 0

Brad: When it’s not obvious.

141

Wendy: When it’s not obvious. Do you know what I mean? So what can you say about
these two tables and then what about these two tables? [Tables 1 and 2 versus Tables 1
and 3.] These two [Tables 1 and 3] have the same, they’re in the same form, right there
and then. So can you still say these two [Tables 1 and 2] have the same form? I guess
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you can because they do have the same form it is just not in it yet. It’s just disguised.

Wendy saw that Tables 1 and 3 had the same form, demonstrating that that the form (and
hence the abstract group) was independent o f the names o f the elements. She was
conflicted, however, as to whether the arrangement o f the elements determined the form.
She saw renaming and reordering as different processes with different consequences.
Renaming left the form intact, whereas reordering seemed to change the form. Wendy
was uncomfortable with this point o f view, however, perhaps because she had a sense
that the order in which elements were listed in a table ought to be unimportant.
142

Brad: Here is a question to ask about it. D o es...? You might ask whether the tables have
the same form, is one way o f asking it. But another is to ask sort o f more abstractly, do
the groups have the same form?

145

Wendy: See, the tables don’t have the same form. That’s what I was trying to get at, but
the groups do. Like they’re, they definitely, these elements under their operations have
the same form, because it’s just the way you made up your operation table that you
disguised it and made it look like it didn’t have the same form. But if you take it and
erase it, like we did, and like reordered it and renamed it, it really does have the same
form. You can see it.

The distinction between the form o f the group and the form o f the table was helpful to
Wendy. At this point it seems as though she wanted the phrase same form to be tied to
the group but not to the particular arrangement in the table. But then she became
concerned about her work on the midterm exam.
147

Wendy: Like we were saying with any 4-order table in our take-home exam, we had, we
had that there are 4 different.... I don’t .... Do you remember how, what exactly the
question is that he asked us? Because I am curious to know whether we actually
answered the question right on the exam or not.

14 8

Brad: The question was something like, “Assuming you have four elements, e, a, b, c
where e is the identity, write down all the group tables that you can.”

14 9

Wendy: All the.... So it was right that we wrote all the different arrangements, because
there are four different arrangements o f this group table. Like these are all group tables
you can fill out.

151

Wendy: But we figured out that this one is different. These, all three o f these are the
same, can be rearranged to hold the same form, if you rearranged them and renamed
them.
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Wendy was reassured that her work on the midterm exam had been correct, but she had a
sense that there was a deeper question that would also incorporate her sense that three of
the four tables were the same.
153

Wendy: But, if you really look at the form and see which ones are actually different....
But I want to know what question.... And I think maybe he asked this. Which, what
would you ask to get the answer, to get the two different forms?

154

Brad: You mean.... On the, the way the midterm was worded the answer was four
different tables. Here they are.

1 55

Wendy: Right, different arrangements. What would you ask...? How many congruent
or...? What question would you ask to only get...? I want to try to figure out what
question you would try to ask to only get two.

Again, the interview took a new direction. Wendy knew an answer for which she could
not formulate a question. In referring to the “two different forms,” she was talking about
abstract entities that are independent o f both the names o f the elements and the order in
which they might be listed.
She continued trying to formulate the question:
157

Wendy: These are all little links now. I am trying to figure out exactly what’s going on.
So what is this actually called? Like, what are we actually doing? Like, maybe list all.
List the different forms.... List the tables.... [inaudible] Maybe ...

15 9

Wendy: Show the different tables o f different forms? Or [inaudible] form o f order 4 ....
Of a group o f order 4.

I asked Wendy what if the question on the exam had been to write down all the groups o f
order 4 and began recalling some o f the many groups o f order 4 we had discussed in
class. Wendy interrupted:
163

Wendy: I think there is an ... like endless amount o f tables you could write down,
[inaudible]

164

Brad: Endless, i f ...

16 5

Wendy: If you consider all o f the different operations, the different.... I am sure there are
tons o f different 4-like element groups.

168

Brad: The idea o f having to write down this many is kind o f annoying, maybe.

169

Wendy: Yeah, because there are all the same, most o f them are the same thing.
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170

Brad: They are the same in what sense?

171

Wendy: It breaks down to two forms. Like, if you look at any, every single one o f those
4 ordered tables, there are only two forms that they can have. This form or pick any one
o f those three forms. Because you can.... There are only four different arrangements o f
those four.... This is what we figured out in the exam. If you take any 4-ordered group,
it has to hold one o f these arrangements. Okay? But, so, we realized when we started
working with isomorphic groups that these are just different arrangements.... Like you
can.... Say you wrote down this form, you can arrange any o f these to look like this one.
So really these three are the same, have the same form. And so if this is one form and
this is one form because there is no way you can make it look like this because it has
different elements in the diagonal. But y ou .... It has to .... Any 4 element, 4 ordered
group will either hold this form or this form.

It is readily apparent that Wendy had developed some conviction about the idea that there
are two groups o f order 4. Furthermore, her use o f the word fo rm was becoming less tied
to the to the table and more associated with the abstract groups o f order 4.
I asked how she might reword the question from the exam:
173

Wendy: List all o f the arrangements o f a 4-ordered group ... which have different form?
Which have a different form? Would that narrow it down?

She considered using the words isomorphic and congruent but eventually stuck to the
word form.
18 9

Wendy: Or you could even say, How many forms are there? [inaudible] And what are
they? And then it could be any combination o f these 2.

1 90

Brad: You mean Table number 4 and ...

191

Wendy: Any one o f those [Tables 1 through 3],

Thus, by the end o f this episode Wendy had a firm conviction that there are two groups of
order 4. A glance back at the beginning o f the interview reveals, however, that she
already had a sense o f this when the interview started. What had she learned during the
interview? She had changed her use o f the word form so that it was no longer tied to the
particular arrangement o f elements in the table, but it is hard to point to any other
learning.
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During the interview, the word isomorphic had not been very helpful to Wendy, although
it seems likely that she would still say that isomorphic means “same form.” She
preferred to use the word form , perhaps because neither the terms isomorphic nor
isomorphism provide appropriate syntax for what she saw as the essential idea. When
one says that two groups are isomorphic, what is it, then, that the two groups have in
common? The answer is something like “their essence” or “their form” or “their
structure.” The term isomorphic is not necessarily helpful.
During this interview, Wendy was simultaneously developing concepts o f the two
abstract groups o f order 4 and developing language to talk about them. This process
involved separating her concept o f the groups from the names o f the elements and also
from the order in which elements were listed in the table. She spent most of the interview
generalizing her use o f the word form to accommodate this abstraction. It appears that
these processes can take a good deal o f time and mental effort.
Mathematical habits o f mind. The most prominent feature o f W endy’s second interview
is that she had noticed a profound mathematical idea: There are essentially two groups of
order 4. During this interview, she had a sense that this idea was separate from the names
and arrangement o f the elements in the tables, but her reasoning was so tied to the tables
that she had trouble making the separation. Furthermore, she was going a step beyond
this observation and in doing so adopted an inherently mathematical point o f view. She
wanted to know what question to ask in order to get the answer, “There are two groups of
order 4.” In other words, she not only saw the mathematical elegance o f this statement,
she also wanted to be able to talk about it.
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In retrospect, perhaps I should have been more helpful in her struggle, for it is highly
unlikely that Wendy would have been able to phrase the question in anything like the
conventional mathematical way: “Up to isomorphism, how many groups of order 4 are
there?” (see Fraleigh, 1989, p. 112; Hungerford, 1974, pp. 76, 82). The subtlety and
difficulty in the idea are perhaps underscored by the fact that the phrase “up to
isomorphism” is not an obvious metaphor.
This episode is noteworthy for another reason: It illustrates some inherently mathematical
habits o f mind. Throughout W endy’s interviews, her calculations were sometimes slow
and seemingly unaided by mathematical insight. At the same time, she often showed
good mathematical instincts and asked deep mathematical questions that sometimes led
to important insights. For example, she decided that 0 could not be an element o f a group
if the operation was multiplication . 1 2 She focused on the squares o f elements in a group
as an indication o f something essential about the group. She demonstrated interest not
only in how to rearrange an operation table but also in counting the number o f ways that
it could be done. After concluding that Z 3 is not a subgroup o f Z&, she looked at other
possibilities, including Z2 . She chose a useful name, 2 Z 3 , for a subgroup o f Z(, and then
decided to investigate whether 4 Z3 was a subgroup. She sought to understand the
meaning o f specialized terms, such as isomorphism, and was conscious o f her language
difficulties. In a later interview, she noted, “If you operate any two-cycle groups that
don’t equal the identity, it is going to equal a three-cycle” (Wendy 4, line 481),
demonstrating seed o f a good idea here: In £ 3 , the product o f any two (distinct) two-

12 Wendy did not distinguish among various kinds of multiplication.
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cycles is a three-cycle. Furthermore, the observation generalizes to S„, although it is
necessary to add the hypothesis that the two-cycles overlap.
Habits o f mind such as these ought to be cultivated. They might be missed, however, in a
traditional class that does not encourage students to articulate their nascent ideas. From
the ways that students are typically assessed and from the ways that mathematics texts are
written, the implicit message is that in mathematics what is valued is the result of
thinking, not the process o f thinking. The case o f Wendy suggests the potential o f
changing the message.

Other Students and Isomorphisms
As described above, the concept o f isomorphism was introduced informally as a process
o f renaming and reordering operation tables, and the formal version was introduced later.
The interviews and the students’ exams together provide evidence that the connection
between the formal and informal conceptions was not made very well. The students in
general had a good intuitive sense o f when two groups were isomorphic, though they
were often drawn to other language, such as “similar,” “corresponding,” “the same as,”
“equal,” and, particularly, “congruent.” Their concept images were dominated by
patterns and relationships they saw in operation tables and in renaming processes, which
they were sometimes also able to imagine without operation tables. The formal concept
definition, in contrast, was rarely evoked. In a nutshell, the students demonstrated
shallow understanding o f “isomorphism” as a function with particular properties but rich
understanding o f “isomorphic,” including the ability to see two different operation tables
as being the same abstract group. To illustrate this result, I describe below the definitions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

210

the students provided on their final exams and the ways in which they used the operation
tables to support their informal understandings.
Definitions. On their final exams, the students’ definitions o f isomorphism were not very
close to the formal definitions that had been provided in class. In particular, although
Carla and Robert noted that an isomorphism is a function, none o f the key participants
explicitly included a condition such as J[a*b) = f(a)*'f{b). Instead, most students gave
approximate informal definitions o f isomorphic, using phrases such as “congruent” and
“renaming and reordering.” Lori’s definition was the least formal:
f) isomorphism Two groups are isomorphic to each other, if the groups are
similar or congruent. This means that there are two totally different groups that
can be renamed and possibly reordered to be represented exactly the same. The
two groups have the same number o f elements, they have an identity element that
acts similarily and they have elements that have similar inverses. In other words,
the two groups are completely congruent after renaming and reordering.

Robert’s definition, in contrast, was essentially correct, although different from what had
been presented in class:
f) An isomorphism is a special kind o f homomorphism. It is a 1-1 and onto
function. Things that are the same after renaming and reordering are said to be
isomorphic to each other. Note: a homomorphism does not need to be 1-1.

In class, the concept o f homomorphism had been introduced as a generalization o f the
formal version o f isomorphism. Robert had reversed the relationship, making possible a
very simple definition o f isomorphism. Furthermore, his definition combined formal and
informal descriptions clearly and correctly. In fairness, all key participants except Lori
provided answers elsewhere that suggest they knew that an isomorphism is a one-to-one
and onto function that is a homomorphism. Only Robert demonstrated such clarity when
asked to provide a definition o f isomorphism.
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Renaming and reordering. The act o f rearranging the table was procedurally difficult to
carry out and fraught with possibilities for error. For example, it was tempting to try to
reorder the columns and rows at the same time without coordinating the two. Renaming
and reordering were particularly difficult when the two sets o f names overlapped. To
overcome this difficulty, some students preferred to rename both groups to some neutral
representation, although this approach brought the new difficulty o f determining which
element “acted like the identity.”
Renaming sometimes presented conceptual difficulties as well. I asked Robert, for
example, whether he could rename the {0, 2, 4} table, just as he had the {0, 3} table.
27 9

Robert: Yeah, we could maybe call the.... But the thing is, if I had renamed these 1’s in
this one, then we wouldn’t have had a group under mod 6, like addition under mod 6.
But if I was going to do something similar to that, I would just call this 0, 1,2.

Thus, renaming can present cognitive obstacles when the operation has a meaning
because the meaning o f the operation must change to accommodate the new names. This
obstacle is related, o f course, to W endy’s concern about attaching the name 2 Z 3 to the
subgroup {0, 2, 4} in Z6. In mathematical discourse, one talks about isomorphisms (and
homomorphisms) as preserving the group operation, and abstractly that is accurate.
There is a sense, however, in which renaming modifies the operation, or at least the way
one must think about it.
Seeing form in the table. Tables were very present in the students’ concept images o f
isomorphism, particularly for groups o f order 2, 3, and 4. Without prompting from me,
the students often noticed, usually based on patterns in the table, that a group given by
one table was isomorphic to another group. Carla noticed, for example, that both a group
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whose elements were the sets {1,3} and {5, 7} and the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4 could be
renamed to what she might have called the {e, a} group (see Figure 15).
97

Carla: So if we rename {1, 3} to e, the set {1, 3} as e, and the set {5, 7} as a, we will
create a table that looks like e along the diagonal that goes like this, and a along the
opposite diagonal, which is a group because that’s .... Well, for one thing it is one o f the
tables we came up with when we talked about possible groups for a two element set. And
for another thing, we see that each o f the elements appears only once in each row or
column, which tells us it’s a group. And we see that it contains the identity, that a is its
own inverse, e is its own inverse.

116

Carla: So again if you rename 0 to e and 2 to a, you end up with e ’s on the diagonal and
a ’s on the opposite diagonal, just like the table o f the left coset.13

Figure 15. Carla’s groups of order 2
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From the way Carla discussed the diagonals, it appears that she was noticing visual
patterns in the tables. When she noticed these patterns, she did not use the word
isomorphic, yet when I asked her what was the relationship between the first two tables in
Figure 15, she responded immediately and firmly, “They are isom orphic.... Yeah.
Congruent” (lines 118, 120).
For Wendy, the diagonal o f an operation table was a distinguishing feature in groups of
order 4. The diagonal was particularly salient for other students, as well, particularly
when it contained only the identity element. Carla was momentarily convinced, for
example, that a group o f order 3 should have the identity along the main diagonal, which
is impossible for a group o f order 3, although it is necessary for groups o f order 2 and
works for one o f the two possible groups o f order 4 . 14

13 Carla’s use of the phrase “the left coset” is explored in detail in chapter 6.
14 These statements assume that elements are listed along the rows in the same order as along the columns.
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Diane noticed similar relationships in her fourth interview, pointing out that two groups
were isomorphic to the group she called e, a. A t the end o f the interview, as she gathered
her papers, she looked at two operation tables and said, “Oh, wait, wait, wait. These are
isomorphic!” (line 551). When I asked her to think also about Z2, she asserted, “It has
only one possible table for all groups with 2 elem ents.... So anything o f order 2 will be
isomorphic to each other” (lines 561, 563). Thus, Diane had begun to develop a concept
o f the abstract group o f order 2 .
Robert naturally renamed group elements to representations that were more familiar, and
he did this even in his first interview, before there had been any explicit attention to the
idea o f renaming. For example, while he was considering whether {0, 3} is a subgroup
o f Z(>, he noted in passing that “You couldn’t call it Z2” (line 189). Because his comment
suggested he saw a connection, I asked him what Z2 looks like.
193

Robert: Just replace all these 3 ’s by 2 ’s. Oh no, what am I saying? Replace all o f these
3’s by l ’s. So that’s what it would look like.

When I pursued this connection again later, he disagreed that the subgroup {0, 3} was
“like” Z2. Instead, it had reminded him o f Z2 only because it had two elements (lines
220-225).
Robert also eventually renamed the table for the subgroup {0, 2, 4} in Z 6 as {0, 1, 2} and
noticed that the table was then the same as Z3 . The process led him to a more general
conclusion:
318

Robert: All right, cool. Well, I am thinking now that if you have a 3-element set, no
matter what we call the elements, you get the same type o f table.

It seems likely that Robert was seeing the form in the table. He frequently noticed
symmetries, “cycling,” and other patterns in the operation tables, as did all the students.
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Robert was alone, however, in calling such features “geometric,” and saw even more
surprising connections, such as analogizing tables to matrices and renaming to
performing row operations. Independent o f Robert’s unusual associations, it is clear that
patterns in the tables were involved in his emerging concept o f abstract groups.
I interviewed Diane and Lori on the concept o f isomorphism the day before I interviewed
Wendy and before the word isomorphic had been introduced. Nonetheless, their work in
class had provided sufficiently rich experience for me to investigate how they were
thinking about the ideas. They were convinced from their work on the midterm exam
that their four tables exhausted the possibilities for tables with four elements.
Furthermore, from their work renaming and reordering other tables with four elements,
their conviction had become deeper:
5

Lori: Right. These are the only four, no matter what ... [inaudible]. No matter what
group o f order 4 you make a table of, it’s going to be congruent to one o f these four after
renaming them and reordering, I think.

Based on this knowledge, they tended to fill in tables based on the patterns and
sometimes provided justification for their actions. At the start o f the interview, however,
they were skeptical as to whether any o f their tables were “similar” or “congruent” to
each other. Nonetheless, they proceeded to rename and reorder tables, eventually
showing, correctly, that three were isomorphic. I asked them what they thought about the
three tables that they had shown to be isomorphic.
411

Diane: I think they are the same table. They could be the same table. Like they came
from the same abstract table.

413

Diane: Well, I mean, just because you rename and reorder something doesn’t change
what it means, what it defines. Like you can call number 1 a, you can call it whatever
you want to, but it still stays number 1.
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So for Diane, neither the names o f the elements nor the order mattered for what the table
“means, what it defines.” Through or in each o f the three tables, she saw the same
abstract table, where what matters is “the value that [the elements] hold” (line 431).
The abstract group. The fact that several students used the {e, a) group as a canonical
representation o f a group with two elements conflicts with my suggestion that that the
metaphor “Z3 is the abstract group with three elements” (Lakoff & Nunez, 2000,
chapter 3) is backwards. For these students it may be that they were noticing
isomorphisms not with the abstract group with two elements but with the {e, a } group.
In order to notice an isomorphism, however, they must have had some notion o f the
abstract group, yet it is possible that what they were seeing was patterns in the table
rather than the abstract group.
On the one hand, using {e, a) as the canonical representation o f the two-element group
makes perfect sense because then the letters can be anything. One could argue that the
letters are the names o f the elements, but some students saw the letters as variables that
can take on any “values.” On the other hand, the representation {e, a} does not provide
any support for thinking about the underlying binary operation. In fact, it is hard to
imagine an underlying mechanism that would give meaning to an operation on elements
that themselves seem to carry no meaning. In contrast, Z2 , as {0, 1}, brings plenty o f
meaning for the operation. In fact, Z 2 brings so much baggage from operations on
integers that it is hard to think o f {0 , 1 } as representing something else.
Another explanation is that it may be easier to see (and remember?) {e, a} as an object.
Diane demonstrated this possibility by calling the group “e, a, a, e,” listing all the entries
in the interior o f the table (Interview 4, line 559). The table clearly supported object
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conceptions, for the students thought o f it as something that could be acted on as a whole,
compared as a whole with something else, and manipulated as a whole (via renaming and
reordering) in ways that do not change its fundamental nature.
Comparing this result to the findings about the concept binary operation reveals a
contradiction. On the one hand, Dr. Benson and I introduced diamond to represent a
generic (particular but unspecified) operation, intending that it would stand for any
operation. We found that the students saw it as a new operation, distinct from whatever
addition and multiplication might make sense on the set. Yet, on the other hand, we also
introduced a new group on the letters {e, a ), notationally distinct from familiar groups, in
hopes that students might notice that it is “essentially the same” as some of those familiar
groups. We found that students treated it, in a sense, as a generic group, capable of
representing any o f a number o f specific groups.
So who is right? What is the difference between a generic object in a category and a new
unfamiliar object in that category? Are the two cases different? In the case o f the
abstract group with 2 elements, is there a way to represent it generically? Is it better to
consider Z2 or {e, a } as the canonical representation o f the abstract group with 2
elements? The data and analysis above suggest that it might be most profitable to
imagine the abstract group with

2

elements as something that lies in a coordination

between Z2 and {e, a}. That way, both process and object conceptions are supported,
and, more importantly, neither representation is seen as the group.

Summary
The students developed rich, nuanced, and largely informal concept images o f
isomorphism, based on processes o f renaming and reordering operation tables. They
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used operation tables to see when two groups were isomorphic and to construct
isomorphisms. These processes supported the emergence o f concepts o f abstract groups,
independent o f the names o f the elements and the order that elements were listed in the
operation tables. Through these experiences, students came to see that there is one group
o f order 2, one group o f order 3, and two groups o f order 4. These results suggest that the
operation table provides a viable experiential root for the concept o f isomorphism.
Students had considerable difficulty, however, articulating formal versions o f the concept
o f isomorphism. No doubt, this result stems partly from the manner in which the
concepts were introduced (first informally, then formally), but it seems unlikely that it
would be productive to introduce the formal definition without having developed some
sense o f what was being formalized. Thus, the pedagogical problem is what might be
done to help students connect these informal understandings with the formal version.
Among the concepts investigated in this study, the concept o f isomorphism is perhaps the
most striking example o f the general problems o f connecting formal and informal
conceptions, learning to use quantifiers, and learning to reason from definitions. I return
to these issues in the chapter 8 .

Groups and Abstraction
Most o f the analysis above discusses the students’ understandings o f the groups Z„ and
groups given via operation tables. As was mentioned in chapter 4, the students in this
class also had experiences with U„, D„, S„, as well as other standard and nonstandard
examples. There were less data on the students’ understanding o f these classes o f groups
than on Zn. Nonetheless, there were sufficient data to support a few observations.
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Regarding the groups U„, the observations are similar to what was detailed above about
the groups Z„. The students had a tendency to view the elements o f Un as though they are
integers, whereas a more sophisticated point o f view is that they are equivalence classes
o f integers, or that they are merely arbitrary names for an abstract group. The students
often were not immediately sure o f the operation in U„ and carried properties o f the
elements as integers over into U„.
Students often had trouble writing down the elements o f the dihedral groups £ > 3 and D a
and were even unsure o f how many elements there should be. Robert, for example,
described 12 elements o f D a, not realizing that he had listed 4 elements twice. This was
particularly true when the groups were represented as geometric transformations, using
letters, such as R 9 0 for a 90-degree rotation and H for a reflection about a horizontal axis.
The students also had difficulty when the groups were represented as permutations o f the
vertices, although, in this case, the difficulty seemed to have more to do with the
permutation notation.
The students took a long time to become comfortable with the cycle notation for
permutations in S„ and openly expressed frustration early in their learning. Wendy, for
example, complained, “This notation drives me nuts.... It scares me. Do you see how
intimidated I am right now?” (Interview 2, lines 218-220). The students had trouble
maintaining the distinctions between the meanings o f the array and the cycle notations,
and the notational confusions were sometimes compounded by the similarities between
the array notation and the rows o f an operation table. As the course progressed, however,
all the key participants used the cycle notation fluently and with few errors in finding
subgroups, cosets, and quotient groups in D 3 during their fourth interview.
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The data and analysis suggest that with growing fluency, students’ expectations are more
often fulfilled, in the sense that they know ahead o f time what the operation table ought
to look like, whether a subset is likely to be a subgroup, or whether two groups are
isomorphic. This idea makes good theoretical sense and seems to fit the data in this
study, although it would be hard to verify empirically because expectations often remain
implicit. This observation suggests that the literature on the learning o f abstract algebra
would benefit from a notion called something like group sense, analogous to number
sense (Greeno, 1991; Markovits & Sowder, 1994) or symbol sense (Arcavi, 1994), to
describe particular kinds o f fluency and proficiency that students might develop as they
gain familiarity with the examples, notations, language, and results o f group theory and
the objects and properties that they are supposed to represent.
The difficulty that the students experienced with the standard examples o f groups
presents another pedagogical dilemma. On the one hand, abstract algebra is about
abstraction, intended to rise above specific examples to see generalizations that apply to
whole classes o f mathematical systems. On the other hand, the students spent much o f
their time in this class making sense o f specific examples, such as Z6 and D 3 , and, more
generally, classes o f examples (Z„, U„, D„, Sn) that were not available to them previously.
The number systems o f school mathematics (natural numbers, integers, rationals, reals,
complex numbers) do not seem diverse enough for students to develop rich, robust, and
sufficiently abstract concepts o f group, subgroup, and isomorphism. Yet if students
spend most o f the course developing an understanding o f these new classes o f groups,
they are similarly unlikely to develop sufficiently rich and abstract concepts. Dr. Benson
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solved this dilemma by covering less material than is covered in some abstract algebra
courses. W hat kind o f balance makes sense?

Main Themes
In the preceding discussion o f the students’ concept images o f group, isomorphism, and
related concepts, two main themes emerge. First, the students’ use o f language and
notation was often imprecise, as they blurred distinctions between closely related
signifiers and the ideas they are intended to signify. In particular, the students confused
associativity with commutativity and inverse with identity, and they did not distinguish
among various operations called addition. Furthermore, although their informal
understandings were often rich, the formal definitions they provided often lacked
quantifiers and were otherwise imprecise.
Second, much o f students’ reasoning and the procedures they used were based in
operation tables. Tables served to mediate abstraction in that the students could work
with a concrete representation in order to gain access to abstract objects and their
properties. Using tables allowed the students to develop procedures for checking the
group axioms and for constructing subgroups. They could see isomorphisms from the
patterns present in various tables. Tables served a metaphorical role in the sense that
thinking about the table helped students think about the group it represented.
Sometimes the students’ reasoning seemed to be largely external and based in the table
rather than in thinking about the processes underlying the operations, suggesting that the
students’ internal representations were rather limited. In such cases, the table often
served a metonymic role in that it was the group, rather than a representation. This kind
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o f thinking was limited in that it hindered the students’ abilities to see subgroups
composed o f nonadjacent elements in the tables and to see the operation independent o f
the order in which elements were listed in the table. As the students gained experience
renaming and reordering tables, they began to overcome these limitations by separating
the table from the group— the signifier from the signified— thereby developing concepts
o f abstract groups.
The theme o f language use is an example o f a larger issue o f making distinctions between
related ideas and being precise. The theme o f reasoning from the table is an example of
the larger idea o f managing abstraction. These themes are further developed in the
chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER VI

HOMOMORPHISMS, COSETS, AND QUOTIENT GROUPS

The chapter details the students’ concept images o f homomorphisms, cosets, quotient
groups, and related concepts, which were the focus o f the third and fourth interviews.
The organization is by mathematical content. The bottom-up analysis o f these interviews
revealed a number o f themes that are presented in this chapter. The most prominent
among these themes was the issue o f naming— that is, the relationship between a concept
and its name. A related theme was the students’ use o f notation, particularly regarding
the distinction between a set and one o f its elements. In several episodes, notational
issues were central, and results from these episodes are collected together as a separate
section following the section on cosets. Another prominent theme is that the students had
developed considerable proficiency with many o f the concepts. Their calculations were
often guided by correct expectations, they continued to use operation tables to support
their thinking, and they were comfortable with many o f the processes and objects.
Because these themes are well illustrated by Carla’s interviews, the chapter is based on
detailed analyses o f her concepts, names, and notations for the topics o f homomorphism,
coset, and quotient group. The chapter also includes a number o f shorter episodes that
amplify and clarify some of the issues raised by the analysis o f Carla’s interviews. In
many o f these episodes I intervened during the interview, trying to encourage standard
language or notation. Thus, the analysis o f these episodes provides insights into the
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learning that is required to make new distinctions and to change one’s use o f language or
notation.

Homomorphisms
The common core o f the third interviews consisted o f determining whether a particular
function was a homomorphism and finding the cosets o f its kernel. This section begins
with a short analysis o f the concept o f homomorphism, which is followed by an analysis
o f Carla’s concept o f homomorphism. The discussion is then broadened to include other
key participants, focusing on their definitions and the manner by which they verified that
a function was a homomorphism.

Conceptual Analysis
A homomorphism is a function/ from a group G to a group G', with operations * and
respectively, such that for all a and b in G,j{a*b) = f{a)*'f{b). The idea is that the
function preserves the group operation (and hence some o f the group structure) in the
sense that it does not matter whether the operation occurs in G and the result is sent
through the function or, alternatively, the elements are sent individually through the
function and their images are combined under the operation in G'.

In the class that provided the context for this study, the concept o f homomorphism was
introduced as a generalization o f the formal version o f isomorphism, accomplished by
dropping the requirement that the function be one-to-one and onto. An isomorphism
completely preserves a group’s structure. A homomorphism, in contrast, may preserve
some of the structure and collapse the rest. Structure is collapsed by mapping elements in
the domain to the identity in the codomain. The set o f these elements is called the kernel
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o f the homomorphism. The structure that remains is the range o f the homomorphism,
which is the image, j{G ) = \j{g) g e G], o f the entire domain. Because such structural
relationships may be further explored via the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the
concept o f homomorphism provided some o f motivation and context for these more
advanced concepts.
A typical task involving the concept o f homomorphism is verifying that a given function
is a homomorphism. For the third interview, I chose a function / from U%to Z4, given by
X I) = 0,X3) = 0,X 5) = 2, a n d /7 ) = 2, where U% is {1,3, 5, 7} under multiplication
modulo

8

and Z4 is {0, 1, 2, 3} under addition modulo 4. When the function is given

formulaically, the verification that it is a homomorphism is an exercise in symbol
manipulation. W ithout a formula here, however, the students needed to verify that
J(a*b) =fia)*[f{b) for all 16 pairs o f elements a, b from U%.

Carla and Homomorphisms
I began the third interview by asking Carla to explain what homomorphism means. She
gave a reasonably complete definition:
4

Carla: Okay. A homomorphism is a function from one group to another, may not be the
same group, and what makes it a homomorphism is, say, you have a and b in the first
group. Then f(a*b), which is just whatever function makes that a group, that has the
same value as / / ) * ' / / ) , and *' is the operation that makes the second group a group.

Although the necessary quantifiers for a and b were not explicit, it became clear later that
she intended them to be “arbitrary” (line 16). In saying, “whatever function makes that a
group,” she may have meant “whatever operation” and merely misspoke. On the other
hand, she may have been confusing/w ith the group operation, a possibility that seems
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more likely after analyzing more o f the interview. I asked her to give an example o f a
homomorphism.
8

Carla: Well, we were just talking about in class a few minutes a g o ,/o f Z to Z4.

10

Carla: We know that the integers are a group under addition, so our * is going to be
equivalent to adding. And we know that Z4 is a group under addition mod 4, so we know
that *' is addition mod 4. So if we pick an a and a b in the set o f integers— let’s say a is 4
and b is 10— then j{a*b) is the same thing as sa y in g /4 + 10), which eq u als/14).

11

Carla: So when we find / 14), because we are going from Z to Z4, we want to separate Z
into little subsets, to know what maps to what. And we know An, where n is an integer,
always maps to 0, An + 1 maps to 1, An + 2 maps to 2, and A n+ 3 maps to 3. So if we
look at 14, we can say that that is the same as A n + 2 where n is 3. So I will just write
/ 1 4 ) as j{An + 2) just so that.... It’s easier to find what that equals. Since it’s An + 2, it
equals 2. So by definition o f a homomorphism we should also get 2 when we do 4 o f a, I
m e a n ,//) * '//) .

12

Carla: So that is the same as sa y in g /4 ) + (in mod 4 ) /1 0 ) . We can rew rite/4) as just
fiAri) where n is 0, and we can w rite/1 0 ) a s / 4 « + 2) because ... when n is 2, An + 2 is
1 0 , and that helps us to look at which little subset we are dealing with, so we know what
it maps to. So /(An) = 0, when you add mod 4 with j{An + 2) which equals 2 and 0 + 2 in
mod 4 is 2. So we have 2 = 2, and we know it is a homomorphism.

Several issues are raised by Carla’s statements here. First, Carla specified the domain
and codomain o f the function but not the function itself. From what follows, however, it
becomes clear that she was assuming the canonical homomorphism from Z to Z4 given by
x i - 4 r mod 4 , a function that is suggestive o f the group operation in Z4.

Diane, in her third interview, also specified homomorphisms implicitly in ways that
suggest that her concept o f homomorphism was severely constrained by her concepts of
function and binary operation. The phenomenon o f implicit homomorphisms is explored
in detail in chapter 7. A related issue is that this particular homomorphism mirrors the
construction o f Z4 and reflects Carla’s understanding o f modular arithmetic, which is also
explored further in chapter 7.
Finally, in specifying the subsets as An, An + \,A n + 2, and An + 3, Carla was taking
generic values to stand for whole sets, yet she allowed n to take several different values
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during her verification. Thus, she was not distinguishing sets from elements; neither was
she distinguishing different elements from each other. This issue is discussed further
below in the subsection entitled “Wendy and N + N ” It is not clear whether Carla saw
the partitioning o f the domain into subsets as defining the function or as a description o f a
function she had already defined via the ambiguous statement in line 8 .
With either interpretation, and ignoring the seemingly insignificant error in lines 11 and
12 stating the wrong value o f n, by the end o f line 12 Carla had given the gist o f the
verification o f the homomorphism property for a specific case. I asked her whether she
had proven that it was a homomorphism.
14

Carla: No, this is an example of.... If I was told.... Well, this isn’t proving that it is a
homomorphism, it’s just saying that.... It’s an example of why it is a homomorphism.

15

Brad: Okay. In order to prove it what would you need to do?

16

Carla: Um, you would have to take an arbitrary, two arbitrary elements in Z, and you
have to prove that— say, they are a and b—-fia*b) = fia)*'fib).

Here she demonstrated a good sense o f both the quantifiers in the definition o f
homomorphism and also what would be involved in proving that the function/ was a
homomorphism.

I then asked Carla to describe the relationship between her function from Z to Z4 and
fix ) = x mod 4, as it had been defined in class.
19

Carla: fix) = x mod 4 is just telling you that you are going to change whatever x is to a
mod 4, so you are always going to get 0, 1, 2, or 3 for your answer. And when I changed
the integer to An, 4n + 1, An + 2 or An + 3, that was just because then I could look at
whatever integer I am adding to An, and I know what my answer is. This is how I
simplify. For me it makes it simpler.

21

Carla: Well, if it’s small numbers, obviously, I don’t have to go through that but.... Or
especially if I was trying to disprove something or prove that it’s a homomorphism or
anything, I would need my An, An + 1, An + 2 or An + 3. So, it just makes ... I think in
explaining it, it just makes it a little bit more understandable ... because you are dealing
with things in the same kind o f context.
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Carla did not really answer my question, but her description o f the process seems to
indicate that she thought o f her method as a simpler version o f the function from class. It
is not clear to what extent she would have been able to consider an entirely different
function from Z to Z4.
1 next asked Carla to identify the kernel o f the homomorphism.
2

3

Carla: The kernel is 4n, where n is an integer because any integer, any multiple o f 4 is
always going to map to 0, and 0 is your identity in Z4 under addition.

Because Carla did not write anything to accompany this statement, I have guessed that
she meant n rather than N, on the basis o f what she had been writing previously. With
either interpretation, however, her statement is incorrect. There are at least two ways to
correct the statement: “The kernel is the set {4n where n is an integer},” or “The kernel is
4N where N is the set o f integers.” In any case, Carla was not distinguishing between a
set and its individual elements. This issue has arisen several times in the results reported
in this chapter and is treated in detail below in the section entitled “Notational Issues.”
To determine whether/ was a homomorphism, Carla first listed the elements in the
groups and then explained her plan:
33

Carla: So first I am going to try an example where I am going to pick two elements that
map to the same thing, and then if that isn’t a counterexample, I’m going to try two
elements that map to different things.

34

Carla: So first one is going to b e .... I want to show that/ o f.... Let’s see f/ 8 is a group
under ... [pause].... I am trying to think if it is a group under addition or multiplication.
But it must be multiplication, because if it was addition then 0 would be in there.

35

Brad: Why?

36

Carla: Because 0 is the identity for addition. So it must be under multiplication.

Although Carla was momentarily unsure o f the operation in Us, she was able to
determine the operation quickly by reasoning from the group axioms, demonstrating
some proficiency with the groups involved. She then verified the homomorphism
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property for two specific cases, but rather than have her verify all the cases, I chose to
move on.
I asked Carla to identify the kernel o f the homomorphism.
58

Carla: The kernel is 1 and 3 because/(I) = 0 and /{3) = 0 and zero is the identity in Z4.

59

Brad: How do you write that down?

60

Carla: The kernel? [Mm.] It is a set. [Okay.] The kernelis the set that contains the
elements 1 and 3. [Writes { 1 ,3 } = ker(/).] And that contains the kernel o ff.

Carla was correct, although her language suggests that she may not have been
distinguishing between the elements 1 and 3 and the set {1, 3}.
On the surface, the concept o f homomorphism seemed relatively unproblematic for Carla.
By not explicitly describing her homomorphism from Z to Z4, however, she indicated that
her concept image o f homomorphism may have been tied, in potentially limiting ways, to
her concepts o f function or binary operation. That turned out to be a major obstacle for
Diane, as is detailed in chapter 7.

Other Students and Homomorphisms
Almost all the key participants were able to recite a definition o f homomorphism and
describe the concept in several different ways. Furthermore, they were able to check that
the property held for specific elements and were able to use the homomorphism property
in proofs o f other ideas, although quantifiers were often not explicit. These general
observations are elaborated below in a description o f students’ definitions of
homomorphism and the ways that they verified that a particular function was a
homomorphism.
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Definitions. In the students’ definitions o f homomorphism, the equation/(a*Z>) =
fia )* ’fijb) was ever present, but few students were careful to state what a, b, and/ were
intended to be. In the interviews, the students demonstrated varying degrees of
sophistication in their concept images around this central equation. Carla’s definition,
given above, was nearly complete. In contrast, consider the following responses by other
students to the question “What is a homomorphism?” from the third interviews:
7

Diane: I think it’s like a law o f functions. It’s a mle.

8

Brad: Tell me more about what you mean by that.

9

Diane: It’s a property that we can use for functions and stuff. So if something is a
homomorphism, then that means that those elements can follow the rule that it’s defined
by.

10

Brad: And what’s the homomorphism mle?

11

Diane: ThatJ{a*b) =J{a)*'J{b).

12

Brad: Okay. And what kind o f function d oes/h ave to be in order ...

13

Diane: I think that would be defined later. Like function, it could be any function it
wants, but as long as it satisfies this, then it’s a homomorphism.

4

Robert: It’s a function that takes one group to another group and preserves the group
operation.

5

Brad: What do you mean by “preserves the group operation?”

6

Robert: Well, I understand it better in symbols as likej{a*b) =j[a)*'fljb).

1

Brad: Okay, what does that mean, sort o f in words?

8

Robert: It means it doesn’t matter whether you compose the functions first... compose
the elements first and then take the function o f it, or whether you take the function of
each element individually and then compose them.

Thus, for Diane homomorphism was a rule or a law. Robert, on the other hand, had
effectively three different definitions o f homomorphism: a structural one, a symbolic one,
and a verbal procedural one. O f the key participants, only Carla gave a reasonably
complete characterization. The results were similar on the final exam, in that all the key
participants gave definitions o f homomorphism that included the equation f{a* b) =
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J[a)*'f[b), but only Carla’s definition was complete, using quantifiers and specifying that
/ was a function between groups.
Verifying homomorphisms. In the third interview, all the key participants were given the
same function as Carla had been given and were asked to determine whether it was a
homomorphism. Like Carla, Wendy verified the property for a few examples, described
what would be necessary to prove it in general, and then was comfortable assuming that it
was indeed a homomorphism when I suggested that we go on. Diane had considerable
difficulty with the verification because of her understanding o f functions, as mentioned
above. Below I describe the ways that Robert and Lori used the operation table to
complete the verification, but first, I provide some general observations.
While verifying that the function was a homomorphism, the students had minor
difficulties, such as arithmetic errors or forgetting to send a* b through f

Mistakes such

as these are easy to make, o f course, when the elements in the domain and codomain look
the same. The students were often able to avoid or overcome such difficulties by relying
on their proficiency with the groups involved, much as they paid attention to the names o f
elements and the group axioms to determine which group they were in. The distinction
between * and *' in the homomorphism equation seemed to support this process.

Robert was confused at first because he did not “really understand w h a t/is ” (line 16).
After I suggested that he set aside that concern, he was able to try an example. I then
asked whether operation tables might help, intending to explore Robert’s understanding
o f a method that had originally been suggested by another student in class. The method
simplifies the tedious process o f checking the 16 pairs o f values a, b from U%by using
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two tables to organize the calculations ofj[a*b) andf(a)*'f(b). If the tables match, then
the function is a homomorphism. The method is especially appropriate for small finite
groups in tasks such as this one where the homomorphism is not given by a formula.
Upon completing the tables, Robert concluded, “You get the same table we got the first
time. So that convinces me that this is indeed a homomorphism” (line 109). He was able
to explain how specific verifications were represented in the table. And he again
demonstrated a geometric perspective with his observation, “You could take this table
and stick it right on top o f the other one, and you have the identical table” (line 124).
Lori, in contrast, decided on her own to use operation tables to verify that the function
was a homomorphism, although she stated ahead o f time that she was not sure she
remembered how to do it. As it turned out, she applied the method incorrectly so that
both her tables recordedX«)*/(^)> making equality automatic even if the function had not
been a homomorphism. When I pressed her to describe the process, she believed that that
she was computing both j[a*b) and j(a)*J(b).
I constructed another function that was not a homomorphism and asked Lori to check
whether it was a homomorphism. Much o f the rest o f the interview was spent trying to
help her make explicit connections among the specific pairs a, b that she checked by
hand, the results that she had recorded in her two tables, and the results in a third table
that I suggested. By comparing the three different tables, she was able to see what was
wrong with her previous process and was able to articulate more clearly the intended and
procedural differences between the two tables.
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Summary
The students’ concept images o f homomorphism were dominated by the e q u a tio n ^ * 6 )
=J(a)*'j(b) and not always with sufficient attention to specifying a, b , f and the
operations. Given a function between groups, they were able to check that the property
held for specific pairs o f elements and to talk about what would be necessary to verify the
property in general. There was the slight cognitive difficulty o f keeping track o f which
group an element was in, but the students often relied on their proficiency with the
particular groups to manage this difficulty.
These results suggest that the concept o f homomorphism is particularly susceptible to
procedural approaches. Typical tasks involve rule-bound symbol manipulation, but even
the nonstandard task used in this study was vulnerable to the creation o f procedures that
can be misapplied, as Lori demonstrated. The concept o f homomorphism itself did not
seem to raise many issues that impeded the students’ progress with the tasks at hand.
Instead, issues arose in connection with other concepts, particularly the concept o f
function. This observation arises again below, because the students’ concepts o f cosets
were sometimes limited by their association with homomorphisms.

Cosets
With the concept o f coset, the students’ concept images blossomed once again with
linguistic, notational, and conceptual issues that arose and were sometimes addressed
during the interviews. After a brief conceptual analysis below, the stage is set once again
by Carla, who demonstrated both considerable proficiency with the concepts and
procedures and also nonstandard language and notation. The section continues with
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analysis o f an episode from an interview with Diane and Lori, who demonstrated similar
nonstandard language. Finally, the analysis is broadened to include other students.
Notational issues are elaborated separately in the following section.

Conceptual Analysis
Just as a subgroup provides structural information about a subset o f a group, the set of
cosets o f a subgroup reveals information about how the subgroup fits within the structure
o f the group as a whole. Through a generalization o f modular arithmetic (see chapter 7),
the idea is to categorize elements o f a group according to their relationship with the
subgroup. The categories are called cosets. Realization o f the structural power o f cosets
requires also Lagrange’s theorem and the concepts o f normality and quotient groups.
Here I focus only on the concept o f coset.
To simplify the language and notation in the following discussion, I leave the group
operation implicit, as in ah, and call the group operation multiplication. The ideas and
results hold for a group with any operation via simple translation. This is the power o f
the abstract concepts o f group and binary operation. I in no way intend, however, to
trivialize the cognitive requirements in making the translation to a group with an
operation that is called something other than multiplication.

If H is a subgroup o f a group G, and a e G, then the left coset o f H containing a is
defined by the formula aH = {ah \ h e H}. Right cosets are defined analogously.
Computing a particular coset aH requires multiplying a particular value a from the group
by each element in H. Computing all the cosets involves completing such calculations
for all elements a in the group. Either o f these processes may be infinite, and such
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situations carry the additional requirement o f being able to describe the results without
actually completing the processes. For finite groups, it turns out that the cosets o f a
subgroup partition the group into subsets that each have the same number o f elements.
Lagrange’s theorem—that the order o f a subgroup must divide the order o f a (finite)
group— follows immediately from this result.
Because the kernel o f a homomorphism is always a subgroup o f the domain, the
definition o f coset can be specialized as follows: If K is the kernel o f a group
homomorphism f . G - > G ’ and a e G, the (left) coset o f K containing a is given by aK =
{ak | k e K ) . Students proved on the second midterm exam ih&lfla) —fib ) if and only if
aK = bK. In other words, a and b have the same image under the homomorphism if and
only if they are in the same coset o f the kernel o f the homomorphism. As discussed
below, this specialization o f homomorphism was quite salient in the students’ thinking.

Carla and the Left Coset
Carla’s work with cosets followed immediately from her work with homomorphisms.
Given the function / from U% to Z4, given by f \ ) = 0 , f 3 ) = 0 , f 5 ) = 2, and/(7) = 2, Carla
had identified the kernel o f the homomorphism as the set {1, 3}. I moved on to cosets.
62

Brad: Okay, Let’s call that set K, and what I want to do is investigate these sets aK.

63

Carla: Okay. Left cosets. All right. So to do aK, we see what happens.... Okay. The
set {1, 3} is always going to be on the right, and we want to work with every single
element that is in .... Let’s see.... Every ... {1, 3} is a subset, in this case it is a subset o f
Ut .

66

6

7

68

Carla: So you are going to take out every element o f Us,1 think it is. The definition is ....
I think you take every element o f t/8, and you multiply, in this case you multiply because
that’s the operation. [Okay.] Is that right that i f s U{! I’m not sure.... We just said this
today, b u t... [inaudible]
Brad: Well show me what it is you are going to do here, and then maybe you can answer
your own question.
Carla: Well I am going to multiply 1, 3, 5, and 7 each individually by the, by K. So 1x {1,
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3} gives me { 1 ,3 }. 3 x { l, 3} gives me {1, 3}.

For Carla, the notation aK evoked the term coset and seems to have supported her
reasoning: a is an element that varies through U% and ATis a set. The individual elements
o f A-required little o f her attention, as evidenced by the fact that she did not say or write
down intermediate calculations and quickly considered {3, 1} to be the same set as
{1,3}. The lower-level process o f iterating through the elements o f K was essentially
automatic. She computed the other cosets similarly and quickly (see Figure 16),
concluding “So we have two elements in the left cosef ’ (line 70).

Figure 16. Carla’s cosets of {1, 3}
{1,3} = ker(/) = K
aK

lx{l, 3}
3x{l, 3}
5x{l, 3}
7x{l, 3}

=
=
=
=

{1,3}
{1,3}
{5,7}
{5, 7}

From the ease with which Carla performed these calculations, it seems that she had a firm
understanding o f the concept o f coset, but her statement “we have two elements in the left
coset” was nonstandard syntax, suggesting unusual thinking. I asked her to explain:
73

Brad: Two elements in the left coset. What do you mean?

74

Carla: Because {1,3} and {5, 7} are each of, are the two elements that result from aK.

75

Brad: Are the tw o.... They are elements ...

76

Carla: Well, they are sets, but if you look at them as on e.... If you rename {1, 3} to a
and {5, 7} to b then there are two elements in aK.

77

Brad: Oh, okay. So you are saying, on the one hand, we can talk about the set o f cosets.
Does that make sense? [Yup.] So how many cosets are there?

78

Carla: Two.

79

Brad: Two. But now does aK refer to the set o f cosets, does it refer to all o f them, or
does it refer to one specific one?

80

Carla: aK tells you how you find the cosets. So that was none o f your choices. What
were your choices?

81

Brad: Does aK refer to all o f the cosets, or just one o f them?
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8

2

Carla: aK is the general formula that gives you all o f the cosets. Then you choose
specific as for whatever K you are given, and you will find all the specific cosets.

Thus, Carla had an efficient and reliable procedure for computing cosets, and the
procedure was supported by the notation aK. Nevertheless, she did not maintain a clear
distinction between a single value o f a and the set o f all o f such values, and thus did not
distinguish between the particular coset aK and the set o f all cosets o f K Instead, a
varied as part o f a procedure specified by the formula aK, which gave all the cosets.
Psychologically, it seems to be an easy step to then imagine that aK is all such cosets,
without needing to distinguish between a nonspecific one and the collection o f all o f
them.
Analysis. Carla was happy to let a vary through all the elements o f G and to construct
the collection o f cosets aK that result. What she did not see, however, was a need to
distinguish notationally between the particular coset aK and the collection of all such
cosets. By calling the cosets elements, Carla appeared to have little difficulty seeing
cosets as objects, suggesting that she had encapsulated the process o f coset formation.
Furthermore, her language “the left cosef ’ for the collection o f cosets suggests that she
had further encapsulated that collection as an object, a set o f sets, a point of view that is
helpful in order to see the set o f cosets as itself a group under the appropriate coset
arithmetic.
Figure 17 shows schematically the objects and processes involved in coset computation
and delineates the two levels o f processes. Carla’s language suggests that her thinking
was in the transitional process between two objects: the particular coset aK = {ak \
k e K ) and the set o f all cosets o f K, which might be written \a K | a e G) . In the midst
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o f the process, a is varying, so aK denotes neither a particular coset nor all o f them. For
Carla, aK denoted and specified the process. Thus, my question about the distinction
(line 81) was not relevant to her.

Figure 17. Objects and processes in coset computation
A^particular a in G ----------------------- ^ The coset aK ------------------------- ► The set of all cosets of K
The subgroup K
Process:
process:
By letting k vary
through K, calculate
all the products ak.
Collect them into a set.

By letting a vary
through G, calculate
all the cosets aK.
Collect them into a set.

Being immersed in the process allowed Carla some flexibility in her thinking. On the one
hand, she could consider a particular coset by stopping the process for a moment. On the
other hand, she could consider all the cosets by completing or imagining she had
completed the process. From within the process she could broaden her viewpoint slightly
and see both a particular coset and the set o f all o f them as two aspects o f the concept o f
“coset.” Thus, iiaK tells you how to find the cosets,” and together there are “two
elements in the left coset.” Carla maintained this dual role of the term coset through the
fourth interview, and even maintained her process orientation, saying, for example, “The
left coset gives the set o f (23) and (132)” (line 239, emphasis added) rather than the left
coset is that set.

Diane. Lori, and Cosets
Although Carla’s ambiguous use o f the word coset was unusual and idiosyncratic, Diane
and Lori used similar language. During their fourth interview, I asked them to find the
cosets o f a subgroup in D 3 . They each drew a triangle and labeled the vertices 1, 2, and 3
to help themselves write down the elements o f D 3. Based on the geometric interpretation,
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they used the standard term rotation and the nonstandard term flip to distinguish ( 1 ),
(123) and (132) from (23), (13), and (12).
They had initial difficulties with the coset formation process, first multiplying each
element o f £ > 3 by only (12) rather than the whole subgroup, {(1), (12)}. Diane explained,
“The cosets are only going to be using the element (12) because (1) does not matter,
because that’s the identity” (line 42). To overcome these difficulties, I then asked them
to find the cosets o f the subgroup generated by (123), and the bulk o f the interview dealt
with this subgroup. For simplicity o f notation in what follows, I call the subgroup H,
although Diane and Lori always wrote it out in full as {(1), (123), (132)}, sometimes
without the enclosing braces.
Diane explained the process for calculating cosets: “Y ou’d have to take this [subgroup]
and multiply it by each o f the elements in D f (line 67). Lori, on the other hand, was
unclear on the question and asked, “Coset o f D3?” (line
£>3

74

6 8

). I told her I wanted a coset in

o f the subgroup that she had found. She was still unclear on the process:
Lori: All right, I have a quick question. Do you take every element in Z)3 and multiply it
by the singleton (1), then take every element in £ ) 3 and multiply it by (123), and every
elem ent...?

As they continued with their calculations, Diane expected two get “2 different cosets ...
because the order o f this [subgroup] is 3, the order o f £ > 3 is 6 , so

6

over 3 is 2” (lines 82-

84). After computing (1 )H and (123)// and seeing that they both resulted in H, Lori
concluded, “The left coset is probably just going to be this alone” (line 114). But then
Diane pointed out that they should try the calculation with something other than rotations.
Before they began those calculations, I asked Lori what she was calling the coset.
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12 0

Lori: Well, I don’t know what the whole coset is.

124

Lori: I still have to run through all o f these. I don’t know what the whole left coset is yet.
Like what Diane is saying, if we do (132), it’s just going to give us this again, so maybe
we can skip to (23). We are going to g e t ...

12 5

Diane: If you are only looking at two elements o f the coset, and this is one, then if we
take any one o f these we should come up with the same.

This is the first indication o f unusual language. It became clear as the interview
progressed that Lori was calling the collection o f cosets “the whole coset.” Because she
had not completed the calculations, she did not yet know what the whole coset was.
Diane had earlier predicted that there would be two cosets (line 82). Here she called
them “elements o f the coset,” demonstrating language similar to Lori’s. Diane was also
predicting here that calculations with any o f the flips would yield the same “element.”
Diane computed (23)//, and Lori computed (13)//, and they got the same result, {(12),
(13), (23)}, though Lori did not include braces. I asked Lori how she had computed the
coset.
134

Lori: Um, I took the element, the cycle (13) in Z)3, and I multiplied it by the set [the
subgroup] to get this coset.

137

Lori: For the whole left coset, it’s going to be this [FT] and this [(13)//], and that’s it.

Thus Lori was at this point clear on the process. Furthermore, she was calling ( 1 3 ) //a
coset, but // a n d ( 1 3 ) //together were “the whole left coset.”
When I asked them how they would write it, they listed the elements in both cosets, but
Lori merely listed the six elements from D 3 without distinguishing between the two
cosets. I asked them how that was different from D 3 . Lori said, “It’s not” (line 143), and
Diane said, “It is D 3 ” (line 144). Then Lori provided a connection to the computations:
14

6

14 7

Lori: You do kind o f have to distinguish that these are all one when you multiply it by
these elements, and that these are all one, like Diane did. [She adds parentheses.]
Brad: Okay. So explain your notation here?
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14 8

Diane: This is the coset, the left coset, and these are the elements in it.

They had both then written ((1), (123), (132)), ((23), (13), (12)). Lori explained:
151

Lori: I know how to say it. You are always going to get like this first parentheses when
you multiply the first three rotations in Z) 3 times the cycle you wanted us, not ( 1 2 ), the
cycles that you wanted us discussed by this one. So you are always going to get those
first three. So that’s like the first left coset, all in one. And the second one all in one
is .... The last three elements in Z)3 multiplied by that set.

153

Lori: So there is only two left cosets. Like...

155

Lori: Two left coset values. How do you, what do you call it?

15 6

Diane: Elements.

1 57

Lori: Yeah, two left coset elements.

158

Diane: There are two elements in the left coset.

During this passage, Lori was trying to adopt Diane’s language, which was to call the set
o f cosets “the left coset” and to call each o f the cosets “elements.” Much earlier, when
Diane had predicted that there would be two cosets, she had called them cosets (line 82).
But this may have been a slip o f the tongue, for other than this single sentence, her
distinction between “the left coset” and “elements” was entirely consistent. Lori, on the
other hand, seemed to be comfortable with her ambiguous language, and she was also
willing to adopt Diane’s language.
Exploring the language. At this point in the interview, I had a clear understanding o f the
ways that Lori and Diane were talking about cosets. I chose to explore what it would
take to change their language:
172

Brad: What if I told you that ... this that you have computed here is actually a left coset.
That’s one left coset right there.

173

Diane: Wait a minute, so this is a left coset, and this is a left coset, and together they
make the left coset? So there is one ...

Diane was uncomfortable with my suggestion because adopting it would have been
confusing alongside her language. Apparently, she had not noticed the ambiguity in
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Lori’s language, for she was describing Lori’s usage. Lori, on the other hand, was
perfectly comfortable with this ambiguity.
181

Lori: Yeah, that was what I was going to say. There’s six left cosets because every single
element in D 3 is going to produce a different left coset. So there is actually six left cosets
to this subgroup, but they are the same. Like what Diane and I did, all of the rotations are
the same, and then all o f the stationary ones, or whatever you want to call them, are the
same. So then it only comes down to two. Then we call the whole thing one left coset.
So it’s only one set.

Lori was focusing on the fact that there were six coset calculations, but because some of
them were the same, the result was two cosets. Then the two cosets together, collected as
a set, were called one left coset. Diane continued to insist that //w a s an element, not a
coset: “This whole set here is one element” (line 187). Furthermore, she did not like
Lori’s claim o f six cosets. Because the sameness o f the results o f the calculations, there
really were only two sets.
Diane and Lori agreed that what they had written as ((1), (123), (132)) was in fact a set. I
asked whether they could use braces to call it a set, and they both changed their notation
to {{(1), (123), (132)}, {(23), (13), (12)}}. I asked them what that was. Diane said, “A
set o f sets” (line 196), and Lori agreed. Furthermore, it was a set with two elements, each
o f which were sets with three elements.
I asked Diane what she meant by the word coset. She responded, “This whole thing”
(line 214), pointing to the set o f cosets. Lori agreed that she had been using the word
coset to describe the individual calculations. But then she backed off:
224

Lori: I generate six sets by multiplying D 3 by this set [//]. And then I see which is similar
and which are not, and it gets put into one coset set. Maybe, yeah.

22

Lori: It seems like every one I have computed, there’s always ones that are similar.

6

2 27

Brad: And then you find that you have really only ...

22 8

Lori: Have one big set with all o f the different set elements that are not similar in it.
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Thus, despite my attempt to impose the standard language, D iane’s language continued to
prevail, influencing even Lori.
I tried again to impose standard language.
22 9

Brad: What if I told you each o f those things that you have computed is called a coset.

230

Lori: That’s what I was thinking. Like, I computed a coset. There’s another one. Just
because it’s the same doesn’t mean that it’s still not one. It is a coset; I just didn’t write
it. That’s what I was trying to say.

Thus, Lori was comfortable with the standard language for an individual coset. But after
completing the calculations and collecting the cosets, she explained, “There is only one
whole set that’s called the left coset” (line 234). Lori continued to be willing to use the
term coset ambiguously.
Diane, on the other hand, did not agree:
23

8

Diane: Yeah, I think we are having trouble with vocabulary [Okay] because I am thinking
that this is the left coset. It’s complete. You know, that’s why you call it the left coset.
This isn’t complete yet. And this isn’t complete by itself; you have to put them together
for them to be complete.

Diane was focusing on the completed process and was not concerned about individual
cosets. She later agreed that it would be useful to have a name for the sets H and (13)H,
and Lori suggested that the name should be coset. When asked whether it made sense to
call both individual ones and all o f them coset, Lori responded, “Sure” (line 243). Again
Diane disagreed: “It’s just a little confusing though because if you were to talk to
somebody about it and explain it to them, ... they are not going to know what you are
talking about” (lines 244-246). Diane was not comfortable with the ambiguous language.
Thus far, my interventions had been unsuccessful. Next I tried to make a clear
distinction:
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247

Brad: Okay, well it seems to me that there are two possibilities. One is to call the big
thing, that’s everything together, the left coset, which is what you have been saying,
right? And come up with a different name for the individual elements here o f what you
are calling the coset.

2 48

Diane: And then we are going to need a name for all the different things ... [inaudible]

24 9

Brad: Yeah, so we could come up with a different name for that. An alternative is to call
this, each one o f these things, a coset.

250

Diane: A coset. And come up with a name for this [the set o f all o f them],

Diane seemed comfortable with the distinction and with the two options I was putting
forward. I continued:
2

57

Brad: So it seems to me we just need to decide which o f those two approaches to take.
Does that kind o f... ? Am I putting words in your mouth?

2 58

Diane: No, no. I know.

25 9

Brad: I’m sort o f boiling down what the disagreement is.

2 60

Lori: Oh, yeah, I definitely see that.

2 61

Diane: Yeah, I’ve been having problems with calling everything the same thing, and I
want to separate it.

So it appears that Diane and Lori saw the distinction I was trying to make. Furthermore,
Diane made clear that she had been uncomfortable “calling everything the same thing.” I
again tried to impose standard language.
2

62

2 63
2

64

2 65
2

69

Brad: Well, here is the place where I am going to just tell you. These things here, the
smaller things are the cosets. Each o f those is a coset. So here we have a bigger thing
which contains what?
Lori: All o f the left coset.
Brad: Sss.
Diane: Cosets.
Lori: Containing the left cosets.

Thus, after emphasizing the crucial distinction between a coset and the set o f all o f them,
I gave them the standard language, and they seemed comfortable with it. It remained to
be seen, however, what influence that intervention would have on the language they used.
We next began talking about right cosets.
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27 9

Diane: Those are, a right coset. And you have the set o f right cosets.

28 0

Lori: So this is a normal subgroup in these are its cosets. You don’t have to distinguish
left or right because we are going to know they are the same.

It may be that Diane’s first sentence indicated her previous nonstandard language. Her
second sentence, however, is syntactically correct, as is Lori’s statement.
Nonstandard language continued to surface. In predicting the number o f right cosets, for
example, Diane used the formula suggested by Lagrange’s theorem:
2 96

Diane: If you get a group that’s six elements, divided by a group o f three elements, you
should get two groups o f three elements each.

2 97

Brad: Two?

2 98

Diane: Subgroups o f three elements each.

So Diane called the cosets first groups and then subgroups. After some discussion, Diane
pointed out that one o f the two cosets was not a subgroup: “It can’t be; there’s not
identity” (line 318). Lori then concluded, “You don’t get two subgroups” (line 322). So
Diane changed her language: “You get two sub-, cosets” (line 323). Thus, despite the
false start, Diane was able to find the standard language. Lori, on the other hand,
sometimes still used ambiguous language:
34 9

Lori: And there’s going to be two cosets in our whole set. W e’re just calling this a set
[inaudible] or the left coset.

Conclusion. This case demonstrates that Carla’s unusual language was not so unusual.
Lori’s dual usage o f the term coset was quite similar to Carla’s. Although Lori was not
as clear about the process as Carla, neither o f them made a clear conceptual distinction
between a particular coset and the set o f all o f them. Diane’s language, on the other
hand, indicated that she was making the standard conceptual distinction but had attached
names in nonstandard ways.
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Continuing the comparison, Diane’s and Lori’s work with cosets was not guided by the
symbolism aK, as it had been for Carla, but rather involved working with particular
groups. It is not clear what meaning Diane and Lori would have attributed to the
symbolism, but symbolic issues were prominent and problematic in other interviews, as is
illustrated below in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
This case also illustrates some o f the cognitive difficulties in making new distinctions and
renaming concepts. My initial attempts at imposing standard language were
unsuccessful. D iane’s nonstandard language continued to prevail, and Lori’s language
retained its ambiguity. The third attempt was partially successful, it seems, because I
first clearly set out the conceptual distinction I wanted Diane and Lori to make. Yet even
then, Diane and Lori sometimes slipped into nonstandard usage. The theme o f making
new distinctions arises frequently in this chapter.

Other Students and Cosets
In characterizing the concept images o f coset for Carla, Diane, and Lori, I found the
central issue to clearly be one o f language. By broadening the analysis to include other
key participants, a conceptual issue rises to prominence: Many students preferred looking
for a homomorphism and its kernel before they were willing to compute cosets,
suggesting that the concepts o f coset and kernel were closely related in the students’
thinking. Carla, for example, initially thought that to compute cosets she would need the
kernel o f a homomorphism. Wendy displayed similar expectations, as did Robert in both
his third and fourth interviews. This connection is not surprising because, as mentioned
above, cosets require a subgroup, and kernels are always subgroups. Nonetheless, the
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concept images o f cosets and kernels were so strongly connected that the students were
sometimes obstructed in their progress on the interview tasks.
In Robert’s third interview, I asked him whether he could find cosets o f the subgroup
generated by 3 in Z n . He calculated the subgroup as {0, 3, 6 , 9}, called it theta, and then
looked for cosets.
27 8

Robert: All right, so I’ve got to find the kernel though o f Zn in order to get cosets. H is
the kernel. Over here it’s anything that maps to 0 would be in the k ernel... anything in
here that maps to 0 in Z\2.

Thus, Robert thought he needed to find a kernel. He soon realized that in order to talk
about the kernel he needed a homomorphism, which he said would “Take Z n to theta”
(line 284). A good portion o f the interview was consumed constructing a mapping and
considering whether its kernel was a subgroup and even whether the mapping was a
function in his sense o f the term.
Robert’s association between coset and kernel presented a significant stumbling block
that was preventing me from learning about his concept o f coset. Eventually, I
intervened:
370

Brad: But now let’s just say we could design a function that would be a homomorphism
and had the kernel as this thing that I have said here. The kernel would be 3, 6 , 9, and 0.
Let’s say we could set up a homomorphism from.... You know, I am not even going to
tell you what group we are going to. We are going to send it from Z i2 to some other
group— I am not telling you what— but the kernel o f that’s going to be this set (3, 6 , 9, 0}.

371

Robert: And then you want me to find cosets.

My suggestion was sufficient, for Robert then calculated the cosets quickly.
Furthermore, by noticing patterns and making and revising conjectures during the
calculations, he decided, without doing all o f the calculations, that there would be only
three cosets.
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Robert also showed a connection between coset and kernel during his fourth interview. I
had asked him to find cosets o f a subgroup in Z)3. He calculated the subgroup and then
began to consider cosets.
114

Robert: A ll right. So I take any.... I got to know which things.... See, I am still not sure
about the coset thing. Y ou.... When you talk about h being in H, you are talking about
things in the kernel, right?

115

Brad: Well, in order to be talking about the kernel what do you need?

116

Robert: A homomorphism.

117

Brad: Do we have a homomorphism here?

1 18

Robert: No. I think that this means I can just take.... I can take all o f these elements ...

12 0

Robert: ... o f Z)3, and I can operate them on the left with the elements in my set here, and
that’ll give me the right cosets. And I can operate them on the right with the elements in
the set and have the left cosets.

Thus, during this interview, with the support o f improved proficiency with the concepts
and processes, Robert was able more quickly to overcome his association between cosets
and kernels.
In both interviews, Robert demonstrated an insufficiently general concept of coset,
suggesting that the students’ experiences with cosets o f kernels o f homomorphisms
overpowered the more general tasks. For Robert, overcoming such a constrained concept
image o f homomorphism seemed to depend on Robert’s proficiency with the processes
and related concepts. It seems that when a students’ concept o f coset depends upon
having a kernel, it is not easy to generalize to cosets o f arbitrary subgroups.

Summary
The foregoing analysis characterizing the students’ concept images o f cosets supports
two results. First, the students used nonstandard language, which indicated nonstandard
concepts that were dominated by the process o f creating the cosets and which failed to
distinguish between an individual coset and the set o f all o f them. Furthermore, the
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students were resistant to attempts to impose standard language. Second, the students’
concept images were insufficiently general and were dependent on their proficiency with
the concepts, processes, and examples. Other results about the students’ understandings
o f cosets are presented below. Results concerning the ways the students used notation
are presented in the following section. The analysis has already described ways in which
the students considered cosets to be objects, but a deeper discussion o f the process/object
distinction in the students’ concept images o f cosets must take into account not only these
notational issues but also the ways the students used cosets in constructing quotient
groups.

Notational Issues
There was considerable variation among the key participants in the ways that the notation
supported and inhibited their concept o f coset and the related processes. Carla’s
intermediate position in the process between an individual coset and the set o f all o f them
was strongly supported by the notation aK. Diane and Lori, in contrast, did not use such
symbolism during their interview but seemed similarly process oriented. In this section, I
present three kinds o f notational difficulties: confusion between set and element, trouble
managing processes, and losing track o f the objects. Each o f these is illustrated by an
episode related to the concept o f cosets, but the issues are more general, as is suggested
by these descriptors.
Carla’s failure to distinguish between a particular coset and the set o f all o f them might
be characterized more generally as mixing up statements about sets with statements about
elements (see, e.g., Selden & Selden, 1978). The characterization that she was immersed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in the process is more compelling, however, because there is no indication that Carla was
confused. Furthermore, this notion o f being stuck in the process can also explain a
statement Carla had made earlier in the interview, but which I had not pursued: “The
kernel is An where n is an integer” (line 23). As mentioned above, whether Carla meant
N or n, she was not appropriately distinguishing between a set and one o f its elements. A
more compelling explanation, however, is that Carla saw An as the process for generating
the kernel, which might be described as an intermediate position similar to that for her
concept o f cosets. The subsection entitled “Wendy and N + N “ explores almost identical
language and notation during another interview.
The second notational difficulty is related to the set/element distinction but has to do with
managing the process o f coset formation, thereby providing insight into the relationship
between symbolism and processes. During her third interview, Wendy described her
coset calculations as follows:
253

Wendy: It’s going to be all the elements times.... Like 1.... All the elements, we are
going to call them h. h are all the elements in U%. And k are going to be elements in the
kernel. So h times {1,3} is how you are going to find it. So it’s going to be 1 times
{1, 3}, and it’s going to be 3, 5, 7 times {1,3}.

To accompany her statement, she wrote h e U% and k e K. Neither her words nor these
symbols distinguished the different roles played by h and k. Nonetheless, she maintained
the appropriate conceptual distinction, for she also wrote h{ 1,3} and performed all the
calculations correctly. Robert, on the other hand, demonstrated a similar use o f notation
but had considerable difficulty establishing a sufficient conceptual distinction between
the set and the element to manage the processes o f coset formation. This is illustrated
below in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
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Finally, Carla herself showed a marked contrast between her work with particular groups,
such as U% and Z n and her symbolic reasoning about cosets generally, where the group
remained unspecified. In particular, she seemed to forget that aK and bK were cosets and
instead treated the letters like numeric variables from high school algebra. This point is
demonstrated in the subsection entitled “Carla and aK = bKZ

Wendy and N + N
This subsection explores a failure to distinguish between a set and an element and
provides insight into the kind o f learning that occurs as students begin to make such a
distinction. During her fourth interview, Wendy described a function from Z to Z4 where
x goes to x (mod 4)— the same function that Carla had described at the beginning o f her
third interview. Then Wendy listed the cosets o f the kernel o f the mapping:
50

Wendy: Well, we can take the generator group now, and we can find cosets a lot more
easy because if you take ... 4x ... every elem ent... every multiple o f 4 is going to get
mapped to 0 in x mod 4 ... in Z4 ... so 4x is going to equal the kernel. So the cosets are
going to be 4x. Okay. 4x + 1, 4x + 2, and 4x + 3, because 4x + 4 is just going to be [the
same as 4x].

52

Brad: Okay, and what’s x?

53

Wendy: x is going to be aninteger.

54

Brad: Okay, now is x ...? In these 4 cosets, is x a specific integer?

55

Wendy: No.

56

Brad: What do you mean?

57

Wendy: It can be any.... Like any integer you put in here will give you.... Any integer
you put in for x will give you 0 ... will give you 0 mod 4.

58

Brad: So like you could put in 2 for x.

59

Wendy: Yeah, you could put in anything for any o f them, and this [4x] is going to equal
0. This [4x + 1] is going to equal 1, this [4x + 2] is going to equal 2, and this [4x + 1] is
going to equal 3.

Like Carla, who had used 4n, Wendy was using 4x to denote both a particular multiple o f
4 and the set o f all o f them. My language “a specific integer” did not help her make the
distinction I was trying to make. O f course, x was not a specific integer. The question is
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whether she was imagining that it was a particular integer or the set o f all o f them. Yet,
perhaps even this distinction would not have helped, for she was focusing on the images
o f these integers in the codomain, Z4. And for that purpose, 4x + 1 was going to map to 1
whether it was a particular value or any set o f values.
6 8

6

9

Brad: Okay. N ow .... But now you are talking about x as being ... you can put anything
in there for x. Any integer, right? But now is the coset then any integer? Or is it all of
them. Or is it one specific one? Or...? Do you understand what I am asking?
Wendy: No, not really. Is the coset one specific.... Like should we name this
something? [She writes A.]

71

Wendy: Yeah. If I call it N, it’s always, it’s going to be congruent to ... any integer N
that maps to the identity.

73

Wendy: So, it’s not going to be a specific, it’s going to be any multiple of 4.

75

Wendy: So it is not specific. You know what I mean? Like, we are going to call this
coset.... If we call this coset N, N is infinite.

76

Brad: Oh. Is it a set then? Or is it a specific number?

77

Wendy: I f s a set.

The letter N denoted what she had previously called 4x and was “any integer that maps to
the identity,” which was not specific but “any multiple o f 4.” Simultaneously, N was a
set. Thus, Wendy was not distinguishing between any multiple o f 4 and the set o f all o f
them.
W hen I mentioned again that the set was infinite, she said, “That is why I was calling it
4x” (line 81). Because she could not list all the elements, I asked her to show the pattern
o f N. She began with positive multiples o f 4 and then included 0. She included negative
multiples o f 4 only after I asked explicitly whether there would be any negatives in the
set.
8 8

8

9

Brad: So then, when you write this thing 4x, you mean this set o f all the things together,
taken as a whole. Or do you mean individual specific ...?
Wendy: Uh huh. Taken as a whole. Take as a whole.
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So just like N, 4x was simultaneously any multiple o f 4 and the set o f all o f them. From
the fact that Wendy used both N and 4x, a glance at her work might have suggested that
she was using the standard convention o f using capital letters for sets and lowercase
letters for individual elements. Wendy was making no such distinction, however. The
two notations were identical in meaning.
I asked what could be done with the cosets. She reaffirmed that “N = 4x, where x is all
integers” (line 98) and renamed the other cosets to N + l , N + 2 , an d N + 3. She
struggled for a moment over whether to add or multiply the cosets but then decided to
add them because “integers are only a group under addition” (line 112). Then she tried to
calculate N + N and N + (N + 1).
115

Wendy: All right. So, you are going to have, if you have AN.... 4x plus, because N = 4x.
It’s going to equal 8 x. All right? And 8 x is congruent to 4x, which is congruent to 0 mod
4. So this is congruent to N.

116

Wendy: So N is .... You can tell here that N is the identity element. So, you know th at...
[inaudible] when you add N plus, and N + 1 you are going to get 2N + 1 and that’s going
to give you .... That’s the same thing, that is congruent to N + 1. Now I have to figure
out why. [Writes 2N + 1 = N + 1]

It seems that Wendy knew that N + N = N and that N + (N + l) = N + 1. Her reasoning
was flawed, however, relying on algebraic procedures that work for symbols that stand
for numbers but not symbols that stand for sets. Her symbol manipulation was guided
more by her expectations about the results than about the meaning o f the symbols.
I asked her what N + N meant.
120

Wendy: You are adding the same set together, so it is going to be the same set. You
know lik e.... If you add two o f the same sets together you are just going to get all
elements ... the same elements in the set. Like if you add 1 ,2 ,3 ... the set o f {1, 2, 3}
and the set o f {1, 2, 3} you are still going to have the set {1, 2, 3}. Your elements aren’t
going to change any?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253

Wendy saw N + N as a sum o f sets. When I asked her how to compute {1,2,3} +
{ 1 ,2 ,3 } , she did not remember at first how to do it but eventually decided that the sum
would be {2, 3, 4, 5, 6 }. She was not happy with the result, however, because it did not
fit her expectations.
134

Wendy: But if you add any multiple o f 4 and any multiple o f 4, you’re going to get
another multiple o f 4.

13

Wendy: So in this case it’s different. So I know that it looks like. I was like, oh well that
disproves what we are saying here, but it doesn’t because ...

6

1 37

Brad: So then is it right to say 4x + 4x = 8 x? Is it right to even call it this thing 2N7

1 38

Wendy: Well, 4x.... You can say 4x + 4x. I don’t know about this [Crosses out 2N + 1 =
N+ 1], But if you say 4x + 1 + 4x, you are going to get 8 x + 1, which is going to be
congruent to .... This is still a multiple o f 4, so it is still going to be equal to— congruent
to; I don’t want to say equal to— a multiple o f 4, plus 1, which is what N+ 1 is.

Wendy clearly had some thinking that was not reflected in the symbols. Furthermore, she
had not understood what I was implying by my question about whether 4x + 4x = 8 x was
an appropriate calculation to verify that N + N = N. I suggested that 8 x looked more like
multiples o f 8 , not multiples o f 4.
14 0

Wendy: That’s tme, it doesn’t include every multiple o f 4. But w e’re talking about mod
4. And if you are talking about mod 4, we got this because it is 4x + 4x. All right? So if
you have a multiple o f 4 here and a multiple o f 4 here, and then you add one, it is still
going to b e.... If you add two multiples.... Like, if you add.... 8 ’s a multiple o f 4, and
8 ’s a multiple o f 4, and that equals 16. 16 is still a multiple o f 4.

1 41

Brad: Do the two multiples o f 4 have to be the same in this way you are writing 4x + 4x?

1 42

Wendy: No.
think so.

1 43

Brad: Okay, so .... But now does the way you have written it, 4x + 4x, does that handle
both o f these cases? When they are the same and when they are different?

144

8

+ 12, okay? That equals 20 and that is still a multiple o f 4, so I don’t

Wendy: Uh huh.

Thus, W endy’s work with the symbols depended upon her thinking. Furthermore, she
did not see a need to distinguish notationally between the two multiples o f 4. I pursued
this directly in her notation.
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14 5

Brad: So by 4x you just mean ...

14

Wendy: A multiple o f 4.

6

14 7

Brad: A multiple o f 4. And by this 4x you mean a multiple o f 4.

14

Wendy: 4y.

8

15 0

Wendy: This is going to be 4xy. Soit’s still going to bea multiple o f 4 and then you add

1.
151

Brad: 4.xy do you mean? Or ...

152

Wendy: Plus y. So, all right. This explains it better.Do you see why this explains it
better?

It did not take much intervention to get W endy to distinguish betw een the two m ultiples
o f 4, but even after she had made the distinction, her sym bolic m oves were problematic,
suggesting that there were not yet strong connections betw een her thinking and the
sym bols. From this point on, how ever, her sym bolic reasoning improved dramatically:

154

Wendy: If you have a multiple of 4 and a multiple of, another multiple of 4, but where
they’re not the same multiple of 4, and then.... But this multiple.... This is.... Okay,
this is N. Like if this is your multiple of 4, you add a multiple of 4, which we are calling
N, and you are adding it to N + 1, you have another multiple of 4, + 1. Okay? But
because it is not necessarily the same ... like this isn’t necessarily 8 , and this isn’t
necessarily 9. They are not necessarily consecutive numbers. You have to have different
values for x andy. Okay? So, we can, because they have a common factor, we can pull it
out. [Writes 4(x + y) +1.]

15 6

Wendy: Okay, which is the same thing.... So this is still going to be 4 times.... This is
still going to be an integer. An integer plus an integer is going to be an integer. So I am
going have to call x + y = z so 4z + 1, so this is still going to be N + 1. That’s how I can
explain this.

W endy’s reasoning and sym bolic representation seem ed sound at this point. I then
attempted to learn how she had previously been thinking about the sym bols.
15 8

Brad: Okay. But now here, when you are saying this 4x + 4y, are you imagining that this
is one specific x, for now, and this is one specific y, for now?

161

Wendy: Yeah, but it would work for any x andy.

162

Brad: Okay. But are you imagining for a minute that they are fixed?

165

Wendy: It helps me think o f it better, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be. Because no
matter what x or y you p u t... any integer you put in there, it will work. So, and these are
all the integers, x and y are all the integers for ... are just, are all integers. So in that case
and since it works for all integers, you can look at it as the whole set. But yes, you were
right, I was looking [inaudible].
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167

Wendy: ... But it doesn’t make a difference, because.... It did help me clarify at first,
but because if you show for a specific case it does work, and then if you take a step back
and say it does, it works for every case ... like x, no matter what value for integer x, or y,
it will still work.

Thus, Wendy agreed that it helped to think o f x and y as fixed, but any integer will work,
“and since it works for all integers, you can look at it as the whole set” (line 165). Her
thinking could move smoothly from a fixed value, to any value, to all values, and finally
to the set o f all values without ever a need for a clear distinction. Nonetheless, at this
point, she had begun to articulate a distinction in her thinking: first showing that it works
for a specific case and then stepping back to see that it works in general.
I asked her to reflect on possible differences in meaning between 4x and N, and she
asserted that “this set and this set are going to be the same” (line 171).
173

Wendy: I was calling x and y different, but they are not. Because x is going to be all
integers. In this set, y are all the integers. Like this is 4z, and this is 4z + 1. This is the
set 4z + 1 ... all integers ...

1 74

Brad: By z there you mean ...

175

Wendy: All integers in z.

Thus, the distinction in W endy’s thinking was not yet reflected in her interpretation o f the
notation. W endy’s written work through this point included only a single lower case z,
but her statement “All integers in z” seems to suggest that she was thinking about the set
o f integers.
17

6

17 7

17

8

Brad: Oh, do you mean the big Z that means all integers?
Wendy: By calling it x, I think it is like making me think towards ... by saying x ... like
we usually use that for a specific value. B ut.... So if you write Z ... if you write 4Z + 4Z
+ 1 ... 4Z is .... Go ahead. [She writes capital Zs.]
Brad: This Z ... is that the same as this z?

17 9

Wendy: Uh huh.

181

Wendy: The set Z.
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Thus, just as Wendy was not distinguishing between a single value o f x and the set o f all
o f them, she had not been distinguishing between a single value o f z and the set o f all of
them. After I asked whether she meant the set o f integers, however, she changed her
notation from what appears to be a lowercase to the capital that is typically used to denote
the set o f integers (i.e., Z).
183

Wendy: All right, so if we think o f that away from x, a specific case.... I think we, when
we have x, I tend to think o f i t ... and I think that is what you are trying to get to up there

185

W endy:... So if we call it 4Z + 4 Z + 1, 4Z + 4 Z is going to still equal 4Z, + 1. S e e l
think that makes it more clear.

18 6

Brad: Although, now how do you explain to someone why 4Z + 4Z is just 4Z?

187

Wendy: Because it’s .... Because o f the fact that it’s infinite, you’re taking every ele-,
every multiple o f 4 .... Well, you can look at that specific example. If you take an x in,
and ay, a 4x from 4Zand you add it to 4y + 1, w e ll x andy weren’t equal. 4 .... You can
show what I was showing up there that x and y, because they are integers, because you
took them from the set o f integers, x andy will be an integer, so 4 .... This is still going to
be an integer.

It seems Wendy was still somewhat uncomfortable about x being a particular value.
When I asked her to explain the sum 4Z + 4Z, she started talking about the whole set but
then resorted to using x an d y to illustrate a particular case. I asked whether she was
beginning to see a distinction between 4x and 4Z.
1 90

Wendy: Uh huh. Yeah. I am a lot more so than I was when I was up here.

191

Brad: Is that helpful to make that distinction?

192

Wendy: Yeah. I don’t like calling it x now because it does, here looks like a more
specific value, except it is not. But I think in a sense I was thinking o f it, even though I
didn’t think I was.

1 93

Brad: You were thinking o f it in which way before?

194

Wendy: As a more specific value. Although I knew that I should keep in mind that it was
a set, but I think I was still thinking o f it too specifically. I think I was right to show ...
to explain it using a specific example, but I think it was important to go back, to begin
and to end, showing that it was the whole set.

195

Brad: So before when you were talking about this 4x + 1, were you trying to imagine both
ways at the same time?

19 6

Wendy: Yes. I was definitely trying to .... I definitely knew that it works for all values of
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x andy, but I wasn’t really thinking o f it as a whole, as like a Z, like integers.
Wendy was seeing a conflict in her earlier work: thinking o f x as a specific value while
also keeping in mind that it was the whole set. She stated that she had been thinking “too
specifically” and had not really been thinking o f x as the “whole set.” Her language
again suggests an intermediate position between a particular element and the set o f all o f
them, because “it works for all values o f x andy.”
She began to focus on the notation:
19 8

Wendy: For some reason just visually, if you look at this 4x + 2 [points on paper] and 4Z
+ 2, visually, if you look at the two, it’s easier to see one being a set and.... It’s easier to
see 4Z + 2 being a set over 4x + 2.

2 00

Wendy: 4x + 2 looks more like a value than it does a set.

2 02

Wendy: But I think it is clearer to write, you know, like Z as, like an upper case Z, like
writing the notation as a set for the integers. So 4Z + 2 is going to equal, obviously be a
set, and it is not going to be a value.

2 03

Brad: So it is useful, then, you think now, to distinguish between those things that are sets
and those things which are sort o f generic values.

2 04

Wendy: Like I use N, an uppercase N here. I think it makes more sense to use like the....
I think.... Do we use uppercase values for sets, rather than lower case?

So by the end o f the interview, Wendy saw that the standard convention o f using
uppercase letters for sets could be useful in making a conceptual distinction. It seems she
had much earlier developed a sense that uppercase letters were usually sets, though
perhaps she had never before been in a situation where she felt a need to make a clear
distinction between a set and an element.
Wendy seems to have learned to distinguish between a set and an element. Because this
interview took place after the final exam, I can make no claims about the stability or
durability o f this learning. Instead, I would like to point out what seems to have been
required. First, Wendy did not make any distinction between a particular value and the
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set o f all values until she saw that her equation 4x + 4x = 8 x did not support the idea that
the sum o f any two multiples o f four would be a multiple o f four. Yet even after she
began to make the distinction verbally, she still did not make it notationally. And even
after she made the distinction notationally, she had to revisit her intermediate conceptual
position o f something that “works for all values o f x.” Then, by reflecting on the
notation, she was able to see how the notational distinction could support her emerging
conceptual distinction. Furthermore, it seems that I provided cognitive support by asking
Wendy whether she was imagining x as fixed, suggesting that this metaphor was not
available to Wendy at the beginning o f the interview.

Robert and What Varies
O f the key participants, Robert had the most trouble negotiating the processes involved in
computing the collection o f cosets and, in particular, in keeping track o f what kinds o f
entities he was dealing with and where they were situated. During his third interview, he
was working with the same homomorphism as Carla above and had just determined its
kernel. I asked him to find the cosets o f the kernel.
14 0

Robert: Oh boy. Cosets ... equals the set o f all ahs such that h is in H. [Writes ah = {ah \

h e H}.]
141
142

Brad: And what’s H here?
Robert: Yeah, that’s what I was wondering. Good question. I am not so good with these
cosets yet.

143

Brad: Well, is the kernel a subgroup here?

144

Robert: Yeah, it’s a subgroup o f

14

6

U%.

Robert: Isn’t that one o f the things we proved on the take-home exam? That i f / i s a
group homomorphism then the kernel o f / i s a subgroup o f G .

14 7

Brad: Okay. So what would be the cosets o f the kernel?

14 8

Robert: See, I am not really sure, like you say, what this H is. These are.... Okay. H
would be 1 and 3 because those are the things that are in the kernel. So it would be the
set { 1 ,3 }, and each little h would be 1, 3. So then the question is the a. Which side o f
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the equation does this come from?
14 9

Brad: What do you mean “which side?”

1 50

Robert: Where do these as live? Do they live in U%or do they live in Z4?

Robert quickly set down a symbolic definition o f coset but did not know what to do with
it because he was uncertain as to what H and a represented in the problem at hand. This
first uncertainty was quickly resolved, but determining what a was proved to be more
problematic. The homomorphism made Robert uncertain about whether a was in the
domain or the codomain. Furthermore, his uncertainty was deeper than where a was
located; it also involved what kind o f entity a was.
153

Robert: Well, essentially what I would do is I would add 1 to all o f the elements in a. I
want to think that like a is like the generator o f Z4 or something.

154

Brad: What do you mean?

155

Robert: I don’t know exactly. Could a just be all o f Z4? If a was all o f Z4.

1 56

Brad: What do you mean by “all o f Z4?”

157

Robert: 0, 1, 2, or 3. The set.

166

Brad: And is a this whole set, or just one o f them at a time?

167

Robert: Well it’s just one o f them at a time but.... Oh, no, no, it’s not. It’s the whole set.
I think it’s the whole set.

In the first sentence above, Robert talked about “all the elements in a,” suggesting that a
was a set, but in the second sentence, a denoted a “generator” o f Z4. The latter statement
suggests that Robert may have been considering some intermediate role for a, where it
was neither an individual element nor the whole set. But while he considered whether a
could be all o f Z4,1 may have pushed him toward the set interpretation by my question,
“Is a this whole set, or just one o f them at a time?” which implicitly excluded an
intermediate role.
I then tried to encourage him to take advantage o f the common notational distinction
between a set and its elements, using an uppercase letter for the former and the
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corresponding lowercase letter for the latter. I pointed out that he was not being
consistent:
168

Brad: Here you have distinguished between big H, which is the set {1, 3}, and little h,
which equals 1 ,1 guess, or 3.

169

Robert: Uh huh. But there is no big A down here. So, a is the whole set. So I would
have two cosets.

17 0

Brad: Now, here you have written a little h.

1 71

Robert: Yeah, should this be a capital H up here?[Fixes previously written equation to
read aH = {ah \ h e H}.]

172

Brad: I am asking you the question.

173

Robert; I am sure that’s the way that they define it. Okay. So that would make sense.
So, I would have two o f them. This one would be 1, 0, 3 ...

Thus, on the one hand, Robert adopted a notational distinction between uppercase and
lowercase letters, but on the other hand, he continued to see a as the whole set.
175

Robert: I did it wrong anyway. I am adding the 1 to each element. One o f the little hs
from / / t o each element in this set. And I get 1, 2, 3, 0. Same set. Not really anything
different. And h, if I am doing the addition mod 4 . ... I get the same thing. [He writes
a = {0, 1, 2, 3}, ahx = {1 ,2 , 3, 0}, ah2 = {3, 0, 1, 2}.]

In making these computations, Robert took h\ = 1 and hi = ?>. He was concerned that the
two calculations resulted in the same set, but I chose to focus on the fact that he was
adding elements from different groups:
8

Brad: Okay, let me ask you .... We are looking at these things that you have written ah,
right? Where do the things a live?

17 9

Robert: I believe they live in Z4, but I am not sure. That’s one thing I’m really not sure
about.

18 0

Brad: And where do the things h live?

181

Robert: h live in Us- The h live in t/8?

182

Brad: Is that a problem? You are talking about multiplying a thing in Z4 by a thing in
or operating on, somehow.

184

Robert: Yeah that’s a problem, isn’t it? Well, so maybe a lives in U s too. I mean, this is,
H is the kernel o f U s, which is 1 and 3. I am pretty sure o f that.So a could be the things
living in U s, and if they were, then we would be multiplying 1 times the set o f {1,3,
5, 7}. And 3 times {1, 3, 5, 7}.

17
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So Robert decided that the calculations should take place in Us, but a remained a set in
his thinking. Both o f these calculations again resulted in the same set, this time U%. I
asked him to explain the notation a H = {ah \ h e H }.
194

Robert: Well, they are saying that ... this is like the name of the set. And this tells you
what all the sets ... the set is composed of, ahs such that h is in H. So for all of the as,
you operate them with every h in H, and you form a set.

197

Brad: Now is that what you have done?

198

Robert: Well, my big question, I guess, is what is a? Yeah, I believe that’s what I have
done. 1,3. Yeah here’s the hs: 1 and 3 were the only two hs we had. And I guess is a....
I don’t know why I think that a is a set.

205

Brad: So would you write then aH, a big H, is equal to well ... [inaudible] how you write
it.

206

Robert: [Laughs.] a big H is equal to.... This is what, I mean, without doing the
calculations, that’s what it kind of looks like. But it doesn’t seem to make sense to have
all of these brackets. [Writes aH= { 1(1, 3, 5, 7}, 3 {1, 3, 5, 7} }.]

2 07

Brad: Okay. But in a sense it looks like aH is a set containing two sets.

20 8

Robert: Yes. Even though they are the same set.

There are two points to make here. First, if a = {1, 3, 5, 7}, then Robert’s calculation was
correct, as was his notation for it. Second, although he could write appropriate set
notation, he did not like “all o f these brackets,” suggesting that the set notation did not
support his thinking. A t this point, I asked Robert to consider that a was not the set {1, 3,
5, 7} but instead just one o f its elements.
210

Robert: So you are saying that a would be each individual element. Then we’dhave ah\,
ah, ... a\h\, a2h2... hu a^h\, aAh\, aH. You could pick 1. 1 x 1 = 1 . 3 x 1 = 3. This is
kind of a trivial one.

211

Brad: This is for h ...

212

Robert: Equaling 1, h\ = 1.... This would be 7.

213

Brad: So how would you write it now...? Okay, so that’s for a, little hu what would a
big H look like? How did you do that?

214

Robert: It would just be the set of all of those numbers. [Writes aH = {1, 3, 5, 7}.]

Despite my suggestion that a be one o f the elements rather than the set, Robert still let a
vary through all o f Us and fixed h to be one element in H. This is similar, perhaps, to the
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idea he was considering at the beginning o f this episode when he suggested that a might
be a generator o f Z4 . Both o f these ideas— letting a vary through all its possible values
and letting it be a “generator”— are, in a sense, intermediate between considering a fixed
value and considering the set o f all possible values, yet there is no conventional notation
for this idea. Furthermore, because Robert’s calculations explicitly included only one o f
the elements in H, it is not clear to what extent he was distinguishing between H a n d h\.
At this point in the interview, I took a different tack, bringing in an idea that was more
familiar:
2 2

4

Brad: What would 3H be?

225

Robert: 3/7would be ... 3 ^ ? Or 3A2?

2 2 6

Brad: 3 big H.

227

Robert: 3 big//w ould be 3, 1. [Writes 3/7 = {3, 1}]

22 8

Brad: Now how did you do that?

22 9

Robert: Well, H consists of hi and /i2 , which are 1 and 3, respectively, and I operated 3
with each one of those things, and I made a set. 3 x 1 is 3 and 3 x 3 is 9, which is 1 mod
8.

230

Brad: What would 5H be?

231

Robert: 5 //would be 5 , 5 x 1 , and 15 which is 7, 5H, 5 and 7. [Writes 5/7 = {5, 7}]

232

Brad: Okay. Now, what you are saying to me then is that this 3 is fixed, but you are
letting H do what?

233

Robert: Go through its possibilities.

Robert was able to do these more familiar calculations with ease, suggesting that his
difficulties were largely notational and arising out o f the fact that in aH there are two
things that can vary. The notation aH represents a particular but unspecified calculation
o f which 3H is a specific example. Clearly, Robert had not made this connection. But
after I provided supporting language about what was fixed and what was varying in 3 H,
he was able to describe his previous calculations as fixing h\ and letting the as vary.
Then I took advantage o f this distinction:
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2 43

Brad: So I guess there is a choice here, that you can either fix the h\ and let the as vary, or
you can fix the as and let the hs vary.

2 44

Robert: Okay, I see what you are saying now. And if you were to ... if you let the as
vary and fixed the hs you just end up with the same set you had, so that seems, like,
inconsequential.

245

Brad: What if you do it the other way?

24

Robert: Then you get a bunch o f different sets. 4 sets, I don’t know what that would be
... 3 would be 1H, 3H we have there; 5H; 1H is the only one we don’t have. 3 and 5, so I
put the 5H, and so we get 1, 2, 3, 4 different sets this way, but really only two different
sets.

6

2 47

Brad: What do you mean?

248

Robert: Well, these two sets are the same, and so are these two sets. [Draws a line from
3 H = {3, 1} to I H = {1, 3} and a line from 5H = {5, 7} to 1 H = {7, 5}.]

With my distinction between fixing either the a or the h, Robert was able not only to
characterize what he had been doing but also to envision an alternative. At this point he
had completed the calculations and had noticed that the four calculations yielded two
cosets. To see whether Robert could see the appropriate procedure in the notation, I
asked him to reflect on the notation:
2 54

Brad: Built into this notation, aH is equal to the set ah such that h is in H . ... Which do
you think is implied by this notation? I said, we can fix the as and let the hs vary, or fix
the hs and let the as vary, right?

255

Robert: It seems to be let the hs vary. I don’t know. That notation, a times h such that h
is in H. It seems as though you have to let the hs vary. But if a was an individual
element in the original group, then you let both o f them vary, essentially. See, but there’s
nothing there that tells you to let a vary, but there is certainly something to tell you to let
h vary.

25

Brad: And yet when you first did this, which one where you letting vary?

6

2 57

Robert: I let the hs vary. Over here. But I considered a to be the whole set.

258

Brad: As opposed to ...

25 9

Robert: The big question for me now is, Is a the whole set, or is it the individual element
in the set? Which, if a was the individual element in the set, it would mean that a was
varying too. But you take each a and operate it with the varying hs versus taking the
whole set o f a and operating it with the varying hs.
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Thus, despite having completed the correct calculations and being more satisfied with the
result o f two cosets than he had been previously with the calculations that yielded {1,3,
5, 7} twice, Robert was still unsure about the interpretation o f a in the definition o f coset.
This episode demonstrates that notational distinctions do not necessarily create
conceptual distinctions. From a mathematical point o f view, the appropriate procedure
for computing cosets follows directly from the symbolic definition. Yet the symbolism
did not support Robert’s reasoning and seems to have been the cause o f some o f his
confusion. Nonetheless, in the interviews and on the final exam, Robert had no further
procedural difficulties computing cosets, suggesting that some learning had occurred
during this episode. It is unclear, however, to what extent he had connected his
procedure with the notation.
In computing the set o f all cosets o f a subgroup, there are processes and objects at two
levels, as described above. At the lower level, h varies, creating a particular aH, which is
an object. At the higher level, a varies, creating the set o f all cosets aH, another object.
Robert did not see aH as being a description o f 3/7 but instead focused on the fact that a
was supposed to vary, thus merging or perhaps inverting the two levels. Robert did not
make a clear conceptual distinction between what was fixed and what was varying.
Neither did he make a notational distinction between uppercase and lowercase letters.
Furthermore, from Robert’s first response above (line 255), it seems that he had
previously reflected little on the notation. Thus, it may be that Robert did not distinguish
aH from ah or even AH, which would partially explain his merging o f the two levels.
In order to encourage Robert to make the appropriate distinctions, I emphasized
conceptual distinctions between sets and elements and between what was fixed and what

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265

was varying, and I emphasized notational distinctions between uppercase and lowercase
letters. It appears, once again, that both conceptual and notational distinctions need to be
emphasized.

Carla and a K = bK
After Carla had completed the core tasks o f the third interview, I chose to investigate her
understanding o f some o f the results for which she had given correct proofs on the second
midterm exam (see Appendix B). Because all o f the other key participants took
considerably longer than Carla to complete the other interview tasks, comparative data
are not available. Here I provide a few observations that shed light on Carla’s concept
image o f coset and her use o f symbols.
Problem 5 on the midterm began “Let i f be the kernel o f the group homomorphism
f: G G ' and suppose a and b are elements o f G.” The students were asked to prove
several results, culminating with “/(a) - fib ) if and only if a K - bK.” In other words, a
and b have the same image under the homomorphism precisely when they lie in the same
coset o f its kernel. I began quite generally:
133

Brad: What if, in this example here, we know that aK = bK. What can you conclude?

134

Carla: If aK = bK, we know fia) =fib).

135

Brad: Okay. Now why do you know that?

13 6

Carla: ‘Cause we did it on the take-home. The definition o f a K is that aK, uppercase K, is
the same as the set o f a lowercase ks such that/ . . . . Actually we wrote this two different
ways. It’s .... Okay, one way to write it is ak such that k is a member o f K, which is
actually the kernel. But another way we wrote it was that it is all xs in G such that fix) =
fia). So if we write bK as that.... If we write the definition o f bK, we have bk such that k
is a member o f K. W e’d also have x is a member o f G such that fix) =fib). If we said
that aK = bK, then for the two sets to be equal, fia ) has to equalX^) because they both
equal fix).

Carla was almost correct. She first stated the major result from the exam and then
presented, as definitions, two descriptions o f aK, though she expressed concern a few
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moments later that something might be missing from one o f these definitions. The first
definition, aK = {ak \ k e K}, is correct and complete, essentially independent o f where a
and K come from, requiring only that K be a set and that the product ak be defined for
each k e K. The second characterization, aK = {x e G |/(x) = /(a)} , on the other hand,
was not a definition but an intermediate result from the exam. Furthermore, her
explanation that “J(a) has to equal j{b) because they both equal/(x)” ignored the fact that
in the second description o f aK, and likewise for bK, the variable x was not a particular
value but rather was to vary through all possible values for the purpose o f finding those
that satisfied/(x) =J{a).
In order to get a sense o f the meaning Carla was associating with the symbols, I asked her
how she would write an element in aK.
142

Carla: Well it depends on what we are dealing with. Are we dealing with permutations or
sets or what? Or just integers, or ...?

Carla had freed herself from the example we had been working with, which implies that
her earlier statement that fia ) =f{b) required some specifications about f a, b, and K. But
she wanted to attach her thinking to something.
143

Brad: Well, let’s say we want to try think o f it sort o f in the abstract, independent o f any
particular representation. Okay? And let’s say we have some element o f aK.

14 4

Carla: All right. If it’s an element o f aK, it’s also.... Well you know that k is in the
group, because it’s in the kernel. So if it’s in the kernel it has to be in the group. You
know that a is in the group because when we do left cosets we take elements from the
group, and since the group is closed ak is going to represent an element o f the group.

14

Carla: I don’t know if that is answering your question.

6

So Carla took k to be in the kernel, just as she had assu m ed /to be a homomorphism,
suggesting that notational conventions supported her thinking in implicit ways that might
have been hard for her to articulate.
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From this point on, the interview gradually took on a noticeably different character,
becoming more directive and less exploratory. More o f my questions required short,
symbolic answers. During this time, Carla provided shorter answers and focused mostly
on manipulating the symbols, similar to the work that she had done on the midterm exam.
For example, she wrote both z = ak and z = bk (lines 148-150), not realizing that the ks
might need to be different. At another point, she attempted to divide (line 179) rather
than to multiply by an inverse. Her most surprising statement came after I asked her to
verify some o f her symbolic results for the particular case o f the homomorphism and
cosets from earlier in the interview. In response to some difficulty with the symbols, she
said:
20

9

Carla: See, I don’t like this business o f multiplying integers times sets. I don’t think that
is very good.

210

Brad: Why?

211

Carla: Just ‘cause you don’t you usually do it. You usually do sets times sets.

Clearly at this point in the interview, Carla did not recognize that her earlier calculations
o f cosets were elements times sets (see Figure 16). All o f these surprising statements,
coupled with the fact that Carla did not use the word coset again in the interview (lines
147-246), suggest that she had was not conscious o f the fact that aK and bK were
intended to represent cosets like those she had computed earlier in the interview.
Furthermore, she was making no substantive connection between the first and the second
half o f the interview or, equivalently, between her example-driven procedures for
generating cosets and her symbolic calculations related to the proofs on the midterm
exam. One possible explanation is a profound compartmentalization between two
activities involving the symbol aK. On the one hand, there were activities where aK
specified the process for generating cosets, and on the other hand, there were proof
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activities that involved manipulating symbols such as aK according to certain rules. A
less extreme explanation is that she would not have characterized one o f the coset
calculations in Figure 16 as an element times a set because she did all such calculations,
which might be described as a set times a set. As for her discomfort with multiplying an
element times a set, she softened her position the next day: “I don’t know why I said that,
because I was thinking about it later, and 4Z is an element times a set” (Field notes, May
3, 1996).
This episode further supports the position that that, for Carla, aK denoted a process if it
denoted anything. Despite the fact that the process yielded cosets and a set o f cosets that
Carla considered to be objects, the notation aK did not denote such objects but was
somehow separate from them. This result suggests that at least two encapsulations are
required in learning about cosets: one for specific groups and another for reasoning about
cosets generically.

Summary
The common theme in the above episodes is that o f insufficient connections between
notation and thinking. The notations 4x, aH, and aK did not always support a student’s
thinking even when that thinking was sound. Although Carla, Wendy, and Robert
demonstrated different degrees o f success with the tasks involving cosets and very
different understandings, they were similarly imprecise in their use o f the notation. Carla
and Wendy, on the one hand, were clear on the concepts and the processes, yet the
notation was not strongly connected to their thinking. Robert, on the other hand, was
unclear on the concepts and processes and was not able to read the intended processes
from the notation aH.
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These episodes suggest an explanation for the problem o f distinguishing between a set
and an element. W hat seems to be missing in all o f these episodes is the ability to think
about generic objects. Reasoning with the notations as 4x and aK as generic
representatives o f a class o f objects seems to require imagining, metaphorically, thatx, a,
and K are fixed. Then a kind o f encapsulation is required to see 4x and aK as denoting
particular but unspecified objects— a multiple o f 4 and a coset. I say a different kind o f
encapsulation because there is every indication that the students could conceive o f
multiples o f 4 and cosets as objects, suggesting that something like encapsulation had
already occurred.
These episodes also suggest the hypothesis that proper usage o f notational distinctions
requires first the creation o f a need for a conceptual distinction. The conceptual
distinctions and notational distinctions are not automatic, but rather each requires
learning. They are neither simultaneous nor consecutive but rather dialectic.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the metaphors “suppose x is fixed” and
“now let x vary” can provide cognitive support for learning to make such distinctions.

Quotient Groups
As mentioned above, the set o f cosets o f a subgroup can reveal structural information
about how the subgroup fits within the structure o f the group as a whole. Thus, given a
collection o f cosets, a guiding question is whether those cosets can form a group— a
quotient group. This section characterizes the students’ concept images o f quotient
groups. It begins with a conceptual analysis that details the relationships among the
concepts o f subgroup, coset, homomorphism, normality, and quotient group, describing
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important aspects o f the students’ curricular experiences regarding these concepts. The
majority o f the section consists o f a detailed analysis o f Carla’s concept o f quotient
group, based largely on interviews in which she again demonstrated unusual language
alongside well-established concepts and procedures. The analysis is then broadened to
include other students.

Conceptual Analysis
A quotient group or a fa ctor group is a group whose elements are cosets and whose
operation is given by extending a group’s operation to its cosets. Assuming the group’s
operation is called multiplication, the product o f two cosets involves multiplying, in the
appropriate order, all possible pairs of elements, one from each coset. Not all cosets can
form a group in this way, but when the left cosets o f a subgroup are the same as its right
cosets, the subgroup is said to be normal, and the cosets will form a group under the set
operation described.
For example, the set o f left cosets o f {1,3} in C/g is {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} (see Figure 16).
Because multiplication in Us is commutative, the set o f right cosets is the same, and thus
{1, 3} is a normal subgroup. The product o f {1, 3} and {5, 7} is computed as follows:
{1, 3 } x { 5 , 7} = {1x5, 1x7, 3 x 5 , 3 x 7 } = {5, 7, 7, 5} = {5, 7},

where the products inside the braces are taken to occur in Us. All the products o f pairs of
cosets may be organized in an operation table (see Figure 15), where it is possible to see
that the cosets form a group with two elements.

Figure 18. An operation table for {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} from Us
X

{1,3}

{5,7}

{1,3}

{1,3}

{5,7}

{5,7}

{5,7}

{1,3}
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To analyze the interviews involving quotient groups, it will help to step back from
particular objects and processes and consider them more generally. Most o f the
interviews may be described as instantiations o f the general coset activity represented in
Figure 19. How does one make sense o f such an activity? W hat does one take from it?
Figure 19 serves not only as a representation o f an activity but also as an analytical tool
constructed to investigate these questions. It supports semiotic analysis by distinguishing
the processes from the names and the symbols from the objects in order to discern
meaning. Thus, making productive sense o f a coset activity requires distinguishing
among the various components in Figure 19 and then assigning names appropriately.
The standard description o f Figure 19 is as follows: Given a group G and a subgroup H,
the left cosets o f H are calculated and collected. The cosets are then considered elements
in a new structure, a set o f cosets. Coset products are computed, and results may be
organized in an operation table. Carrying out theses two processes requires some
conceptual flexibility: first conceiving o f a set or an element as fixed and letting other
sets or elements vary, and then letting the fixed set or element vary to carry out the higher
processes. Managing such a process, after all, was precisely the problem Robert had in
computing cosets, as described in the subsection entitled “Robert and What Varies.”
If the set o f (left) cosets constitutes a group under this operation o f coset multiplication,
then the set o f cosets is called a quotient group. The construction depends upon both the
group and the subgroup. Thus, the resulting group is called the quotient o f / / i n G,
denoted G/H and read “G modulo H.”
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Figure 19. Coset activity
Group
^

Selecting

Subgroup

Calculating

Left Cosets
^

Calculating

Products of Cosets
^

Naming

Quotient Group

O f course, the set o f (left) cosets does not always constitute a group, and the arrow is
dotted in Figure 19 to indicate this potentiality. It turns out that the key issue is one of
closure: whether the product o f two cosets is again a coset. When this criterion is
satisfied, all the other axioms follow: In G/H, the identity element is the coset H; the
inverse o f the coset aH is the coset aAH\ and associativity follows from the associativity
o f the operation in G. It turns out that equality o f left and right cosets is both a necessary
and sufficient condition to guarantee that the product o f two cosets will be a coset. In
other words, the cosets o f a subgroup form a group precisely when the subgroup is
normal.
Independent o f whether the subgroup is normal, and thus even when set of cosets does
not form a group, structural information is provided via Lagrange’s theorem, which says,
once again, that the order o f a subgroup must divide the order o f the group. An
immediate corollary is that the number o f cosets is the missing divisor. In other words, if

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

H is a subgroup o f G, then \H\ divides |G|, and the number o f cosets o f H is given by
\G\/\H\. There is an obvious symbolic similarity with the notation for the quotient group,
G/H. The similarity is significant, in that the elements o f G/H are precisely the cosets,
which implies that \G/H\ = \G\/\H\.
This equation provides obvious potential for confusion. On the right side, the slash
denotes a quotient o f natural numbers, whereas on the left, the slash denotes a quotient
group. Furthermore, this equation is true in the completely different but familiar context
o f high school algebra. If G and H are real numbers with H ^ 0, then the equation is an
identity for the absolute value function, whose notation is that same as that for the order
o f a group. This analogy may reinforce students’ common but mistaken impression that
G/H is division.

At about the time o f the third and fourth interviews, the students had been investigating
cosets of subgroups and cosets o f kernels o f homomorphisms. The guiding question,
which built upon the students’ early work with set arithmetic was, “Is it possible to create
a group with these cosets.” The students also explored cosets more generally, proving,
for example, that the cosets partition a finite group into equal-sized pieces (see “Problems
to work on the week o f April 22,” Appendix B).
The students also had been investigating relationships between a group and its image
under a homomorphism. Given a group homomorphism f . G —> G', the students
investigated f~ l o f elements in the range o f the homomorphism, which turn out to be
cosets of its kernel. This fact follows from the proof on the second midterm exam that
j[a) =J(b) if and only if aK = bK, where K is the kernel o f the homomorphism. The
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students considered the operation table o f the range o f/ and the operation table for /

1

of

each element in the range (see “Notes on cosets, April 29,” Appendix A). It turns out the
two groups are isomorphic. This is the essence o f the first isomorphism theorem, which
says that the structure o f the image o f a homomorphism is identical to the structure o f the
cosets o f its kernel.
Preceding all o f the fourth interviews and some o f the third interviews, Dr. Benson had
introduced Lagrange’s theorem and the term quotient group to give standard names to
ideas that had emerged from the students’ work on these kinds o f tasks.

Carla and the Normal Group
During Carla’s third interview, she computed the cosets {1, 3} and {5, 7} in Us. I asked
her whether she could use these cosets to form a group.
85

Carla: Well, let’s see.... We will create a table with {1,3} and {5, 7}, o f course, on the
top and on the right. Actually, we talked about this in class. If we know that the right
coset is equivalent to the left coset, then it does create a group. I think it’s called a
normal group, and these w ill.... I think we will have a group because I think that the
right coset equals the left coset, because it really doesn’t matter if you multiply on the
right or on the left.

Citing results from class, Carla was convinced that the set would be a group because, as
she correctly observed, the left and right cosets were the same. She was essentially
correct, except for her use o f the words coset and normal. I have already discussed her
use o f the word coset to denote a set o f cosets. As for her use o f the word normal, it
seems she had lost track o f the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets and was applying the
word to the quotient group rather than to the subgroup. Furthermore, her left coset and
normal group both named the same set o f cosets, suggesting that the set o f cosets was a
very salient object for her.
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Carla completed the coset products easily and quickly, taking advantage o f the
commutativity o f the underlying group and organizing them in a table (see Figure 15).
From the table, she noticed almost immediately that the group was isomorphic to the
group on the set {e, a ), where e is the identity. Later she saw that it was also isomorphic
to the range o f the homomorphism, which was the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4, as detailed in
chapter 5.
Carla had participated in an activity depicted structurally in Figure 19 and had created
written records similar to Figure 15 and Figure 16. She admirably negotiated the various
kinds of processes involved in the activity and seems to have had a good sense about the
kinds o f entities (e.g., sets or elements) she was dealing with. On the other hand, Carla
seems to have attached the names coset and normal to the objects and processes in
nonstandard ways. This hypothesis is further explored in a detailed analysis o f her fourth
interview.
Cosets in Zi?. Carla’s fourth interview concentrated on examples and nonexamples of
quotient groups, which required computing cosets and paying attention to whether the left
and right cosets were equal. When I mentioned to her, as a preface to the interview, that
we would be discussing quotient groups, she showed discomfort:
6

Carla: I have got to figure out what they are. Quotient group.... This is one o f the things I
haven’t.... I’ve needed to study it, but I haven’t done it yet. [Okay] What is the other
name for a quotient group, that we gave? It wasn’t a normal group right, that’s different.

Thus, although Carla had computed a quotient group in the previous interview, she had
not yet attached the name to the idea. I suggested we start with an example and return to
the term later.
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To get started, I asked Carla to find the subgroup generated by 3 in the group Z \2. She
was momentarily confused about the operation in Z \ 2 but quickly resolved that issue and
soon determined that the subgroup generated by 3 was {0, 3, 6 , 9}. I asked her to find the
cosets o f that subgroup.
22

Carla: Okay. First we will do left cosets. Probably the left coset and the right coset will
be the same, but w e’ll start with the left coset. So, do you want me just to use the kernel
as the ...

2

3

Brad: Do it whatever way you think is best.

2

4

Carla: Well, I’ll start with the kernel at least because I am most comfortable with that.
The kernel is 0 because 0 goes to 0. 0 is the identity.

25

Brad: You said 0 goes to 0. What does 1 go to?

2 6

Carla: No. 1 is not in there.

27

Brad: Oh. Okay. So what does 3 go to?

2

8

Carla: I don’t think.... We haven’t really.... Well, we know 0 goes to 0 because the
identity always goes to the identity in two groups. But we haven’t really defined what the
others [inaudible]. The other, you know, function that we are dealing with [inaudible], I
am doing it with 0 and that’s i t ... because I know I can do it with the kernel because the
kernel is .... Oh, wait a sec-. We do cosets.... We have to have a subgroup. And we
have to perform an operation o f the members in Z X1 on the left, for the left coset. So you
have members o f Z\2 * with the subgroup. And I already know what the subgroup is, so
it’s 0, 3, 6 , 9. Took me a while, b u t...

Carla momentarily thought that she needed a kernel to talk about cosets but then reasoned
that only a subgroup was necessary. It seems from line 22 that she was still using the
term “left coset” for the set o f cosets, just as she had in the third interview.
Carla called the subgroup S and listed the elements o f Z \2. In describing how she knew
the operation was addition mod 12, she talked at first about a group G', suggesting she
had not completely abandoned the idea that there was a homomorphism involved. Then
she went on.
35

Carla: Let’s just keep it simple and call S is a subgroup o f G. So S is 0, 3, 6 , 9, as I said
before. And G is Z\2. And I am going to tell the truth here: The reason I chose addition
mod 12 is because that’s the only real operation we have right here. [Laughs.]
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Carla began the coset calculations without hesitation. Her language evolved in the course
of doing the calculations, becoming abbreviated: “If you are doing the operation o f 0 on
0, 3, 6 , 9 ...” (line 37), “If you do 1 star (which is adding mod 12) with 0, 3, 6 , 9 ... 2
with 5” (line 41). Soon she stopped doing the calculations directly and instead reasoned
about the results, based on a pattern.
43

Carla: So we can see that there is a pattern here. 0 and 3 have the same left coset. And so
6 will and 9 will, because they are all multiples o f three, because I can see a pattern o f 3
here. So 1, the left coset, containing 1 is 1, 4, 7, 10. And that is the same as the left coset
containing 4. So 1, 4, 7, and 10 are going to have the same left coset. So then it will be 2,
5 ,8 , and 11 that will have the same left coset.

The results o f her calculations are shown in Figure 20. At first she had not recorded an
operation in some places, such as between 2 and S, but when I asked her about the
notation, she inserted an asterisk (*) and said that it was addition mod

1 2

.

Figure 20. Carla’s cosets calculations for {0,3, 6, 9}
5 = {0, 3, 6,9}
It co set
0*{0, 3, 6, 9}
1*{0, 3, 6, 9}
2*5
3*5
4*5

=
=

{0, 3, 6, 9}
{1,4,7,10}
2, 5, 8, 11
0, 3, 6, 9
1, 4, 7, 10

Carla went on to compute right cosets. She first listed the calculations she intended to
make, and then stopped after computing 5*0.
55

Carla: And right away I see that the right coset is going to the same thing as the left coset
because we are adding mod 12 and it’s commutative. So it doesn’t matter which side your
single element is that changes.

57

Carla: So we have a normal group because....
left coset equals the right coset.

58

Brad: So what is the normal group here? When we have the left cosets and the right
cosets being the same we have this thing called normal, but I want to know precisely what
is normal here.

59

Carla: So the normal group is a set o f sets. So one o f the smaller sets will be 0, 3, 6 , 9.
[Okay.] Another o f the sets will be 1,4, 7, 10. [Okay.] Another one will be 2, 5, 8 , and

I

think it’s a normal group that says that the
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11. So our normal group consists o f three sets.

Two points are to be made here. First, Carla did this work with little interaction from me,
and she noticed quickly that right coset calculations would yield the same result as the
left coset calculations she had just completed. Second, her usage o f the terms coset and
normal group was consistent with her usage in the third interview. For Carla, the
construction o f the normal group required that the left coset equal the right coset. When I
asked in what sense it was a group, she began by stating that the identity would be {0, 3,
6

, 9}. To explain this, she decided to construct a table (Figure 21).

Figure 21. Carla’s normal group with {0, 3, 6, 9}
.{0, 3, 6,9}
{1,4, 7, 10}
{2, 5, 8, 11}

{0, 3, 6, 9}
{1,4, 7, 10}
{0, 3, 6, 9}
{1,4, 7, 10}
{1,4, 7, 10} • {2, 5, 8, 11}
{2, 5, 8, 11}
{0,3 6 9}

{2, 5, 8,
{2, 5, 8,
{0,3 6
{1,4, 7,

11}
11}
9}
10}

While filling in the table, Carla at first performed the set addition by listing aloud all the
pairs to be added. As she continued, she filled in the table according to what she believed
it should look like. She used abbreviated procedures, partly to check her expectations,
and she described much o f her thinking aloud:
79

Carla: All right. So I know that this is a normal group, so I.... Because I know it’s a
group, I know it’s going to create a group table. So I can.... I have a pretty good idea
what this table is going to look like. It’s going to have 1, 4, 7, 10 in the first column
second row, and it’s going to have 2, 5, 8 , 11 in the position below that because 0, 3, 6 , 9
is the identity, so it needs to just reflect what row it’s in because I am working on the first
column.

81

Carla: Now I think that the middle spot in the table is going to give me 0, 3, 6 , 9. So I am
going to .... Well, but I can see that it’s not going to do that. So then I know that it’s
going to be 2, 5, 8 , 11. The reason that I knew it wasn’t going to do that is because I saw
1 + 1 is 2, and that’s not in it. So that cancels that right there.

8

5

Carla: Yes, [you should always get another coset in these calculations] with a normal
group. And I know that with my 3-by-3 group tables one o f the options is to have all of
the identities down the diagonal, so that’s why I automatically thought that might be the
identity in the middle position. But then when I checked it, I realized it wasn’t. But it still
can b e .... I can still have a group table.
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8 8

Carla: Since this is a group, I know that every element only appears once in each row or
column, so I see that 0, 3, 6 , 9 is left, for the second row. And then I can just check that 2
+ 1 is 3, 5 + 1 is 6 , 8 + 1 is 9, 11 + 1 is 12, which is 0 mod 12.

92

Carla: Even if you just see one o f the elements, you know which coset it is going to belong
to because the cosets don’t overlap.

98

Carla: It has to contain 3, and that’s the only coset that contains 3. So then I have one spot
left so I know that has to be 1, 4, 7, 10 because both the third column and the third row
lack that set.

Carla’s approach, based on patterns and facts, was reasonably efficient and included
some redundancy, which she used to catch errors. She knew every pair o f cosets would
produce another coset (line 85). She knew the result would be a group, so she had
expectations about the patterns in the table (line 79), and she used the fact that in group
tables every element appears exactly once in each row and column (lines

8 8

, 98). She

knew the cosets did not overlap (line 92), so she used representative calculations to
determine which coset should appear in a cell and to check errors. She believed, for
example, that, as a 3x3 group table, it would have the identity along the diagonal (lines
81, 85). That is incorrect, although both 2x2 and 4x4 tables can have the identity along
the diagonal. This error o f memory did not cause much trouble, however, because on the
basis o f a representative calculation she quickly realized that her belief was not correct.
Exploring the language. Carla had previously stated that the result would be a normal
group, but I wanted to get some clarity on how she was using the phrase. When I asked
her what the resulting table was and what it had to do with the word normal, she
responded that it was a group table that had “everything to do with the word normaP’
(line 102). She continued:
105
10 9

Carla: Well, the thing that it has to do with is that this table is a demonstration o f the
group o f those three sets— that they are a group.
Carla: The normal part o f it just says that you got it because you had left and right cosets
that were equal to each other.
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111

Carla: That’s how you know. That’s how it differentiates from just any old group.

So the normal group was a group, as demonstrated by the table, and it was normal
because there were left and right cosets that were equal to each other. These associations
o f the words normal and group are essentially correct. In particular, when the left and
right cosets are equal to each other, the word normal applies. But the term is supposed to
point back (see Figure 19) to the subgroup that led to the particular set o f cosets not
forward to the quotient group.
I next explored whether Carla could make any connection to the subgroup:
112

Brad: But these were left and right cosets o f what?

11 3

Carla: O f S.

114

Brad: O f S. So does the word normal have anything to do with S?

115

Carla: I am not sure what you mean. Normal group, like just as far as words in the
English language, doesn’t really have any meaning to me, that’s just what it’s called.

116

Brad: Okay, what what is called? That’s what I really want to get at.

117

Carla: Oh. The normal group is the group o f cosets where the left and right coset o f S are
equal.

I take this last statement to be Carla’s definition o f normal group. She recognized that it
was the subgroup that led to the cosets but did not see any reason to attach the word
normal to the subgroup. Furthermore, she stated moments later that if the left and right
cosets o f S had not been equal, she would not have gotten a group.
At this point in the interview, it was clear that Carla had the right ideas but was using the
words coset and normal in unconventional ways. I then explored what she would do with
the conventional language:
121

Brad: Does the phrase normal subgroup, would that mean anything?

122

Carla: My guess would be that a normal subgroup would be a subgroup of a normal group.

12

Carla: If that’s true, then a normal subgroup o f this normal group that we are talking about
could be this set {0, 3, 6 , 9} because that’s in the kernel. That is .... Well, actually I am

6
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mixing things here. I know it could be 0, 3, 6 , 9 because that’s just the identity, so it’s
obviously closed and has its own inverse and ...

In response to my suggestion, Carla held on to her notion o f normal group and applied
her concept o f subgroup to that. As the interview continued, she proposed {0, 3, 6 , 9} as
a one-element subgroup o f her normal group because it was the identity o f that group.
She went on to legitimize this group by noting that there is no “rule against” a oneelement group and that the group axioms were satisfied.

I then decided to be more

explicit about the term quotient group:
164

Brad: Now what if I were to tell you that the thing you have actually created here, this
table with an operation table— I mean a group table for these three cosets— that’s a
quotient group.

165

Carla: Oh. Maybe the quotient group is.... My only guess would be that the.... The
quotient.... I don’t know if we ever defined it, actually. But my guess would be that the
quotient group would b e.... Well in this case the quotient group equals the normal
group.... Do you see what I’m saying? I mean, it’s the same ...

16 6

Brad: What if I were to tell you that the thing that you have been calling the normal group
is the thing that is called the quotient group?

167

Carla: [Laughs.] Oh, okay. What is a normal group then?

Carla was willing to accept the term quotient group but was reluctant to let go o f her
usage of normal group. Despite my direct statement, she at first was still trying to figure
out what a quotient group was (line 165) and only gradually came to decide that it was
the same as her normal group, though perhaps only in this case. She had not yet detached
the term normal group from her previous meaning. My next statement (line 166),
however, seems to have caused her to consider a different meaning for normal group.
As the interview continued, Carla said, “I guess I have a problem with names” (line 171).
I suggested that the idea was already there and that the issue was sticking a name on it.
Then I encouraged her to connect the word normal to the subgroup:
178

Brad: But in order to talk about cosets you need to have what?
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17 9

Carla: A subgroup.

18 0

Brad: Right, so this word normal tells us something about the subgroup that led to those
cosets. Now let’s see if that can make any sense.

181

Carla: Maybe it’s when the subgroup is the kernel? I don’t know. Because that’s the only
thing that I can think o f that w e’ve been talking about that kind o f sets the subgroup apart.
Like that’s the only more specific characteristic o f a subgroup that I can think o f right now
that we have talked about. The other subgroups were just subgroups, but if you have a
subgroup that contains only the elements that map to the identity, then that’s more
specific.

182

Brad: Okay. But in order to have ...

183

Carla: We don’t even have a homomorphism here. So, there goes that theory.

Even when I told her directly that the word normal applied to the subgroup (line 180),
Carla was not able to make the appropriate gluing. The suggestion she made about the
kernel, it should be mentioned, is correct in principle, in that the kernel o f any
homomorphism is a normal subgroup and any normal subgroup is kernel o f a
homomorphism. This is a pretty sophisticated view, however, and one that would
ordinarily have required consideration o f some major results, such as the first
isomorphism theorem, that were not yet available.
Cosets in Dy. I next turned to the group D 3 , which has both normal and non-normal
subgroups. To begin, I asked Carla how she would write down the elements o f £>3 . She
acknowledged the possibility o f representing them as rotating and flipping triangles but
chose to use permutation representations instead, which she also called the “ 123 way.”
She wrote down the six elements quickly. I asked her for the subgroup generated by (12),
and she immediately responded that it would be just ( 1 ) and ( 1 2 )
2 02

Carla: Because any subgroup has to have the identity, so that’s (1). That’s why (1) is in
there. And then if you .... And (12) obviously has to be in there because it’s generated by
it. So if you operated (1) on (12) you just get (12). So it’s in there so we are all set. And
(12) operated with (12) just gives you (1). Another way you can think of it is that the
order o f (12) is 2. So if you call alpha (12), then the subgroup is only going contain alpha
to the 0 and alpha to the 1 .
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Here Carla described two approaches and provided a hint o f the extent o f the proficiency
she had developed both with the group D 3 and with the creation o f subgroups more
generally. She carried out six coset calculations (see Figure 22), making one small error
that was quickly corrected. She saw that she got only three cosets as a result and
suggested that the right cosets would be different because here “the order that you do that
in does matter” (line 222). When computing the right cosets, her calculations were
guided by expectations that grew from noticing which elements were paired with other
elements in the cosets, an approach that implicitly took advantage o f the fact that cosets
do not overlap.

Figure 22. Carla’s cosets of {(1), (12)} in D3
S={(1),(12)}

Lt Co sets

Rt Cosets

(!)* { (!). (12)}

=

{(1), (12)}

(12)*S
(23)*S
(13)*S
(123)*S
(132)*S

= S
= {(23), (132)}
= {(13), (123)}
= {(123), (13)}
= {(132), (23)}

S * (l)

S*( 12)
S*(23)
S*(13)
S*(123)
S*(132)

= 5

= S
= {(23), (123)}
= {(13), (132)}
= {(123), (23)}
= {(132), (13)}

Upon completing the calculations, Carla noted that the left cosets were not equal to the
right cosets and claimed that with these cosets, an operation table would be a mess. I
asked her to try to make an operation table with just the left cosets. Before computing the
product o f {(1), (12)} and {(23), (123)} she predicted the result would be a “four element
thing” (line 246), demonstrating some proficiency with set arithmetic with non-normal
subgroups. When her prediction turned out to be correct, she noted, “It’s not closed”
(line 256), because the product o f the two cosets was not another coset. (See Figure 23
for the partial table.)
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Figure 23. Carla’s table for the cosets of {(1), (12)} in Z>3
(1 )( 1 2 )

0 ).(1 2 )

(2 3 ),( 1 3 2 )

(1 )(1 2 )

( 2 3 )( 1 3 2 )( 1 2 3 ) (1 3 )

(1 3 ),( 1 2 3 )

(2 3 )(1 32)
(1 3 )( 1 2 3 )

Note: Carla included no braces f o r the sets and om itted commas below the top line.

1 next asked Carla to consider the subgroup generated by (123). She responded
immediately:
2

63

Carla: The subgroup generated by (123) is (1), (123), and (132). The reason that I know
that’s because I remember (123) and (132) are inverse o f each other, from working with
them before.

She seems to have known by recall that (132) and (123) are “inverse o f each other,” and
yet moments later she did not remember what (123) squared was. She called the
subgroup S again and computed the left cosets (123)*S and (132)*^ quickly (see Figure
24), reasoning from the fact that S is closed. For the other cosets, her calculations were
guided by expectations based, for example, on the fact that cosets do not overlap. By the
time she was computing the right cosets, her procedure had become quite abbreviated,
demonstrating increasing proficiency with coset calculations and with Z)3.

Figure 24. Carla’s cosets of {(1), (123), (132)} in Z>3
5 = {(1), (123), (132)}
Lt Cosets
(1)*£
= £

Rt. Cosets
£*( 1)
=£

(123)*£
(132)*£
(12)*£
(13)*£
(23)*£

£*(123)
£*(132)
£*(12)
£*(13)
£*(23)

=
=
=
=
=

£
£
{(12),(23),(13)}
{(13),(12),(23)}
{(23),(12),(13)}

=£
=£
= {(12),(13),(23)}
= {(13),(23),(12)}

After completing the calculations, Carla noted that the left and right cosets were the
same. She then reflected on the fact that, while order mattered in Z)3, the order did not
seem to matter in these coset calculations:
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303

Carla: Right, but we had the right combination o f things so that.... Where the order
mattered.... Because the elements o f the sets can be in any order.... So where the order
mattered it covered up for it because you had the right combination o f elements.

3 14

Carla: Well, we just see that the subgroups in case o f the subgroup generated by (12), we
didn’t have the right combination o f elements ... or “right” as in to make the cosets equal,
the right combination o f elements so that they were equal. And in this case we did have
the right combination o f elements.

318

Carla: Well, one thing that might have helped us is that this subgroup has more elements
in it. So it might cut down on the error.

Rather than just ascribing the differing results to the original subgroups, Carla looked
inside the subgroups to determine what might have caused the results.
Exploring the language again. Equipped with these additional examples, I pursued the
language again:
32 0

Brad: Do you suppose we could use the word normal to help us out here?

321

Carla: [Laughs.] I don’t know .... Well, which one is normal? Can you tell me that? I
don’t, I have no idea what normal is. I thought I knew about it. I have no idea.

3 22

Brad: Well, you were saying before that you have a situation kind o f called normal when
you have left and right cosets being the same, right? You said something like that, didn’t
you? So where are left and right cosets here?

32 3

Carla: Well, left and right cosets are the same here. Maybe it has something to do with
their inverses. Because this one (123) and (132) were inverses o f each other, whereas in
this one each element is its own inverse. That probably didn’t answer your question. I
was kind o f half listening. What was it?

Carla recognized that she was not sure about the use o f the word normal, and she
recognized that the two subgroups were somehow different in that one led to left and
right cosets that were the same and the other did not. Rather than merely using (and not
using) the label normal to distinguish between them, she was looking for something
deeper: some differing characteristics o f the subgroups that would explain the differences
in the cosets. As a result, she did not hear my question, so I repeated it:
32 4
325

Brad: Before you said that normal had something.... You used the word normal as having
something to do with when the left cosets and the right cosets are the same.
Carla: Yeah. But I wasn’t right on that ‘cause that was quotient group.
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32

6

327

Brad: Ah, well now, but what was quotient group?
Carla: Quotient group is one by, the set o f cosets where the left and right cosets are equal.
I guess.

This last statement is almost identical to Carla’s previous definition o f normal group (line
117), suggesting that she had substituted the new name for the old idea. As for the
differences between the subgroups, she was still trying to find a reason:
33 9

34 0
341

Carla: Well, yeah, but the only thing that I see ... the only difference that I really see
between, at least right now, between them, is the thing about the inverses. I’m not seeing
any other ... unless it is just normal because it’s generated ... [inaudible] doesn’t make
sense. I don’t know. It doesn’t.... If a quotient group is the set that you get when, from
the cosets, if the left and the right cosets are equal, then maybe the normal group is the
group that you use to get the left and right cosets in that case.
Brad: What do you mean?
Carla: Is the normal group the group that is always going to be your S, when you find your
left and right cosets in the way we do the quotient group?

342

Brad: Oh, so you mean the subgroup we started with?

343

Carla: Yeah.

351

Carla: So I would say that this subgroup is a normal group. If, well, if my guess is right,
this subgroup is a normal group, and that one isn’t. [She points first to the subgroup {(1),
(12)} and then to {(1), (123), (132)}.]

It seems that at this point in the interview she had at last made the desired connection
between the word normal and the subgroup that determined whether the left and right
cosets were the same. The only remaining difficulty, it seemed, was that she was calling
it a normal group rather than a subgroup.
352
353

Brad: What about saying “normal subgroup”?
Carla: [Laughs.] Well, that kind o f would be doing left and right cosets o f left and right
cosets, I would think. You know. Go another step into it.

3 54

Brad: What do you mean?

355

Carla: Well, I would think a subgroup is usually a smaller group. So I would think that a
normal subgroup, you have to get that from a quotient group. And that it would have to
give you a different quotient group.
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Carla gave meaning to term n orm al su bgroup in a way that indicated that for her the term
norm al was still strongly connected to the quotient group, maintaining some o f its

previous meaning. Yet a few moments later, she reconsidered:
3 63

Carla: Right. So, well, then maybe we were a l l ... we only talked about normal subgroups
and not normal groups. Is that what you’re saying? Because I’m fine with calling it a
subgroup. I really don’t care. Because if you don’t really talk about normal groups and
you only call them normal subgroups, you’re just focusing on the fact that they are
subgroups.

While thinking about the terms used in class, Carla relaxed the tie between the word
norm al and the quotient group and was willing to consider alternatives. She realized that

she may have been remembering the wrong term and that if the correct term was norm al
su bgrou p then perhaps it made sense to apply it to the subgroup that led to the cosets. I

closed the interview by checking on how she labeled the various objects and the
connections among them.
364

Brad: So, which is the subgroup here? Which is the normal subgroup?

365

Carla: S.

366

Brad: And it’s a subgroup o f what?

367

Carla: D 3.

368

Brad: And it’s normal because ...

369

Carla: It is what you use to get left and right cosets which are equal.

370

Brad: And this subgroup here, generated by (12) ...

371

Carla: It’s not a normal subgroup.

372

Brad: Okay. But it is a subgroup o f ...

373

Carla: Z)3.

374

Brad: D 3 still. So here we have one subgroup o f Z) 3 which the left and right cosets were
different. So we say its ...

375

Carla: Not a quotient group. And S is not a normal subgroup.

376

Brad: Well, you don’t get a quotient group.

377

Carla: Right. This set o f these is not a quotient group.
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From Carla’s correct usage o f the term normal subgroup in the above exchange, it is clear
that some learning had occurred. Because this exchange required only short answers
from Carla, however, it is not clear to what extent she had changed her meaning and
usage o f the word normal. On the final exam, she did use the term correctly, writing, for
example, “H is not a normal subgroup o f G because It. cosets * rt. cosets” in response to
the question, “Is H a normal subgroup o f G? Explain” (problem 9d). It would be
interesting to know how she would have responded to a more open-ended question such
as, “Compute the left and right cosets o f H. W hat can you say on the basis o f your
calculations?”
Analysis. The schematic diagram in Figure 25 is an expanded version o f Figure 19,
showing a few more o f the processes and objects involved in activities related to quotient
groups. The core o f the activity is depicted vertically along the center o f the diagram.
Given a group and a subgroup, compute the left and right cosets. Compare the set o f left
cosets with the set o f right cosets. If they are the same, then designate the original
subgroup as a normal subgroup. Calculate the various products o f left or right cosets. If
the sets o f left and right cosets are the same, identify the set o f cosets (with their
products) as a quotient group.
This core activity may be enlarged in two ways. First, the group and the subgroup may
be identified as the domain and kernel, respectively, o f a homomorphism between two
groups. This is similar to Fraleigh’s (1989) treatment, in that the concept of quotient
group is introduced as the group o f cosets o f the kernel o f a homomorphism. The second
way to enlarge the core coset activity is to ask, once the quotient group has been
calculated, whether the quotient group is isomorphic to a familiar group. Several
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students did this naturally on the basis o f the patterns in the table, as discussed in
chapter 5.

Figure 25. Quotient group activity
Two groups and a
homomorphism

^ Group and
Subgroup

A

o

£

C/5

Left Cosets

03

o1-

Right Cosets

Sets of Cosets

i
Products of Cosets
V

Quotient Group

►
Familiar
isomorphic group

Note: Arrows indicate processes. The d otted arrows denote designation
processes that are legitimate only if the left and right cosets are the same (the
result o f an implicit comparison process on the sets o f right and left cosets).

These extensions are useful in the analysis because for Carla these extensions were
sometimes natural parts o f the activity. In particular, in one task she at first wanted the
subgroup to be the kernel, demonstrating a connection between the core activity and the
concepts o f kernel and homomorphism (Carla 4, line 28). And after completing the
group table for {1, 3} and {5, 7}, she went on to show, without any prompting from me,
that the group was isomorphic to a familiar group with two elements.
The extensions are also useful for mathematical reasons because the entire diagram can
be tied together with the first isomorphism theorem, which says that, given a group
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homomorphism, the quotient o f the domain and the kernel o f the homomorphism is
isomorphic to its image. This is illustrated in the isomorphism that Carla noticed
between the quotient group {{1, 3}, {5, 7}} and the subgroup {0, 2} in Z4 .
Building on the analysis above, it seems that for Carla, the entire center of Figure 25,
from just below “Subgroup” to “Sets o f Cosets,” was essentially one concept: coset.
Although within that concept she could distinguish between left and right cosets, she did
not distinguish vertically between the processes and objects. Regarding her use o f the
word normal, she correctly associated the word with the comparison o f the cosets, but
rather than reaching backward in the activity to attach the label to the subgroup, she
reached forward and attached it to the quotient group. This labeling is not surprising
when one realizes how distant the subgroup is when one is comparing the sets o f right
and left cosets. Furthermore, once the name normal was attached to the quotient group, it
was very difficult for Carla to make any connection between it and the subgroup.
W hat is important in the diagram in Figure 25 is not the names o f the processes and
objects but the structure— the relationships among the various components. Just as
learning group theory requires abstracting from the particular names o f the elements and
the operations, thinking about the learning o f group theory requires abstracting from
particular names o f the objects and processes. This conclusion alone is not very
surprising, as it is obvious that different languages use different terms for concepts. The
above analysis, however, suggests more. First, to learn group theory requires not only
attaching names but also carving the activity into concepts. Second, making new
distinctions and changing one’s language both require accommodation in the sense of
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reorganizing one’s conceptual structures. These ideas are elaborated in the next
subsection.

Diane. Lori, and Quotient Groups
Diane and Lori’s fourth interview took place the same day that Dr. Benson had
introduced Lagrange’s theorem and the term quotient group. Diane and Lori were able to
compute an operation table for a quotient group, but whereas Carla had a nonstandard
name for the quotient group, Diane and Lori had no name at all. Instead, their concepts
o f coset and quotient group were aided and obstructed by vague connections with
Lagrange’s theorem.
While computing cosets o f a subgroup in £>3, Diane stated that there would be two cosets,
“because the order o f this [subgroup] is 3, the order o f £ > 3 is 6 , so

6

over 3 is 2” (line 84).

The calculation is correct, by Lagrange’s theorem (see the subsection Conceptual
Analysis above). I asked them for justification.
8 8

Lori: Probably the definition came up in class.

90

Lori: That’s like Lagrange’s theorem, wasn’t it?

92

Lori: I don’t remember it, because I just learned it [inaudible],

93

Diane: Well, if this is a subgroup ...

95

Diane: ... then we know that it’s a normal group o f this and we got the subgroup o f that.

96

Lori: It’s the order o f the group divided by the subgroup. Like order G divided by H.

97

Lori: Yeah, it was order G divided by H, but that was G mod ...

98

Diane: Well, they’re similar; they are the same definition G mod H.

Rather than a clear justification, Diane and Lori provided vague associations with a
number o f phrases and symbolizations: Lagrange’s theorem, normal group, order G
divided by H, and G mod H. Many o f these words could be part o f a correct justification,
but some o f the phrases are nonstandard. The data are insufficient to provide a sense o f
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what Diane meant by the term normal group, but because she does not use the term later
to describe a group o f cosets, it seems unlikely that she was using the term as Carla had.
The phrase “order G divided by H " is ambiguous because o f the lack o f parentheses in
everyday speech: Did Lori mean \G\/Hor \G/H\? The former is mathematically
problematic; the latter is standard notation only when the quotient group G/H is defined,
which requires that the subgroup be normal. In that case, it is numerically though not
logically correct as a way to count cosets because G/H and the set o f cosets o f H are
identical as sets.
The issue o f the meaning o f G/H came up again later in the interview. Diane had again
called upon the calculation

6

divided by 3 to justify that there would be 2 cosets.

Recalling that we had proved this result in class, I asked them what about the proof
implied that
2 91

6

divided by 3 made sense?

Lori: That was the quotient group definition; Lagrange is a little different. Lagrange,
like, stems from it. Is that correct? You actually had G divided by H under the whole
quotient group definition. I remember that.

2 92

Brad: Right, but remember G is a group, and H is a group....

2 94

Brad: So a group divided by a group is a little different than a number divided by a
number. I mean, you are doing 6 divided by 3.

2 95

Lori: Well, we are doing the order o f G.

296

Diane: If you get a group that’s 6 elements, divided by a group o f 3 elements, you should
get 2 groups o f 3 elements each. [Lori writes G/H.]

D iane’s phrase “divided by a group o f 3 elements” suggests that her work with cosets and
with Lagrange’s theorem had become something like quotitive division:

6

elements -r

3 elements per group = 2 groups. This statement would be almost correct if she had used
the term coset rather than group. But again she did not provide justification.
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From what Lori wrote and said, it appears that she was considering only the orders o f the
groups in her division, so she did not see a problem o f meaning in either “G divided by
H ” or “the order o f G divided by H .” As the interview continued, she seemed more
concerned with what to write down than with its meaning:
32

6

Lori: Yeah, isn’t it like the order o f G divided by HI [Okay.] Or the order o f both, which
is it? I am not clear on the definitions.

32 7

Brad: Well, clearly if we talk about G the group divided by H a subgroup, and write it
that way ...

32 8

Diane: If you’re taking the orders ...

The way Diane interrupted me suggested that she too was thinking mostly about the
orders o f the groups.
I again distinguished between dividing groups and dividing their orders and stated that
the quotient group was written as G/H, which Lori described as “no order” (line 332).
3 34

Lori: [Writes “quotient: G /#.”] Did you even right this on the board or am I jumping
ahead? Just because I remember this. Did we talk about this today?

33

Diane: We did something with order.

6

3 37

Lori: Then this must be Lagrange’s theorem. It must be like this. [She changes earlier
G/H to \G\/H. See line 296.]

338

Diane: No, it was on the left board. It wasn’t near Lagrange. Cause Steve wrote
Lagrange, and Steve wrote something else. He had something like G, order G, and
something like order o f K, I think it was. [pause] Yeah. Because K is the subgroup and
this is a subgroup. So you take G, which is this, and divide it by the order o f K. I think
that was it. [Lori changes |G y#to \G\/\H\.]

Thus, for Diane and Lori, the concepts, processes, and notations for Lagrange’s theorem
and quotient groups were mixed together in a jumble o f vague memories from class.
Moreover, the way that Lori moved flexibly from G/H to \G\/H to \G\/\H\ suggests that the
vertical bars did not carry much meaning for her and reinforces the point that the
symbolizations were about the orders o f the groups and not the groups themselves.
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After we had determined that the subgroup was normal, we were ready to talk about
quotient groups. I asked what could be done with normal subgroups.
368

Lori: Maybe figure out something with quotient groups?

37 3

Lori: So quotient group is just G divided by H.

374

Brad: Well that’s the notation for it.

375

Lori: That’s not the definition.

37

Diane: No.

6

377

Lori: Can I see the definition? I am not too clear on it.

37

Diane: No, I am not too clear.

8

Thus, for Lori and Diane, qu otient grou p had little meaning beyond the symbolism G/H,
further supporting the idea that they had been dividing not groups but orders o f groups all
along.
I asked several questions about what they typically might do with the set o f cosets but did
not get much o f a response until I asked whether it would be possible to create a group.
Diane began making some calculations. Lori did not see whatshe was up to, so I asked
Diane to explain.
40 5

Diane: I am multiplying each elem ent...

407

Diane: ... o f one set with each element o f another, o f the coset. Take (1) divided by each
element, (123) divided by each, multiplied by each element and then (132) multiplied by
each element. I think w e’re going to get a [group].

T hey com pleted their calculations and saw that it was a group with tw o elem ents that
were sets, where one o f the sets acted like the identity. I asked them what to call it.
4 43

Diane: A group o f cosets? No. A group generated by cosets?

445

Lori: I am sure it has another name, though.

4 46

Diane: ... [If] you say a group o f cosets, then you can say any cosets you absolutely want
to. It has to be a little more.

448

Diane: A group o f cosets under Z)3.

450

Diane: The elements o f D 3 generated by ...
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4 52

Diane: ... generated by (1), (123), (132)?

D iane’s suggestion o f “a group o f cosets” was a good start, but she had a sense that she
needed to provide a more precise description. Lori later likened it to a subgroup but saw
that it was not a true subgroup, because “things are like sectioned o f f ’ (line 460).
They continued suggesting names:
4 62

Diane: Probably something so obvious. A group o f cosets.

4 63

Lori: Group coset. Coset groups?

4 64

Diane: Normal subgroup. Normal group? Normal coset group.

Again, they provided good suggestions, but they were not connecting with the language
that had been introduced that day in class. I asked them what other words had been used
in class and they suggested isomorphism and kernel. W ith that, they noticed that their
group was isomorphic to the {e, a) group. I reminded them that the left and right cosets
had been equal, and they pointed out that H was a normal subgroup.
499

Diane: It’s two [cosets] together, and since this is the table generated by it [the normal
subgroup] maybe this is the normal group.

500

Lori: Normal subgroup group.

The strong connection with normality provided some reasonable yet nonstandard
language that was, in fact, identical to Carla’s language, suggesting once again that
Carla’s unusual language was not so unusual after all.
I decided to intervene :
52 4

Brad: What about quotient group? What do you suppose a quotient groups is?

525

Lori: This is a “divided by” it’s not like a contained in some little subgroups [inaudible].
It’s G divided by H.

52

Brad: Well, that’s the notation for it.

6

5 27

Lori: Okay. Steve said he liked to think o f it as a remainder, like in the Z4 case.

52

Diane: I think this would probably be more o f a quotient group, because you want to say
that this group is only generated by this element, and you would only get this table right

8
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here because you’re not taking into consideration this element.
52 9

Lori: Right, and when I said that this normal subgroup, when I said that this generated
this table ...

531

Lori: ... it didn’t really, because if you just had it how would you come up with this set?
So this is the normal subgroup, and this must be the quotient group, generated by that
normal subgroup.

They both were uncomfortable about the idea o f saying the normal subgroup “generated”
the other cosets. Nonetheless, they eventually both pointed to the operation table they
had created for the cosets and decided that it must be the quotient group. Lori, for
example, said, “I ’m thinking, by definition, this must be the quotient group” (line 540).
Thus, in the end, both Lori and Diane were able to compute and recognize a quotient
group. They had no trouble making the calculations, once they got started, but they
associated neither the process nor the result with the term quotient group. While trying to
find a name for the group o f cosets they had created, they had several good suggestions,
including Carla’s term normal group, but they decided to call the group a quotient group
only after I brought up the term.

Other Students and Quotient Groups
An overriding theme in the analysis o f the interviews above was the problem o f attaching
names and notations to processes and objects with which the students had developed
some proficiency. In this section, I elaborate on this theme. The section opens by first
returning to the previous discussion o f the process/object distinction in the students’
understanding o f cosets and then broadening the discussion to include the concept o f
quotient group. There was a strong sense in which the students understood cosets and
quotient groups as both processes and objects, and yet there were ways in which their
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conceptions were incomplete, as evidenced by significant linguistic and notational
difficulties.
The linguistic difficulties manifested themselves primarily in the strong connection
between the concepts o f normality and quotient group, because, after all, they both
depend upon left and right cosets being the same. Thus, I next discuss the students’
understanding o f the concept o f normality followed by a presentation o f the various ways
that students tried to name the quotient group. The section closes by bringing together
the issues o f naming, notation, processes, and objects by considering the metaphor of
gluing names to ideas.
Processes versus objects. Although a few o f the key participants experienced initial
difficulties computing cosets, they all were eventually able to manage the process, some
o f them with considerable proficiency. Thus, all the students developed process
conceptions o f cosets. After computing the cosets o f a subgroup, all the students were
willing to talk about cosets as being elements o f a larger structure, a set of sets. They
could compare left and right cosets and notice whether they were the same or different.
They could perform coset arithmetic, even in the case o f Z)3, and could talk about whether
a pair o f cosets produced another coset. Thus, metaphorically, cosets were also objects.
Nonetheless, the students had difficulty using notation to support their thinking, and they
sometimes used language ambiguously in ways that suggested that their thinking was
immersed in the process o f computing all o f the cosets.
To begin their computations o f quotient groups, the students often needed a direct
question such as, “Can we make a group out o f these cosets?” With that question, the
process for creating such a group seemed obvious and natural to everyone except Lori,
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although she was quick to latch on to what Diane suggested. Operation tables served
both to organize the students’ calculations and to help them see that the result was or was
not a group. Operation tables helped them think o f cosets as objects that can have
inverses or that can function as the identity. With the operation table they saw
isomorphisms between the quotient group and other familiar groups. Thus,
metaphorically, quotient groups were objects as well. Nonetheless, the students had
trouble with the term quotient group and with the notation G/H.
A brief characterization o f the students’ concept images is roughly as follows: Cosets
were objects, but aH was a process. The term coset applied both to an individual coset
and to the set o f all o f them. When the left and right cosets were the same, the “left
coset” could form a group, which was called “the normal group.” Both of these were
objects. Coset arithmetic was a process, and the resulting operation table was an object,
yet the terms quotient group and the notation G/H referred to neither o f these.
Clearly the hierarchical process/object distinction is insufficient to explain these results.
What does it mean to say that a student thinks o f quotient groups as objects when the
student does not call those objects quotient groups? What does it mean to say that a
student thinks o f cosets as object when the notation aH is not part o f that understanding?
I reconsider the process/object distinction in chapter 8 .
Normality. The students’ concept images o f quotient group were very closely tied to
their concepts o f normality. The common thread among the students’ uses o f the word
normal is captured by Carla’s statement, “You had left and right cosets that were equal to
each other” (Interview 3, line 109). This characterization applies both to standard and
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nonstandard uses, including Carla’s “normal group.” All o f the students gave such a
characterization o f the word n orm al at some point during their interviews.
W hat was different among the students’ conceptions was the object to which the word
n orm al applied: to the group o f cosets or to the subgroup. When one determines that the

left and right cosets are the same, the standard language points both back to the subgroup
and forward to the group o f cosets, attaching the names n orm al su bgroup and qu otient
grou p, respectively. All o f the key participants except Carla were able to point back to

the subgroup to call it normal, although they demonstrated varying degrees o f certainty.
Diane and Lori were willing to point forward while searching for a term to describe the
group o f cosets, suggesting terms such as n orm al grou p and n orm al co set grou p, thereby
supporting the reasonableness o f Carla’s language. The terms qu otient grou p and norm al
and the ideas they represent are so strongly connected perhaps it should not be surprising
that the terms are sometimes confounded.
The students also demonstrated strong connections between normality and
commutativity, often concluding correctly that the left and right cosets were the same
when the group was commutative. Robert’s concept image o f normality was strongly
connected to the word A belian, a label applied to groups in which the operation is
commutative. In his fourth interview, for example, when comparing left and right cosets
o f a subgroup, he said, “It does not look like this thing is Abelian as I predicted” (line
148). In his explanation, he focused on whether the elements themselves commuted with
each other and then whether the left and right cosets were the same. Later, he seemed to
be thinking that when the left and right cosets were the same, the resulting quotient group
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should also be Abelian, a prediction that is true for all o f the groups the class investigated
in detail but false in general.
Naming the quotient group. All o f the key participants demonstrated some difficulty
attaching the standard name quotient group to the group that they created from cosets.
For example, after completing an operation table for some cosets, Robert said, “I ’d
describe it as a normal subgroup. But actually, no. It’s a group somehow that’s like
generated by a normal subgroup” (line 351). Later, he provided another formulation: “I
formed a group o f ... an Abelian group using cosets generated by (123)” (Interview 4,
line 391).
During her third interview, Wendy called the result “the coset group ... because it’s a
subgroup o f coset elements” (lines 309-313). I asked her for clarification on the word
subgroup, and she rephrased her response: “So it’s the group o f all o f the elements in the,
all o f the cosets elements” (line 315). By her fourth interview, Wendy had attached the
term quotient group in the standard way. She explained that “a quotient group is the
operation table o f the cosets ... elements” (line 6) and later, after computing an operation
table for the quotient o f 4Z in Z, she characterized the quotient group as “the group
containing all the cosets” (line 219).
Thus, all the students came up with names for quotient group that indicated reasonable
conceptual connections and that demonstrated a good informal sense o f the concept. The
connections to words normal and coset were particularly strong. Wendy was the only
key participant who was able to give a characterization o f the term quotient group
without my intervention. W endy’s fourth interview took place after the final exam,
however, so I hesitate to draw conclusions from this comparison with the other students.
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In any case, Carla’s insistence on calling a quotient group a “normal group” is not really
surprising.
Gluing. The diagram entitled “Quotient Group Activity” (Figure 25) does not paint a
sufficiently detailed picture o f the conceptual complexity o f what there is to leam. If the
figure were to be augmented to include various symbolizations and Lagrange’s theorem,
however, it would become unwieldy and defeat its purpose. Thus, rather than
constructing another figure, I state more simply that the overriding issue regarding the
concept o f quotient group was the confusion among the following:
•

•

•

names
o Lagrange’s theorem
o quotient group
o normal [group or subgroup]
o coset group
symbolizations
o G/H
o G mod H
o order G divided by H
o \G\/H
o \G/H\

o \G\/\H\
processes and objects
o counting cosets by dividing the orders o f the groups
o calculating the products o f the cosets
o the resulting group [given by its table]
o the subgroup that gave rise to the cosets

Each o f the above is a signifier o f some aspect o f the students’ activity regarding the
concept o f quotient group. Some o f them are standard signifiers; others were invented by
the students.

The list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather is intended to demonstrate

the complexity o f making the standard connections among the various signifiers. Clearly
learning the concept o f quotient group is more complicated that is suggested by the
metaphor o f gluing names to ideas (see, e.g. Hewitt, 2001).
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Perhaps some o f the confusion was caused by the fact that the standard names, notations,
and processes were introduced at about the same time. This explanation is probably
insufficient, however, for the notation G/H seems to be very easily interpreted as division
o f natural numbers, and that was not the only confusion. Because the students were able
to carry out the processes adequately and appropriately and were able to talk about the
results as objects, a more plausible explanation is that there is considerable cognitive
work to be done in attaching the names and notations to the objects and processes.

Summary
Once again, the overriding issue regarding the concept o f quotient group was one o f
language and notation. The students were happy to consider the cosets as elements o f a
larger structure. They often knew that in order for the cosets to form a group, the left and
right cosets needed to be the same. Despite the fact that many o f them needed some
prompting about coset arithmetic, they seemed to regard the procedure as reasonable and
even natural. By organizing their calculations in an operation table, they were able to see
whether the result was a group. Thus, the students conceived o f cosets and quotient
groups as both processes and objects. Attaching language and notation to these concepts
and calculations was problematic, however, and the students were aware o f these
difficulties. Regarding the term quotient group, other terms such as coset group and
normal group seem to be more natural. More generally, some o f their difficulties seemed
to arise out o f the strong procedural, conceptual, notational, and experiential
commonalities between the terms, making it difficult for the students to manage the
connections among them.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

303

Main Themes
Regarding the concepts o f homomorphism, coset, and quotient group, the main themes
developed at the end o f chapter 5 also serve well for organizing the results o f this chapter.
Once again the students’ use o f language and notation emerged as a central issue. Once
again, the students used operation tables and other conceptual tools for managing their
relationships with abstract ideas.
With each o f the topics in this chapter, the students’ language and notation was
sometimes nonstandard and often imprecise. Furthermore, the students sometimes had
trouble with the concepts and process because o f confusions about the language and
notation. And even when they seemed to understand the concepts, they sometimes had
trouble using language and notation in standard ways to support their thinking. They
often left off quantifiers in their definitions o f homomorphisms and began reasoning
symbolically without adequately specifying their symbols. Nonetheless, at other times,
the students’ language was nonstandard yet precise. Carla, for example, consistently
called a quotient group “the normal group.” Furthermore, the students’ seemingly
idiosyncratic language was often not idiosyncratic, as there were commonalities across
students.
The students often did not distinguish adequately between a set and an element,
particularly regarding notation but even regarding their use o f the word coset. The
notation aH was sometimes a particular coset, sometimes the set o f all o f them, but
mostly a process for generating cosets, although the notation did not always support the
students’ understanding o f the process. The data suggest the problem o f distinguishing
between a set and an element might be better described as a difficulty conceiving o f a
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symbol as representing a generic yet particular object. For some students, symbols such
as 4x represented neither a specific nor a particular multiple o f 4 but rather any multiple
o f 4. And if it can represent any multiple of 4, it is a short cognitive leap to imagine that
it represents all multiples o f 4. This kind o f reasoning was characterized as being
immersed in the process o f generating all such elements.
The metaphor o f gluing is clearly unsatisfactory to describe the cognitive requirements of
making connections among language, notation, processes, and objects. Instead, learning
to make standard linguistic and notational distinctions seems to require first conceptual
distinctions and then a dialectic that supports connections among them. Thus, both
creating and changing a student’s use o f language and notation require building cognitive
structures that support and fit the linguistic and notational distinctions.
To manage their relationships with abstract ideas, the students often used operation tables
to support their reasoning. Operation tables served to organize the students’ calculations
for determining whether a function was a homomorphism. Organizing their coset
calculations in an operation table seem to help them see whether a set o f cosets formed a
group and also helped them see the result as a group— an object— with elements that
were sets.

With the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the students also supported their thinking
through proficiency with the concepts, examples, representations, and related facts. For
example, when creating tables o f quotient groups, they demonstrated considerable
proficiency with abstract groups and their representations, using facts about the tables in
order to support their calculations and catch errors.
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The process/object distinction was helpful in characterizing the students’ thinking but
was insufficient for making developmental distinctions. The students could conceive o f
cosets as objects, yet the notation aH specified a process. They conceived o f quotient
groups as objects, but confused the notation G/H with Lagrange’s theorem. The data
suggest that two encapsulations might be required for cosets: one to see a specific coset
(say in Z u or D 3 ) as an object and another to see aH as representing such an object,
which harkens back to the problem o f imagining generic particular objects. These issues
and themes are further elaborated in chapter 8 .
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CHAPTER VII

PRELIMINARY MATHEMATICS

This chapter includes discussion o f the relationships between the concepts in group
theory and preliminary mathematical ideas that became prominent in my analysis o f
student understanding. While success in abstract algebra clearly requires broad and
strong background knowledge, it was not clear a priori what background concepts would
be implicated. The two concepts for which there were sufficient data for an analysis are
functions and modular arithmetic. Because neither o f these topics was explicitly
investigated in the interviews, it is not possible to provide a thorough analysis o f the
students’ understandings o f either o f them. Instead, I provide an analysis o f particularly
salient episodes that raise some interesting issues and then discuss how those issues
played out more broadly with the other students.
Before presenting my analysis o f the students’ understanding o f functions and modular
arithmetic, however, I make brief comments about two other concepts: exponents and
zero. These preliminary mathematical ideas likely played a significant role in the
students’ thinking, but little detailed data was available. The topics deserve mention here
because o f their importance in both group theory and school mathematics and because o f
potential implications for an abstract algebra course that aims to provide opportunities for
students to strengthen their understanding o f these key ideas.

306
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Issues related to exponents came up periodically when, in unfamiliar settings, students
were unsure what g° might mean or whether g ~4 should mean (g _1)4or (g 4)-1. In
abstract algebra, as in school mathematics, the rules for exponents are initially defined for
exponents that are positive integers. Those rules are extended first to allow exponents
that are zero and then exponents that are negative integers. The guiding principles behind
the extensions are, first, that the rules that work in the original system should continue to
work in the extended system and, second, that the original system should be isomorphic
to a subset o f the extended system. Only with these guiding principles can the
conclusions be adequately supported that g° should be the identity and that g

~4

may be

either (g _1)4or (g 4 ) - 1 because they must all be equal. These extensions are identical to
the extensions from the natural numbers to the whole numbers to the integers—
extensions that prove to be important and difficult for primary school children (Kilpatrick
et al., 2001). Thus, it should not be surprising that extending the rules o f exponents
requires some mathematical and cognitive work.
A more surprising set o f issues that came up from time to time, and likely had some
influence on the students’ difficulties with exponents, had to do with the ontological
status and properties o f zero. Some students were convinced, for example, that zero is
neither even nor odd. Some were convinced that 0/0 = 0. Because the status o f zero as a
number presented considerable obstacles historically (see, e.g., Kaplan, 2000; Seife,
2 0 0 0

), perhaps it should not be surprising that zero continues to be a difficult concept for

some advanced undergraduates. (See Nardi, 2000 for an extended discussion o f the role
o f zero in advanced mathematics.)
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The concepts o f exponents and zero are important in both undergraduate and school
mathematics. With the available data, however, I am able to say only that the concepts
deserve more attention both in the teaching o f undergraduate mathematics and in research
about students’ understanding o f undergraduate and school mathematics. Regarding the
concepts o f functions and modular arithmetic, this study provides more evidence and
insight.
As mentioned in chapter 6 , Diane’s concept o f function became a significant obstacle in
her understanding o f homomorphisms. An analysis o f her third interview revealed
similarities with the thinking o f students who were able to complete the interview tasks
successfully. Regarding modular arithmetic, several students used the word m od with
unusual syntax, but the analysis showed Carla’s syntax to be consistent and
mathematically insightful. Other students demonstrated conceptual difficulties that may
be explained by distinct but related uses o f the word mod in standard mathematical
language.

Functions
The concept o f function plays a role in the abstract algebra concepts o f isomorphism,
homomorphism, and binary operation, though it is easy for its role to remain implicit for
the concept o f binary operation and for informal versions o f isomorphism. The concept
o f function figured prominently when the students were dealing with homomorphisms, as
they tried to manage the relationship between the function provided as a potential
homomorphism and the binary operations in the domain and codomain o f the function.
Before discussing these relationships in the students’ understanding, I provide a brief
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discussion o f two observations that suggest that some o f the difficulties identified in the
literature on the learning o f functions continue to be difficulties for mathematics majors
in advanced courses.
Based on the literature on the learning o f functions, it is not surprising that some o f the
students in this study wanted functions to be given by formulas (see, e.g., Vinner, 1992;
Ferrini-Mundy & Graham, 1994). For example, when I gave the students a potential
homomorphism by specifying the image o f each element in the domain, both Diane and
Robert wanted to know what the formula was, and Carla also strongly identified the
function with its formula. They were willing to assume that there was a formula,
however, and thus were able to continue with the interview and with the tasks I had
proposed.
The students’ concepts o f function were also marked by confusion between closely
related terms and ideas. Carla, for example, temporarily confused the roles o f x andy
regarding the real-valued function described by y = x2 when she said that when x is 3 the
y-value would be V3 (Interview 2, line 32). A number o f students in the class
interchanged the terms range and codomain, an issue I chose to explore with Carla in her
second interview. In the interview, she displayed connections and understandings built
up around the terms. For example, she talked about the idea o f restricting the range o f a
function, analogous to the way the domain o f a function is often restricted in
mathematical discourse. Carla’s “equal-handed treatment o f x an d y ” (Lauten, Graham,
& Ferrini-Mundy, 1994, p. 233) seemed to contribute to a robust yet problematic concept
image. Thus, it seems unlikely that her confusion could have been fixed by merely
telling her she had the terms reversed.
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The remainder o f the discussion on the concept o f function is intended to illustrate some
ways in which the students’ understandings o f functions mattered when they approached
concepts in abstract algebra. I base this discussion on an episode in which Diane
demonstrated particularly unusual understandings and then broaden that discussion to
illustrate how similar phenomena arose with Lori and Carla.

Diane. Functions, and Homomorphisms
Diane’s third interview focused mostly on homomorphisms and functions, and we did not
get to the tasks about cosets. The following episode illustrates three aspects o f her
understanding o f functions, which together impeded her progress on the interview tasks
and likely obstructed her understanding o f the concept o f homomorphism. First, Diane’s
concepts o f function, homomorphism, and binary operation were connected and
intertwined in unusual ways that led to implicit (i.e., unspecified) homomorphisms.
Second, she had trouble attaching the names o f and her associations with the concepts
one-to-one and onto to the objects and processes under consideration. Third, she had an
unusual concept o f function that was connected to and supported by the notation. These
issues were revealed slowly over the course o f the interview.
When Diane provided her definition o f homomorphism, she did not mention the word
group, which perhaps is not surprising, since students in the course almost always were
dealing with some group or other. I asked her how groups were involved:
15

Diane: If a group is a homomorphism, that means you can do this \J{a*b) =fta)*flb)]
with every single element and have both sides be true and a group is a homomorphism.

This appears to be merely unusual syntax, but, as will become clear below, for Diane a
group could be a homomorphism and the group operation supplied the function.
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1 asked her to come up with an example and to show that it was a homomorphism.
19

Diane: So, from like U%I have 1 , 3 , 5 , 7. So for a homomorphism I would have 1, 3
would equaiyfl) and/(3) like that? [Writes/(I *3) = /( l)*/(3)-]

20

Brad: Okay, so what i s / f l ) then?

21

Diane:y(l) is 1, and thenJ{3) = 3. ,/[l*3) here is 3, and/[3) is 3. So it’s 3, and then 1*3
is 3.

Diane began verifying the function was a homomorphism before she had specified what
the function was. From her calculations (lines 21 and following), however, it is clear that
the function she had in mind was equivalent to the identity function on U%, which, as an
isomorphism, is necessarily a homomorphism. It seems unlikely that she would have
described her thinking this way.
1 asked Diane how she had decided thaty(5) was 5 andy(7) was 7:
27

Diane: Well the function here is mod 8 . So under mod 8 , 5 is 5, and 7 is 7. So the
function here is U&.

31

Diane: The function here is Ug. Is the mod 8 . Multiplication.

So for Diane, the group Us provided a function, and the signifiers Us, mod 8 , and even
“mod multiplication 8 ” (line 41) were synonyms for that function. It is true that a group
operation is a function in the sense that it takes an ordered pair o f elements from the
group and returns an element o f the group, but Diane’s function was a function o f one
variable, not two, and hence was not the group operation. Because she seemed to be
concerned about doing “mod 8 ,” a better description o f her function might be/(x) =
x mod 8 , but because the domain o f her function was the set {1, 3, 5, 7}, it is impossible
to tell the difference between this function and the identity function /(x) = x.
Thus, Diane was confusing the concepts o f binary operation, homomorphism, and
function, all under the vague heading “doing mod 8 ,” an idea that was provided implicitly
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either by the binary operation in U% or by the construction o f its elements. This is the
phenomenon o f implicit homomorphisms mentioned in the case o f Carla in chapter

6

and

discussed further below.
I next asked her to consider the function from C/g to Z4 that I had used with all the
participants in their third interview:
34

Brad: Okay. And under this mapping, I want you to send 1 from Ug, I want you to send it
over to 0. And I want you to send 3 also to 0, and I want you to send 5 and 7 from Ug,
both o f them I want you to send to 2.

35

Diane: Using a homomorphism, or just send them over?

36

Brad: Well, send them over. Now I want that to be the mapping,and I want to call it g.
Is that a function? Call it little g. How about that?

37

Diane: It’s a function only if this is true. If you can send them over using g as a function
then it’s true.

38

Brad: I am not sure I understand what you mean by that.

39

Diane: Well, Ug and Z4 here are.... To bring this over to here is g. So if you can bring
this over here, and it’s . ... I think if you can bring 1 and 3 over to 0, and you bring 5 and
7 to 2. I think g can be a function.

40

Brad: I am not quite sure what it is that you are saying and also what it is that you are
worried about. Explain it out loud, as much as you can, what is going through your head.

41

Diane: Well, from here I was saying that Ug was a function. Mod multiplication 8 was
the function. And you are saying that here g is the function. But you have Ug and Z4, but
I would think that Ug and Z4 would be the functions.

In this excerpt, D iane’s language is particularly curious and hard to understand. The
explanation lies in her concepts o f function, homomorphism, group operation, and the
interaction between them. It became clear later in the interview that D iane’s
understanding o f function was based largely on a metaphor o f “sending over,” which, in
this excerpt, forms half o f Diane’s distinction in line 35. Regarding her concept o f
homomorphism, this excerpt reinforces the proposition that, for Diane, the groups
supplied functions, so that where I had suggested a single function g, Diane saw three
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functions: U%, Z4, and g, which were mod 8 , mod 4, and the function that was used to
“send elements over.”
As Diane considered the function I had defined as g, she said did not know “what the
function would be” (line 43), suggesting she wanted it to be given by a formula. She
began using the concepts one-to-one and onto to support her reasoning, but she knew she
was “fuzzy a little bit on the one-to-one and onto definitions” (line 114).
116

Diane: Well, I am remembering that one-to-one means that each element from G has at
most 1 element in G' that it’s being mapped to. And then onto means that each element
G has at least one element.... No, that’s not right; it’s the other way around. One-to-one
means that G' has at most one element being mapped to it, and onto means at least one
being mapped to it. Is that right? Now I am not even sure what the definitions mean. I
know one-to-one is at most 1 and onto is at least 1. I am not sure where it starts.

Thus, her concepts o f one-to-one and onto were guided by associations with “at most
one” and “at least one,” respectively, but these associations were not enough to help her
determine whether to focus on the domain or the codomain.
W hen the interview returned to determining whether g was a homomorphism, Diane
described how she was thinking about the verification process:
14 4

Diane: And, well, here you have the function g. I should put g here. And then you take
your two elements and put them through g and you get an element here in Z4. So if you
do it on the other side o f the homomorphism, you take a here send it through the function
and get your element, send b through the function and get your element, and then you put
them together in Z4.

146

Diane: We could take like g and 3 times 1. And in Ug, 3x1 = 3, andg(3) is 3. And g
of.... I don’t think I did what I said I’m supposed to do. I think I sent this over to get
g(3) in Z4 is 3 and 3 star 1...

In her description o f the process, it appears Diane saw g(a*b) and g(a)*g(b) as two sides
o f the homomorphism, suggesting that the defining formula for a homomorphism was the
homomorphism itself. Furthermore, in evaluating g(3), Diane ignored my definition o f g
altogether and instead decided that g(3) was 3.
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At this point Diane suggested we stop the interview because she was too tired and was
not thinking clearly. I told her that it was entirely up to her but, that I would probably
still find the interview to be useful in my analysis. She chose to continue. We returned
to determining why g(3) = 3.
1 63

Diane: Okay, from here g(3), I took 3 and 1 from Ug, put them together in Ug, sent them
over to g, then you take g(3) from here, and that equals 3 because you are in Z4.

164

Brad: I didn’t follow that. I understand that 3x1 is 3 in Ug. But then where is the sending
over happening, and where are you writing that? That’s what I am not following.

165

Diane: Well, I want g(3), so I am taking the 3, bring it over through g.

166

Brad: Taking the 3 from?

167

Diane: From Ug. Across the function g into Z4, and so I am now taking 3 from Z4. And it
equals 3.

168

Brad: Okay, because 3 in Z. ... Hold o ff from this for a minute. What is g(5)?

169

Diane: First you take the five from Ug. 5 in Ug is 5. Bring over g(5) into Z4. So g(5) is 1.

170

Brad: And how did you do that?

171

Diane: You took the element 5 from Ug, and you want to bring it over through g. So g(5)
is now in Z4, and 5 in Z4 is 1.

172

Brad: Oh, because ...

173

Diane: Because g isn’t happening to any element until it passes into Z4.

174

Brad: And so what does g do?

175

Diane: g maps something over; it sends something over. So g is sending the 5 over. It’s
not doing anything to the 5 really, it’s just sending the 5 over.

176

Brad: And once the 5 gets over there ...

177

Diane: You can do the other operation to it.

Diane then explained that the other operation is “the Z4 operation” (line 181). Diane had
completely ignored my definition o f g and saw g instead as sending elements over from
one group to another. Once an element had been sent over to Z4, she did the Z4 operation
to it (i.e., found its remainder, mod 4) to be sure that it was an element o f Z4. It is not
clear from D iane’s description, however, whether the 5 becoming 1 was part o f g or
something that happened after g had completed its job.
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In this episode, Diane’s peculiar take on functions and homomorphisms was supported, in
part, by the ease with which an element from U% could be transformed into an element o f
Z4 . I then constructed a function h from D 4 to U% for which this would be impossible. In

response, Diane used my specification without hesitation, saying, for example, “h(R0),
that sends Ro to 1” (line 209) and later “Ro is 1” (line 213), suggesting that she had made
an identification o f elements between the two groups in such a way that h was still doing
the sending. When I asked her why she knew that h mapped i ? 9 0 to 3, she responded,
“Because you said so” (line 233), implying that she was aware o f my role in the
specification o f h.
I then asked her to think about g (3) from the previous example, and she responded that “g
maps 3 to 0” (line 235). I ask her whether that was what she had said before:
23 9

Diane: Nope. I don’t know why this would make more sense. I guess it’s because we
just did it in class or something. O f course, it shouldn’t have made a difference.

24

Diane: That g was just.... I didn’t think that g itself was doing anything really. So I
thought that if I did this first, that g is actually Ug.

6

24 7

Brad: That g is actually U{! What do you mean by that?

24

Diane: Well, when I said “g(3) is 3.”... In t/g, g(3) is 3. So I think maybe that’s what I
was doing.

8

Thus, at this point in the interview, her thinking had changed, but I still had not reached
much clarity on how she w as thinking about the function g. I asked her to clarify:
2 51

Brad: So what are you thinking now g does to ...?

25 2

Diane: g sends the 3 to 0.

253

Brad: And the 3 is something that exists where?

254

Diane: In U%.

255

Brad: And the 0 is something that exists ...

256

Diane: In Z4.

257

Brad: Okay. Then you said g(3).... And whenever you talk about g(3), where is that
thing?
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2 58

Diane: Right here in the middle.

259

Brad: What do you mean by that?

2 60

Diane: I haven’t actually.... This by itself, g(3), I haven’t exactly done anything to it yet.

Diane imagined three different places where a value might exist: the domain, the
codomain, and in the middle. This interpretation becomes clearer in the following
explanation:
2

64

Diane: You take an element in Ug, apply the function g to it, so now you have the
function g o f something in Ug. So now it’s no longer in Ug, because you are applying g to
it. [Okay.] Okay? Now as you bring it over, g is not doing anything but mapping it
over, just carrying it over. So, if you are stuck— well, you’re not going to be stuck— but
if you happen to be in the middle, you are not actually doing anything to the element. So
it’s still going to be g o f an element in Ug. And when you bring it all o f the way over to
Z4, then you are actually doing something. So g(3) is now 0 because you are actually
over in Z4.

Thus, 3 begins in Ug; g(3) is the process o f carrying the 3 over to Z4, which exists
between Ug and Z4 but which does not actually do anything until the 3 is brought all o f
the way over, at which point g(3) becomes 0.
The above episode illustrates three issues, which are treated in different ways in the
discussion that follows. Diane’s implicit specification o f the homomorphism from Ug to
Ug is discussed below with reference to a similar episode with Carla. Diane’s difficulty
attaching the terms one-to-one and onto to aspects o f the given functions can be seen as
another instance o f the issue o f naming, which is treated in detail in chapters 5 and

6

regarding other concepts. Her nonstandard interpretation o f function notation is
discussed next with reference to Lori’s understandings and interpretations of functions.

Function Notation
The idea that g(3) denotes a value between the domain and the codomain is a nonstandard
interpretation o f function notation. Lori demonstrated similar nonstandard interpretations
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during her third interview, which took place separately from Diane’s. She was working
with the function/ from C/ 8 to Z4, given by 7(1) = 0,7(3) = 0,7(5) = 2, and7(7) = 2.
Regarding the notation7(1), she knew that 1 was in U%. She first claimed that7(1) was in
the codomain because it was 0. Then she changed her mind: “I ’m sorry, f(l), and that’s
in the domain, ... but then when I take their functional values, 7(1) is 0” (line 79).
I asked her again where7(1) was.
83
8

4

85

Lori:7(1). Do you mean7(1) before it’s evaluated? Or7(1) after it’s evaluated.
Brad: Well, explain both.
Lori:7(l) is actually in the domain. But then the functional value o f7 (l) is 0, and that’s in
the codomain.

Thus, Lori first imagined two senses of7(l): before and after it is evaluated. But then she
made a distinction between 7 (l), which is in the domain, and its value 0 , which is in the
codomain. So at first, the notation was ambiguous, but then she resolved the ambiguity
by making an incorrect notational distinction.
As the interview continued, she decided that ‘7(1) is like 1” (line 91), which perhaps
prepared her for a different notational distinction. I then asked her to consider another
function g, which I did not specify, and asked her where g(3) would be. She decided
correctly that 3 was in the domain and g (3) was in the codomain and made similar
conclusions about 7 ( 1 ).
I asked her to explain how she had been thinking o f it earlier.
115

Lori: Oh, I said that if—it’s wrong now— but I said that if,7(1) before it was sent is in the
domain, and then after it’s sent, it’s 0, and it’s in the codomain. [Okay.] That’s wrong. 1
is in the domain, andy(l) is in the codomain, andyf 1 ) evaluated in the codomain is 0 .

121

Lori: 1 is before it’s sent,7(1) is after it’s sent, and 0 is after it’s sent.
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Lori’s focus on “before and after” suggests that she, too, focused on a process that
occurred between the domain and the codomain. For D ian e,/(l) was in the middle,
whereas for Lori, /( l) was in either the domain or the codomain depending upon whether
it was before or after evaluation.
It appears that there is something salient about the process o f evaluating a function—
something that led Lori to conclude, if only momentarily, that/(1 ) represented both the
before and after o f this process. Lori resolved this ambiguity first by p lacin g /[l) in the
domain. Diane, in contrast, resolved the ambiguity by creating a new abstract entity that
existed “in the middle” between the domain and the codomain.
The idea that g(3) is a value in the middle between the domain and codomain is a
reasonable, although incorrect, conclusion to draw from the notation and the metaphors.
In standard mathematical usage, when g(3) = 0, the 3 is in the domain, and both g(3) and
0 are in the codomain. But by imagining a function as a process, as a machine, or as
something that “sends elements over,” the process or the traveling will take time, creating
a metaphorical need to notate a value in process or in transit. The notation g(3) is an
obvious choice because the way it is written seems to suggest that the 3 is still inside the
function and has not yet emerged as 0. For Diane, g(3) denoted this value in the middle.
This interpretation o f the notation and the metaphors seems so obvious and natural that it
seems likely that other students have come to similar conclusions, but the phenomenon
has apparently not been recognized in the literature on the concept o f function. Yet, the
fact that I was able to observe this unusual conception depended, perhaps heavily, on the
particular line o f questions I asked. Without the particular question in line 257, Diane’s
unusual thinking would likely have remained hidden.
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Implicit Homomorphisms
Just as D iane’s unusual interpretation o f function notation was found to have similarities
in the thinking o f other students, her implicit specification o f a homomorphism was an
issue that arose in Carla’s interview as well, as mentioned above. Both Carla and Diane
began verifying that a function was a homomorphism before they had specified what the
function was. In other words, they were working with functions defined implicitly and
did not see a need to be explicit. On the one hand, for Carla, the function was inherent in
the construction o f Z4 and was based on her conception o f modular arithmetic, as is
explored in more detail below. For Diane, on the other hand, the function was tied to
mod 4, which she saw as the group operation. In both cases, the result was that their
understandings o f functions and modular arithmetic led to unexpected outcomes.
Diane’s and Carla’s conceptions raise serious questions about the prominence given to
the canonical homomorphism f. Z —» Z„ given by fix ) = x mod n. On Problem 3 on the
second take-home exam (Appendix B), the students were asked to show that this function
is indeed a homomorphism, and the example was also discussed in class. These events
occurred shortly before third interviews, which may explain why the function was
prominent in Carla’s mind. The issue is that the function does not seem to do very much,
giving the impression that the function is already part o f the codomain and has little to do
with a mapping between two groups. A similar statement can be made about the
canonical homomorphism f . Z -> nZ defined by/(x) = nx.

Another way to look at these episodes is to observe that Carla and Diane were not able to
distinguish between a function between groups, the group operation, and the construction
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o f the group. Thus, this is yet another example o f a need to encourage students to
distinguish among ideas that are closely related.

Summary
Regarding the students’ concept images o f functions, I have presented a few issues that
became prominent in the analysis and that had particular relevance for their
understanding o f elementary group theory. The issues seemed peculiar to Diane at first,
but similarities with other students emerged during the analysis.
Diane’s idea that g(3) was in the middle between the domain and codomain was a natural,
although incorrect, consequence o f the notation and the metaphors. Lori similarly had
trouble placingX l), and although she did not suggest that it was between the domain and
the codomain, her language suggests that the process o f evaluating the function was
psychologically salient. The dominance o f the process in function evaluation has
psychological similarities with the dominance o f process conceptions in students’ concept
images o f cosets.
Diane and Carla both specified functions implicitly when providing examples o f
homomorphisms. The analysis suggests that their concepts o f function, homomorphism
and binary operation were intertwined and that the binary operations in Us and Z4, or,
more simply “mod 8 ” and “mod 4,” provided the functions that they were thinking about.
Thus, it is plausible that some o f their nonstandard conceptions were related to their
understandings o f modular arithmetic, which is the focus o f the next section.
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Modular Arithmetic
Many students used the word mod in unexpected ways in the interviews and in class,
suggesting that their concepts might have differed from those in the mathematical
community. Rather than a thorough analysis o f students’ understanding of modular
arithmetic, I focus on two episodes that provide grounding for the results. The section
begins with a semiotic analysis o f Carla’s use o f the word m od during her first interview.
Then I present an episode that occurred during a class early in the course when many
students were still making sense o f modular arithmetic. The conceptual analysis is
postponed until after the episodes and incorporated into the analysis in order to give more
o f a sense o f the phenomena that the analysis is intended to describe.

Carla and mod
All statements in which Carla used the word mod were collected for analysis. Focusing,
in particular, on statements in which her language use seemed unusual, I constructed an
explanation that accounts for most o f what she said. The series o f statements below is
intended to illustrate the evolution o f this explanation. In these statements, the word mod
is set in bold to draw attention to those phrases that were the subject o f analysis. The
series o f statements is interrupted periodically with comments and working hypotheses to
illustrate how the conclusion grew out o f the data.
1 2

Carla: Because the addition wasn’t a group mod n. Something about mod n isn’t a group
with addition, because multiples of.... Something about multiples of n. Let’s see, mod n
with addition. All right. For an identity for mod n, that would be just zero with addition.

61

Carla: S is just mod n under addition.

79

Carla: So the next thing to check would be associativity. But mod n is a subset of Z
because all of your elements in mod n are integers, and Z under addition is associative, so
therefore mod n under addition is associative. So therefore mod n under addition is a
group.
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Hypothesis: For Carla, mod n was a set. In Carla’s written work, S denoted a set and she
identified that set with mod n (line 61). The notion that mod n is a set, which is clear in
lines 61 and 79, also fits Carla’s language in line 12.
94

Carla: Mod 5 means that a = 5q + r. Mod 5 means that you have elements called a that
satisfy the condition 5q + r. It is kind o f a way to back up from the integer group.

96

Carla: Okay, because if you take an integer, you can ... To me it seems almost like it’s
simplifying because you are dealing with less elements. If you take an integer, say 18,
you can write it in a mod, and you can express.... Say you were dealing with mod 9. 18
is 0 mod 9, but 36 is also 0 mod 9, so it gives you a way to kind o f group and simplify.

Hypothesis: For Carla, mod n was also an operation. Her statement in line 94 also
indicates a connection to the division algorithm, but it is not clear how that relates to her
other conceptions.
118

Carla: For example, the integer— I mean the inverse o f 2 mod 3 would be 1/2 mod 3, and
1/2 is not an integer, and it is not in mod 3, and the only elements o f mod 3 are 0, 1, 2.

18 9

Carla: If you are dealing with Z3 you are supposed to add them in mod 3. So what you
are saying is that the operation is different because you are dealing with mod 3 or mod 6 .
Yeah, I think I remember something being mentioned about that in class.

Note: For Carla, Z3 was not the same as mod 3.
196

Carla: If you are dealing with mod 3, 2, 3, 4 is the same thing as 2, 0, 1 in mod 3. So I
don’t know. I think that it could be a subset because ...

198

Carla: Well, I mean.... Actually, we already know it is a subset, I think that the mod 3
and mod 6 wouldn’t make a difference as far as being considered different operations
because it looks, even though the numbers are different, in the portion of the Z6 table they
are equivalent to the Z3 table if you are dealing with (mod 3). Even though I think that
something was said in class about mod ... 2 mods, different mods are different
operations.

2 00

Carla: Initially they seem the like different operations, but.... Oh, well actually we
weren’t debating really whether Z3 was a subset o f Z6. We are talking about, are their
operations different? I don’t know if they are different. I’m not sure. I don’t think they
are because I remember something being said about that they’re not. And I have nothing
that would make me think that they are the same operation. Because you are doing
nq + r, but with mod 3 you are doing 3q + r and in mod 6 you are doing 6q + r, and
3q + r is very different from 6 q + r. So I think they are different.

Conclusion: For Carla, mod n was the set that you get from “doing nq + r." This
explanation accommodates the set, operation, and process interpretations given above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On the surface, it seems Carla had a rather odd and problematic concept, but on a deeper
level, there were some profoundly mathematical aspects o f her thinking. First, Carla was
able to think about the concept mod n as being both an object (a set) and as a process
(doing nq + r). Second, the set is a set o f remainders, which results from a process that
involves stepping back (backing up) from the integers, and organizing them into
equivalence classes, which she elsewhere described metaphorically as packages
(Interview 1, line 98). Thus, Carla’s mod n describes precisely, without using the
standard names, the idea, the process, and the object that are behind the symbol Z/3Z,
which simultaneously denotes all three. The idea in the standard construction is using the
subgroup 3Z to organize the integers into equivalence classes, the process is creating the
cosets, and the object is the group consisting o f the three cosets under the operation o f
coset arithmetic. In other words, if Carla had instead said “Z/3Z is the set you get from
forming the quotient (or the group o f the cosets) o f 3Z in Z,” we would have been quite
impressed. O f course, this language was not available to her at this early point in the
class.
I have emphasized that the students’ conceptual grids may be different from the accepted
one, thus giving rise to concepts that do not fit the accepted grid. But here we have a
case where the portions o f the grid fit quite well but it is very hard to see the fit through
Carla’s idiosyncratic language. Her unusual language, in this case, does not seem to
indicate a problematic concept. On the other hand, she did seem to focus too much on
the division in the process, making her thinking somewhat slow and laborious.
These excerpts also suggest that some learning had taken place. During the interview
Carla came to a determination that, when “doing nq + r,” the value o f n is a
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distinguishing characteristic o f the related group operation: A different value o f n
indicates a different operation.

Other students and mod
I attempted similar analysis for other students and was not able to come to clear
conclusions. Nonetheless, an episode from class provides helpful ideas for the analysis.
During the second week o f class, after the students had been working for a while on
problems involving modular arithmetic, Dr. Benson asked all the collaborative groups to
spend a few minutes writing down every fact they could think o f that was related to a = b
mod n. They had access to two definitions:
Modular Equations
If a and b are integers and n is a positive integer, we write a = b mod n when n
divides a - b . (Gallian, 1994, p. 8 )
DEFINITION

We say a = b mod n if a and b have the same remainder when divided by n.
(Problem Sheet 1, Appendix C)

The students used both equality and equivalence, with the corresponding symbols, to
describe such relationships.

During the discussions in this particular class period, several issues arose. For example,
the statement 15 = 7 mod 4 created disagreement in some groups o f students. Some
students thought the statement was wrong; others thought that it just had not been
simplified all the way. Wendy pointed out, “The whole point is you’re getting a
remainder.” Another student suggested that the idea was to “Take a big problem and
make it smaller.” More generally, students wondered whether the following statements
were equivalent:
a = b mod n

and

b ~ a mod n.
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For some students, these were not equivalent because a = b mod n meant that a was
supposed to be smaller than b and than n; others thought that b was supposed to be
smaller than a and n.
These notational difficulties were accompanied by more general algebraic difficulties.
Some students, for example, were not sure whether they should write n divides (a - b) or
n divides (b - a), not realizing that the statements were equivalent. In thinking about the
common remainder interpretation, one group first wrote
a
—= q +r
n

,
and

b
,
—= q+ r
n

where q and q' were quotients and r was the remainder. After some discussion, they
decided that the correct expression was
a
r
—~q +—
n
n

,
and

b
, r
—= q H— .
n
n

The groups o f students spent some time considering yet not resolving, many o f the issues
raised by the class. Dr. Benson said,
Some o f you are likely thinking, “Why don’t they just tell us?” Well— and I
don’t mean this in a sarcastic way at all— we did. The point I want to make is
that we did tell you and still there were issues that need to be resolved. (Field
notes, Jan. 24, 1996)

A student said, “Wait! Problem Sheet 1.” Finally, the class summarized the results on
the board:
1.
2

a = b mod n

. b = a mod n

3.

n divides a - b

4.

n divides b - a

5.

a - b = nq for some integer q

6.

a = b + nk, where k is an integer
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7.

a and b have the same remainder when divided by n

8.

— = q H— and — = q'-\— , with q, q’ quotients, r remainder

9.

ci

v

b

v

n

n

n

n

ci —v
n

b —v

= q a n d -------- = q ' , with q, q’ quotients, r remainder

n

Note: q, q’, and r are integers and n cannot be zero.

Several points can be made here. First, as Dr. Benson pointed out, giving the students a
definition was not sufficient for building adequate understanding. They did not even
think o f consulting a definition until after Dr. Benson reminded them that we had told
them.
Second, a deep understanding o f the concept o f modular arithmetic should include all o f
these statements and the connections among them. In other words, all o f these (and the
reasons for their equivalence) are desirable parts o f a sophisticated concept image. But
these representations all use traditional algebraic symbolism and say little about other
representations that might support understanding. Carla, for example, used the metaphor
o f packages, as mentioned above, to help her think about the equivalence classes. Wendy
used the metaphor o f the clock to help her think about the arithmetic in Z„.
Third, although the nine characterizations are algebraically equivalent, they were not
psychologically equivalent for these students. Significant thought was required for the
students to decide that some o f these were equivalent to a = b mod n. One might hope
that the fact that Characterizations 3 and 4 are equivalent would be obvious from the fact
that a - b = - ( b - a ) . But for some o f the students, this was far from obvious, perhaps
indicating insufficient proficiency with high school algebra.
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Analysis
Can all o f the difficulties be attributed to reluctance to consult the definition and to
insufficient proficiency with algebra? Prompted by these events, I conducted a
conceptual analysis. W hat was most surprising in this episode was the students’
disagreements over whether Characterizations 1 and 2 were equivalent. The very notion
o f an equivalence relation implies that it must be symmetric. Just as a = b implies b = a,
so also a = b mod n implies b = a mod n. W hat could be the cause o f difficulty with
something that should be obvious?
I claim the difficulty is caused by ambiguity in the notation. Specifically, the problem is
polysemy: related but distinct uses o f the word mod. It is not often recognized that the
symbol m od is both a type o f equivalence relation and a binary operation. The
equivalence relation interpretation is what Dr. Benson had in mind in the episode
described above. In other contexts, particularly in computer programming languages , 15
m od is a binary operation: an instruction to divide and keep the remainder. In fact,
Gallian (1994) makes this explicit:
D e f in it io n
a mod n
Let n be a fixed positive integer. For any integer a , a mod n (sometimes read “o
modulo n ”) is the remainder upon dividing a by n. (p. 7)

This definition is followed by computational examples such as “8 mod 3 = 2.”
These two interpretations o f the symbol mod create ambiguity in the interpretation o f the
statement 15 = 7 mod 4. If mod qualifies an equivalence relation, the statement is true

15 Both Pascal, BASIC and use m o d as a binary operator. C and C++ use “%” as the symbol for modular
arithmetic, so that “17 % 5” evaluates to 2, for example. The mathematical programming languages
Maple and ISETL use m o d as a binary operator. Mathematica and Mathcad, on the other hand, use
function notation, so that Mod [ 17, 5 ] and mod (17, 5), respectively, are the appropriate ways to
calculate 17 mod 5.
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because 4 divides 1 5 - 7 . B ut if m od is a binary operation, then the right side o f the
equation evaluates to 3 (the rem ainder after dividing 7 by 4), and the statement is false
because 1 5 ^ 3 .

At least some people in the m athem atical com m unity are aware o f this ambiguity. The
m athem atical typesetting language TeX, for exam ple, provides two different commands:
“ \b m o d is to be used w hen ‘m o d ’ is a binary operation, ... and \p m o d is to be used
w hen ‘m o d ’ occurs parenthetically at the end o f a form ula” (Rnuth, 1984, p. 164). Some
texts (e.g., Fraleigh, 1989) distinguish betw een these two uses by adopting the convention
that K nuth describes, but this convention is not universal (see, e.g., Gallian, 1994). Dr.
Benson and I did not use this notational convention consistently, but other results o f this
study suggest that, even if w e had, the students w ould not have used the convention
consistently, at least until they also had m ade the corresponding conceptual distinction.
The conclusion, then, is that both the notational and conceptual distinctions should be
m ade explicit in instruction, perhaps even m aking connections between the two uses. For
exam ple, the statem ent a = b (mod n) can be translated into a binary operation
interpretation as follows:
a mod n = b mod n (in the sense that they both operations give the same result)
Then, w ith the help o f these distinctions, the students m ight be m ore likely to see the
equivalence o f the various formulations o f equivalence m odulo n, such as:
a = b (mod n) if and only if n divides a - b
a = b (mod n) if and only if a and b have the same remainder when divided by n
This way, the polysem y o f the w ord m od m ight be used to support rather than im pede the
growth o f conceptual understanding.
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In summary, this analysis supports three points. First, the distinctions among the several
uses o f the word m od should be made explicit in instruction. Second, the various
formulations provide different conceptual support and sources o f meaning, and several
should be available in instruction. Third, the connections among the various formulations
are not obvious and each connection requires some learning. W hat is unclear is which
definition should be introduced first.
In fact, there is a third use o f the word mod, as in the expression a = b (modulo H), where
H is a subgroup o f a group. The relationship between equivalence modulo //a n d
equivalence modulo n is accomplished via the following generalization o f the standard
definition:
a = b (mod n) if and only if n divides a - b
a = b (modulo H) if and only if abA e H (or a - b e H, if the group is additive)

It is difficult to see the meaning behind these definitions. Thus, it is worth asking
whether there is an alternative definition that would suggest more meaning and
simultaneously make strong connections with equivalence modulo n. The conceptual
root for equivalence modulo H is the idea o f remainders, but remainders cannot be
imposed directly on a group and a subgroup, where there may be no division algorithm.
An alternative definition may be found via equivalence classes, but because the binary
operation carries no notion o f equivalence classes, a better route is through the concept o f
coset.
a = b (modulo H) if and only if a and b lie in the same coset o f H (i.e., aH = bH)

The results o f this study suggest that the above definition should be available to students
for the meaning and understanding it might provide. Furthermore, this definition could
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provide opportunities for students to deepen their understanding o f modular arithmetic,
cosets, and the connections between them. Again, however, it is not clear whether this
definition should be introduced before or after the standard definition.

Summary
This section explains some nonstandard uses o f the word m od that occurred during
Carla’s interview and during a class early in the course. For Carla, mod n was the set the
you get from “doing nq + r ” Conceptually, Carla’s nonstandard usage seems to carry the
same meaning as the more standard statement that Z„ is the set you get from calculating
the quotient group Z/nZ and choosing representative elements. The class had
disagreements about the correctness o f several formulations o f a = b (mod n). Some of
the difficulties that Carla and other students had with the term m od are explained by the
fact that the word is used ambiguously, both as a binary operation and as a type o f
equivalence. It is suggested that the various uses o f the word mod, the various
formulations o f equivalence modulo n and equivalence modulo H, and the connections
among them should be explicit in instruction.

Conclusion
This chapter set out to describe the students’ understandings o f preliminary mathematics
as those understandings came into play in their learning o f group theory. The students’
understanding o f preliminary mathematics was not a specific focus o f any o f the
interviews. Nonetheless, there were episodes demonstrating that the concepts o f function
and modular arithmetic are crucial and that sometimes the students’ nonstandard
conceptions appeared to obstruct their progress on tasks and concepts in abstract algebra.
Regarding the key concepts o f function and modular arithmetic, the analysis shows that,
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just as in the previous chapters, students’ understandings are intimately tied to issues o f
language, notation, and metaphor. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that students’
understandings may be strongly influenced by the particular examples and particular
definitions chosen.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This exploratory study sought to describe students’ understanding in abstract algebra in
the context o f an undergraduate course. Using Tall and V inner’s (1981) notion o f a
concept image, which is the entire cognitive structure associated with a concept, the study
identified prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images for
central concepts in group theory, up to and including the concept o f quotient group.
The setting for the study was an abstract algebra class for mathematics majors, covering
many o f the standard topics from group theory but in which lectures were replaced by
collaborative and individual work on problem sets designed to promote connections
between students’ prior and emerging understandings and the concepts o f group theory.
The analysis and the ensuing results are based largely on interview data with five students
from the class. Other data sources, such as field notes and students’ written exams,
provided corroborating and contrasting evidence.
The research questions were as follows:
•

What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images
as they are learning the fundamental ideas o f group, subgroup, and isomorphism?

•

What are the prominent characteristics and components o f students’ concept images
as they are learning the more advanced ideas o f homomorphism, coset, and quotient
group?

•

How do students’ understandings o f prior mathematics come into play as they are
learning elementary group theory?

332
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Detailed results for each o f these questions, organized according to mathematical
concept, are found in chapters 5-7. This chapter presents a synthesis o f the findings,
along with conclusions and implications.
W hat was initially most salient in the data and the results was that the students used and
interpreted language and representations in nonstandard and unexpected ways that were
not readily explained by available theoretical and conceptual perspectives on advanced
mathematical thinking. On the conviction that the students’ understandings were
reflected in their language and actions, I endeavored to describe and explain the meaning
behind their utterances and their use o f representations. Through these efforts,
characterizing students’ concept images became a process o f theory generation.
Specifically, through an analysis o f language, the goal was to understand students’
representations and to represent their understandings. In this sense, this study was about
the interplay among mathematics, language, and representations.
The results o f the study derive from three types o f analysis: detailed analysis o f the
interview transcripts, global analysis o f the students’ use o f words and notations, and my
own conceptual analysis o f the mathematical content. The methods o f analysis emerged
through the analysis itself, and the research questions evolved as part o f the process. The
detailed analyses generated preliminary hypotheses that were refined through continuing
analysis and synthesis. The global analyses involved searching the data for words and
notations to confirm and refute the emerging hypotheses. The conceptual analyses served
to make explicit the ways in which the students’ use o f language was compared with
standard usage in the mathematical community. These analyses were performed
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iteratively so that emerging results could continually inform other types o f analysis. The
analysis and synthesis produced two main findings.
The first finding concerns issues o f language and notation; it is described below as
making the vague more precise. In short, language use that at first had seemed
idiosyncratic and ambiguous was found to have common threads across students. The
students confused related words and had trouble attaching names to their experiences in
standard ways. This finding supports the position that attaching names to experience is
not simply a process o f gluing labels to pre-existing, “self-identifying” concepts but first
requires cutting up experience and organizing it into concepts. Students do not
necessarily make the same distinctions as those made by mathematicians and
mathematics educators, and thus they cut up experiences in different ways, both
indicating and further establishing a collection o f concepts that are substantially and
structurally different from concepts that are used in the mathematical community.
The second finding has to do with issues o f representation and abstraction; it is elaborated
below as making the abstract more concrete. In order to gain access to abstract ideas, the
students relied on representations, metaphors, and other conceptual supports in order to
manage their relationships with unfamiliar abstractions. Representations both provided
and obstructed the students’ access to abstract mathematical ideas and thus both supported
and constrained their understandings. The result is well illustrated by the phenomenon I
call reasoning from the table, in which the group operation table serves metaphorically as
the group, supporting students’ thinking and reasoning. The operation table is a
representation that mediates abstraction, giving students access to and ways to think
about abstract ideas but sometimes also impeding their progress toward an abstract view.
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The conclusions continue with the suggestion that the two findings are distinct and
fundamental aspects o f mathematical activity. Learning advanced mathematics is a
matter o f making distinctions and managing abstraction, and language and
representations are the tools. Mathematics is a complex interplay between logic and
intuition, between precision and initially vague abstractions.
Following the synthesis o f the findings, the chapter discusses some general implications
for mathematics teaching and teacher education. The central theme is the importance o f
encouraging students to make their thinking explicit as a way to build their understanding
and also to identify the distinctions and abstractions they are and are not making. The
chapter closes with a discussion o f implications for theoretical and empirical work in
mathematics education.

Making the Vague More Precise
Learning advanced mathematics involves learning concepts, processes, language,
notation, and the relations among them. That learning can be uneven, and what is learned
can be connected (and disconnected) in surprising ways. A main finding o f the study was
the seeming independence between the students’ ideas and the language o f abstract
algebra. Sometimes the students’ nonstandard language was close to standard usage, as
when they interchanged two closely related terms: using range for codomain,
associativity for commutativity, or identity for inverse. At other times the students used a
term more broadly than was appropriate— ’’the left coset” for the set o f cosets— thereby
introducing apparent ambiguity into their language.
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In some cases, such ambiguity may lie mostly in a superficial interpretation o f the
students’ utterances, for they actually used their idiosyncratic language precisely and
consistently, as when one student used the phrase normal group for the quotient group
that may be constructed when a subgroup is normal. Some students resisted attempts to
impose standard usage, particularly when it seemed to contradict their own usage. Other
students, in contrast, seemed to be much less precise in their use o f language and also less
bothered by ambiguity.
O f course, the use o f standard language is not necessarily an indication o f understanding.
For example, although many o f the students stated on the final exam that a subgroup is
(or is not) normal because the left and right cosets are (or are not) the same, some o f
those same students did not compute the cosets correctly.
Mathematical discourse depends for its effectiveness on subtle distinctions in notation
and syntax that are established by convention. These distinctions, however, are not
necessarily apparent to students. Furthermore, mathematical discourse is not without its
own ambiguity. The word mod, for example, is used both as a binary operator and as a
modifier o f an equivalence relation, thereby creating ambiguity in statements such as
15 = 7 mod 4.
One way in which teachers and researchers can deal with such problems o f ambiguity
may be to focus explicitly on linguistic, notational, and conceptual distinctions, probing
beneath the surface whenever possible. This idea is elaborated below along with other
implications. In this section, I elaborate the linguistic, notational, and conceptual issues
that arose in this study.
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Naming Concepts
Although lacking the rigor and specificity o f a true instructional method, the “discovery
method” exists, in name at least, in the literature and in some mathematics classrooms
(see, e.g., R. B. Davis, 1990; Dean, 1996; Mahavier, 1997; Morriss, 1998; Touval, 1997).
In fact, the instructor for the class that provided the setting for this study characterized the
class this way (Benson, in press). A description o f the discovery method would likely
include the following features: Give the students a rich problem situation to explore.
They will discover patterns and relationships, develop ideas and concepts, and create
objects and processes. Then simply give the students the commonly accepted
terminology, and with some metaphorical glue (Hewitt, 2001), they will attach standard
names to established objects or properties unproblematically. Leron and Dubinsky
(1995), for example, suggest that “except for the new name, the students can really feel
that the instructor merely summarizes what they have found in their investigations” (p.
238).
This study showed that the final step o f naming is not necessarily routine and
unproblematic. Learning mathematical vocabulary and its appropriate syntax is
sometimes a complicated process with much potential for a misstep. What might explain
the difficulties students have with the seemingly trivial process o f attaching a name to an
idea? I identified three kinds o f naming difficulties, each with its own explanation.
The first kind o f naming difficulty is that two words are sometimes confused when they
involve closely related ideas. A person says one thing but means another, as when the
students in this study swapped identity for inverse, commutativity for associativity,
multiplication for addition, and range for codomain. Sometimes such errors are mere
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slips o f the tongue; at other times the ideas themselves have become somewhat muddled.
In either case, these results are consistent with the observation from linguistics and
cognitive science that such whole-word substitutions occur when words are semantically
related (Hotopf, 1980; Stillings et al., 1995). Cognitive science provides an explanation
that fits with its models o f long-term memory: Metaphorically, closely related words are
stored in close proximity and thus are sometimes confused and hard to keep apart
(Stillings et al., 1995). This study demonstrates that even when the boundaries between
related concepts are relatively easy to draw, such as between the identity and inverse
properties, the distinction between the corresponding words is sometimes hard to
manage. When the boundaries are harder to draw, the distinctions can become quite
problematic.
The second kind o f naming difficulty seems to be caused by the name itself. In such
cases, learning the name requires building some cognitive structure around the name to
support its meaning and use. Sometimes, as in the terms cycle and identity, the name
carries an everyday meaning that is somewhat different from the mathematical meaning
(see, e.g., Lajoie & Mura, 2000; Pimm, 1987). Other terms have multiple meanings
within mathematical discourse (Zazkis, 1998; Durkin & Shire, 1991). In this study, such
polysemy was noted for the words mod and congruent, but only the former seemed to
cause difficulty. With still other terms, the name carries content that begs explanation.
One student experienced just such a difficulty with the term isomorphism when
interviewed early in the course. Perhaps the students’ difficulties with the term quotient
group may be explained similarly.
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The first two kinds o f naming difficulty are not particularly novel; both appear in the
literature. The third is rarely recognized, however, at least in the mathematics education
literature. Furthermore, it is o f a different character from the other two because it is more
epistemological than cognitive. The difficulty is as follows: The linguistic, notational,
and conceptual distinctions that students make are not necessarily the same as those made
by mathematicians and mathematics teachers. Some o f the distinctions that teachers
make are neither apparent nor relevant to their students. And students make some
distinctions that their teachers do not make. Making distinctions, delineating concepts,
and assigning names are, as Foucault (1971) noted, a matter o f imposing order on
experience:
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner
law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and
also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an
examination, a language; and it is only in the blank spaces o f this grid that order
manifests itself in depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the
moment o f its expression, (pp. xix-xx)

Foucault came to this conclusion through an historical analysis o f two great
discontinuities in the nature o f knowledge in the seventeenth and early nineteenth
centuries, yet this perspective seems particularly apt for describing many o f the
discrepancies observed in this study between students’ language and what I take to be
standard mathematical usage.
In this study, the students used grids that did not fit with standard mathematical
discourse. Some students, for example, did not make clear linguistic distinctions between
a particular coset and the set o f all cosets. To her, these objects and the process that
connected them were all part o f a single concept. In contrast, another student, discussing
the meaning ofg(3) = 0, not only distinguished between the value 3 in the domain and
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the value 0 in the codomain but also saw g(3) as a value that was “in the middle.” Thus,
in situations where a mathematician might see two ideas, the first student saw one, and
the second saw three.
A problem in naming that involved several related concepts occurred when one student
expressed many o f the key ideas about normality and quotient groups but had not yet
attached the standard names to those ideas. When the left and right cosets were the same,
all the students knew that the word normal applied in some way. But what was it that
was normal? The resulting group, the subgroup, the generator o f the subgroup, or the
cosets? And from the symbolic equation aH = Ha, there was also a sense that the word
Abelian should apply.
In developing language to describe a particular area o f study, constructing definitions and
meaning is a matter o f carving the area into a collection o f related concepts, which
requires imposing a structure on the area o f study and a grid on the various activities.
This imposition is, in principle, arbitrary, although it is guided by historical and cultural
precedent and by Occam’s razor, a principle that has its roots in Plato’s suggestion that
we carve the universe at its joints (Plato, 1998, 265e) and that was eloquently interpreted
by Einstein: “Make your theory as simple as possible, but no simpler.” When students
try to make sense o f an activity and to construct meaning for the various words, they, too,
impose a grid on the activity, but constructing the standard grid requires that they see the
joints that are implicit in the standard distinctions, some o f which are historical accidents.
The results o f this study indicate that students do not necessarily see such joints and thus
do not use the standard conceptual grid.
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Returning to the issue that opened this section, the results o f this study imply that the
discovery method underestimates the cognitive complexity o f naming and, more
specifically, that the metaphor o f gluing names to ideas is too simplistic. The gluing
metaphor implies that the experience is cut up into concepts that are naturally and
unproblematically identified and, thus, that naming is a matter o f assimilating standard
names into well-defined cognitive structures that have been created by the experience.
This study suggests, in contrast, that cognitive structures are still being created during the
process o f naming. I am claiming not that the process o f naming always requires
building new cognitive structures but rather that sometimes assimilation is insufficient to
describe what is involved in learning to use the standard language. And in any case, the
resulting concepts may not fit with those o f a teacher or researcher, not to mention the
possibility o f problems o f fit among teachers and researchers.
During several interviews, after I had developed a good sense o f the student’s
nonstandard language, I intervened and tried to encourage the student to use standard
linguistic conventions and distinctions. In general, these interventions were not
successful until the student had made the corresponding conceptual distinctions and thus
had developed a psychological a need for the standard linguistic or notational
conventions. Even then, learning standard usage seemed to depend upon a dialectic
between the conceptual and the linguistic distinctions. These results suggest that learning
new language and particularly changing one’s use o f language may be better seen as
accommodation rather than assimilation. Therefore, it is necessary, at the very least, to
pay attention to the distinctions that students make and to make standard distinctions
explicit in instruction. These ideas are explored further below.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

342

The three naming difficulties described here have distinct explanations. In practice,
however, they are by no means distinct but rather operate simultaneously. After one
carves one’s experience into concepts, the concepts and words may be very closely
related and hence difficult to keep separate. At the same time, the available words may
carry other meanings or may present other challenges.
I am not saying that language creates reality. Far from it. Rather, I am saying
that what counts as reality— what counts as a glass o f water or a book or a table,
what counts as the same glass or a different book or two tables— is a matter of
the categories that we impose on the world; and those categories are for the most
part linguistic. And furthermore, when we experience the world, we experience
it through linguistic categories that help to shape the experiences themselves.
The world doesn’t come to us already sliced up into objects and experiences;
what counts as an object is already a function o f our system o f representation,
and how we perceive the world in our experiences is influenced by that system o f
representation. The mistake is to suppose that the application o f language to the
world consists o f attaching labels to objects that are, so to speak, self-identifying.
On my view, the world divides the way we divide it, and our main way of
dividing things up is in language. (Searle, quoted in Magee, 1979, p. 184)

Searle’s point, along with the results o f this study, put a subtle spin on linguistic
determinism. Language is simultaneously a social and a personal construction. The
language that an individual experiences both influences and constrains the reality that the
individual creates. The language that an individual uses influences and constrains that
reality more fundamentally. These two languages are unlikely to match and might not
even fit, however, for the individual and the community do not necessarily divide things
up in the same ways, and thus their meanings can be substantively different.

Learning Notation
As with names, students’ use o f notation does not necessarily incorporate the same
distinctions as in standard mathematical discourse. Thus, much o f the above discussion
about names applies to students’ notation as well. In particular, the students in this study
did not always distinguish between sets and elements, between the two different notations
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for permutations, between distinct elements in the same set, and between variables and
names o f elements.
These issues are examined further below as part o f the discussion o f the ways that
notation can help manage abstraction. Here I point out only that many mathematical
distinctions are maintained by notational conventions. Sets, for example, are denoted by
uppercase letters, elements by lowercase letters. Functions are/ and g ; variables are x
andy. The identity element in a group is e. Experience suggests that these conventions
support thinking in the sense that it takes some psychological adjustment to think about a
function x(f) or, as demonstrated in this study, to recognize that a letter other than e might
represent the identity. The psychological support provided by these conventions is not
often discussed in the literature. Yet, students do not necessarily adopt these
conventions, making it difficult sometimes to interpret their work. And even when they
do adopt the conventions, one cannot necessarily conclude that they have made the
corresponding conceptual distinctions and abstractions.

Using Definitions
The students’ definitions in this class were a blend o f formality and informality.
Although the nature and role o f mathematical definitions was not an explicit focus o f the
class, definitions were periodically introduced, and the instructor and I regularly worked
with students, both individually and collectively, to help them get better at using
definitions. Thus, I took a broad view o f definitions in the analysis for this study,
allowing both formal definitions that the students provided on exams as well as informal
statements that they provided when asked what a word meant. This approach was
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intended to increase the possibility o f insight into the meanings that the students
imagined words to hold.
The students’ formal definitions often lacked quantifiers and were otherwise imprecise.
Their informal definitions were o f varying degrees o f correctness and bore varying
degrees o f resemblance to the formal definitions.
Some o f the students’ definitions were informal and either vague or missing important
features:
• Subgroup means a subset that’s a group.
• Z6 means mod 6
• Z6 means {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
• Isomorphism means congruent, same form (with renaming and reordering).
•

Identity means the do-nothing element.

Some o f their definitions were informal but largely correct and potentially supportive o f a
correct formal version:
• Group means it’s associative, it has an identity, it has an inverse, and it is closed.
• Kernel means the elements that are mapped to the identity.
•

Homomorphism means a function that preserves the operation.

• Coset means aK or aH.
• Normal means the left and right cosets are the same.
•

Quotient group is the group of the cosets when the left and right cosets are the same.

Other definitions were similar to formal definitions but were missing quantifiers or
specification o f notations:
•

Associative means (a*b)*c = a*(b*c).

•

Homomorphism means j{a*b) =j{a)*'j{b).

• Closure means for all a and b in G, a*b is also in G.
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The students had trouble stating some o f the formal definitions, particularly regarding the
use o f quantifiers, but their informal definitions served them well in much o f their work
and reasoning.
Because informal definitions were often helpful in guiding the students’ intuitions, it
seems counterproductive to suggest that their informal characterizations should have been
discarded in favor o f more precise formal versions. Further, as I argue below, both
precision and vague intuition are necessary in mathematical activity.
It is worth exploring whether potential confusion arising from the absence o f quantifiers
and other imprecision can be reduced through instruction that makes explicit connections
between carefully chosen informal definitions and the associated symbolic expressions.
For example, some informal definitions have quantifiers built in:
•

A function is a homomorphism if it preserves the group operation.

M any o f the students not only could state this informal definition but also associated the
word homomorphism with the formulaJ[a*b) = fia)*'fib). Articulating the formal
definition, then, is a matter o f connecting the informal idea with this formula in ways that
make the quantifiers explicit. This seems a promising approach because it acknowledges
the importance o f intuition as well as the need for precision.

Generalization Versus Distinction
This study has shown through many examples that students cut up experience in ways
that do not necessarily fit with standard mathematical discourse, leading to surprisingly
novel or confounded concepts and to unconventional use o f language and notation. This
phenomenon is fundamentally about making distinctions and generalizations, which
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involves paying attention to some differences and ignoring others. In this way, making
distinctions is the opposite o f generalization.
Sometimes the students were too general in their use o f language and notation and were
insufficiently precise, failing to make important distinctions. Some, for example,
inappropriately generalized the notion that associativity is a “global” property— a
property that applies to any subset when it applies to a group as a whole— and concluded
that addition in Z„ is associative because Z„ is a subgroup o f Z. Preventing or overcoming
this generalization requires making a distinction between addition in Z and addition in Z„.
Conversely, at other times, the students were not general enough, making unexpected
restrictions or distinctions, such as in considering g(3) to be “in the middle” between the
domain and the codomain.
It would be disingenuous and unproductive to suggest that students need to pay better
attention to differences, because many differences in notation and language are not
significant. Sometimes small differences in a signifier denote large differences in the
signified, as in the common convention o f denoting sets by uppercase letters and
elements by lowercase letters. Conversely, large differences in the signifier sometimes
denote small differences in the signified. This is, after all, the idea behind the concept o f
isomorphism: noticing that two seemingly different representations are essentially the
same and thus may be considered to represent the same abstract object. The problem is
knowing which differences merit attention.
Making such distinctions is a problem both for students trying to leam mathematics and
for teachers and researchers trying to understand and analyze students’ thinking. Only by
paying careful attention to language was I able to leam that for at least one student g(3)
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was “in the middle” between the domain and the codomain. Similarly, only by paying
attention to the subtle distinctions between the words coset and cosets was I able to
conclude that some students’ concepts o f coset were categorically different from the
standard concept, in the sense that they did not adequately distinguish between a
particular coset and a set o f cosets. Simultaneously, however, I had a sense that other
students’ concepts o f coset were not general enough, because they insisted that the
process o f calculating cosets must begin with the kernel o f a homomorphism.
Generalizing the coset idea to subgroups required letting go o f something (the kernel)
that seemed central to the process as it had been introduced.

Making the Abstract More Concrete
The students in this study demonstrated at least three ways in which they managed
abstraction: metaphor, reification, and increasing proficiency. The students gained access
to groups via operation tables, using the operation tables metaphorically to support their
thinking about the groups. They gained access to cosets, quotient groups, and properties
o f binary operations by focusing on the processes associated with these concepts.
Eventually, through increasing familiarity, some o f these processes were reified as
objects. Also through familiarity, abstract objects and properties became more concrete
as the students developed proficiency with the concepts, procedures, and examples, and
gained a better sense o f what to expect. These strategies are discussed in turn in the
sections that follow.
Philosophically, it is possible to create abstract objects, properties, or categories by using
a definition, a description, a process, or a representation, or by noticing a pattern or
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common properties. Notationally, it is possible to discuss abstract categories by choosing
a generic member o f the category. Psychologically, however, it seems there is much
more involved.
Many o f the results in this study can be viewed as examples o f ways student reduce the
abstraction level (Hazzan, 1999) o f a concept. But what do strategies such as metaphor
and reification imply about the psychological processes called abstraction! Frorer,
Hazzan, and Manes (1997) assert that are three different kinds o f abstraction. Sometimes
abstraction is about ignoring the pesky details. At other times, it involves thinking in
terms o f properties. At still other times, it is about one’s relationship to an idea (see also
Wilensky, 1991). This last kind o f abstraction is most helpful in explaining the results o f
this study. The first two kinds seem to require enough familiarity to be able to imagine
generic objects that have particular properties or whose details can be ignored. This
problem o f imagining generic objects is elaborated below in the section about managing
abstraction and trying to be general.

Operation Table as Metaphor
Operation tables served to mediate abstraction for the students in this study in that they
worked with a concrete representation to gain access to abstract objects and their
properties. A group’s operation table makes the group more concrete by making aspects
o f its form directly visible. Furthermore, by squinting one’s eyes or coloring the
operation tables by elements or by cosets, the abstract group— o f which the particular
table is an instantiation— can almost become visible. Abstracting the essence o f a group
from an instantiation seems a quintessential example o f an activity that requires reflective
abstraction— abstraction based on action (i.e., operations) alone. With the help o f the
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operation table, however, perhaps only empirical abstraction is required. Thus, the table
becomes both a tool for reasoning and an object o f reflection. Under W ilensky’s (1991)
view o f abstractness as a measure o f one’s familiarity with a situation, the table serves to
increase one’s familiarity, thereby making the abstract more concrete.
Operation tables served a metaphorical role for many students in that the tables supported
their reasoning and helped them think o f groups as objects. For some o f the students in
the study, the table was the group rather than a representation— a metonymic substitution
o f the concrete for the abstract. Their reasoning seemed to be largely external, in the
sense that it was based in the table and in procedures that required that the operation table
be present rather than in reflection on the binary operation. The cancellation laws (e.g.,
ab = ac implies b = c), for example, became embodied in the requirement that each
element appears exactly once in any row or column. One student went so far as to
describe the geometry o f the table, suggesting that for him the table was a geometric
object with geometric properties such as symmetry. The geometric object was a
metaphor that supported the class’s use o f the word congruent in discussing group
isomorphisms. In fact, a congruence between two geometric figures requires specifying a
correspondence between parts, just as a group isomorphism requires specifying a
correspondence between the elements o f groups.
The table served also to heighten the students’ sense o f anticipation about the way the
calculations should turn out, similar to Boero’s (1993) observation about the role o f
anticipation in algebraic manipulation. One student, for example, expected {5, 7} to be
its own inverse. Many students came to expect certain patterns in their operation tables
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and likened those patterns to cycles, which caused some potentially problematic
connections with the cycle representations o f permutations.
The students in the study could see isomorphisms by looking at operation tables. Some
o f them were especially drawn to the squares o f elements in the group, as the squares
appeared on the diagonal o f the table. They were able to see important differences
between groups on the basis o f the number o f elements appearing on the diagonal.
The table as metaphor is not without its limitations, however. First, it becomes
cumbersome for large groups, and extending the metaphor to infinite groups requires
some sophisticated patterning abilities since it is not possible to write out the whole group
table. Second, the students expected subgroups to occupy a com er o f the table, probably
because o f an overly literal Groups-Are-Containers metaphor. Third, writing down a
group table requires one to choose an order for the elements, which sometimes made it
difficult for the students to recognize isomorphisms and to think o f the order as
nonessential. Nonetheless, through experiences in renaming and reordering operation
tables, the students began to separate from the table from the group— the signifier from
the signified— and thus began to develop concepts o f abstract groups.
The results o f this study suggest that the operation table can play a useful metaphorical
role in students’ thinking about group theory because o f the conceptual support that the
metaphor can provide. Still, it is important to make the metaphors explicit and to be
aware of their limitations.
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Processes and Objects
In the literature, the process/object distinction is usually portrayed as developmental and
hierarchical, with an object conception being the more sophisticated (see, e.g., Dubinsky
et al., 1994; Sfard & Linchevski, 1994). The present study suggests, however, that this
portrayal may be too simple. There were three concepts for which the process/object
distinction was particularly relevant: group, coset, and quotient group. This study
demonstrated that in all three cases that the emergence o f an object conception was not
necessarily an indication o f a well-developed process conception.
Regarding the concept o f group, all the key participants in this study demonstrated a
strong object conception, often based in the operation table. Not all o f them, however,
demonstrated a strong process conception. When the students focused on the operation
table, they took it to be an object— a whole with pattern and symmetry. Furthermore,
subgroups were imagined as portions o f the table— as subobjects in a sense— although
this view was sometimes constrained by the arrangement o f the elements in the table.
When the students focused on the processes involved in carrying out the operation, they
were able to see that addition mod

6

is different from addition mod 3, although this

distinction was sometimes overwhelmed by the sense that “addition is addition.” The
data give the impression that the process conception was more powerful and more
sophisticated. Was the developmental trajectory reversed in this case?
One possible explanation is that the tables were not objects but pseudo-objects for these
students (Sfard & Linchevski, 1994; Zandieh, 2000). When they were focusing on the
table, there was a noticeable “externality” in their relationship to the group and its
operation in that they sometimes needed to see the whole table before they could reason
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clearly, as mentioned above. Finding the inverse o f a in Z„, for example, requires looking
for 0, the identity, in the a row o f the table. This process is easier to carry out when the a
row is complete. Those students whose reasoning was based on the operation, on the
other hand, were able to find the inverse o f an element without consulting the table,
sometimes even coming to the general conclusion that the inverse o f a would b e n - a .
Regarding the concepts o f coset and quotient group, the results o f this study are
consistent with the finding in the literature that in order to construct quotient groups, one
must be able to conceive o f a coset as an object (Dubinsky et al., 1994). When the
students were able to compute quotient groups, they seemed to consider cosets to be
objects. Contrary to the literature, however, conceiving o f cosets as objects was not very
problematic for these students, even for the student who found the process o f constructing
cosets difficult to manage. The students were perfectly happy to talk about sets o f cosets
and about a binary operation on cosets, both o f which might be taken as hallmarks o f
object conceptions. They found it relatively easy to compute quotient groups in both
Abelian and non-Abelian cases and seemed to see the calculations as rather natural.
Furthermore, after completing such computations and organizing them in an operation
table, they saw the quotient group, and hence the set o f cosets, as being an object,
probably because their object conception o f groups was supported by the operation table.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, many students found it quite difficult to use standard
language to describe what they were doing. Moreover, regarding the concept o f coset,
there was a sense in which some students were stuck in the process, failing to distinguish
either notationally or linguistically between a particular coset and the set of all cosets.
For these students, the notation aH signified the process for calculating the cosets.
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In short, the students in this study conceived o f cosets as objects but did not necessarily
think o f aH as representing one such object; they saw the operation table for a quotient
group as being an object, but they had trouble calling it a quotient group. This result adds
a subtle distinction to the previous finding that students have trouble seeing cosets as
objects (Dubinsky et al., 1994). It is possible that this study yielded a different result
partly because the analysis, with its particular attention to language and notation, was
more sensitive to such a distinction. It is also plausible to conclude that the different
result was caused partly by the introduction o f “arithmetic o f sets” early in the course.
By the time the students were asked to try to create groups out o f sets o f cosets,
performing an operation on two cosets seemed completely natural and unproblematic for
many o f them. By actually computing products o f cosets, the students were able to see
that it was desirable that the product o f cosets be another coset. They also saw cosets as
elements o f a new structure, although most o f them did not call it a quotient group during
their interviews. Leron and Dubinsky (1995) suggest that the computers can support
students’ calculations with cosets so that they may begin to see cosets as objects (p. 240).
I agree and would add that this study suggests that hand calculation is also beneficial.
Taken together these two approaches suggest that proficiency with procedures helps turn
vague ideas into objects. That is, both approaches support reification.
The inclusion o f set arithmetic in the course may be supported for mathematical reasons
as well: Coset multiplication is a special case o f set arithmetic that has applications
throughout abstract algebra. Thus, it makes sense to use these ideas to support each other
rather than to keep them separate. Furthermore, by spending some time computing coset
products that are not again cosets, students gain some experience with the mess that is
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created when a subgroup is not normal. They have an opportunity to appreciate the
usefulness o f the concept o f normality and to explore the concept o f closure in an
unfamiliar situation. At the same time, they may begin to look for the kinds o f
regularities that support normality and their relationship with the overall group structure.
In other words, set arithmetic in general and coset arithmetic in particular can provide an
experiential base on which to build an understanding o f the more formal aspects o f
abstract algebra.
What, then, do the results o f this study say about the process/object distinction? Is the
process/object distinction truly developmental? One might argue in support o f the
developmental process/object distinction by stipulating that a student’s thinking should
be classified not as an object conception but as a pseudo-object conception unless it is an
encapsulation o f a process, conceived with generality and fullness. This solution seems
problematic, however, because it guarantees that the distinction is developmental, in the
sense that “object conception” would really mean “object and process conception,” which
would provide no theoretical room for object conceptions that are weakly supported by
the underlying processes.

Alternatively, one might acknowledge that the process/object distinction is too blunt an
instrument. After all, even for a specific concept, not all encapsulated processes are the
same. Instead, researchers could try to characterize various kinds o f process conceptions
and also various kinds o f object conceptions. Given the results o f this study, however,
this approach seems the more promising one, although it implies that there is
considerable theoretical work to be done.
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I do not have a satisfactory solution for this dilemma. I do suggest, however, that
researchers remain cautious about attributing object conceptions to students on the basis
o f object-like language and, more importantly, about making developmental claims on
the basis o f such language. Certainly an object and process conception is a desirable goal
for many mathematical topics, independent o f the developmental trajectories that might
be followed along the way.

Concept Proficiency
Early in the course, the students were tied to particular representations, such as the
operation table, and tied to the processes. As mentioned above, the students’ concepts
became more abstract and more flexible as they moved away from the operation tables
and began to think of processes as objects. These changes demonstrate the usefulness of
metaphor and reification in managing abstraction. These phenomena alone, however, do
not account for another prominent method o f managing abstraction, namely, through
increased proficiency with a concept. Again, by proficiency, I mean not only fluency
with the procedures but also the ability and disposition to use understanding to reason
about and solve problems with the concepts (see Kilpatrick et al., 2001).
This characterization was particularly noticeable in the phenomenon I called operation
confusion. In the early interviews, some students were unsure o f the operations in Z3 and
Z(, and spent much o f their time determining the operation. In later interviews, they were
still sometimes unsure o f the operation, but, in contrast, they were able to determine the
operation quickly by relying on the group axioms and familiarity with the elements in the
group.
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As the students became more familiar with concepts and associated representations,
processes, and examples, their concept images became richer and more flexible and
efficient. Their work was more often guided by correct expectations, and even when
their expectations were incorrect, they were increasingly able to notice errors and resolve
inconsistencies by relying on multiple ways o f thinking about the concepts. If
abstractness is regarded not as property o f a concept but rather as one’s relationship to the
concept (Wilensky, 1991; Frorer et al., 1997), then increasing proficiency is a way to
reduce abstractness.

Balancing Precision and Abstraction
Thus far, the results o f this study have been discussed under two themes: issues of
language and notation and issues o f abstraction. Elaborating and synthesizing these
themes has led to the theoretical proposition that the themes are not separate but are
fundamentally intertwined in mathematical thinking and learning. On the one hand,
precise definitions, notation, and language are necessary for the precise thinking that
allows careful distinctions to be made among objects. On the other hand, there is a
fundamental human cognitive need to reduce the operative models— to abstract and
generalize so that many diverse phenomena can be particular instantiations o f a single
idea. The results o f this study suggest that mathematical activity might be considered a
carefully orchestrated balance between two opposing tendencies: making distinctions
among things that seem the same and blurring the distinctions among things that seem
different. In other words, mathematical insight occurs not only when we realize things
we thought were different are the same, but also when we realize that things we thought
were the same are different.
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Advanced mathematical thinking includes not only precise definitions and logical
deduction (Tall, 1992) but also significant abstraction and generalization (Dreyfus, 1991).
Although teachers expect students to reason with sufficient precision and with sufficient
generality and abstraction, in fact these are opposing expectations. Being sufficiently
precise requires using rigorous definitions and careful notation to maintain important
distinctions. On the one hand, some o f the students in this study did not make important
distinctions between set and element and between addition in Z and addition in Z 6 . Being
sufficiently general and abstract, on the other hand, requires blurring distinctions among
things that were thought to be different. Building a deep understanding o f the group Zs,
for example, requires that -1 be considered the same as 5. The very concept o f
isomorphism is about blurring representational distinctions in order to gain access to
abstract mathematical objects that “lie behind” all o f them.
Mathematical learning involves building intuition, creating mathematical objects, and
making distinctions among them. Each introduction o f a name, symbol, or definition,
raises the possibility o f making unusual abstractions and nonstandard generalizations and
distinctions, for the standard distinctions are not pre-existing in the world of
mathematical objects (wherever that is). Clearly there are more and less effective ways
o f maintaining the balance between precision and abstraction, but the best solutions are
rarely clear a priori. Thus, students should be expected to make unusual distinctions
regularly as part o f the learning process.
My argument about the balance between making and blurring distinctions echoes
Poincare’s (1946) observation that logic and intuition play complementary roles in
mathematics. Guided by intuition alone, one defines mathematical objects vaguely.
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Intuition cannot bring certainty and can even deceive, so rigor is necessary. Rigor
requires logic and begins with definitions, but logic can create nothing new. Thus, logic
and intuition are each indispensable.
Building on Poincare’s argument, logic is about precision, making careful distinctions,
and reasoning from rigorous definitions and axioms. But formal definitions alone are
empty. Instead, there must be something to formalize, some intuition that is being made
precise. Definitions themselves do not create mathematical meaning. Instead, they allow
for distinctions among objects that have been or might be created by other processes.
These propositions imply not that intuition must precede definitions but rather that
definitions must be populated with mathematical objects before there can be any
meaning.
Intuition, on the other hand, is guided by abstractions and generalizations that are well
supplied with examples. Yet, intuition alone is vague and ambiguous, and meaning
remains confused until the intuitions have been carefully delimited and distinguished
from related ideas. That, o f course, requires logic and precise definitions.
Effective mathematical communication requires that both the speaker and the hearer (or
the writer and the reader) have constructed abstractions and distinctions that are
somewhat comparable, in the sense o f fit. Effective mathematical learning involves
building such abstractions and distinctions. When and how does this happen? It is a
wonder that it happens at all, given that so much o f it is implicit.
Poincare’s argument suggests that in the history o f mathematics, precise definitions were
the result o f a slow evolutionary dialectic between logic and intuition. That suggests the
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hypothesis that one way o f improving students’ abstraction and distinctions, along with
their intuition and use o f definitions, is to make this dialectic explicit.

Managing Abstraction and Trying to be General
In elaborating and synthesizing the results o f this study, I saw the students’ use o f
notation at first as an issue that was mostly about imprecision and ambiguity. It now
appears, however, that notation is simultaneously a tool for mediating abstraction. The
claim that notation is used both to manage abstraction and to impose precision may be
seen as a rephrasing o f a guiding principle o f semiotics: that a sign is not meaningful in
itself but rather is meaningful within a system o f signs. This point becomes particularly
apparent when comparing the students’ use o f notation with standard usage.
In introducing and discussing the concept o f binary operation, the instructor used a
diamond or a star, intending to denote a generic operation, which might be any familiar
or unfamiliar operation but which is imagined to be particular but unspecified. The
generality is that in any problem (or proof) setting the diamond may denote any operation
that satisfies the context, and thus any reasoning and results apply to all such operations.
This generality leads to an abstraction, which is the creation o f a new concept— binary
operation— that is the set o f all possible binary operations, familiar and unfamiliar,
known and unknown, specified and unspecified. In this study, the students sometimes
saw neither the generality nor the abstraction, but instead saw the diamond as another
specific operation, distinct from both addition and multiplication. Furthermore, some of
the students decided that the diamond was to be used when the elements were a and b,
which we “don’t know how to add.”
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Similarly, the instructor provided the students access to the set o f all finite cyclic groups
through the notation Z„. The notation is general in the sense that it can stand for any such
group, but it depends upon an abstraction: the set o f all such groups. Once again, some o f
the students did not see the generality and abstraction, as evidenced by their statements
that Z3 and Z6 were subgroups o f Z„. Unfortunately, the data are not sufficient regarding
this phenomenon to provide a clear picture o f the object that they were calling Z„. The
data do suggest, however, that these students saw Z„ not as a particular but unspecified
group but rather as another specific group, and, furthermore, that “any Z group” (except
perhaps Z itself) might be considered a subgroup o f Z„. I use the students’ language “any
Z group” here because the standard language and notation yields a sentence that is
striking in its ambiguity: “For any n, [what is commonly called] Z„ might be considered
a subgroup o f [what these students called] Z„.” Again, it is not clear what object the latter
Z„ denotes. Either the students were not aware o f their ambiguous use o f the symbol Z„,
or they were not particularly concerned by it.
The students’ ambiguous use o f notation proved to be an indicator o f issues with both
abstraction and precision. In the case o f diamond and Z„, the students were not making
the intended abstractions, thereby introducing ambiguity into their use o f the notations.
In other cases, students used notation ambiguously when they did not make important
distinctions, such as with the notation aH, which for some students represented both a
particular coset and all such cosets. Similarly, some students used a symbol such as 4x to
denote both a particular multiple o f 4 and all multiples o f 4. One student also used 4x to
denote two (possibly distinct) multiples o f 4.
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Actually, it should not be surprising that students use notation ambiguously, for standard
mathematical discourse uses notation that might appear to students to be ambiguous.
Notational precision is not in the notation itself, but is implied by the surrounding text.
Compare the following typical phrases that might come from an abstract algebra class:
•

Suppose G is a group and a, b e G.

•

An operation * is commutative on a set G if a*b = b*a for all a, b

•

Suppose G is a group with 3 elements, e, a, and b, and suppose e is the identity.

g

G.

This study suggests that some, perhaps many, students would call a and b variables in
these statements, yet that label may obscure subtle but important distinctions revealed by
the differences in syntax. In the first statement, a and b represent unspecified but
particular elements o f G. Unless stated otherwise, they cannot be assumed distinct.
Generality may come later, in that whatever is argued about a and b will hold for any pair
a, b in G. In the second statement, a and b are pattern generalizers. We imagine that a
and b vary through all possible pairs in G, and in any such pair a and b are not
necessarily distinct. The generality is in the statement itself. In the third statement, a and
b are specific elements o f the group G. They are names o f the elements o f G, and they
are necessarily distinct. The generality comes later, and only as part o f another
abstraction: that there is only one group o f order 3.
So what does this discussion imply about the relationship between generalization and
abstraction? Sometimes it is hard to separate them. General reasoning seems to require
abstractions. Commutativity, for example, requires imagining all possible pairs of
elements from a set. General reasoning about a binary operation requires ability to
imagine a generic operation. Is it necessary to construct the abstraction that is the set of
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all binary operations? Is it possible to imagine / : iR —> 91 to be an arbitrary function
without imagining the set o f all o f such functions? I say yes, although one needs to be
able to imagine a wide range o f diverse possibilities. In other words, general reasoning
about a concept requires a significant psychological step toward the mathematical
abstraction that is the set o f all instances o f that concept.
For some mathematical concepts, there is no simple and standard notation to distinguish
between a particular thing and the set o f all o f them. D oes/(x) = x 2 denote a generic
function value or the set o f all such values? What about /(a ) = a 2 or / (x0) = Xq ? In most
contexts the abbreviated formX*) = x 2 is taken to denote the entire function, despite the
misleading metonymy— in this case, substituting a generic pair for the set o f all such
pairs. The literature on the learning o f functions suggests, however, that students have
difficulty making the transition from x being a particular value to being a variable that
takes all values in the domain.
By treating aK both as a specific coset and as representing all o f them, some o f the
students demonstrated that they had applied a similar metonymy in a context where it is
not often done. This ambiguity and flexible use o f notation is not surprising when one
considers that there is no common notation for the set o f all cosets o f a subgroup when
the subgroup is not normal. O f course, in some contexts it is easy to make notational
distinctions between a generic value and the set o f all such values, such as in 4x + 1 and
4Z+1.

From a psychological point o f view, it is easy to see why students have trouble making
distinctions between a generic value and the set o f all such values. If a symbol can
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represent any suitable value, it is a short conceptual leap to considering all o f them. To
better portray the relationship between the mathematical and psychological distinctions,
the relevant distinctions are superimposed in Figure 26.

Figure 26. Mathematical and psychological distinctions
generic
specific — ► (particular) — ► any
value
value
value

all such
values

the set of all
such values

The important mathematical distinction is usually between the generic value and the set
o f all such values, and the distinction may be managed metaphorically by first imagining
that a value is fixed and then imagining that it varies through all such values and the
result is collected in a set. Mathematicians do not make an ontological distinction
between a specific value, a generic value, and any such value, but the mathematical status
o f “all such values” is problematic unless those values are collected in a set. Thus, there
are essentially two kinds o f mathematical objects on this continuum, and mathematicians
use notation and context as a way o f managing the distinction between them.
The students in this study, in contrast, were often thinking simultaneously o f any and all
values, so that the important mathematical distinction was neither apparent nor relevant.
When they talked about all values, they sometimes did not bother to collect the values in
a set, suggesting that this distinction was also irrelevant. A specific value was
psychologically distinct from the idea o f any value, but the idea o f a generic particular
value seemed to be unavailable to them.
Thus, there are important mathematical distinctions between a generic value and the set
o f all such values, and standard notation conventions provide inconsistent and sometimes
ambiguous support. But when and how might students learn such conceptual and
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notational distinctions? Such distinctions seem to depend also on careful interpretation of
the text that surrounds the introduction o f the notation and on metaphors such as
“imagine x is fixed.” I suspect that many difficulties with quantification may be partially
explained by this result.

Implications
The preceding sections have included many implications about the teaching and learning
o f abstract algebra in particular and mathematics more generally. In this section, I focus
on what I see as this study’s most important implications for teaching, teacher education,
and research. M ost o f these implications grow out o f the dialectic between making
distinctions and managing abstraction.

Teaching
The results o f this study make clear that students do not necessarily make standard
conceptual, linguistic, and notational distinctions; in fact, the standard distinctions might
not even be relevant or apparent to students. This finding has implications for teaching
because o f the potential for failure o f communication when the teacher and the students
are using conceptual grids that do not fit with one another. To overcome this obstacle,
teachers must become aware o f the distinctions that students are and are not making.
This awareness is possible only by encouraging students to make their thinking explicit.
Then, informed by knowledge o f the students’ thinking, teachers may help them make
important conceptual distinctions and encourage them to make more o f the standard
distinctions in their language and notation.
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The teaching o f advanced mathematics must be sensitive to language, notation, and the
important conceptual distinctions that the linguistic and notational distinctions are
intended to convey. Consequently, language and notation should periodically be given
explicit attention in instruction. This suggestion for teaching is consistent with and
provides additional support for the communication and representation standards proposed
by the NCTM (1989, 2000). Thus, one could suggest that mathematics teachers at all
levels should ask open questions that allow students’ linguistic, notational, and
conceptual difficulties to become apparent. Students should be supported through
instruction to translate early and often among the various signifiers o f a mathematical
object or property, including names, definitions, symbols, and other representations.
Furthermore, students should be encouraged to articulate their thinking, for it is only
through such articulation that nonstandard conceptions might be noticed.
The interview data collected for this study are noteworthy for their richness and for the
fact that the students were often able to talk for long stretches with little intervention
from me. The design o f the study did not permit any attribution o f the cause o f this
richness, but a plausible contributing factor was that, in this course, the students were
often expected to articulate their thinking not only in their collaborative groups but also
during office hours and on their written work. This interpretation implies that
cooperative work can support learning by encouraging students to make their thinking
explicit, even if they are not equipped to notice unusual conceptions and are not yet fluent
in the standard vocabulary and syntax. Such work can also provide instructors with a
window into students’ thinking.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Asking students to make their thinking explicit can serve to also inculcate habits o f mind
that may be important to mathematics learning, such as asking the questions, “What does
it mean to say th a t... ?” or “What would we need to do to show th a t... ?” Furthermore,
by articulating their thinking, students who are not yet strong conceptually or
procedurally can demonstrate important mathematical habits o f mind that deserve to be
supported by instruction.

Preparation of Teachers
Part o f the rationale for conducting this study was that a course in abstract algebra is
often required in the preparation o f secondary school teachers. Thus, it makes sense to
ask whether the study has implications for that preparation. A thorough investigation of
the role and relevance o f abstract algebra in the preparation o f teachers would require a
very different set o f studies that would, o f necessity, include significant work in
secondary school mathematics classrooms to determine which ideas from abstract algebra
are useful in teachers’ instruction, planning, and reflection. Nonetheless, this study
supports three observations.
First, abstract algebra could be a setting in which preservice teachers develop a deep
sense o f the nature and role o f definitions and proof in mathematics. If secondary
teachers are to develop in their students a sense o f mathematical reasoning and proof, as
is currently recommended (NCTM, 2000), then the teachers must themselves understand
how definitions and proof support mathematical reasoning. These were secondary goals
of the class that provided the setting for this study, the primary goal being that the
students develop an intuitive and experiential sense o f the concepts. Thus, it is perhaps
not surprising that the students’ proofs and definitions were more uneven in quality than,
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say, their computations o f cosets and quotient groups. It would be worth designing an
abstract algebra course for preservice teachers in which intuition and rigor were twin
goals and explicit foci o f instruction.
Second, it is important that preservice teachers come to have a sufficiently abstract view
o f the concepts o f inverse, identity, and binary operation, and to be able to see many
examples as instantiations o f the main ideas. Because the secondary mathematics
curriculum includes the concept o f inverse functions, for example, teachers need
sufficient sense o f the more abstract concept o f inverse to be able to treat inverse
functions in ways that are faithful to the abstract concept. Although cosets and quotient
groups are certainly good candidate topics for teaching the roles o f definitions and proof,
this research has not convinced me that cosets and quotient groups are necessary
background for high school mathematics teachers, because there are few obvious
connections with high school mathematics. For preservice teachers who are to learn
about quotient groups, the results o f this study suggest paying particular attention to the
structural relationships between Z and Z„, for that is where the teachers can gain a firm
and subtle sense o f the relationships between addition o f integers and addition modulo n.
Third, the results o f this study suggest that sensitivity to conceptual, linguistic, and
notational distinctions should be an explicit focus o f the pedagogical preparation o f
teachers. As mentioned above, there is good reason to believe that secondary
mathematics learning will be enhanced if students are often encouraged to make their
thinking explicit. For that to happen in secondary school mathematics classrooms,
preservice teachers should be encouraged not only to reflect on their own language and
notation and to make their thinking explicit but also to reflect on such experiences as a
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way to help them see the pedagogical benefits o f mathematical communication and the
importance o f making careful distinctions.

Empirical and Theoretical Research
Many o f the conclusions and implications in this chapter carry messages for research. In
particular, the themes o f making distinctions and managing abstraction can be seen as the
beginning o f a theoretical construct that takes seriously both logic and intuition. In this
section, I make additional comments about some o f the other theoretical constructs that
informed this research and make suggestions for additional research.
First, the results o f this study suggest that concept image may be a problematic construct
if it is take to suggest a prescribed way o f cutting up experience into concepts. The data
and analysis demonstrate that students do not necessarily make standard conceptual,
linguistic, and notational distinctions. To accommodate this emergent result, the analysis
for this study depended upon a flexible notion o f a concept image that allowed conceptual
boundaries to migrate in order to explain the data. That flexibility was accomplished via
a semiotic conceptual framework, which allowed consideration o f the standard concept,
the extent to which a student had mastered the concepts and processes, and the meanings
that the student associated with the names and notations. In particular, by paying careful
attention to the students’ use o f language and notation by separating names, symbols, and
definitions in the analysis, I was able to characterize their concept images in ways that
explained their nonstandard use o f language and notation. Any viable notion o f concept
image must maintain similar flexibility that does not require that the name o f the concept
be the organizing determinant.
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Second, as discussed in detail above, the results o f this study suggest that the
process/object distinction is more subtle and nuanced than is commonly portrayed in the
literature. In particular, it appears that sometimes the developmental hierarchy can be
circumvented when a representation supports an object conception without requiring a
robust process conception. Many questions remain, however. For example, when is it
advantageous to inject into instruction representations that support object conceptions
before students have developed a robust process conception?
It might be profitable to acknowledge that not all process conceptions and not all object
conceptions are the same. Even without comparing two different individual learners, it is
clear that constructing an object conception is not the completion o f a learning process
but rather the beginning o f a new phase o f learning about the concept. In other words, an
object conception creates new possibilities. Some o f this might be captured by
acknowledging the gradual development o f conceptual proficiency, which might be
described as increasing richness in one’s process conception, increasing applicability of
one’s object conception, and increasing ability to move between the two.
This study suggests that much is to be gained by paying attention to the ways that
students manage abstraction, particularly their use o f metaphors and representations.
Although it is clear that the students in this study did not necessarily make the standard
distinctions between any object o f a kind and all such objects, it appears that the idea o f a
particular unspecified object was not available to some o f the students. I hypothesized
above that metaphors such as “imagine it is fixed” may help, but many questions remain
about the psychological requirements for imagining a generic object. Furthermore, there
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may be many more as-yet-unidentified metaphors that both support and constrain
thinking in abstract algebra in particular and advanced mathematics more generally.
If we take Poincare’s dialectic seriously, it is fair to say that this study focused on
intuition at the expense o f logic. I studied mostly students’ informal definitions, and
proof was not an explicit area o f investigation. This decision made sense given the
context, the available literature, and my particular interests. My intent was to study the
meanings that students construct for the various concepts in group theory and to
characterize those understandings. It is now quite clear, however, that the logical side
needs equal attention, for that is the way that students begin to make more careful
distinctions that are necessary for clear thinking and for effective participation in
mathematical discourse. The semiotic perspective makes clear, after all, that signs have
meaning not in themselves, but within a system o f signs. Thus, many questions remain
about how students learn to use definitions, notation, and language precisely, and to use
such rigor in the service o f reasoning, proof, and communication and to support further
development o f intuition.
For the continued investigation o f learning in abstract algebra in particular and advanced
mathematical thinking more generally, the conceptual and analytic framework developed
here can offer a good starting point. The framework was developed in order to
characterize students’ understandings, focusing on meaning and intuition. Because it
supports identification o f distinctions that students do and do not make, the framework
seems equally applicable to investigating not only the logical side o f mathematical
thinking but also the relationship between logic and intuition.
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Perhaps future research in advanced mathematical thinking could take advantage o f the
dialectic between intuition and logic. Beginning with logic, one might ask, W hat does it
take to build stronger connections between symbolic proofs and the examples to which
the proofs are intended to apply and the intuitions the proofs are intended to formalize?
Beginning with intuition, one might ask, W hat does it takes to encourage students to
make distinctions that are not apparent to them? An extended research program could
ask, W hat does it take for students to come to sophisticated understandings o f the nature
and role o f definitions and proof in mathematics?
Research in advanced mathematical thinking is still a young field with many open
questions, many challenges, and many opportunities. This study has explored linguistic,
notational, and conceptual issues for undergraduate students in a particular abstract
algebra class and has provided detailed results about the students’ learning o f particular
concepts. Some o f the conceptual issues and theoretical explanations are of sufficient
generality to suspect that they may be useful in describing advanced mathematical
thinking more generally. Thus, the study has also provided insights about some o f the
theoretical constructs commonly used in research on advanced mathematical thinking. In
addition, the study has put forward and elaborated the theoretical proposition that
mathematical thinking and learning may be viewed as a balance between precision and
abstraction and has suggested that balance is needed in both the research on advanced
mathematical concepts and the practice o f teaching advanced mathematics. I hope the
empirical and theoretical results presented here will influence the research agenda and
ultimately will serve to improve the learning o f mathematical concepts that historically
have been among the most challenging in the undergraduate curriculum.
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Math 761, Spring 1996
Abstract Algebra
MWF Kingsbury 308 and Th Kingsbury M309
Textbook: Contemporary abstract algebra by Joe Gallian
Instructor: Steve Benson
Office: KN M331
Phone: x-2684
Office hours: MWF 1:30-2:30; TuTh 11-12 (and by appointment)
TA: Brad Findell
Office: KN M333
Phone: x-2674
Office hours: M F 11-12; WTh 3-4
This course will most likely be ve ry different from your previous mathematics classes,
both in content and in instructional style. However, the choices w e’ll be making are
based on a significant amount o f research on teaching and learning, as well as on our own
experience as students and teachers o f mathematics (specifically abstract algebra). It
might be a little hard to get used to, at first, but I rea lly believe that this is the best way to
get us to our goal, developing an understanding of, and facility with, abstract algebra
concepts and their applications. We will be taking a d isco ve ry approach in this class,
which means that, during class time, yo u will be doing mathematics, rather than watching
m e do mathematics. O f course, there may very well be occasions, during class
discussions for instance, that I might clarify some points or explain some details or define
some terminology. As part o f the discovery approach, we will often be working in KN
M327 (the computer lab in Kingsbury) or the M orse H a ll computer lab (a.k.a. Spicerack)
using a variety o f software packages designed for abstract algebra This software will be
useful both for learning and for applying the concepts w e’ll be learning. Although we
w on’t be following the book in “lock-step” fashion, we will be using it as a supplement to
what we do in class. I find Gallian’s book to be very readable with lots of nice examples,
problems, and references.

Grading policy:

Classwork
Homework
Midterm exams
Final exam

30%
30%
20%
20%

Classwork will involve class participation and work (done individually or in groups).
Most of this work will be collected, some o f it will be graded, but all collected work will
be looked at and commented on (a preposition is a terrible thing to end a sentence with).
Homework is self-explanatory, I suppose. Like classwork, most, if not all, o f it will be
looked at and some will be assigned a grade. Sometimes, the grade will depend only on
whether you made a reasonable attempt to solve the problem, while other times the
homework will be graded in a more “traditional” way. In addition to regular homework,
there will be occasional “projects” which will be designed to pull together some o f the
key concepts w e’ve dealt with in class. These projects might involve both group and
individual work, depending on the particular project, and you’ll typically be given several
days to complete them. Since you have a little extra time, it will also be important for
you to be sure that you write up your work carefully and completely. B eing able to so lve
a m athem atical p ro b lem is ju s t p a r t o f the m athem atical p ro ce ss. It's also im portant that
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y o u be able to explain y o u r w ork a n d its ju stifica tio n s to others. O f course, you should

also write up your homework carefully, but I realize you w on’t have as much time to
work on it! There will be two midterm exams during the semester (times to be
announced during the first two weeks o f class). There will be both in-class and takehome components to these exams, as well as on the final exam.
Brad and Steve will divide up the task o f looking at, and making comments on, the
homework, but Steve will do the actual grading. In addition, Steve will be the grader o f
the projects and exams (lucky him!).
In order to learn mathematics, one must do mathematics, not sit idly by while someone
else does it. An analogy might be helpful: Learning mathematics is like learning to drive
a car. While you may very well pick up some pointers while watching someone else
drive, the things you learn are mainly p ro c e d u ra l (where to put your h^nds, use one foot
(unless there’s a clutch), etc.). However, when you first sit behind the wheel and begin to
accelerate, you realize that there’s a lot more to it than in that class video simulation.
Even once you’re an experienced driver, you’ll often make a wrong turn, forcing you to
do a U- turn or even pull off the road and check the map. Sometimes, you even have to
go back home, make a phone call, and start over, but you still eventually make it to your
destination. Doing mathematics is like that, too. We often make false starts and
mistakes, but if we keep at it, we can solve the problem, or learn the concept, or prove the
Theorem. At the risk o f stretching this analogy to the breaking point, isn’t it usually very
difficult to remember directions to a location you’ve only been driven to (pardon the split
infinitive), and never driven yourself? Until you’ve actually driven somewhere yourself,
it’s hard to find your way back, especially if you have to take a detour which takes you
o ff o f the usual path. If you just sit and watch the teacher, even if you understand why
everything he, or she, does is correct, you may very well still have a lot o f difficulty
remembering how to do the exact same thing at a later time. And it might seem
impossible to use these ideas from class to solve new problems in the homework or test
situations (sound familiar?).

Mathematics is like a video game; if you ju st sit and watch,
you ’re wasting your quarter (or semester).
I’m really looking forward to this class. I really like the material you’ll be learning and I
hope that you will also have a good time. It will be a lot o f work, but if we work together
, I know that everyone can be successful.
As a final suggestion, I recommend that you keep your work in a notebook to which you
can often refer. In particular, keep your “scratch work”, examples an notes from class,
definitions, theorems, and your own questions and conjectures in the notebook. If you
like, think o f the notebook as a class journal. Occasionally, I w ill be asking you to
provide examples, questions, and conjectures concerning class material, so this will be
good practice. I also think it will be a useful study device as you prepare for classwork,
homework, and exams. At the end o f the semester, I would like to see your notebooks, if
you’re willing to share them with me. However, the notebooks will not be graded. In
future class discussions, I will talk more about these notebooks and why I think they’re
important.
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Class questionnaire for Math 761
Please provide the following information. Also, be sure to check the box if you’re willing
to share your phone number and email address with the class.

1. Name:

2. Major/concentration:

3. phone number

May I share your number with the class?

4. email address

May I share this with the class?

5. past classes:

6 . future plans:

7. questions, goals, hopes, concerns you have about this class, or
mathematics in general:
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M a t h 761 —( a r i t h m e t i c o f s e ts d is c u s s io n a n d p ro o fs )
D e f in itio n . I f A and B are subsets o f th e integers, then A + B is th e set {a +
b | a e A , b e B } . (W h en necessary to avoid confusion, we will specify th a t th e sum
is in Z . ) Furtherm ore, i f n is a p o sitive integer, then n A = {na \ a e A } and
A + n = {a + n \ a e A }.
For exam ple, th e sum of { 1 ,3 ,4 } and {2,6} in Z is { 3 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,9 ,1 0 } , 2A —
{ 2 ,6 ,8 } an d A + 2 = { 3 ,5 ,6}.
As an o th er exam ple, le t’s consider some infinite subsets. Recall th a t th e Divi
sion A lgorithm guarantees th a t every integer can be expressed (uniquely) in th e form
3q, 3q + 1, or 3q + 2, for some integer q. In o th er words, every integer is in exactly
one of th e sets 3Z , 3 Z + 1 , or 3 Z + 2. I ’m curious, then: W h a t’s (3Z + 1 ) + (3Z + 2)?
L e t’s choose several elements from th e two sets to see if we can make a guess at
w h at th eir sum is. T he integers 1 ,-2 , 4, an d 10 are all elem ents of 3 Z + 1, and 2,
—1, —4, an 5 are all elem ents of 3 Z + 2. Therefore, th e sum of th e two sets contains
1 + 2, l + ( —4), —2 + 5, 4 + ( —1), 10 + 5, and l + (—4). T h a t is, 3, —3, an 15 are all in
(3Z + 1 ) + 3Z + 2. W h at do you notice ab o u t these elem ents? T hey are all m ultiples
of 3, b u t does th a t necessarily m ean th a t th e sum contains just m ultiples of 3? And,
if th is is th e case, are all of th e m ultiples of 3 in th e sum ? Investigating further,
we see th a t th e following integers are also in th e sum in question: 10 + (—4) = 6 ,
4 + 5 = 9, and 4 + (—4) = 0. I ’m alm ost convinced, b u t not quite. How can we
convince ourselves, and others, th a t (3Z + 1 ) + (3Z + 2 ) = 3Z?
Is it OK to use th e fam iliar rules involving add itio n to prove this? In particular,
is it “legal” to ju s t say (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2) = 3 Z + 3 Z + 1 + 2 = 3 Z + 3 Z + 3?
Then, since “m ultiples of 3” + “m ultiples of 3” give you m ultiple of 3, we’re done.
T h ere are a few things “fishy” ab o u t these statem en ts. F irst of all, how do I know
th e fam iliar rules apply? We ju st defined how to ad d sets and haven’t checked
th a t all of th e properties still hold. I fact, we m ight be a little dubious, since we
w eren’t terrib ly certain this was th e “rig h t” way to define th e sum of sets. Also,
th e statem en t th a t we alluded to above (3Z .+ 3Z = 3Z ) isn ’t so obvious, either.
L e t’s tr y a slightly different approach. It does seem sort of obvious th a t if you
add an integer which is 1 m ore th a n a m ultiple of 3 to an integer which is 2 more
th a n a m ultiple of 3, you’ll get an integer which is 3 m ore th a n a m ultiple of 3. B ut
if a num ber is 3 m ore th a n a m ultiple of 3, th en it m ust be a m ultiple of 3, itself.
This is a fairly convincing argum ent th a t (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2) is a subset of 3Z,
b u t it doesn’t convince me th a t every m ultiple of 3 is in th e sum. In addition, i t ’s
entirely possible th a t someone m ight n o t be convinced by th e intuitive argum ent,
above. L e t’s see if we can make it a little m ore “rigorous” (th a t is, le t’s leave no
room for doubt).
We w ant to eventually show th a t (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2) = 3Z . For th e sake
of brevity, le t’s let A = 3Z + 1 and B = 3Z + 2. We w ant to show, then, th a t
A + B = 3Z . A technique th a t often comes in handy when attem p tin g to show th a t
one set equals an o th er is to show th a t th ey are b o th subsets of one another. T h a t
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is, we’ll show th a t A + B C 3 Z and 3Z C A + B .
F irst, suppose th a t x e A + B . T h en x = a + b, where a e 3 Z + 1 and b e 3 Z + 2,
so a = 3g + 1 for some integer q and b = 3k + 2 for some integer k. Therefore,
x = ( 3 g + l ) + (3&; + 2) = 3q + 3 k + 3 = 3(g + fc + l) , which is an elem ent of 3 Z , since
q, k, and 1, and therefore th e ir sum, are all integers. We have succeeded in showing
th a t any elem ent of A + B is an elem ent of 3 Z , so we have proved A + B C 3 Z .
W e’ll now a tte m p t to prove th a t 3Z C A + B . To th a t end, let y be an elem ent
of 3Z (th ere’s no reason n o t to call th is elem ent x, b u t we d o n ’t w ant to cause any
undue confusion and th ere are a lot of letters in th e alphabet!). T hen y — 3n for
some integer n. In order to show th a t y is also an elem ent of A + B , we need to show
th a t y can be expressed as th e sum of one elem ent from A and one elem ent from
B . T h a t is, we need to show th a t y = (3g + 1) + (3k + 2), for some integers q an d k.
Well, we can always rew rite 3n as 3(n — 1) + 3 = 3(n — 1) + 1 + 2, which is alm ost
w h at we w ant. B u t now, notice th a t y = 3n = 3(n — l) + l + 2 = 3n + 3(—l) + l + 2 =
(3n + 1) + (3(—1) + 2), and we see th a t y is an elem ent of A + B . Thus, we have
succeeded in showing th a t every elem ent of 3Z is also an elem ent of A + B . T h a t
is, 3 Z C A + B.
We m ay therefore conclude th a t A + B = 3Z, and our conjecture is proved.
How would th a t proof have appeared in a tex tbook? H ere’s one possibility.
P r o p o s i tio n . (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2) = 3Z.
Proof. Let 3g + 1 and 3k: + 2 be elem ents of 3Z + 1 and 3Z + 2, respectively.
T h en ( 3 g + l) + (3fc + 2) = 3(fc + g + l ) e 3 Z , so (3Z + l) + (3Z + 2) C 3Z. Conversely,
if 3n e 3Z, th e n 3n = [3(n —1) + 1] + [3(—1) + 2] e (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2), showing th a t
3Z C (3Z + 1) + (3Z + 2), an d th e proposition is proved.
W h at are th e m ain differences betw een these two proofs? W hich is th e “b e tte r”
proof? Is one m ore correct th a n th e other? In my m ind, these proofs are identical,
logically. T heir m ain difference is th a t th e first proof goes further in explaining each
of th e steps, som etim es even “talking you th ro u g h ” th e thought processes involved
in solving th e problem . In th is respect, th e first proof is “b e tte r” if you w ant to
know how and w hy, while th e second proof is best if you ju st w ant to be convinced
th a t th e proposition is true. In general, th e purpose of a proof is to convince you,
th e reader, th a t a statem en t is true. U nfortunately, in my opinion, th e raison d ’etre
of a proof is to convince, not necessarily to enlighten. I ’d like to suggest th a t we
w rite our proofs w ith b o th goals in m ind. A fter all, if we really w ant to know w h a t’s
going on, we w ant to know m ore th a t ju s t w hat is true; we also w ant to know why
things are tru e (knowing why things are tru e often helps us rem em ber th a t th ey are
tru e).

E x e rc ise s:
1. S tate and prove conjectured values of th e sums 3 Z + ( 3 Z + 1 ) an d ( 3 Z + 2 ) + 3Z.
2. Com plete th e addition tab le for 3Z, 3 Z + 1, and 3Z + 2.
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Math 761 (selected answers to the homework and other problems)
Proposition. The s e t 3Z is a g ro u p under integer addition.
Proof. We need to show that the four group axioms hold for 3Z (recall that 3Z =
{3z | z € Z}, so the statement “x is an element o f 3Z” means that x = 3a for some integer
a.). First, o f all, let’s confirm that the associative law holds. If 3a, 3b, and 3c are in 3Z
(notice that this means a, b, and c must be integers), then 3a + (3b + 3c) = (3a + 3b) + 3c,
since 3a, 3b, and 3c are all integers and addition is associative in Z. Therefore, addition
is associative in 3Z. (That is, the associativity o f addition in 3Z is inherited from the
associativity o f addition in Z). To see that 3Z is closed under addition, let 3a and 3b be
elements o f 3Z and note that 3a + 3b = 3(a + b), by the distributive law (in Z). But a and
b are integers, so 3(a + b) is an element o f 3Z. Thus, 3Z is closed under addition. Now,
we need to determine whether 3Z contains an identity element. It’s true that 0 + 3a =
3a + 0 = 3a for each 3a in 3Z, since 0 is the identity element o f Z and 3Z is a subset o f Z,
but we also need to show that 0 is an element o f 3Z. But 0 = 3(0), so 0 is an element of
3Z (since 0 is an integer), and we may conclude that 0 is the identity element o f 3Z. The
last property we need to confirm is the “inverse property.” It’s true that if 3a is an
element o f 3Z, then 3a + (-3a) = 0 = (-3a) + 3a, so (-3a) is the inverse o f 3a in the
integers but how do we know that -3a is an element o f 3Z? Well, -3a = 3(-a), and if a is
an integer, then so is -a, so -3a is, indeed, an element o f 3Z, and w e’ve been successful in
proving that every element o f 3Z has an inverse in 3Z. W e’ve now shown that all o f the
group axioms hold for 3Z under addition, so 3Z is a group under addition.
Notice that several o f the properties for 3Z follow directly from the fact that Z is a group
under addition. Specifically, the fact that addition was associative in 3Z was a direct
consequence o f the fact that the associative law held for all integers, and therefore must
hold for our specific subset o f Z. Also, the identity o f 3Z was the identity o f Z and the
inverse o f each element was just its inverse from Z. However, we still had to check that
the identity, the inverse o f each element, and the result o f every addition were in 3Z
(these are the local, or locational, properties).
Many of you noticed that the set {a + b i \ a , b e Z } is not a group under complex number
multiplication, since the element 0 = 0 + 0 / does not have an inverse (if such an inverse
a + bi existed, then w e’d have 0 = 0 (a + 6 /) = l, which is impossible, since 0 + 1 ).
However, many o f you also stated that the set {a + bi \ a, b e Z and a 2 + b2 + 0} is a
group under multiplication. First, notice that this set is the original set with 0 removed.
However, the set is still not closed under taking inverses, since 1 + 2/ is in the set, but
( 1 + 2 / ) ' 1 = ~ + =^i, which is clearly not in our set, since neither y nor ~
are integers.
Notice that we have to omit a lot o f the elements o f the set S = {a + bi \ a, b e Z} in order
to end up with a group. In particular, the only complex numbers in the set S that have
multiplicative inverses in S are 1,-1, /, and -/. The proof o f this fact is left to you.
We finish this handout with a discussion o f the importance o f understanding set notation.
Many of the group properties involve determining whether the set (which w e’re trying to
determine is, or isn’t, a group) contains certain elements (e.g. an identity, inverses for
each element o f the set, the “product” o f set elements). For example, suppose that we
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know that the set G is a group under its operation 0. Given an element a o f G, we define
the subset Sa = {a 0 g 0 a'1 \ g e G}. That is, Sa consists o f elements that can be
expressed as a 0 g 0 a '1 for some g in G, where the element a is always the same. That is,
if x, y, and z are elements o f G, then a 0 x 0 a '1, a 0 y 0 a '1, and a 0 z 0 a'1 are all elements
o f Sa. I ’m getting really tired o f writing the symbol 0, so I ’m now going to write xy to
denote x 0 y. Notice that we know that Sa is a subset o f G, since aga'1 will always be in
G whenever a and g (and thus g"1, too) are in the group G, which is defined to be closed
under its operation and under taking inverses.
As we decided in class, in order to determine whether Sa is a group under G’s operation,
we need only check that the following properties hold: (1) The identity o f G is in Sa. (2)
For each x in Sa, x '1 is in Sa, too (that is, Sa is closed under taking inverses). (3) For each
x an d y in Sa, xy is in Sa , too. Since each o f these properties involve elements being in Sa
, it’s important for us to know how to determine whether a given element is in Sa. By the
definition o f Sa, we know that an element X is in Sa if and only if X = aga4 for some g in
G. With this in mind, let’s proceed. First, let’s show that the identity o f G is in Sa. That
is, if e is the identity o f G, we need to find a g in G so that e = aga'1. How can we find
such a g? Let’s work backwards. Suppose we had found g. Then w e’d know that e =
aga'1, so we can solve for g by “multiplying” (actually, w e’re 0-ing) by a ' 1 and a on the
left and right sides o f each equation. Therefore, a ' 1ea = a'\aga~x)a = (a'1a)g(a'1a) =
ege = g, so w e’ve found that g = a ' 1ea = e. But by solving for g, we had to suppose that g
existed, and that’s part o f what w e’re trying to prove, so we need to make sure that this g
really works. Clearly, though, if g = e, then aga ' 1 = aea ' 1 = e, so the identity e is an
element o f Sa.
Now, let’s show that Sa is closed under taking inverses. To that end, suppose that x is an
element o f Sa. Then x = aga'1 for some g in G, so x ’ 1 = (aga'1)'1. But is x ' 1 in Sal It
might help to figure out exactly what (aga'1)'1 is. We know that (aga'1)'1 is the element b
o f G so that (aga'x)b = b(aga']) = e. But if b(aga']) = e, then b = agAa' 1 (to see this,
carefully solve the equation for b), which is an element o f Sa , since g ' 1 is in G.
Therefore, whenever x is in Sa , w e’ve shown that x" 1 is in Sa , too.
Finally, we need to show that Sa is closed under the operation o f G. If x and y are in Sa,
then x = aga'1 an d y = aha'1 for some g and h in G, so
xy = (aga'l)(aha'1) = ag(a'1a)ha'1 = a(gh)a~\
which is an element o f Sa , since g and h (and therefore gh) are in the group G. W e’ve
succeeded in showing, then, that Sa is closed under the operation o f G.
Since w e’ve shown that the set Sa satisfies the required properties, we may now conclude
that Sa is a group under the operation o f G.

Now, how would a “textbook”proof look?
Theorem . I f G is a group, a e G, and S = {aga'1 \ g e G}, then S is a group under the
operation o f G.

Proof Notice that if e is the identity o f G, then e = aea'1 e S. Similarly, if aga'1 is in S,
then (aga'1 )"’ = ag~la~1 is in S, since g ' 1 is an element o f the group G (as the inverse o f an
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element o f the group G). Finally, if a g a 1 and aha'1 are in S, then {agaA){ aha'1) = agha']
is in S, since gh is in G (as the product o f elements o f the group G). Therefore, S is a
subgroup o f G.

A definition is in order here, don't you think? A subgroup o f a group G is a subset o f G
which is itself a group under G’s operation. In order to prove the above Theorem, we
used the fact that the associativity law automatically holds in S, since it holds in all o f G.
Similarly, we didn’t need to check whether e satisfied the identity property, nor did we
need to check whether the elements o f S had inverses or satisfied the inverse property, as
these properties were already known to be true in the whole group G. To summarize, we
used the following Theorem, the proof o f which depends on the arguments o f this
paragraph.
Theorem. A subset S o f a group G is a subgroup o f G if and only if the identity o f G is in
S, S is closed under the operation o f G, and if the inverse o f each element of S is in S.
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Math 761 Notes on Cosets
April 29, 1996
We began by stating that / : Z§ —> D% was a homomorphism with /(0 ) = (1) and / ( l ) =
(123). From the fact that / was a homomorphism, we calculated /(2 ) = (132), /(3 ) =
(l),/(4 ) = (123), and /(5 ) = (132).

Below is the operation table for the range of / . If we consider / _1
the range we get another operation table.
{0,3} {1,4}
(123) (132)
+6
(1)
r
i
(132)
{0,3}
{0,3}
(123)
{1,4}
(1)
(1)
—*
(123) (123) (132)
{1,4} {1,4} {2,5}
(1)
(132) (132)
(123)
{2,5} {2,5} {0,3}
(1)

of each element of
{2,5}
{2,5}
{0,3}
{1,4}

The operation table for Z% can be rearranged with elements reordered according to their
images in D 3 under / . Consider coloring the reordered table so that two elements have the
same color if they have the same image in D$.
+6 0 1 2 3 4 5
+6 0 3 1 4 2 5
1
2
4
1
4
2
5
0 0
3
5
0
0
3
2
1 1 2 3 4 5 0
4
1
5
3
3
0
reorder
2 2 3 4 5 0 1
1
1
4
2
5
3
0
4
4
1
2
3 3 4 5 0 1 2
5
0
3
4 4 5 0 1 2 3
2
2
4
1
5
3
0
2
1
4
5 5 0 1 2 3 4
5
5
0
3
The operation table for the cosets of K where K = ker / .
+6
K
1+ K
2+K

K
K
1+ K
2+ K

1+ K
1+ K
2+ K
K

2+ K
2+ K
K
1+ K
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Math 761 Notes (cont.)
April 29, 1996
If g : D± —> U 8 is a homomorphism with g(H ) = 3 and
other values of g as follows:

5

(Ago) = 5, we can calculate the

g ( R 0)

= 1
g{Ri 8o) = g{R9o)g(R9o) = 5 -5 = 1
ff(A27o) = 3 ( A 9o) _1 = 5 " 1 = 5
g(V)
= g(H )g(R 180) = 3 -1 = 3
9(D)
= 9 ( H ) g ( R 9 o ) = 3 -5 = 7
g(D’)
= g(R 90 )g(H) = 5 -3 = 7

Below is the operation table for the range of g, which in this case is all of U8. If we
consider g~~l of each element of the range we get another operation table.
•8

1
CO

5
7

1 3
5 7
1 3
5 7
3 1 7
5
5 7 1 3
7 5 3 1
19 1

{Ago, A270}

{A go, A270}

{ H ,V }
{ R ,v }
{A o , Aiso}
{D,D<}

{A o , A is o }

{H ,V }

{D ,D '}

{A go, A270}

{H ,V }

{A o , A iso }

{A o , A is o }

{Ro, Also}
{ H ,V }

{A o , A is o }

{A go, A270}

{D,D>}

{ B ,V }

{A go, A270}

{D ,D '}
{D, D'}

{.D ,D ' }

{A go, A270}
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Math 761
Midterm exam #1
Please record your answers and their explanations on a separate sheet of paper.
This sheet is yours to keep.
You may, if necessary, use the fact(s) that the sets Z, Q, R, and C (the integers,
rational numbers, real numbers and complex numbers) are groups under addition.
and the nonzero elements of Q, R, and C, respectively, form multiplicative groups.
1. a) Explain how we know that there are no integer solutions to 3x = 8 (mod 90)
b) Find all integer s x so that 0 < x < 9 1 and 3x = 8 (mod 92).
(you may fin d it helpful to notice that 3-31 = 1 (mod 92).)
2. Write complete definitions o f the following phrases. That is, carefully describe
exactly what each phrase means.
a)

e is an identity o f the set S under the operation 0.

b) The operation 0 is associative on the set S.
c) The operation 0 is commutative on the set S.
d) In the group G, x' 1 = y.
e) The set S is a group under the operation *.
3.

As you might expect, y Z is defined to be the set { j z \ z e Z j .
a) Confirm that -j Z is a group under addition.
b) Is j Z a group under multiplication? Explain.

4.

a) Construct the multiplication table for {4, 8 , 12, 16} in Z 2 0 .
b) Determine whether {4, 8 , 12, 16} is a group under multiplication (mod 20).

5. The following operation table is not a group table. Which properties fail? Explain.
You may use the fact that you know that this isn’t a group table in your explanation.
*

a

b

c

d

e

f

a
b

a

b

c

d

e

b
c

c
d

d
a

e

c

f
b

f
a
e

d

d

e

e

e

f

f

f
a

f
b
e

f
a
c
b

c
a
d

b
d
c
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Math 761
Midterm #1 - take home portion, Due Friday, March

8

Be sure to justify your responses to the following problems. You may talk to Brad
and Steve about these problems, and you may use your book and class notes, but
please work alone.
1. The set {e, a, b, c, d} is a group under the operation which is given in the table below.
Unfortunately, I only had time to copy down part o f the table. Fill out the rest o f the
table and check to see that we get a group. Explain how you know that your choice
for each entry is the only possibility. Then use Exploring Small Groups to confirm
that you have, indeed, created a group table.
* e
e e
a
b
c
d

a b c d
b
e
c d e
d
a b

2. Fill out all possible operation tables which make the set {<?, a, b, c} a group. You
may assume that e is the identity o f each group. In the process, be sure to explain
your decisions and prove that the set is a group under each of the specified
operations. You may use the computer to check the associative property, but you
must justify all o f the other properties “by hand”. You don’t have to provide a
formula for the operation, but explain each decision you make while filling out the
table. For example, explain how we know that the first row and column is the same
for each possible table. What are the possibilities for a 2? Are there any that don’t
work (that is, that w on’t allow the set to be a group)? In a particular table, once
you’ve “chosen” a2, does this “force” some (or all) o f the other values in the table?
Why can’t we have be = b l Is it possible to fill out the table so that the set is a
nonabelian group?

3. Recall that the funny addition operation * on the set R o f real numbers is defined by
a*b = a+b+ab. Show that * satisfies the associative property .

4. Prove o f disprove: If x, y, and z are elements o f a group G, then (xyz' 1) ' 1 = xAy Az.

5. Prove or disprove: If x, y, and z are elements o f a group G, then (xyzA)A = zyAxA.
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Math 761
Take-home exam #2

due Monday, April 29

1. Are the following statements true, or false? Prove or find a counterexample.
a) If G is an abelian group, then the set {g e G \ g 2 = e} is a subgroup o f G.
b) If G is a group, then the set {g e G | g 2 = e) is a subgroup o f G.
2. Find the subgroup generated by the given element(s) in the specified group G.
a) The subgroup o f S 4 generated by (134).
b) The subgroup o f Ss generated by (124)(35).

c) The subgroup o f S 4 generated by (14) and (124). Additional question: Is
there an element a in S 4 so that the subgroup you just found is generated by
a ? Explain.
3. Let the function/: Z —» Z 4 be defined by j{x) = x (mod 4).
a) Show th a t/is a homomorphism. Is/one-to-one? Is/o n to ?
Recall that the kernel o f a homomorphism f: G —> G' is
the set ker(/) = {g e G \g 2 = e'}, where e' is the identity o f G'.

b) Find the kernel o ff

4. Suppose f: G -» G' is a group homomorphism.
a)

Prove that ker(/) is a subgroup o f G.

b)

Prove that if g is an element o f G, then (/(g ) ) ’ 1 = /(g ’').

c)

Prove that /(G ) is a subgroup o f G'. Recall that/(G ) ={/(g) | g e G}.

d)

Prove that if G is an abelian group, then/ (G) is an abelian group.

5. Let K be the kernel o f the group homomorphism f: G —> G' and suppose a and b are
elements o f G.
a) Show that if b is in the set aK = {ak \ k e K}, then/(fr) = a.
b)

Show that if j{a) =J{b), then there exists an element &in ATso that b = ak by
following the steps below.
i)

First, explain how we know that there is a &in G so that b - ak.

ii) Now show that the k you found in part i) is in K .
c) Explain why we may now conclude that aK = {x e G \f{x) = f(a)}, and
therefore fia ) =J{b) if and only if aK = bK.
6

. Prove that i f / i s a group homomorphism, th e n /is one-to-one if and only if
ker (/)={e}.
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M A TH 761
Final Exam
Friday, M ay 10

N A M E ____________________________________

1. Provide complete definitions for the following terms and phrases. Be sure to explain any other
wise undefined terms.
a) associative operation
b) commutative operation
c) group
d) subgroup
e) homomorphism
f) isomorphism
g) the order of the element a in the group G
2. Carefully define the following groups, being sure to include the operation under which these
sets are groups.
a) Zn
b) U n
3. Describe the following sets in words AND using set notation.
a) the kernel of the group homomorphism
b) A

+

c) A

*

f

:G

—* G ' .

B (where A and B are subsets of the integers)
B (where A and B are subsets of the group G, under the operation *)

4. Let a be the permutation of {1, 2,3,4} defined by 1 —►2,2 —> 3, 3 —» 1,and 4 —>4, and let (5
be the permutation defined by 1 —>4, 2 —>3, 3 —> 2, and4 —> 1.Find the order of a(32 a ^ 1.
5. Let / : Z —> 2Z be defined by f ( z ) = 2 z.
a) Determine

whether / is a homomorphism.

b) Determine

whether / is one-to-one.

c) Determine

whether / is onto.

d) Determine

whether Z is isomorphicto2Z.

6. Recall that if g is an element of G, then the cyclic subgroup of G generated by g is defined to
be the set (g ) = {gn \ n € Z}.
a) How does the order of (g) compare to the order of g l Provide a brief explanation.
b) If G has finite order and g is an element of G, can g have infinite order? Explain.
c) Recall that Lagrange’s Theorem states that if H is a subgroup of a finite group G, then the
order of H is a divisor of the order of G. With this in mind, finish the following statement:
Lagrange’s (other) Theorem : If g is an element of a finite group G. then the order of g is
Provide a brief explanation of why the Theorem is true.
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7. Let G be a group and define the set S as follows: S = { x € G \ x A = a;}
a) Carefully state what it means for a to be in S.
b) Carefully state what it means for b not to be in S
c) Suppose G = Dz and S is defined as above. Note that the table for D 3 is at the bottom of
the page.
(i) Is (123) in 5?
(ii) Is (13) in 5?
d) Now let G be an arbitrary group. Is S a subgroup of G1 If so, prove it. If not, whichof the
properties fail? Under what circumstances will S be a subgroup of G? Prove that, under
these circumstances, S is a subgroup of G.
8.

Find the cyclic subgroup of Z 15 generated by 5.
a) List the left cosets of 77 in
Z 15 ,where77 is the subgroup you found above.
b) Is 77 a normal subgroup of Z 15 ?Explain.
c) Provide the table for the quotient group Zis/77.

9. Let 77 = {(1), (25)} and G = {( 1 ), (245), (254), (24), (25), (45)}. The table for G is provided
below for your viewing pleasure.
a) Confirm that 77 is a subgroup of G
b) Find the left cosets of 77 in G.
b) Find the right cosets of {(1), (25)} in G.
c) Carefully compute (24)77(254)77.
d) Is 77 a normal subgroup of G? Explain.
10. E xtra credit:
a) Is Z4 a subgroup of Z?
b) Is Z4 a subgroup of Zs?
c) When working on the problem “do the elements a and b commute?”, your friend says “I
think that a does, but b doesn’t.” Can your friend be right? How do you respond to their
comment?

(1)
(245)
(254)
(24)
(25)
(45)

(1)
(123)
(132)
(12)
(13)
(23)

(1)

(245)

(254)

(24)

(25)

(45)

(1)
(245)
(254)
(24)
(25)
(45)

(245)
(254)
(1)
(45)
(24)
(25)

(254)
(1)
(245)
(25)
(45)
(24)

(24)
(25)
(45)
(1)
(245)
(254)

(25)
(45)
(24)
(254)
(1)
(245)

(45)
(24)
(25)
(245)
(254)
(1)

(1)

(123)

(132)

(12)

(13)

(23)

(1)
(123)
(132)
(12)
(13)
(23)

(123)
(132)
(1)
(23)
(12)
(13)

(132)
(1)
(123)
(13)
(23)
(12)

(12)
(13)
(23)
(1)
(123)
(132)

(13)
(23)
(12)
(132)
(1)
(123)

(23)
(12)
(13)
(123)
(132)
(1)
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•
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•

Problems, February 12: Definition o f group

•

Introduction to Exploring Small Groups, March 8

•

Guiding questions, April 11

•

Problems, April 22

•

Final assignment

•

Review problems, May 6
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M ath 761. A bstract Algebra
Problem Sheet 1
Jan u ary 17, 1996

1

N u m b e r T h e o ry

Abstract algebra has roots in number theory, in geometry, and in methods of solving equa
tions. The first few assignments are designed to explore these roots. Perhaps the most
famous number theory problem is Fermat’s last theorem1 (or, more accurately, Fermat’s
conjecture) which states that there are no non-trivial2 integer solutions to the equation
x n + yn = zn when n is an integer greater than 2. Investigation of this question alone has
led to incredible achievements in the development of the fields of algebra, number theory,
and algebraic geometry. We cannot consider the question here, but instead consider related
questions.
1. Euler proved in 1770 that x 3 + y 3 = z 3 has no non-trivial integral solutions. In order
to gain an understanding of this problem, we might first ask whether x 3 + y 3 is ever
divisible by 3? If so, what can you conclude about x and y. If not, why not?
Hint: A useful way to explore this equation is through modular arithmetic, sometimes
called arithmetic of remainders. We say a = b mod n if a and b have the same
remainder when divided by n. For example, 3 = 24 mod 7 because both have a
remainder of 3 when divided by 7.
2. Investigate solving equations of the form ax
= b
modn for n = 5and n
=6, where
a and b are constants. For example, does 3x = 5 mod 6 havea solution? Try several
different values of a and b. Be sure that you have found ALL solutions. Summarize
your results.

2

3. Investigate a + x = b mod n for n = 5 and n

= 6.

4. Investigate x 2 + 3x + 2 = 0 mod n for n = 5

and

n = 6.

A rith m e tic w ith se ts
1. If A = {1,3,4} and B = {2,6}, can A + 1 make sense in a way that pays attention to
arithemetic of integers? W hat about A + B , A B , 2A, and A + A? W hat about 2Z
and 2Z + 1, where Z is the set of integers? Are there any choices to be made? If so,
what are the advantage and disadvantages of each alternative. If not, why not.
2. Now suppose A is the set of even integers and B is the set of odd integers. W hat can
you say about A + B? A + A? Try all possibilities. Describe, as completely as you
can, arithmetic with these sets.
3. Compare the sets 3Z, 3Z T 1, 3Z T 2, 3Z + 3, 3Z + 4, 3Z T 5, 3Z 4- 6, and 3Z T 7.
Describe, as completely as you can, arithmetic with these sets.

1At the joint meeting of the AMS and the MAA in Orlando last week, Andrew Wiles of Princeton
University gave a series of lectures on his proof of this theorem.
2There are obvious solutions if x, y, or z are zero, but as these solutions are not very interesting, they
are called “trivial.”
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M A T H 761
A s s ig n m e n t # 1
D u e M o n d a y , J a n u a r y 22

1. R ead pages 3-4, om ittin g th e last p arag rap h of page 4, an d pages 7-9 (on
m odular arith m etic). In p articu lar, carefully read th ro u g h th e proof of the
Division A lgorithm (on page 4) u n til you feel th a t you’d be able to explain it
to someone else.
(a) R ew rite th e proof of th e division algorithm , being sure to fill in all of the
details th a t you feel are missing.
(b) E xplain th e W ell-O rdering Principle, in a way th a t a high school stu d ent
would understand.
2. W ork th ro u g h problem # 2 from th e first handout. C om pare th e cases n = 5
and n = 6, using a t least 4 different choices for a an d b. S tate a conjecture
based on w hat you find. A re th ere generalizations th a t seem to be tru e for all
n, a, and 6?
3. W ork th ro u g h problem # 3 from th e han d o u t. C om pare th e cases n = 5 and
n = 6, using a t least 4 different choices for a and b. S tate a conjecture based
on w hat you find. Are th ere generalizations th a t seem to be tru e for all n, a,
and bl
4. W ork th ro u g h problem # 4 from th e handout. C om pare th e cases n = 5 and
n = 6, S tate a conjecture based on w hat you find. A re th ere generalizations
th a t seem to be tru e for all n?
5. Investigate th e values of n 3 (m od 6). Make and prove a conjecture based on
your “d a ta ” .
6. Do # 2 7 on page 19 of th e tex tbook. Explain how you know you’ve found all n
th a t satisfy th e specified condition.
7. W o r k o n , b u t d o n ’t t u r n in . Prove th a t x 3 + y 3 is divisible by 3 if an d only
if x + y is divisible by 3.

R ead th e rest of pp. 3-13 (up to, b u t not including, equivalence relations).
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Math 761-Spring 96
Group problems for Monday, February 12 (and beyond)

^

Definition of group (and its consequences)
As we defined in class, a set S, along with an operation 0, is a group if the following properties
are satisfied:
1. For all a and b in S, a 0 b is in S.
We then say that S is closed under the operation 0.
2. For all a, b, and c in S, (a 0 b) 0 c = a 0 (b 0 c).
We then say that 0 is associative on S.
3. There exists an element e in S so that e 0 a = a 0 e = afor each a in S.
We then say that e is the identity element of S.
4. For each a in S, there is an element a 1in S so that a 0 a' 1 = a' 1 0 a = e (where e is the identity
element of S). We say that a 1 is the inverse of a in S.

Problems for group discussion:
1. Determine whether the subset {2,4,6,8} of

is a group under multiplication (in Z )0).

In earlier problems with operation tables, we noticed that in some rows and columns of some
tables, not all elements of the set occurred. For example, consider the multiplication table for Zi0.
Several of the rows and columns have repeated elements, so some elements have to be left out;
for example, 1 is not in the “2 row”.
2. In an earlier problem, you were asked to determine whether ab = ac implies b = c for a
variety of sets and associated operations. Is this cancellation law true for groups? That is, if
S’is a group under the operation 0 and a 0 b = a 0 c, then is it necessarily true that b = cl In
other words, is it possible to cancel the a from both sides of the equation?
3. The above version of the cancellation law is often called the left cancellation law, since the a
is canceled on the left. Determine whether the right cancellation law is true for groups.
4. What do the right and left cancellation laws imply about whether the rows and columns in a
group’s operation table have any repeated elements?
5. Show that each row and column in a group’s operation table contains every group element
exactly once. For example, to show that the element c occurs in the “a row”, we need to
show that the equation a 0 x = c has a solution in the group. Show that this is true, explain
why it shows that c is in the “a row”, and show that c also occurs in the “a column”.
6. Suppose that (S, 0) is a group with identity e. If a 0 x = a for some a and x in S , what can
you conclude about x? What if x 0 a = a ? That is, what kinds of elements can act like an
identity in a group?
7. How many inverses can an element in a group have? That is, if a is an element of a group S
with operation 0 and identity e, and ifx 0 a = e o r a 0 x = e, what can you conclude about x?
8. If S is a group with operation 0 and identity e, and a and b are elements of S so that a' 1 = b'1,
what can you conclude about a and bl

Additional terminology:
Let S be a group under the operation 0. If a 0 b = b 0 a for all a and b in S, then we say that 0 is
commutative on S and that S is an abelian group. If S is not abelian, we say that S is nonabelian.
9. Show that the “mixed” cancellation law is true for abelian groups. That is, prove that if the
groups, with operation 0, is abelian and if a 0 b = c 0 a, then a = c.
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M ath 761
Introduction to the Exploring Small Groups software package
1. Sit down at one o f the IBM clones (one o f the planets) in the M227 computer lab. If
the machine isn’t on, turn it on. If the screen saver is on, “jiggle” the mouse.
(Note: if you’re working on Jupiter, you might need to press the spacebar in order
to “wake it up”.)

2. Start up Exploring Small Groups. If you’re in Windows, double-click the “Groups”
icon in the Mathematics Software folder.
If you’re in DOS, type
c d . . \m a t h \g r o u p s \e s g followed by <RETURN> (or <Enter>), then type
s t a r t followed by <RETURN>. I f this doesn’t work, type e s g then <RFTURN>.
3. At some point, it will be good to read the information provided when you start up the
program, but today, w e’ll hit <RETURN> until w e’re at the Table Generation
Menu, which I ’ll usually refer to as the Main Menu. From the Main Menu, we can
choose to create our own operation table, or use one o f the “canned” tables which the
software “knows”. If you want to exit the program, you need to get back to this
menu. In order to do that, hit the F10 button until the computer asks you if you
want to return to the table generation menu. Typey and you will be back at this
menu. You can then type 5 to exit the program.

4. W e’ll first try some o f the tables the software already knows.
<RETURN> to see the “commutative loop”.

Type

34 then

The operation table now appears before you, along with a variety o f commands that you
can use. Your screen should look something like:
1. Check Commutative Property
2. Check Associative Property
3. Check Identities and Inverses
4. Check Cancellation Property
*

A
B
C
D
E
F

A
A
B
C
D
E
F

B
B
C
D
E
F
A

C
c
D
A
F
B
E

D
D
E
F
A
C
B

E
E
F
B
C
A
D

5. Check Subset Closure
6 . Check Group Axioms
7. Table Alterations

F
F
A
E
B
D
C

It’s fairly easy to use the software, but you’ve got to be sure to read the instructions on
the screen. Sometimes, you’ve got to hit the spacebar (or some other button) to continue.
In addition, you often have the choice o f stepping through various calculations. For
example, let’s check to see if the associative law holds for the set {A, B, C, D, E, F}
(notice that it’s not too hard to see that the set is closed under the operation, that A is the
identity o f the set, and that A ' 1 = A, B ' 1 = F, C 1 = C, D ' 1 = D , F 1= E, and F ] = B).
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5. Choose to check the associative property by typing 2. You can choose to step
through the calculations, or just check to see whether the property holds, or not.
6

. O f course, if you’re just interested in whether or not the set is a group under the given
operation, we can just check the group axioms by typing 6 . Not surprisingly, the
associative law fails to hold.

7. One o f the nice features o f ESG is that we can change the table (the order o f elements
and the names o f elements). To see this, type 7. When the table alterations menu
appears, type 2 so that we can rename the elements. Replace the elements A, B, C, D,
E, and F with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (in that order). Be sure to hit <Retum> after each
new element is entered, then type N if the new elements are entered as you intended.
8 . Now, we want to return to the main menu. Type F10 a few times, then Y, when
asked whether you want to go back to the table generation menu. Then, type 3 so that
we can define an operation table ourselves. I want to look at the operation table for
C/ 9 under multiplication (mod 9), so we need to create a table for {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 }.
Therefore, type 6 , since our set has 6 elements. We then want to change the name o f
the elements, so we can tell that C/9 is, in fact, the set w e’re talking about. Do this,
then fill out the rest o f the table. Have the computer check that this is, indeed, a
group. Having done this, you will be able to use the Group properties menu.
9. By choosing the Powers and orders option (#1), you can compute the powers o f
elements much more quickly than is possible by hand. Use this option to compute the
powers and orders o f each element o f the group. What are the different orders o f the
elements o f the group?

10. Get back to the main menu and choose the Sample Library (#1), then choose to view
the operation table for C/2 0 . Again, find the order o f each element, after checking that
the group axioms hold, so that we may gain access to the Group properties menu.
While you’re doing this, find the sets {g2 \ g e C/2 0 }, {g3 I g e C/2 0 }, and {g4 \
g e C/2 0 }, the collections o f squares, cubes, and fourth powers in C/2 0 .
11. Use the table alterations menu (option #7) to focus on the set {g2 \ g e U2 o}. Accept
the “restrict to a closed subset” option to see whether the set is closed under the
operation. After this is done, hit the F10 key to get back to the group properties
menu. Check to see whether the group axioms hold. That is, determine whether
{g2 I g e G) is a group.
12. In order to check whether {g3 1g e C/2 0 } and {g4 | g e U2o} are groups, you’ll have to
repeat steps 10 and 11. In particular, you’ll need to get back to the main menu, then
choose the operation table for C/2 0 , then restrict the table to the specified set, etc.
There is no better way to learn how to use Exploring Small Groups than to just start
using it. The following exercises have been designed with this in mind.

Problems
1.

Determine whether the subset {AD, BC, ~A, ~B, ~C, ~D} (of set #30 in the
Sample Library) is a group. By choosing the table alterations menu (option 7),
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then the “restrict to a closed subset option (4)” we can choose to focus only on the
above listed elements.
2.

List any o f the following elements that exist: an identity for the above set and
each element which has an
inverse (with its inverse).

3.

Create an operation table for the set {e, a, b} so that the set, along with the
operation, forms a group (I’ll bet you’ve already guessed which element we
should choose to be the identity). While it’s possible to create the table without
the use o f the software, I ’d recommend using the computer to check the
associative law, at least. In order to do this, choose the user defined table
command from the main menu, then ask for a table for a 3 element set. Accept
the option to change the names o f the elements so that your table starts off
looking like the one below.
*

e

a

b

e
a
b

In determining how to fill out the table, recall that a number o f group properties
come directly from the operation table. For instance, we know what to put in each
entry o f the e row and column, right? Be sure to explain each o f your choices for
table entries. When you’re done, check to see whether you’ve created a group, or
not.
4.

Once you’ve created a group, determine whether it is possible to make any
different choices and still end up with a group? Explain.

5.

For each o f the following group operation tables, determine whether the set
{g2 1g e G} is a group (follow 11 and 12 above). Does there seem to be a way to
predict when the set will be a group? Check tables 0602, 0802, 0804, 0901 ,0902,
and 1204 from the Group Library and 12 and 18 from the Sample Library.
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M ath 761
Guiding Questions
April 11, 1996
You now have many examples o f groups: permutation groups, dihedral groups, the
groups Z„ and Un, groups involving matrices, and also groups involving the integers,
rational, real, and complex numbers. In order to understand these groups, it is useful to
ask:
What are the easiest groups to describe and understand?
For these groups, and especially for the more complicated groups, it is useful to break the
groups down into smaller pieces. We can ask:
What are all the subgroups o f a given group?
Some o f you have noticed that the subgroup o f S4 generated by (1432) looked a lot like
Z 4 . We might ask whether it is essentially the same as Z 4 . Or we might ask the

following more general question:
Given a group (or a subgroup o f a group), is it “essentially the sam e” as
another more fam iliar group?
In order to show that two groups are essentially the same, we must set up a
correspondence between them. Such a correspondence can be given by a function which
maps one group to the other.
Can we specify a function which shows that two groups are essentially the
same?
But there must be more than just a correspondence between the elements of the two
groups. The function must also show a relationship between the operations o f the two
groups.
What properties must such functions have in order to show a relationship
between the group operations?
When groups are not essentially the same, they might still have important similarities. So
given two groups, we might ask:
Given a function which maps one group to another, what kind o f
relationship does the function establish between the arithmetic o f the two
groups?
This last question sounds quite abstract, but in fact it is just a generalization o f the
question, “How is addition in Z related to addition in Zn?”
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Math 761
Problems to work on the week of April 22
Suppose that G and G' are groups under the operations * and
respectively. Recall that
a function f: G —» G' satisfying the property that for all x an d y in G ,/x * y ) = /x ) * 'fly), is
called a (group) homomorphism. I f / i s also one-to-one and onto (or, as the French are
wont to say, injective and surjective), then we say th a t/is an isomorphism and that G is
isomorphic to G'. We further d e fin e /G ) = {f[g) \ g e G} to be the image of G under /
(That is ,/G ) is the set o f all possible outputs from/ arising from inputs in G).
The kernel o f / i s defined to be the set {g e G | / g ) = e'}, where e' is the identity o f G'
and is often abbreviated as ker(/). Note also that, even though the kernel typically refers
to a homomorphism, w e’ll use the word to denote the elements o f G which/ sends to e'
even i f / i s not a homomorphism.
1. Determine whether the following functions are group homomorphisms. Which, if
any, are isomorphisms?
a) / Z 5 —» Zio defined b y /x ) = x (mod 10).
b) / Z 5 —» Z 5 defined b y /x ) = x2.
c) /: I >3 —» D 3 defined b y /x ) = x2.
d) /: Zg —» Zg defined b y /x ) = 2 x.
e) / : Z —» Z 5 defined b y /x ) = x (mod 5).
f) / Z —» 2Z defined b y /x ) = 2x.
2. For which o f the a b o v e /is ker(/) a subgroup o f the domain of/?
3. Partially definef Z& -» D3 b y /0 ) = (1) a n d /1 ) = (123). In order th a t/b e a
homomorphism, how should we d e fin e /2 ) = / l +1)? / 3 ) ? / 4 ) ? / 5 ) ? / 6 ) ?
4. Suppose/ : G -» G ' is a group homomorphism and g is an element o f G.
a) Prove that if n is a positive integer, th e n /g " ) = f(g)n.
b) Prove that if n is an integer (not necessarily positive), th e n /g ”) = / g ) ”.
c) I f g is an element o f G and the order o fg is 6 , must the order o f / g ) be 6 , as
well? Hint: see 1. d) above. W hat can you say about the order o f /g ) ?
5. For each o f the following groups G, determine whether the function/ G —> G,
defined b y / x ) = x 2 is a homomorphism. For which, if any, G is / a n isomorphism?
a) G = Z.
b) G = Z;
c) G = Z (
d) G = D
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Math 761
Problems to work on the week of April 22
6

. Use Exploring Small Groups to find all o f the subgroups o f Z>3 and D 4. Note that
while many o f the subgroups o f a given group are generated by a single element,
some groups have subgroups which are generated by more than one element. For
example, {(1), (12), (34), (12)(34)} is a subgroup o f S 4 but it is not generated by a
single element o f S 4. It is, however, generated by (12) and (34). Make a conjecture
about the order o f any subgroup o f a finite group.

7. Suppose G is a finite group, H is a subgroup o f G, and a is an element o f G. Recall
that aH is defined to be the set {ah \ h e H }. In this context, we call aH the left coset
o f H containing a.
a) Explain why it makes sense to say that “aH contains a.” Therefore, every
element o f G is in at least one left coset o f H.
b)

Show that \aH\ = j/7| by showing that if x ^ y , then ax ^ ay.Therefore, every
left coset o f //h a s |77j elements.

c)

Show that c is in aH if and only if cAa is in H.

d)

Suppose that c is in aH n bH. Show that aH = bH by showing that a 'lb is in
H. Therefore, if left cosets overlap, they are identical. Therefore, every
element o f G is in at most one left coset o f H.

e) W e’ve thus shown that every element o f G is in exactly one left coset o f H
and that each left coset has \H\ elements. That is, the left cosets o f / / i n G
“partition” G into disjoint, equal size pieces. Explain how we may now
conclude that \aH\ is a divisor |G|.
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Math 761.
Final assignment.
One o f the central tenets o f this class has been that you, the students, should come to
some personal conviction and some group consensus about definitions, questions and
answers. One consequence o f this approach has been that sometimes consensuses have
come slowly and sometimes they haven’t come at all. Still, in order to participate in
discussions about the ideas in this course, it is important to reach consensus on many o f
the basic facts.
The following activities are designed to bring the class toward greater consensus. They
will help you prepare for the final exam and will also help Steve and Brad make up the
final exam. In the activities below, you are asked to write a list o f questions. Some of
the questions you write will appear on the final.
Responses to each o f the following activities are due at the last class meeting. During
that class we will discuss and consolidate your responses.
1. Write a list o f questions about “basic facts” that you believe everyone who completes
this course should know. These questions might take one o f the following forms:
What is _ _ _ _ _ ?
What is meant b y _________ ?
How many w ay s__________ ?
How do y o u __________ ?
Include answers for each o f these questions.
Example:
Q: What is Z„?
A: You decide. [Did you think we might slip and give an answer?]

2. Come up with a list o f questions about the big ideas o f the course. These questions
should necessarily be more general (and abstract) than the questions above.
Example:
Q: Why do the rules for exponents make sense? Are the any differences
between positive, negative, and zero exponents? W hat assumptions must
be made in order to begin? Explain.
A: Again, you decide.
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M ath 761. A b stract A lgebra
R eview P rob lem s
M ay 6, 1996
1. From your take-home exams, it seems that some students are unclear about proper
use of set notation. Determine which of the following item s are the same as which
others. Assume G is a group and e is the identity.
(a) {g £ G | g2 = e)
(b) { g2 \ g e G}
(c) {x | x £ G, x 2 = e}
(d) h £ G where h 2 = e
(e) g2 where g £ G
(f) { k 2 \ k £ G, k2 = e}
(g) { x 2 = e | x £ G}
(h) { g2 £ G | g2 = e}
(i) The squares of the elements in G.
(j) The elements in G whose squares are the identity.
(k) The squares of the elements in G whose squares are the identity.
(1) An element in G whose square is the identity
(m) The square of an element in G.
2. You should find that you know how to do each of the following problems, once you
understand what the question is asking.
(a) Let H be the subgroup of S'4 generated by (1432). Find the left cosets of H in
S 4 . How many should there be? Is H a normal subgroup?
(b) Make an operation table

for the quotient group ^ 1 2 /(9 ) -

(c) Compute the left cosets of (4) in Ui§. Is the subgroup normal? Why or why not?
If so, make an operation table for the quotient group.
(d) In a group of order 18, what are the possible orders of elements in the group?
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U n i v e r s i t y

o f

N e w

H a m p s h i r e

Office of Sponsored Research
111 Service Building
51 College Road
Durham, New Hampshire 03824-3585
(603) 862-2000
(603) 862-3716
(603) 862-3750
(603)862-3564

P roposals & A wards
A ccounting
D irector
Fax

March 20,1996
Mr. Brad Findell
Mathematics
Kingsbury Hall
Campus Mail

IRB Protocol #1694 -

Learning in Abstract Algebra

Dear Mr. Findell:
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research has reviewed the
protocol for your project as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46, Subsection
46.101 (b)(2). Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. If you decide to
make any changes in your protocol, you must submit the requested changes to the IRB for review and
approval prior to any data collection from human subjects.
The protection of human subjects is an ongoing process for which you hold primary responsibility. In
receiving IRB approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the project in accordance with the ethical
principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects in research as described in 'The Belmont
Report." Additional information about other pertinent Federal and university policies, guidelines, and
procedures is available in the UNH Office of Sponsored Research.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to the IRB upon project completion unless you
experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation of human subjects.
Please report these promptly to this office.
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact Kara Eddy, Regulatory Compliance
Officer (for the IRB), at 862-2003. Please refer to the IRB # above in all future correspondence related
to this project. We wish you success with the research.
Sincerely,

Kathryn B. Cataneo, Executive Director
Research Administration
(for the IRB)
KBC: ke
Enclosure
cc:

Karen Graham (advisor), Mathematics
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LEARNING IN ABSTRACT ALGEBRA
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Learning in Abstract Algebra is a dissertation in mathematics education. The aim o f the
dissertation is to describe how students think about the concepts in abstract algebra. It is
hoped that this dissertation will lead to better teaching and learning in undergraduate
mathematics.
You may participate in this Study in any, all, or none o f the following ways:
•
•
•
•

by
by
by
by

allowing copies o f your written work to be included as data;
allowing your discussions to be audiotaped during regular classtime;
allowing your discussions to be videotaped during regular classtime; or
participating in videotaped interviews with the researcher.

Because the interviews will require time outside o f class, you will be paid $6/hour for
that time. Approximately four interviews o f about one hour each will be scheduled
during the semester.
Many students who participate in research o f this type typically find the process to be
helpful in their own learning. They benefit because in order to communicate with the
researcher and with other students, they reflect upon and deepen their understandings of
the mathematical concepts involved.

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND RESPOND AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE.
1 .1 understand that the use o f human subjects in this project has been approved by the
UNH Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection o f Human Subjects in
Research.
2 . 1 understand the scope, aims, and purposes o f this research project and the procedures
to be followed and the expected duration o f my participation.
3 . 1 have received a description o f any potential benefits that may be accrued from this
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4 . 1 understand that my consent to participate in this research is entirely voluntary, and
that my refusal to participate will have no effect on my grade in Math 761.
5 . 1 further understand that if I consent to participate, I may discontinue or modify my
participation at any time with no effect on my grade in Math 761.
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6 . 1 confirm that no coercion o f any kind was used in seeking my participation in this
research project.
7 . 1 understand that if I have any questions pertaining to the research or my rights as a
research subject, I have the right to call Dr. Van Osdol (862-2690) or the UNH Office o f
Sponsored Research (862-2000) and be given the opportunity to discuss such questions in
confidence.
8 . 1 understand that I will be paid $6/hour for participation in interviews to be conducted
outside o f classtime. I further understand that there will be no financial compensation for
other participation.
9 . 1 understand that anonymity and confidentiality o f all data records associated with my
participation in this research, including my identity, will be fully maintained to the best
o f the researcher’s ability.
10. I understand that data from this study may be used in presentations for audiences of
researchers and teachers.
11. I agree to respect the confidentiality and anonymity o f the other participants to the
best o f my ability
1 2 .1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose o f this research project and
its risks and benefits for me as stated above.

I , _________________________, CONSENT to participate in this research project in the
following ways. (Initial all that apply.)
by
by
by
by

allowing copies o f my written work to be included as data;
allowing my discussions to be audiotaped during regular classtime;
allowing my discussions to be videotaped during regular classtime;
participating in a videotaped interview with the researcher.

I , _________________________, DECLINE to participate in this research project.

Signature o f Student

Date
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LEARNING IN ABSTRACT ALGEBRA
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR USE OF VIDEO DATA
Learning in Abstract Algebra is a dissertation in mathematics education. The aim o f the
dissertation is to describe how students think about the concepts in abstract algebra. It is
hoped that this dissertation will lead to better teaching and learning in undergraduate
mathematics.
Data collected as part o f this research project will be held strictly confidential. I will use
videotapes and audiotapes primarily to develop written transcripts. When using excerpts
from these transcripts in research papers and presentations, I will use pseudonyms to
protect your anonymity. When using actual videotape rather than transcripts in a
research presentation, however, it is not always possible to maintain anonymity. Thus it
is important that I request specific permission for such use o f video.

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND RESPOND AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE WILLING TO ALLOW USE OF VIDEO DATA.
1 .1 understand that the use o f human subjects in this project has been approved by the
UNH Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection o f Human Subjects in
Research.
2 . 1 understand the scope, aims, and purposes o f this research project and the procedures
to be followed and the expected duration o f my participation.
3 . 1 have received a description o f any potential benefits that may be accrued from this
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4 . 1 understand that my consent to the use o f video in presentations is entirely voluntary,
and that my refusal to participate will have no effect on my grade in Math 761.
5 . 1 further understand that if I consent to the use o f video in presentations, I may
withdraw my consent at any time with no effect on my grade in Math 761.
6 . 1 confirm that no coercion o f any kind was used in seeking my consent to the use o f
video in presentations.
7 . 1 understand that if I have any questions pertaining to the research or my rights as a
research subject, I have the right to call Dr. Van Osdol (862-2690) or the UNH Office of
Sponsored Research (862-2000) and be given the opportunity to discuss such questions in
confidence.
8 . 1 understand that there will be no financial compensation for my consent to the use o f
video in presentations.
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9. I understand that any video data from this study may be used in presentations for
audiences o f researchers and teachers.
1 0 .1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose o f this research project and
its risks and benefits for me as stated above.

I , _________________________ , CONSENT to the use in presentations o f video o f me
gathered as part o f this research project.

I , _________________________ , DO NOT GIVE CONSENT to the use in presentations of
video o f me gathered as part o f this research project.

Signature o f Student

Date
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